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Abstract 
 
The study is about safety rule revision with hierarchical and risk-based approaches in the 
Norwegian railway system. The two approaches represent a change in the rule 
modification tradition of this system. The overall research question is:  
 
How did the Norwegian railway system respond to new requirements  
for safety rule modifications? 
 
The study gives special attention to the influence of modification processes upon railway 
knowledge. 
 
There are three objectives for the study. One objective is to provide descriptions of 
modification processes that can contribute to increased understanding of these. This 
includes revealing how problems and roles are framed and to contribute to the building of 
repertoires of how such processes can be run (Schön, 1991). Another objective is to 
compare the descriptions with theory. A third objective is to discuss implications of the 
study.  
 
For these purposes four rule modification processes of the Norwegian railway system 
have been studied. The study has applied an explorative and qualitative approach. The 
main sources for information have been interviews with participants of the modification 
processes and documents developed by the projects. The study was performed in the last 
phase of the processes. Accordingly, the study looks at the modification processes from 
the perspective of the participants of the studied processes as experienced in their last 
period of their work. 
 
The main conclusion of the study is that the four modification processes abandoned the 
intentions of hierarchical and risk-based approaches. First, they did not develop outcome-
oriented rules on the background of risk analyses. Second, they did not derive 
prescriptive rules from outcome oriented rules. Third, they did not choose rule solutions 
where the hierarchy of rule solutions was linked to the positions of rule-imposers in the 
organizational hierarchy such as had been suggested.  
 
The main reason was that the new approaches did not take existing railway knowledge, 
that had been found to be important for safe performance, sufficiently into account. 
Instead, the modification work of all cases turned into processes that are given the name 
“reverse invention” in the study. Here existing railway knowledge and prescriptive rules 
were used as a fundament for the work. Accordingly, existing knowledge was brought 
forth.  
 
The risk analyses supplemented railway knowledge. The four cases integrated the risk 
analyses in the modification processes in four different ways (See Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 
7.4 in Chapter 7). This gave the analyses different functions in the rule development. The 
evolving work was evaluated with railway knowledge as a reference and brought in 
accordance with this knowledge.  
 iii
 
The cases favored solutions that took advantage of different perspectives upon rationality 
and knowledge. However, existing railway knowledge, including existing prescriptive 
rules, appeared remarkably persistent compared to the expectations for the work. 
Furthermore, the modification processes contained mechanisms that validated this 
knowledge.  
 
The new approaches and the processes of reverse invention raised questions that initiated 
inquiries into railway knowledge. These inquiries revived this knowledge. It remained 
uncertain whether the potential of inquires for organizational learning resulted in actual 
new knowledge.  
 
However, the rationalistic ideals of new approaches stimulated a reduction of the revived 
railway knowledge into more rationalistic theoretical forms, i.e. relational and contextual 
elements were removed. Theory argues that the latter knowledge is important for the 
ability to decode theoretical knowledge for future use and to judge its relevance (Stein, 
1995; Baumard, 1999; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The benefit of revived knowledge 
might therefore be lost in the future. The study outlines some solutions for counteracting 
such a negative development.  
 
At the end of the study the implications of this conclusion are discussed. Also, links to 
theory and needs for further research are elaborated upon. 
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 PART I: FRAMEWORK AND STUDY DESIGN 
 
Part I is an introduction to the study. It starts with a brief introduction to the problem 
area, the field of the research, the methodological approach and the core research 
questions. These topics are then elaborated upon in the following chapters. Chapter 2 
presents the Norwegian Railway system, its historical development and the two projects 
included in the study.  The emphasis is upon issues of relevance for the research 
questions. Chapter 3 provides the framework and the theoretical basis for the study. Here 
theoretical concepts and problems are elaborated. The last chapter of this part, Chapter 4 
provides a presentation of the applied research method, the study material and a 
discussion of the research quality. 
 
 1
 2
1 Introduction 
 
The study is about safety rule revision with hierarchical and risk-based approaches in the 
Norwegian railway system. Special attention is given to the influence of modification 
processes upon railway knowledge.  
 
The overall purpose of the study is to contribute positively to accident prevention through 
increased knowledge of safety rule revision. The study has three objectives. One 
objective is to provide descriptions of modification processes that can contribute to 
increased understanding of these. This includes revealing how problems and roles are 
framed and to contribute to the building of repertoires of how such processes can be run 
(Schön, 1991). Another objective is to compare the descriptions with theory. A third 
objective is to discuss implications of the study. 
 
1.1 Framework of the study 
 
The theme of the study needs an introduction. Its main elements are introduced below. 
These will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.  
 
1.1.1 Safety rules and knowledge 
 
Safety rules are important elements of safety work and are based upon two assumptions. 
First, it is possible to do something to prevent accidents. Second, rules can contribute to 
this purpose (Kirwan et al. 2002). 
 
Hale et al. (2003) argue that every technology and activity has safety rules that are 
usually formulated explicitly, taught to those operating in the system and imposed on 
them. The safety rules also determine liability after accidents. The primary purpose of the 
rules is to make the system manageable by revealing how it can be made to work most 
effectively and who is responsible for doing what (Hale, 1990). Hence, rules direct 
attention, influence decisions and activities and provide demands and limitations. Rules 
can also serve other purposes such as power (Weber, 2000), creation of scapegoats (Hale, 
1990; Hovden, 1998b) and communication of knowledge (Baumard, 1999).  
 
To be useful for safety work, safety rules must fit the actual situation they are applied to 
(Reason et al. 1998). The rapidly changing conditions of society make this a serious 
concern, which is discussed in safety literature (Bourrier, 1998; Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason, 1997). Hale et al. (2003) point to the fact that 
there is surprisingly little literature about how to manage safety rules effectively, how to 
decide what rules are needed, how to prepare and formulate them and how to promulgate 
them and ensure that they stay appropriate Also, there are still few clear ideas of how best 
to avoid the main pitfalls in producing workable safety rules. The purpose of the study 
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implies that the focus here will be on the work to ensure that rules stay appropriate. This 
includes to change or remove existing rules or to develop additional rules.  
 
Rules constitute an important record of the organization’s learning about its operational 
dangers (Reason, 1997; Reason et al. 1998). Traditionally safety rules have been 
developed in accordance with the lessons learned from past accidents, i.e. their evolution 
has been based on practical experiences (Kjellén, 2000; Rasmussen, 1997). Hence, there 
is a close relationship between safety rules and knowledge of activities and related risks 
in a regulated area. The rules have been directed at control of known risks and can be 
seen as a result of the knowledge at the time of the rule making. In Baumard’s 
terminology they represent explicit collective knowledge (Baumard, 1999).  
 
Hale (1990) also argues that the greatest value of safety rules lies in the process of 
actually finding out and writing down the rules. This is a value the rules can retain by 
being treated as a living repository of all lessons learned in the life of the system. 
Accordingly, safety rules are not only a result of a learning process, they can be seen as a 
part of them. However, there is also a general concern that it is not wise to transfer all 
lessons learned into rules (Hale, 1990; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997).  
 
The discussion of the relationship between safety rules and knowledge illustrates that 
traditionally rule development has been developed in accordance with rule-developers’ 
current understanding of the actual situation. Hence, the logic of appropriateness has 
played an important role. This logic is associated with rule- and identity based decision-
making where actions are matched to situations by means of rules organized into 
identities (March, 1994).   
 
1.1.2 From practical experiences to the risk-based approach 
 
The evolution based on practical experiences is now subject to discussion. Rasmussen 
(1997) and Rasmussen & Svedung (2000) find that in the past the empirical approach to 
risk management has been very effective for prevention of small and medium scale 
accidents. However, they argue that it is necessary to reconsider this in the present fast 
pace of change in the conditions of risk management. During periods of fast change, they 
find it necessary to choose a risk management strategy based on a predictive hazard and 
risk analysis. They suggest taking advantage of the more analytical management strategy 
developed by industries positing a potential for large scale accidents. Reason (1997) 
supports the critics of the reactive approach. He argues that if organizations continue to 
rely principally on outcome measures, they have to experience accidents before they 
know where they are. His outline to a workable alternative is the regular assessments that 
are common to both quality and safety. Risk assessment is also an inherent element in the 
internal control principles that are increasingly used for risk management (Flagstad, 1995; 
Hovden, 1998a). Here the organizations are required to identify and control their own 
risks.  
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The main purpose of risk analyses is to provide decision support (Aven, 2003; Rausand & 
Øien, 2004). In Perrow’s terminology, this move towards increased use of risk analyses 
represents a strengthening of the tradition of absolute rationality (Perrow, 1999). 
According to him, this is a form of rationality wherein calculations can be made about 
risks and benefits, clearly showing which activities we should prefer. The risk assessment 
professionals are generally technologists and statisticians such as engineers, scientists and 
social scientists. Accordingly, the experts come from theoretical, academic fields. This 
means that risk analyses serve as support for choices between preferences, i.e. choice 
based decision-making as described by March (1994). He links the term “rationality” to 
this form of decision making.  
 
Rasmussen (1997) argues that there is a parallel evolution of the paradigms within 
decision- and management research and changes in paradigms within branches of safety 
research. Description of human behavior typically starts by identification of rational 
behavior by normative models. Then actual behavior is described in terms of some kind 
of deviation, i.e. error with reference to the normative behavior. There is now a wide 
spread acceptance of limitations in human cognition (See for instance Kahneman et al. 
1982; Simon, 1966). March (1994) sums up that rational choice theories have adapted to 
the observations of decision-making in the real world and gradually introduced the idea 
that rationality is limited or bounded. The core notion of limited rationality is that 
individuals are intentionally rational. Although decision-makers try to be rational they are 
constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information. Thus their 
actions may be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions and efforts. 
According to Rasmussen this brings with it a further trend. This is a trend towards 
modeling actual behavior in terms of behavior shaping constraints of the environment and 
the adaptive mechanisms of human actors in the environment. 
 
The increased emphasis upon risk assessment, both in theory and in the internal control 
principles, implies an incitement for increased emphasis upon more academic oriented 
risk analyses as decision support in rule modification processes. The analyses are 
supposed to provide information that serve as basis for the definition of rules. In this 
study this approach will be labeled the “risk-based approach”.  
 
1.1.3 From operative prescriptive rules to the hierarchical approach 
 
Hale (1990) describes safety rules as usually specifying the means by which safe working 
should be achieved in the form of prescriptions about what to do or specified standards. 
Very often they also specify who is responsible for doing what. With reference to March 
(1994) one can say that they are directed at forming appropriate decisions and actions at 
the execution level, i.e. rule- and identity based decision-making at the lower levels of the 
organizational hierarchies.  
 
There is a now a trend to move away from detailed prescriptive rule solutions towards 
rule solutions directed at decision-making and management (See for instance: Becker, 
2002; Hale et al. 1997; Hovden, 2002; Maidment, 2002;). One of the main arguments 
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behind this development is that such rules are seen to be more flexible and hence more 
suitable for changing conditions (See for instance Becker, 2002; Maidment, 2002; 
Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason et al. 1998). 
 
This development and the increased use of the internal control principles can be seen to 
represent a trend towards more hierarchical strategies to the development of rule systems. 
This consists of different hierarchical elements that in the study will go under the heading 
“the hierarchical approach”.  
 
Hopkins & Hale (2002) relate these rule solutions to three levels of intervention in risk 
control. The safety case/safety management regime specifies the rules for the safety 
management block and/or requires that block to demonstrate how it structures and runs 
the direct control activities. The internal control principles are examples of this level of 
intervention. The rules directed at decision-making might have a goal-oriented form that 
tries to specify the safety output instead of the rules to achieve it. The rules to achieve it 
or the technical prescriptions specify the rules for the direct risk control function.  
 
With reference to hierarchical task analyses, Hale (1990) argue that the central levels of 
the systems should formulate the rules that represent objectives illustrating what must not 
happen and what has to be achieved. When necessary, the central level should also 
formulate rules for methods to increase thinking before decisions are taken and the 
explanatory supplements to the rules. The detailed rules must be worked out more locally 
because they become more context specific. Building upon this, Hale & Swuste (1998) 
propose a thesis that rules should be seen as a progressive limitation of freedom of choice, 
limiting first goals, then how decisions are arrived at and finally limiting the actions 
themselves.  
 
According to Hovden (1998a) internal control means a shift to meta-regulation by society 
and delegation of direct rule-based control by the industry itself. Each enterprise is free to 
adjust it to own needs, routines organization and culture. There is supposed to be a logical 
chain of inferences between authorities, companies and parties where the distribution of 
responsibilities are one important element (Flagstad, 1995). Hovden finds that emphasis 
upon internal control places more obligations on top management of organizations.  
 
This deductive thinking is also an inherent element in the striving for harmonization 
within the European Union (EU) (European Commission, 2004b).  
 
This implies a hierarchy of rule solutions where the traditional prescriptive rules 
describing what to do become subordinated higher order rules with focus upon 
management and objectives. An increased emphasis upon goals in rule solutions implies a 
strengthened position of rationalistic choice based decision making. Furthermore, such 
changes in the content of rules imply a change in the required competency of the rule-
imposer and the rule-follower. The rule-imposer must know what the desired goals are 
and the rule-follower must know how to achieve these.  
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In addition, this can be seen to imply a hierarchy of rule imposers and rule followers 
where the work of rule development should start at the central higher hierarchical levels 
of the organizational system, i.e. the direction of invention is top-down from the higher to 
the lower levels. The hierarchy of rule solutions can be associated with the positions of 
rule-imposer and rule-follower in the organizational hierarchy.  
 
This can also be seen to imply that prescriptive rules should be derived from higher order 
goal-oriented rules, i.e. that a deductive strategy should be applied for rule development. 
Inherent in this strategy is a need for some kind of risk assessment to decide the means to 
fulfill higher order rules. Therefore this deductive strategy is also influenced by the 
rationality of risk assessments. 
 
Put together, this reveals that the hierarchical approach to rule development can refer to 
four aspects. The first is the order of the development of the different hierarchical rule 
solutions, i.e. a deductive or inductive process. This will be elaborated in Subsection 
3.3.3. The second is the hierarchy of rule solutions. This will be elaborated in Subsection 
3.3.1. The third is the placing of the rule-imposers in the organizational hierarchy. The 
fourth is the placing of the rule-follower in the organizational hierarchy. The two latter 
aspects will be elaborated in Subsection 3.3.2. 
 
However, as will also be elaborated in these sections the picture is not so simple and 
orderly. The need to adapt rule solutions to the actual situation and characteristics of the 
rule-followers is also widely recognized in theory (Hale, 1990; Hale & Swuste, 1998; 
Hopkins & Hale, 2002; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason, 1997). Hovden (1998a) 
argues that internal control means both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches with 
involvement and responsibility of top line management combined with participation and 
participation and industrial democracy. Hale & Swuste (1998) find the key question to be 
how to decide who is best placed in what types of situation to impose what level of 
limitation. In addition, the introduction of meta-regulation and delegation of 
responsibilities can also lead to a development where risk assessment is used to prove the 
legitimacy of rules developed for local purposes. Furthermore, it differs what the central 
higher level consists of. Due to ongoing internationalization, this level might be 
international or national bodies or simply the highest level of an organization.  
 
1.1.4 Issues of concern and limitations 
 
This introduction reveals that it is of general interest to study responses to the incitements 
to use hierarchical and risk analytical approaches to safety rule modifications. The study 
will concentrate upon these two aspects of rule modification. As revealed above, these 
two approaches are not alternative approaches. Instead, the risk based approach can be 
seen as an important element in the hierarchical approach. 
 
The introduction also demonstrates that safety rule modification might have a value in 
itself regarding organizational learning and knowledge development. Therefore, the study 
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will give special attention to the impact that the two approaches have upon knowledge 
about regulated activities and related risk. 
  
Perspectives upon knowledge and decision-making are closely related (March, 1994). 
The increased emphasis upon “rationality” in decision-making that hierarchical and risk 
analytical approaches represent makes it necessary to give some attention to decision-
making when discussing knowledge.  
 
The study focuses upon rule modification with the two presented approaches. This 
implies that it will not go deeply into the choice of detail level of rules nor their different 
roles as, for instance, official requirements or internal codes of practice. It will also not 
go deeply into discussions of rules as a solution compared to other means to enhance 
safety nor other purposes that modification process and resulting rules can serve. 
Furthermore, it will not pay much attention to discussions of internal control and safety 
management. In spite of special attention towards knowledge, the ambition is not to 
develop knowledge theories. 
 
The limited theoretical knowledge of safety rule modification calls for an empirical 
approach containing both descriptive and analytical elements. Therefore, the study will 
analyze real modification processes to achieve insight into scientific and practical 
dilemmas of the application of these two approaches.  
 
1.2 The Railway framework 
 
The Norwegian railway system1 and European railways are now undergoing severe 
changes. The Treaty on European Union includes the broad aim of creating trans-
European networks and promoting interoperability, in particular through technical 
harmonization (DG Energy and Transport, 2000). Three specific objectives are set for the 
railways. These are improvement of interoperability, creation of a single market for 
railway equipment and restructuring to develop competition and new markets in train 
operations. Further, the 1996 EU White Paper urges the member states to separate 
railway infrastructure management and transport operations into distinct business units, 
and to introduce market forces within domestic passenger transport (European 
Commission, 1996). 
 
A report for the Directorate-General (DG) for Energy and Transport argues that the 
development of European railways into a more dynamic industry increases the 
importance of safety regulations as a means to ensure safety (DG Energy and Transport, 
2000). The report relates this to more innovation, more operators including new entrants 
and a wider range of suppliers. However, it also comments that safety regulations have 
only been in the background of these developments. The investigations in the report 
reveals that in all Member states most existing rules and standards are still those created 
under the previous nationalized industry regime. Further, it is generally recognized that 
                                                 
1 Definition of “Railway system”, see the introduction to Chapter 2, page 15. 
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however strong the commitment to reform, substantial change in railway rules and 
standards cannot be made quickly.  
 
The challenges of the ongoing changes in railway systems are now given attention both in 
Norway and within EU. The Research Council of Norway has an ongoing 5-year research 
program focusing upon Risk and Safety in the Transport sector, including the railways 
(The RISIT program).  Here the question of deregulation is thoroughly discussed. The 
program considers deregulation to be “a multi-level process initiated by political or 
regulatory action to open up competition” (Rosness et al. 2004b).  
 
As a part of this program, Rosness et al. (2004b) provide two conclusions of particular 
interest for the study. One is that deregulation usually leads to a need for more 
regulations, i.e. an increased public effort in order to regulate the market conditions and 
commercial aspects as well as safety. Another is that the need for an effective regulatory 
authority during and after a deregulation process is emphasized. In another paper for the 
program, Savage (2003) describes that in the United States, deregulation had made it 
necessary to replace previous implicit rules with explicit safety regulations. There have 
been contacts between this study and participants in the research program.  
 
Within the EU, the challenge of the changes is followed up by the Railway Safety 
Directive (Directive 2004/49/EC). Here it is noted that it is necessary to establish a 
common regulatory framework for railway safety. To provide a basis for the development 
and implementation of the Directive, the European Commission has financed a project 
under the Fifth Framework Programme given the name SAMRAIL. The objective of the 
project is to develop a comprehensive and consistent safety management program for 
European railways (European Commission, 2004c). The project is run in parallel with 
this study.  
 
One of the work packages of this project focuses on safety regulations and rules of the 
railways (European Commission, 2004b). Here current practice in four countries is 
studied and compared to a preset framework. My study supplements the SAMRAIL study 
in several aspects. First, it is an in-depth study that goes into a limited part of the 
framework; the modification process. Second, my study limits itself to give special 
attention to adaptation of the hierarchical and risk-based approaches. Third, special 
attention is given to the influence of these approaches upon knowledge. Fourth, the main 
purpose is not normative. There have also been contacts with the working group of this 
work package. 
 
The work package, focusing upon safety rule management, reveals that there is a lack of 
systematized knowledge of how to manage safety rules properly (European Commission, 
2004b). However, the studies also reveal that a large knowledge-base is available in the 
railway organizations. Unfortunately there are no formal processes in place to retain this 
organizational knowledge. In addition, the privatization processes of formerly 
nationalized railway companies have contributed with a fragmentation and distribution of 
knowledge throughout the railway systems. Accordingly it is of special interest to 
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increase the understanding of safety rule modifications in railways and their influence 
upon knowledge of rail activities and related risk. 
 
The Railway Safety Directive also identifies risk assessment as one of the main elements 
in a common safety management system framework for the EU railways (Directive 
2004/49/EC). Risk assessment is defined as an overall process of risk analysis and risk 
evaluation (European Commission, 2003a). In order to accelerate the introduction of 
innovative systems within EU, the European standards EN 50126 (CENELEC, 1999), EN 
50128 (CENELEC, 1997) and EN 50129 (CENELEC, 2003) introduce systematic hazard 
identification and risk reduction as the main tool. This is done as a supplement to the 
former tradition to use proven technology (Schäbe, 2002). 
 
The report for DG Energy and Transport illustrates that this is consistent with a long time 
trend towards a more analytical approach to the safety work in the European Railways 
(DG Energy and Transport, 2000). However, the report also illustrates that the use of risk 
assessment varied widely across Member states of EU. Further the case studies of rule 
management in different European countries, made by SAMRAIL, reveals that in general 
there is a lack of systematic risk identification and analysis at a formal level (European 
Commission, 2004c). Attempts to apply risk analyses in rule development have also been 
made (Becker, 2002; Harms-Ringdahl & Kecklund, 2004; Harms-Ringdahl, 2004; 
Maidment, 2002;). In the suggested framework for safety rule management of SAMRAIL, 
risk assessment is included (European Commission, 2004b). Hence it is of interest for 
railways to elaborate the adaptation of a risk-based approach to rule modifications. 
  
The railways are subjected to a hierarchy of rules, procedures, regulations and work 
instructions (European Commission, 2004c). Maidment (2002) has compared the rule 
development of the railways in different countries. He found that in some countries the 
national railway systems have taken the initiative to reconsider the traditional prescriptive 
standards and rules; in other cases the railway safety regulators have been the prime 
movers for change. With different emphasis, all were working towards fewer 
prescriptions, more room for innovation, more proactivity, simpler rules and more 
flexible standards. Attempts are also made to develop higher order rules in the railways 
(Becker, 2002; Maidment, 2002). This development is encouraged by the Railway Safety 
Directive (Directive 2004/49/EC). Due to limited knowledge of rule modification, there is 
limited knowledge about how to perform such changes in rule principles.  
 
The Norwegian railway system that consists of a number of subsystems reflects the 
situation within EU. The system is under a process of severe change. The main changes 
are related to the transformation of the former bureaucratic monopolistic state 
organization to a pluralistic, partly privatized and competitive system of organizations 
(Gulowsen & Ryggvik, 2004).  
 
Over years the Norwegian railway system has developed knowledge about the functions 
and interactions of the railway system, i.e. railway knowledge2 (Gulowsen & Ryggvik, 
2004). The system has had a practical oriented and often experience-based prescriptive 
                                                 
2 The expression “Railway knowledge” is elaborated in Chapter 3, page 74 
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rule tradition mainly directed at lower operative levels of the system (Ryggvik, 2004). 
The rules have been gradually developed on the basis of growing railway knowledge, 
especially after experiences with severe accidents. They have also been changed as a 
result of changes in the technology. This tradition is now changing. To a great extent the 
Inspectorate have introduced the goal-oriented form in their rule development, for 
instance in their new regulation for education (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2002). 
Furthermore, it has emphasized a safety management strategy built upon the internal 
control principle (Ryggvik, 2004). The Ministry of Transport and Communication has 
specified that the safety management system must apply risk analyses 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 2001a).  
 
The Norwegian railway system has run two rule modification projects of relevance for 
the purpose of the study. One project modified rules related to traffic operation and 
another rules related to maintenance of the infrastructure. These rules have traffic safety 
as one important element. This is particularly evident in the rules for traffic operation. 
The modification projects were instructed to introduce a risk-based approach to the rule 
modifications. They were requested to reduce the amount of prescriptive rules by 
developing higher order rules and to relate these to the new organizational system, i.e. a 
hierarchical approach to rule development. The rules of both projects have had a role in 
the system’s knowledge management, especially the rules of traffic operation.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
The study uses these two rule modification projects of the Norwegian railway system as 
cases. The overall research question is:  
 
How did the Norwegian railway system respond to new requirements for safety rule 
modifications? 
 
In accordance with the limitations of the study, the research will focus upon the 
adaptation of hierarchical and risk-based approaches in the rule modification processes of 
the projects. This raises two sub questions: 
 
1) How was a hierarchical approach to rule modification adapted? 
 
2) How was a risk-based approach to rule modification adapted? 
 
The study intends to give special attention to the impact from the modification processes 
upon knowledge of the regulated activities and related risks, hereafter called railway 
knowledge. Related to both sub questions above, a third research question becomes:  
 
3) How did new requirements influence railway knowledge?    
 
These research questions will be elaborated upon in the theory chapter (Chapter 3). Here 
problems related to the new approaches will be discussed.  
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Further, these research questions are rather prescriptive. The overall purpose of this study 
is to increase the understanding of modification processes. It is therefore interesting to go 
behind the descriptive answers to these questions and try to explain the results, i.e. to ask 
“why?”.  
 
As safety rule modification is a practical challenge, it is interesting to follow up the 
conclusions with reflections upon practical implications. This is done together with the 
conclusions in Chapter 9. 
 
1.4 Study approach 
 
The scientific tradition that is chosen as a basis for research depends on the problem area 
and the research questions (Latour, 1987). The research strategy depends on the type of 
research question, the control an investigator has over actual behavioral events and the 
focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena (Yin, 1994).   
 
The purpose of the study is to contribute to new insights into the rule modification 
process. This is a practical goal related to ongoing development in railway system. The 
wish is to study contemporary and real rule modification processes as close to their 
natural environments as possible. Hence, it is neither possible nor desirable to exert any 
kind of control over behavioral events or to set up an experimental situation. Further it is 
difficult to develop standardized instruments for the work. 
 
The limited scientific knowledge about the subject also calls for an explorative and 
qualitative approach (Hellevik, 1991). An explorative investigation is flexible and gives 
an opportunity to capture and interpret new information when it is achieved. A case study 
design is chosen in combination with a grounded theory approach and related methods. A 
theoretical framework that illustrates the main subjects and indicates work hypotheses is 
studied with a flexible and open mind. Special attention is given to problems revealed in 
theory. The hope is that this will make the study relevant for both nonacademic and 
academic audiences. The theoretical framework and problems are presented and 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The core elements in the study are interviews of participants of the modification work of 
the two projects and documents developed by the projects. Accordingly the study looks at 
the modification processes from the perspective of the participants of these processes as 
experienced in their last phase of their work. This means that the study does not include 
systematic studies of rule-followers’ opinions of the rules. Their opinions are only 
included when they are included in the modification processes. Furthermore, their 
efficiency to prevent accidents is not evaluated. 
 
The development of the work of the study has been an iterative process. The work has 
developed from an ever-interlocking attention to theory and data collection and analyses.  
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As the work of the projects was not fully finished when much of the data collection was 
done, the research might have influenced their processes.  
 
From the beginning of the study I posited prior knowledge of the Norwegian railway 
system as a former employee in their health services. My background is elaborated in 
Appendix B. 
 
1.5 Structure of the study  
 
The structure of the study is as follows: 
 
To introduce the studied projects and their context, an introduction to the Norwegian 
railway system, its rule tradition and the projects are given in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the theory applied in the study. Central concepts are clarified and 
the theoretical framework for the study is discussed.  
 
In Chapter 4 the methodological approach and the study design are presented. The 
procedures for data collection and analyses and a discussion of the quality of the study 
are also included.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the near context of the study cases, i.e. traditions of rule modification 
that the cases build upon and known plans for future modifications, characteristics of 
rule-imposers and rule-followers and the rules’ context 
 
Chapter 6 presents findings and discussions of the adaptation of the hierarchical approach 
and discusses these.  
 
Chapter 7 presents findings and discussions of the adaptation of the risk-based approach 
and discusses these.  
 
In Chapter 8 the influence from the adaptation of the new approaches upon railway 
knowledge are discussed.  
 
Chapter 9 draws the main conclusions of the research and pull out the implications of 
these. Links to theory and needs for further research are also discussed.  
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2 The Norwegian railway system and the cases of the study  
 
The two projects to be studied here are not isolated phenomena. The Norwegian railway 
system has a long history and the safety rule development of the system has been an 
integrated part of this. Therefore, it is necessary to present the history and organizing of 
the system, its rule tradition and current development and the links between rules and 
railway knowledge. In addition, it is necessary to present the two projects that were 
chosen for the study. 
 
The introduction draws on historical documents, official documents, policy documents 
and steering documents of the railway system itself, information from the research and 
my own knowledge.  
 
Based on the definition of the Railway Safety Directive, in this study the “railway 
system” means the totality of subsystems for structural and operational areas as defined in 
Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC as well as the management and operations of the 
system as a whole (Directive 2004/49/EC, Article 3).  
 
2.1 History and organizing of the Norwegian railway system 
 
For the purpose of the study it is convenient to divide the development of the Norwegian 
railway system into two parts. The fist concerns the development of the organization into 
a rather stable bureaucratic organization. The second concerns the background for 
ongoing changes in the organizing of the system and its safety management. 
 
2.1.1 The development towards a stable bureaucratic organization 
 
As one of the last countries in Europe to do so, Norway got its first railway in 1854. The 
further development of Norwegian railway policy evolved as a result of private and 
governmental, local and centralized interests and investments. This resulted in a 
differentiated railway system that operated under changing geographical conditions 
regarding nature, technical solutions and traffic density. Because of the late start up of the 
Norwegian railways, it was possible to take advantage of technical development and 
experiences of other countries. This included safety rules that were adapted to local 
conditions. (Berg, 2004) 
 
Gradually the government took more control of the development. At the end of the 1920s 
this ended with a centralized and political governed state railway system. All the different 
local railways were brought together under one governmental organization, the 
Norwegian State Railway (hereafter called NSB). (Berg, 2004)   
 
NSB developed a bureaucratic organization. The management style had a militaristic 
feature (Ryggvik, 2004). The routines were considered so good that there was almost no 
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need for commands, every man was supposed to know his position and his duties (NSB 
BA, 1998).  
  
From the beginning, a considerable part of the railway work was to accomplish safety 
procedures. The work functions were described in detail in the form of rules. But the 
safety aspects were not only related to the rules, they were also incorporated into the 
culture. Many of the work force performing safety critical activities were working alone. 
Their superiors seldom interfered in their work. Hence the work contained a great deal of 
autonomy. Further, the work was governed by the formal procedures. When the rules did 
not provide sufficient instructions, the workers had to make the decisions by themselves. 
(Ryggvik, 2004) 
 
NSB alone controlled the traffic safety of the organization. A special “Safety Office” was 
responsible for the development of safety rules, control of compliance and accident 
investigations related to traffic safety, e.g. collisions or to prevent trains from derailing. 
The employee safety work in respect of the Working Environment Act was kept separate 
from this work (Ryggvik, 2004).  
 
2.1.2 Incitements for changes 
 
The new liberalistic trends in politics with increased emphasis upon so called “New 
public management” have changed the conditions of the former NSB. Whether the 
Norwegian railways should be governed by socioeconomic or commercial principles, has 
been an issue for discussion and conflict (NSB BA, 1998). In 1996 the Norwegian 
Parliament decided to reorganize the traditional NSB. The part of NSB that was 
responsible for infrastructure management was transferred to the newly established 
Norwegian National Railway Administration (Rail Administration). Some of the former 
activities of the latter are now privatized, outsourced or run by subcontractors.  
 
The traffic operational part of the former NSB with its inherent service activities was 
transferred to a new company for traffic operation called NSB BA and later NSB AS 
(hereafter called NSB BA or NSB AS depending on historical timing). The requirement 
of the new company was to operate with profit based on market orientation and 
competitive power (NSB BA, 1998). This company is later divided into separate and 
partly state owned companies. The Norwegian railway infrastructure is now open for 
other train operating companies (NSB AS and the newcomers as group are hereafter 
called traffic operators). In addition the Norwegian railway system is under pressure of 
competition from other transport domains, e.g. private cars, buses, aviation. 
 
Due to the changes of the system and criticism of leaving the system to control its own 
performance, the Ministry of Transport and Communication established a new authority, 
the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate (Inspectorate), in 1996. In the beginning the division 
of the responsibilities between the Inspectorate and the Rail Administration was unclear. 
The new Inspectorate was sparsely staffed and many of the recruited personnel had 
background from the oil industry (Ryggvik, 2004). The staff has grown and more people 
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with backgrounds from the railway system have now been recruited. With the 
establishment of the official body of an inspectorate, the safety work of the system 
became more open for insight by external parties. In addition, in 2002 the mandate of the 
Accident Investigation Board for aviation run by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication became extended to include investigations of railway accidents.  
 
The organizing of these safety control functions under the ministry with administrative 
responsibility for promoting the business of the railway sector is criticized. This issue has 
been discussed by a Commission of the Norwegian government on means for reducing 
vulnerabilities. The Commission proposes that as a rule, any safety control function 
should be allocated to a ministry other than the one with administrative responsibility for 
promoting the business or sector in question (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2000a). 
 
There is also a general trend of the Norwegian authorities that within given frameworks, 
the responsibility for the governing of the activities is gradually transferred to the actors 
themselves. However, the Ministry of Transport and Communication has neither earlier 
nor lately, been directly engaged much in the safety of the railways (Justis- og 
politidepartementet, 2000b). 
 
The increased emphasis upon commercial principles of the Norwegian railway system 
increased the attention to competition between involved actors and cost-effectiveness. 
The interviewees provided examples where knowledge was considered a competitive 
advantage. They also provided examples where concerns for cost-effectiveness had 
caused pressures to shorten the duration of railway educations and trainee periods. 
Furthermore, a number of discussions of staff reductions were reported. For instance, the 
number of engine drivers in the trains was reduced from two to one. The timeframes was 
reduced for many tasks. 
 
Regarding the technological development, the Norwegian railway system started out with 
simple technological principles. To ensure predictable and safe traffic performance, the 
railway system developed complicated human based information networks. The 
limitations of human performance and the costs related to this system have caused a 
gradual introduction of automatic solutions. Introduction of new automatic solutions was 
often followed by staff reductions. This is particularly evident with the gradual 
introduction of the Centralized Traffic Control (CTC). (Gulowsen & Ryggvik, 2004) 
 
In the last century the Norwegian railway system has experienced major accidents with 
more than five victims in 1921, 1950 and 1975 (Gulowsen & Ryggvik, 2004). In 2000 
two serious accidents happened again. One was the Åsta accident where two trains 
collided on a single track line (Justis- og politidepartementet 2000b). The accident report 
concluded that one of the trains most probably drove through a red light (Justis- og 
politidepartementet 2000b). The actual line had Centralized train control (CTC) but as the 
line was not electrified it could not be stopped by turning off the power. Nineteen people 
were killed. The other was the Lillestrøm accident, where defective brakes made a train 
transporting compressed explosive gas collide into a parked train. The gas leaked and set 
fire. Nobody was killed but an explosion was close to happening (Justis- og 
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politidepartementet, 2001). This could have destroyed the whole center of the city 
Lillestrøm.   
 
The discussions following the accidents and in particular the work of the accident 
commission, had consequences for the safety philosophy of the system (Gulowsen & 
Ryggvik, 2004). For the first time, railway accidents became investigated by an external 
commission. The same commission investigated both the Åsta and Lillestrøm events. In 
its accident report, the commission gives credit to the safety work of the railway system 
(Justis- og politidepartementet. 2000b). It finds that the Norwegian railway system has 
made serious efforts regarding the safety work. However, the commission criticizes the 
safety work for being too event based and reactive. The commission recommends 
implementing measures to ensure that proactive safety management is applied to all 
railway operations. Further it recommends that the Rail Administration and the NSB BA 
should intensify their efforts to develop higher quality and efficient internal control 
systems in all their activities.  
 
2.2 Safety rule tradition and current development 
 
As already indicated, the Norwegian railway system has developed a rule tradition. 
Below, this tradition and the influence from the incitements for changes will be discussed.   
 
2.2.1 Safety rule tradition 
 
The safety rule tradition that serves as a fundament for the rule modifications of the study, 
builds upon the traffic safety tradition of the old NSB. The rules were gradually 
developed for internal use in the relatively stable NSB organization. Interviewees of the 
study revealed that practical considerations played an important role in the rule 
development. Therefore many of the rules were developed for safe traffic performance 
under normal conditions and for maintaining undisturbed and safe traffic performance 
under exceptional conditions, i.e. the rules combined concerns for traffic safety and other 
purposes. Rules that required strict adherence and rules of a more advisory nature were 
included in the rule system.  
 
The rules were considered as a collection of several generations’ experiences with 
railway activities (Gulowsen & Ryggvik (2004). However, common knowledge was not 
always expressed in the rules because it was taken for granted3. Hence, there were holes 
in the rule system.  
 
The interviewees of the study described that the rule-developers of the former NSB 
usually were a few centrally placed, very experienced and respected people with good 
knowledge about the actual activities. The most common educational background was 
either internal railway educations or railway relevant external technical educations. When 
                                                 
3 Information from  Safety director Skovdahl of the Rail Administration, 2/19/2003 
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employed the latter had to follow introduction courses to the railway system. These 
introduction courses included extensive and varied trainee programs. Accordingly, the 
rule-developers posited extensive railway knowledge and networks of people. Usually, 
the networks included rule-followers.  
 
The rule-developers performed the rule modifications according to their own knowledge, 
beliefs and norms. Very often they were in dialog with their personal network within the 
organization and trade unions. However, the latter were not involved in a systematic way. 
Furthermore, the interviewees revealed that the stable situation of the organization, the 
recruitment pattern and stability of the employees and a tradition of overlapping when 
they were leaving, made it possible to transfer knowledge from one modification process 
to another.  
 
The main rule modifications were based upon knowledge transferred from other countries, 
analyses of dangers related to changes in technology and after experiences with 
dangerous events or accidents within the system itself (Berg, 2004; Gulowsen & Ryggvik, 
2004). However, as long as the traffic across national borders was rather limited, the 
organization had the possibility to make relatively free decisions related to technical 
solutions and rules.  
 
Gulowsen & Ryggvik (2004) explain that the attitude to rule modification was that the 
existing rules were carefully developed. Therefore it was necessary to be hesitant before 
changing them. When in doubt, the practice was to keep the old rule. One interviewee 
illustrated the tradition like this:   
 
”…if changes in the rules shall happen, first someone has to die. Yes, it was like 
that before. It is a little better now.” 
  
Accordingly, there were seldom dramatic changes of rules. New rules were mainly made 
when technology was changing or when accident investigations revealed that rules could 
have prevented events from happening. (Ryggvik, 2004). 
 
The main target group of the rules, i.e. the rule-followers, was actors at the operative 
level. This means that they were posited at the lower levels of the organizational 
hierarchy. According to Ryggvik (2004) most of the work force of the railways was 
stable and recruited from families that were already involved in the railway system. They 
had good knowledge about each other and the organization. The educational system for 
the railway professions was rather comprehensive. The function of the rules in the 
educational system is further elaborated in Section 2.3.  
 
Lack of compliance with the rules could lead to sanctions, for example reprimands or 
demotion. However, Ryggvik (2004) describes how the trade unions of the railway 
system used to counteract sanctions by addressing the responsibility of the management.  
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2.2.2 Current development and challenges 
 
Lately the rule tradition of the Railway system has been increasingly challenged. In 
particular, the increased emphasis upon internal control principles and the development 
within EU has represented a challenge for the tradition. Furthermore, the organizational 
changes have changed the conditions for transfer of knowledge about accomplishing rule 
modification processes. 
 
2.2.2.1 Internal control: Emphasis upon hierarchies and risk assessments 
 
With the Regulations relating to Systematic Health, Environmental and Safety Activities 
in Enterprises (Internal Control Regulations) the principle of internal control was 
introduced to the railway system for the first time in 1992 (Arbeids- og 
inkluderingsdepartementet, 1996). However, Ryggvik (2004) explains how attempts to 
implement internal control principles to traffic safety created conflicts and were not 
successful. According to him the main reason was that the Safety office of NSB 
associated internal control with the work for the employees’ safety. The office considered 
the traffic safety of the railways to be another discipline where internal control was 
irrelevant. Furthermore, the attempts to implement internal control was combined with 
attempts to weaken the dominance of railway professionals in the existing railway culture. 
The staff at the Safety office also felt that traffic safety as such was under pressure. 
 
Ryggvik (2004) reveals that the newly established Inspectorate chose to emphasize the 
safety tradition of the oil industry instead of the existing safety tradition of the Railway 
system, as for instance Sweden did. This tradition has applied the principles of internal 
control. However, in accordance with the tradition of Traffic safety, the democratic 
elements with its bottom-up approach did not become as evident here as in the regulation 
of Internal control for Health, Safety and Environment. Accordingly, the deductive top-
down elements are dominating.  
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the principles of internal control require some kind of 
risk assessment. According to Rausand & Øien, (2004) the Railway Inspectorate were 
also influenced by the development in England. In 1994 the British Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) implemented a solution closely related to the internal control principle; 
the so-called “Safety Case” regime (Rausand & Øien, 2004). This requires the companies 
to demonstrate to the authorities that safety is effectively managed. Here quantitative risk 
analyses are required.  
 
In the Safety regulation (“Sikkerhetsforskriften”) of 1999 and the later Requirement 
regulation (“Kravforskriften”) of 2001, the Inspectorate specified the requirement to 
perform risk analyses (Samferdselsdepartementet, 1999/2001). Here it is required that 
those engaged in railway activities have to perform the necessary analyses to identify 
conditions that can cause loss of life or serious personal injury and to follow up on the 
results of analyses. However, the kind of analyses is not specified like it is in the 
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mentioned Safety case regime of the British HSE. The actors are also required to ensure 
that single errors cannot lead to such accidents and to establish criteria for acceptable risk.  
 
The Inspectorate has intended to use goal-oriented rule solutions as the underlying 
principle for regulations4. As revealed in Chapter 1, it has also started to apply the goal-
oriented form in their regulations. However, the prescriptive form is also still used 
throughout the system.  
 
In total these changes direct attention towards decision making, safety management and 
use of risk analyses. Hence the rule system has become more differentiated into a rule 
hierarchy. The safety responsibilities at the management level of the railway system are 
emphasized instead of the former tradition, where the responsibilities were placed with 
the operative staff at lower levels in the organizational hierarchy. Furthermore, the 
ongoing division of the system has created a situation where the former safety rules are 
distributed in accordance with new roles and responsibilities. This implies that the rule-
imposers and the rule-followers are more distributed in the organizational hierarchy than 
before.  
 
The distribution of responsibilities and rules at different hierarchical levels of the system 
give the rules different levels of formality. The rules at the level of the authorities, i.e. the 
Ministry and the Inspectorate, have the form of laws and regulations. These can be 
supplemented with guidelines and standards in the form of supplementary texts or 
separate publications. The regulations are related to the laws and concretize their 
requirements at a more detailed level. The Rail Administration issues rules that regulate 
operators’ access to rail infrastructure. These rules can have contents serving other 
purposes than the safety, for instance economic considerations. When found necessary or 
useful, the Rail Administration, the traffic operators and other companies that operate 
within the Railway system, develop their internal safety rules for internal activities. These 
rules can have different forms that vary from clear requirements that have to be followed 
without deviation, to informal guidelines and advice for the work. Also at these lower 
levels of the railway system’s hierarchy, the safety related rules are often combined with 
rules serving other purposes.  
 
Many interviewees underlined that the establishment of the Inspectorate and the division 
of responsibilities have increased the emphasis on formal juridical aspects of rules. The 
recent accidents have also illustrated that juridical aspects of responsibility are of great 
interest for the media. On the other hand, many of the interviewees argued that efforts 
had been made to change the former tradition to sanction lack of compliance with rules. 
More attention is now given to communication about possible reasons behind lack of 
compliance and opportunities for organizational learning. This includes learning about 
the quality and efficiency of existing rules.  
 
Ryggvik (2004) provides some reflections upon the influence from the oil industry. He 
claims that the authorities related to the oil industry, the scientists educated by grants 
from that industry, safety experts of the large enterprises and particularly all the 
                                                 
4 Information from Director Johnsen of the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate, 3/5/2003. 
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consultants with background from the oil industry have a hegemonic role in Norwegian 
safety work. These actors were influenced by the conditions of this industry with a short 
history and new and rapidly evolving technology. Their safety thinking was oriented 
towards system thinking and risk analyses. The tradition of the oil industry has also 
influenced the Railway system, and in particular the Inspectorate. Furthermore, in the 
work of the accident commissions, the traditional safety philosophy anchored in the old 
railway system and its culture were blamed for the accidents. According to Ryggvik 
(2004), this laid the way open in the railway system for the prevailing practices of the oil 
industry. However, he finds that these practices gave little attention to the technology of 
the railway system and its old tradition where safety has been a central element.   
 
The influence of the oil sector is also discussed in a-state-of-the-art review of current 
knowledge of risk and safety in the transport sector (The Research Council of Norway, 
2003). Here the transport sector is advised not to apply the prevailing practices of the oil 
industry without further considerations. They consider the greatest danger of the practices 
to be the power this gives to a small group of experts who implicitly have the power to 
decide a kind of objective risk. Instead the review recommends bringing the actual 
decision-makers more firmly into the picture. Further it argues that assessments of what 
is adequate from a safety perspective are of a political nature. Hence, these should not be 
decided through a mechanical use of risk acceptance criteria, where the analyst may not 
see the full scope of the choices that are made. 
 
Many of the interviewees of the study spontaneously provided reflections upon this. They 
illustrated that the early attempts to introduce internal control, new types of rules and the 
risk analytic approach did not develop without hurt feelings among the railway staff. This 
was based on interpretation of limited respect for their safety competency and the former 
safety work. Further some interviewees argued that the transfer of practices from the oil 
industry had not taken the special features of the railway activities sufficiently into 
consideration. In particular they emphasized the features of the rail technology with 
requirements to coordination and communication between different involved actors. 
 
2.2.2.2 Influence from the development within EU 
 
An additional challenge to the rule development of the Norwegian Railway system is the 
international rule development. Through the agreement of European Economic Area 
(EEA) Norway has to conform to EU decrees and directives. Hence, the opportunity of 
the system to freely choose rule solutions will be gradually restricted. 
 
Of particular importance is the Railway Safety Directive (Directive 2004/49/EC). It 
contains many of the same basic principles as the Norwegian oil industry. Point 13 states 
that in carrying out their duties and fulfilling their responsibilities, infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings should implement a safety management system. The 
guidelines for the safety management system proposed by the SAMRAIL-project 
introduced in Section 1.2 suggests that the structure follows the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA) cycle, which is the recommended approach by the International Organization for 
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Standardization (ISO) for specifying management systems (European Commission, 
2004d). This is compliant with the Safety Management System requirements given in 
Annex III of the Railway Safety Directive. Management of Rules and Standards is one 
element in the proposed system.  
 
Further, in point 10 the Directive recommends that national rules should gradually be 
replaced by rules based on common standards, i.e. Technical Specifications of 
Interoperability (TSI) (Directive 2004/49/EC). These are directed at the Trans-European 
Conventional Rail System and in particular associated with traffic across borders (Weill- 
Fassina et al., 2003). The introduction of new specific national rules, which are not based 
on such common standards, should be kept to a minimum. This implies higher levels of a 
top-down approach to future rule development. Except for instances where the 
development of these TSIs directly influence the studied modification processes, the 
development of these are outside the scope of the study. 
 
The European Standard EN 50126 Railway applications – The specification and 
demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) has 
already influenced the Inspectorate (Rausand & Øien, 2004). This standard does not 
require a full quantitative risk analysis but suggests different types of accept criteria. This 
gives the opportunity to also apply qualitative approaches.  
 
In addition, some of the activities of the railway system are regulated by regulations that 
indirectly relate to railway activities, for instance regulations directed at activities 
involving electricity.  
 
According to interviewees, the Norwegian Railway system is also expected to become 
more involved in trans-national traffic, particularly between Norway and Sweden and 
between Sweden and Denmark. Therefore Scandinavian railway systems are cooperating 
with the purpose to harmonize infrastructure, rule systems and terminology. Further, 
foreign traffic operators are already operating in the Norwegian infrastructure. Some 
maintenance activities are conducted abroad.  
 
2.2.2.3 Knowledge of accomplishing modification processes 
 
Regarding the knowledge of how to accomplish rule modifications, the interviewees 
explained that the ongoing changes of the Railway system have reduced the chances for 
overlap in rule modification processes. Accordingly, the traditional experience transfer 
between modification processes is weakened. Further, ongoing changes at both the 
national and international level have created expectations of future need for rule 
modifications. Therefore, methods for rule modification have been discussed.  
 
In addition, the ongoing changes have endangered knowledge about context and the 
intended function of rules, and some are already lost. This has led to a concern about the 
value and conservation of such knowledge. Some efforts are already being made to 
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prevent more losses of knowledge. As an example, one Safety Officer of NSB AS has 
interviewed retired employees. He reported the results of the interviews as:  
 
”I was glad I did those interviews, I got lots of input about previous events and 
against which the rules were established as a barrier.”  
 
The recent practice for modifications of the two projects and plans for the future are 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 
2.3 Links between rules and railway knowledge 
 
Gulowsen & Ryggvik (2004) explain that the rule tradition was closely related to the 
management of the safety knowledge of the railway system. Safety and related rules were 
fundamental for the teaching of rail employees. The traditional teaching approach was to 
train the students to memorize the rules. The students were taught that even if they didn’t 
immediately understand the meaning of a rule, they should still assume there was a 
reason for it.  
 
The educational programs contained long periods of varied practice where the work force 
contributed, i.e. a trainee system. The interviewees of the study provided vivid 
descriptions of how rules and functions of the systems were illustrated and discussed 
during the practice periods. Stories of accidents and unwanted events were kept alive. 
The students learned about the practical application of the rules. Further they learned 
about other functions of the railway system than their own (Ryggvik 2004). This 
illustrates that the educational programs contained strong elements of rich and 
comprehensive practical knowledge and socialization. These elements were strengthened 
by the discussed recruitment pattern to the system. Further, a career in the system was 
heavily based on a combination of professional skills and length of service. According to 
Ryggvik (2004), the former railway personnel knew almost everything about trains, 
railways and railway traffic. This extensive competency made it possible for the actors to 
quickly discover any kinds of failures.  
 
The interviewees who are involved in the education of railway professionals, argued that 
the theoretical education has also gradually come to put more emphasis upon a deeper 
understanding of the rules. This included the history behind them, their context and their 
intended function. The rules and this knowledge are used to explain the functions of the 
system and the role of the rules in safe traffic performance. Increased attention is now 
given to the role of the rules in the system’s safety barriers5. However, the duration of 
practice periods is reduced. More personnel without any former links to the railway 
system are recruited directly into different positions in the system, for instance at the 
management level. Hence, the ongoing changes of the Railway system have also changed 
the conditions for traditional experience transfer and socialization.  
 
                                                 
5 Information from Østningen, the Administrative Manager of the Railway school, 10/14/2003  
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The interviewees also revealed that during recent years, the future of the educational 
programs of the Norwegian railway system and the Railway school has been heavily 
discussed. The discussions are not yet fully concluded. Parts of the education system are 
under pressure for more efficiency in terms of duration and in particular the practical part.  
 
Many interviewees spontaneously expressed a concern that changes in the educational 
system, policies for personnel recruitment and promotion and the introduction of new 
actors to the railway system might have a negative effect upon the competency of the 
railway personnel. This might undermine their knowledge of the function and 
competency of each other, their understanding of the complex interactions of the different 
activities and the context and intended functions of the safety rules.  
 
2.4 Cases of the study 
 
The two projects chosen for this study were selected because they were feasible for the 
research questions.   
 
2.4.1 The Traffic-rule project 
 
The project for modification of Traffic-rules is named TRJ 2003 (Traffic-rules for 
Railways 2003). This project represents one process of rule modification and will 
therefore be treated as one case, labeled the “Traffic-rule case”. The formal organization 
of the case is presented in Subsection 4.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.1, page 82. The 
organizing of the work and characteristics of the rule-imposer are elaborated in Section 
5.2. 
 
There were several reasons for the project. These were closely related to the development 
of the Norwegian railway system presented above. In particular: the change from a 
practical experience-based safety policy to an analytical one, the changes in 
responsibilities because of the division of the system, changes in technology and 
international development.  
 
The rules to be modified in the project were the experience-based prescriptive and very 
detailed rules for traffic operation. These were not pure safety rules; they had more the 
form of procedures for the part of the traffic performance that were not automatic6. Hence, 
they combined concerns for safety and a stable and effective traffic performance. The 
rules have had a function similar to formal regulations. During the project the 
responsibility for the rules was transferred from the Rail Administration to the 
Inspectorate. The rules were directed at the actors at the lowest level of the system’s 
hierarchy, i.e. the operative staff. The main groups were those directly involved in traffic 
management and train control and train driving. The rule-followers were engaged by 
                                                 
6 Information from  Safety director Skovdahl of the Rail Administration, 6/24/2003 
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different organizations involved in traffic operation, i.e. the traffic operators and the Rail 
Administration.  
 
Supplementary rules and advisory texts were provided as separate issues. However, there 
were no textbooks to explain the context and the intended function of the rules. Such 
knowledge was transferred orally through lessons and practice via the educational system 
of the core rule-followers. Therefore the rules also had a function as textbooks. They 
introduced the different functions of the railway system to the students. As revealed, the 
rule-followers were supposed to know the rules almost by heart and strict compliance was 
demanded.  
 
In the initial discussions and preparation of the project, the Rail Administration played 
the major role, but also the Inspectorate participated. The project was formally 
established as a Rail Administration project 1/1/2000 and administered by the department 
for Traffic Safety. The plan was to implement the rules in 2003. The modification process 
became delayed and 4/1/2004 the preliminary rules of the project were transferred to the 
Inspectorate for further development and approval. This study follows the development 
of the rules during the project period, i.e. until the transferal to the Inspectorate.  
 
In the beginning, the project did not receive any clear mandate or formal documents for 
its management7. The intention was to clarify these in parallel with the project. Success 
criteria for the project were developed.  
 
One of the initial objectives for the project was to “…maintain and develop the 
established safety level in a positive direction. The safety level shall be based upon risk 
analyses and be evaluated in a social economics perspective.”8 In the mandate for the 
project dated 4/15/ 2002 it was specified that the rules should be based upon analyses of 
the safety conditions9. No risk analytic method was decided upon in advance.  
 
Later versions of the success criteria contained the sentence “The rules shall be made 
goal-oriented where found appropriate.”10 This implied that higher order rules and a 
more hierarchical rule system were introduced. This was in accordance with the 
Inspectorate’s policy and its hierarchical position in the railway system. User-friendliness 
and simplicity of the rules were also emphasized; the case should “…concentrate around 
the most important conditions and not specify unnecessary details but instead describe 
the directives for the employees in unexpected situations.”11
 
Basic knowledge and information such as arguments for the rules and considerations 
should be kept aside from the rules but be accessible and organized in the same system as 
                                                 
7  Audition report about the project from the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate: Statens jernbanetilsyn. 2000. 
Report no 3-00 
8   Project log 12 
9   Project log 695 
10 Project log 690 
11 Project log 690 
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the rules12.  The main participants of the work reported that they were encouraged to 
“think new”. 
 
2.4.2 The Maintenance-rule project 
 
The modification project for the Maintenance-rules for the railway infrastructure was one 
sub-project of an Overarching Maintenance project. This project was run by the 
Technical department in the Rail Administration. The rule modification project will 
hereafter be called the “Maintenance-rule project” and the overarching project the 
“Overarching Maintenance project”  
 
The main reason for the Overarching Maintenance project was the increased focus upon 
cost-effectiveness13. Its purpose was to develop and improve the management of the 
infrastructure maintenance. In addition to the development of the Maintenance-rules, this 
Overarching project paid attention to the development of a steering document for 
maintenance, tools for decision support, a strategy for development of competence, 
optimization of preventive maintenance and definition of what kind of data is important 
to register for analytical purposes14 . Therefore, this project also contains other sub-
projects than the Maintenance-rule project.  
 
The formal organization of the Overarching Maintenance project is presented in 
Subsection 4.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.2, page 86. The Maintenance-rule project had 
an informal organizational structure and did not provide formal descriptions of this.  
 
The Maintenance-rules are organized according to the four main systems of the 
infrastructure. One system is the Superstructure that consists of equipment on the surface 
of the ground such as rails, sleepers and points. Another is the Substructure that consists 
of structures and equipment under the ground such as the foundation of the ties and 
bridges. A third is the Power-supply that consists of equipment that transfers electricity to 
the system such as electrical cables, transformers and switches. This system consists of 
three subsystems. A fourth is the Signalling and interlocking that consists of equipment 
for the different signals directing the traffic, for example different types of signals and 
information signs.  
 
The study follows three modification processes within the Maintenance-rule project. In 
accordance with the subsystems that the rules of these cases regulate, the cases are 
labeled the Signal case, the Power-supply case and the Superstructure case. The selection 
of cases is presented in Section 4.2.1. The organizing of the work and characteristics of 
rule-imposers are elaborated in Section 5.2. 
 
The rules to be modified in this project were also consistent with the experience-based 
and prescriptive rule tradition. To some extent their form and focus differed between the 
                                                 
12 Project log 690 
13 Home page of the Overarching Maintenance project 
14 Home page of the Overarching Maintenance project 
 27
cases. For instance some rules had a form of work instructions or detailed check lists, a 
few had a form of detailed triggering requirements. Generally, concerns for safety and for 
maintenance performance have been integrated. However, according to interviewees 
there had been a tradition to judge rules for accessibility and rules for safety differently 
and to build in more safety margins in the safety related rules.  
 
Again the rules were directed at actors at the lower operative level of the organizational 
hierarchy but here the core rule-followers were the line managers, who were the staff 
leading this operative work. However, many of the prescriptions in the rules were also 
directed at the staff performing the practical maintenance work and their group leaders. 
These rule-followers were all employed by one organization, the Rail Administration. 
Due to the ongoing privatization process, sub contractors have been increasingly involved 
in activities. The different subject areas have developed different traditions for 
management and use of the Maintenance-rules.  
 
The old rules of the Maintenance-rule cases had included explanatory texts. These had 
later been removed from the rules and gathered in separate textbooks. Here the context 
and the intended functions of the rules were explained. 15
 
The Overarching Maintenance project was established on 10/1/2001. The Maintenance-
rule project was established shortly after. The Overarching Maintenance project is still 
not complete. The Maintenance-rule project implemented the modified rules on 1/1/2004. 
The study follows the project until the development of the rules was finished.  
 
The reasons for establishing the Maintenance-rule project were both related to the general 
development of the Norwegian railway system and the purpose of the Overarching 
Maintenance project. The intention was to move from rule-based to risk-based 
management of the maintenance activities, i.e. to introduce a risk-based approach and to 
make sure that the activities and limitation that the rules imposed were really necessary16.  
The rules had to be concise, that is to say that they only consist of requirements/accept 
criteria17 . One reason for this requirement was a wish to reduce differences in the 
standards of the infrastructure because of different traditions in the regions. Furthermore, 
the rules had to be differentiated according to the function and importance of the 
components18.  The level of safety relevance of the rules should also be taken into 
consideration.  
 
On this background, the project intended to apply risk assessment and to increase the use 
of higher order rules, i.e. triggering requirements as the participants of the work labeled 
them. These rules should contain defined standards for the technical equipment that the 
maintenance activities were supposed to maintain and descriptions of required actions if 
the standards were weaker than defined. By reducing work instructions, requirements to 
                                                 
15 Information from Nordgård, the leader of the Maintenance-rule project 
16 Information from Svee, the leader of the Overarching Maintenance project and Nordgård, the leader of 
the Maintenance-rule project. 
17 Homepage of the Overarching Maintenance project. 
18 Homepage of the Overarching Maintenance project. 
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maintenance intervals and checklists to a minimum, and to give them a status as 
attachments, the rules were supposed to be less voluminous. This reveals that a hierarchy 
of rules was introduced. The plan was to relate the higher order rules in the form of 
triggering requirements to higher levels of the organizational structure and to give them 
and safety related rules higher level of formalization regarding procedures for changes 
and deviance.  
 
When found adequate and optimal there should also be room for professional judgments 
in the maintenance activities19. Further, due to differences in the rule traditions of the 
different subject areas, there was a wish to develop a more uniform and consistent rule 
system for maintenance20. User-friendliness was emphasized here too21. Also in this 
project the main participants of the work reported that they were encouraged to “think 
new”. 
 
2.5 Delimitations of the cases 
 
To sum up, this introduction to the Norwegian railway system, its rule tradition and the 
two projects illustrates that the four chosen cases offer possibilities to study the 
accomplishment of rule modification regarding the research questions of the study.  
 
However, there are also inherent limitations in the cases. First, this study has a time limit. 
Within this limit it is only possible to follow the cases until the rules are written within 
the frames of the projects. Accordingly, this study will not follow up the further 
development of the Traffic-rules by the Inspectorate. Further it will not follow up the 
approval, the implementation and the effects of the modified rules. Second, the rules of 
the projects include elements of other issues than safety. Therefore they do not offer the 
opportunity to study modification of pure safety rules. However, this is also typical for 
safety rules in railways elsewhere (European Commission. 2004b).  
                                                 
19 Homepage of the Overarching Maintenance project 
20 Homepage of the Overarching Maintenance project 
21 Homepage of the Overarching Maintenance project 
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3 Theoretical basis for the study 
 
3.1 Revisiting the framework of the study 
 
The theme of this thesis is safety rule modifications in the context of the Norwegian 
railway system. Safety rule modification implies that safety rules already exist and a rule 
tradition serves as an outlet for the work. Chapter 2 has introduced the rule tradition of 
the Norwegian railway system. Chapter 1 has revealed that there is not much theory 
describing how to perform safety rule modifications. However, Hale et al. (2003) discuss 
the content of such processes. They provide this description:  
 
“…the modification process in which the activity, process or technology may 
change, in which lessons from experience may suggest that rules for previously 
unregulated situations are necessary, or that rules can or should be removed or 
relaxed, or simply changed for better rules”  (Hale et al., 2003, p 4).  
 
The modification processes of this study are according to this description. The rules of 
the Norwegian railway system have been dominated by prescriptive rules directed at 
personnel at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. The intention of a hierarchical 
approach where different rule solutions are adapted to rule-imposers and the rule-follower 
at different levels of the system’s organizational hierarchy, implies to change existing 
rules.   
 
Chapter 2 has also revealed the development of existing rules has been based on practical 
experiences and evolving knowledge of the system’s functions. The requirement to the 
projects of risk-based rule development implies a change in the foundation of the 
decisions of the modification processes.  
 
In addition, Chapter 2 demonstrated that there are strong links between the rule tradition 
and the knowledge management of the Norwegian railway system. When studying 
modification processes the study intends to focus upon the influence of the hierarchical 
and the risk-based approaches upon knowledge. Chapter 1 argued that both of these new 
approaches belong to the same tradition of rationality. In the terminology of March (1994) 
this is the “rational” choice based decision-making. Chapter 1 also argued that this form 
of rationality differs from the rule and identity based form of rationality that was 
commonly used in the decision-making of the Norwegian railway system. As revealed, 
March (1994) finds that perspectives upon rationality are closely related to perspectives 
upon knowledge.  
 
Therefore, as a theoretical framework for the study these elements and their relationship 
are illustrated like this: 
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Rule- and knowledge tradition of the Norwegian railway system 
(See Chapter 2, 3 and 5) 
Hierarchical approach Risk-based approach 
(See Chapter 3 and 6) (See Chapter 3 and 7) 
Knowledge and rationality 
(See Chapter 3 and 8) 
 Figure 3.1 Theoretical framework for the study 
 
This theoretical framework is to be considered as a conceptual model structuring the main 
subjects and work hypotheses of their influence upon knowledge. The elements described 
in each box are the main concepts to be discussed. The arrows between the boxes 
illustrate that there are interactions between the concepts and hypotheses about their 
directions of influence. The arrows from the rule- and knowledge tradition towards the 
hierarchical and risk based approaches demonstrate a hypothesis that this fundament will 
influence the implementation of the two approaches. The two-ways directed arrow 
between the hierarchical and risk based approaches indicates that the approaches are 
expected to interact. The arrows from the two approaches towards knowledge and 
rationality represent a hypothesis that the introduction of the approaches will influence 
existing knowledge and rationality. 
 
The theoretical basis for the elements in the framework will be elaborated below. The 
theory will be supplemented in discussions of the study’s results. 
 
3.2 What is a safety rule?  
 
The projects were encouraged to move from the prescriptive rule tradition and develop 
higher order rules; in the Traffic-rule project in the form of goal-oriented rules, in the 
Maintenance-rule projects in the form of triggering requirements. The study covers a 
meeting between different safety rule solutions with different rule-imposers positioned at 
different levels of the organizational hierarchy of the system. Hence the rules also have 
different levels of formality. Therefore, the notion of safety rules has a wide meaning. 
Hale & Swuste (1998) discuss what safety rules are. They consider safety rules as 
constraints imposed from outside on the freedom of choice of individuals or companies. 
They define a safety rule as  
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“…a defined state of a system, or a defined way of behaving in response to a 
predicted situation, established before the event and imposed upon and/or 
accepted by those operating in the system as a way of improving safety or 
achieving a required level of safety.”  
(Hale & Swuste, 1998, p 164)  
 
For the purpose of the thesis, this wide definition of safety rules is applied. However, this 
study does not extract a modification process of pure safety rule. The rules to be modified 
serve both safety and other purposes. Therefore, it studies a modification process of 
safety rules together with rules serving other purposes. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
Norwegian railway system has traditionally distinguished between traffic safety and other 
aspects of safety. The major safety concern in the rules to be modified is traffic safety, 
that is to say, the means to prevent trains from derailing or collision (Ryggvik, 2004).  
 
The form of rules can range from unwritten rules to written statutory codes (Hood, 
Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001). The work of the projects in this study focuses on formal 
written safety rules imposed upon rule-followers from outside. Rules issued at the level 
of the authorities are labeled laws and regulations and constitute the safety legislation. 
When found to be clarifying this distinction will be used. In other cases the general term 
“rules” will be used.   
 
The necessity of safety rules is thoroughly discussed by Hale and his associates in several 
articles (Hale, 1990, Hale & Swuste, 1998; Hopkins & Hale, 2002). Their conclusion is 
that safety rules are needed. Regarding railways, the work of SAMRAIL illustrates that 
safety rules have an important role in achieving safety performance (European 
Commission, 2004c). Hale et al. (2003) argue that in a complex system like the railway, 
safety rules are needed to make the system behave in a predictable way for all system 
elements, both people and hardware. Further they are needed to show how the system 
must be managed to achieve its objectives.  
 
However there is still a question whether safety rules are an appropriate solution for the 
control of risk at stake. The European Directive of Machinery Safety (CEN, 1991) 
illustrates that other solutions might be available and that rules can serve different 
functions. First the need for safety rules might be removed by better design. Further, if 
isolation or guarding is applied, these might have different forms and hence, require 
different rules. Safety rules might be applied to introduce and maintain safety barriers. As 
the last solution, rules can be introduced as compensation for lacking technical barriers. 
 
The need for rules can also be related to the competency and motivation of the involved 
actors. Reason (1997) distinguishes between two main kinds of controls of a system’s 
defenses against accidents. Safety rules represent the external control of the system’s 
defenses. A system’s internal control is derived from the knowledge and principles 
acquired through training and experience. Between these two are various blends and 
mixtures. Hale (1990) holds the position that it is not necessary to impose rules from 
outside if the normal rules that the regulated devise for themselves can cope adequately. 
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Hale & Swuste (1998) ask when it is best to leave the personnel taking the action to 
decide for themselves how to proceed safely and when it is appropriate and/or acceptable 
that their freedom of choice is limited by getting someone else to decide what the action 
should be.  
 
The request for rules might be dependent on the context of control and enforcement. Hale 
& Swuste (1998) argue the more compliance is stressed, the more rules are used as a 
basis for assessing behavior by punishment or reward and the more disputes between 
parties over the behavior expressed in the rules, the more there is pressure to define the 
rule at a management or regulatory level in terms that are easy, quantifiable and verifiable. 
This reduces the complication and expense of disputes of interpretation.  
 
Further, the competition between alternatives of safety and other benefits is a concern. 
DG Energy and Transport has performed case studies of European railways (DG Energy 
and Transport, 2000). These revealed that there are difficulties in acknowledging choice 
situations between safety and other benefits. The report concludes that due processes 
including clear and consistent decision rules for standard setting are particularly 
important for railways. The importance of explicit rules for policy criteria is underlined.  
 
These discussions reveal that the use of safety rules raises a whole range of practical and 
ethical problems. The study is limited to the modification processes themselves. It does 
not include studies of, for instance, implementation and use of rules. Therefore, these 
issues will only be touched upon when found to be of vital importance for the purpose of 
increased understanding of modification processes.   
 
3.3 The hierarchical approach  
 
As the introduction of a hierarchical approach to rule modification in the Norwegian 
Railway system represents a meeting between two rule traditions, it is an ambitious task.  
 
The rules to be modified in the projects had a history in the former NSB. As illustrated in 
Chapter 2 this organization had a typically bureaucratic, hierarchical structure. There was 
extensive use of prescriptive safety rules issued by the higher levels of the system and 
directed at the lower operative levels. This rule tradition is in accordance with the 
descriptions that Weber (2000) made of bureaucratic systems. He found that an important 
element in bureaucratic systems were rules related to professionalism. He argued that the 
main purpose of laws, requirements and rules issued by the higher levels of the system 
was to create predictability of behavior, especially at the individual lower levels of the 
organizational hierarchies. In the railway tradition the rules were directed at predictability 
regarding safe and predictable traffic performance. They were developed with evolving 
knowledge of the technical system and practical experiences. 
 
Accordingly, safety rules were not differentiated and organized in a hierarchy. First, they 
were not differentiated regarding different rule principles. Second, the general pattern 
was that rule-imposers were centralized instead of distributed in the organizational 
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hierarchy of the system. Third, safety rules were usually not developed for different 
levels of rule-followers. However, occasionally the management was held responsible 
when accidents happened (Ryggvik, 2004). 
 
The ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system described in Chapter 2 have 
changed the conditions for such a system. The context has become more dynamic and 
influenced by international development. The system had developed into a more divided 
organizational structure with more actors and changed distributions of responsibilities 
and authority. The introduction of the internal control principle by the Inspectorate and 
the expectation to the projects to introduce goal-oriented and triggering requirements 
represents a break with the former prescriptive rule tradition. The Inspectorate’s choice of 
applying the internal control principle and the limited use of democratic principles for 
traffic safety also implies a predominantly deductive approach to rule development in this 
field. In addition, the changes include increased emphasis upon competition and cost-
effectiveness that can be seen as a more hostile environment, a less homogenous work 
force and uncertainties related to the educational system. 
 
All together this development represents moves towards a more hierarchical approach to 
rule development regarding all four dimensions introduced in Chapter 1. These are the 
rule hierarchy, the hierarchical positions of the rule-imposer and the rule-follower in the 
organizational hierarchy of the system and a predominantly deductive strategy for rule 
development.  
 
This development is also reflected in the two rule modification projects to be studied. The 
suggested rule solutions introduce new types of rules that can be seen as overarching 
rules for prescriptive rules. This strengthens the opportunities for alternative solutions 
regarding rule principles. The rules had to be related to the new distribution of 
responsibilities and authority within the railway system. This refers both to potential rule-
imposers and rule-followers. The work is done within the frames of internal control 
principles and the application of these upon the field of traffic safety.  
 
The four dimensions will be elaborated in the next sections and related to the current 
development of the Norwegian railway system. 
 
3.3.1 Hierarchy of rule solutions 
 
The fist hierarchical dimension at stake is the hierarchy of rule solutions. As will be 
discussed below, the different rule solutions are associated with different control 
principles. Furthermore, they contain different requirements and are seen to be more or 
less suitable for different contexts. 
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3.3.1.1 Rule solutions, their control principles and their interrelationship 
 
The suggested rule solutions for the projects represent a change in the inherent control 
principles of the rules compared to the prescriptive rules of the former NSB 
 
Goal-oriented rules such as the Traffic rule case was encourages to apply are rules 
formulated as goals and linked to the strategy of management by objectives. Such rules 
are based on feedback output control that is predominantly discretionary (Reason, 1997). 
Here the rules specify the goals of the safety output but not the rules for the direct risk 
control function. In other words, they impose no rules as to how the goals should be 
achieved (Hale & Swuste, 1998). Such rules require frequent comparisons of 
performance with goals; the system is controlled by closed-loop feedback strategies 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). This also requires performance indicators (Kjellén, 2000). 
Output control depends primarily upon organizational control by social (or group) 
controls and self- (or individual) controls (Reason et al. 1998). Such rules communicate 
expectations and explain why certain actions have to be taken. This means that they have 
a “BECAUSE” content (Hale, 1990). The focus of the goal-oriented rules can be directed 
towards technical equipment, human performance and organizational conditions.  
 
An example of a goal-oriented rule directed at organizational conditions is § 5 in the new 
regulation for education:  
 
“The one who runs railway activities has to decide scope and frequency for 
repetition of education for those tasks mentioned in § 1 to ensure that built up 
knowledge, built-up skills and attitudes are maintained.” 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 2002) 
 
This rule describes a goal to maintain built-up knowledge, skills and attitudes. Further, it 
describes why certain actions have to be done, i.e. a BECAUSE element but not exact 
descriptions for how they shall be done. 
 
Prescriptive rules such as the traditional rules of the former NSB represent process 
control that attempts to standardize the work process (Reason et al., 1998). They 
prescribe what to do in response to certain situations. This means that they have an IF-
THEN form (Hale, 1990). The prescriptive rules are based on the principles of feed 
forward process control (Reason, 1997). Here the system is controlled by pre-planned 
strategies and prescriptive procedures (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). The process 
control relies wholly upon direct guidance from centralized management (via rules and 
procedures) (Reason et al., 1998). 
 
An example of a prescriptive rule is §2.24 in the regulations concerning traffic control 
and rail traffic on the national railway network and connecting private tracks that are 
under revision: 
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“ When colliding with large wildlife or livestock the engine driver shall as soon 
as possible give notice to the train dispatcher or the traffic controller with 
information about what kind of animal was hit,  where the animal went, or is lying 
and what has been done with it.” 
      (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2001b) 
 
This rule prescribes the actions that the rule-follower, in this case the engine driver has to 
take under certain conditions, i.e. IF-THEN prescriptions. Furthermore, it prescribes in 
detail how these have to be done. 
 
Reason (1997) also describes the mixture between the two underlying control principles 
of the goal-oriented and prescriptive rules, i.e. a mixed feedback and feed forward control. 
Here output measures are frequently compared with organizational objectives. The 
deviant performances are corrected and the congruent performance is stored as rules and 
procedures. The triggering requirements that the Maintenance-rule project intended to 
implement combined both feedback and feed forward control principles. First the defined 
standards, i.e. the IF-condition of the rules, had a function both as a condition that 
required action and as reference for the maintenance activities. Accordingly the IF 
condition of these rules had elements for feedback and outcome orientation. Second, the 
requirements to act, i.e. the then condition of the rules represent a feed forward element 
prescribing an action. However, the intention of these rules was not go into detail 
describing how the prescribed actions should be done.  
 
An example of a triggering requirement can be taken from the revised Maintenance-rules 
of the Superstructure case. The rule is developed for controlling quality of wooden 
sleepers:  
 
“If 3 or more sleeper screws for each plate are loose after tightening until 150 
Nm, the tie shall be changed.” 
     (Jernbaneverket, 2004, Chapter 2, no. 8.3) 
 
This requirement contains a prescriptive IF-THEN element that a sleeper has to be 
changed if it is so weak that it does not hold three or more of the screw sufficiently tight 
after the described tightening but not how this change should be done. Implicit here is a 
goal that ties should be in a better state than this; ties have to be changed BECAUSE they 
are weaker than the condition described in the rule. 
 
These rule solutions can be placed in a hierarchy with respect to each other. The 
prescriptive rules are supposed to describe the control functions that serve the purpose of 
safety goals expressed in safety rules. Accordingly, goal-oriented rules can be considered 
as higher order rules while the prescriptive rules as lower order. The mixed solution that 
triggering requirements represents, can bee seen as a rule solution that belongs to the 
mid-range level.  
 
This mixed mid-range solution is different from that suggested by Hale (1990) and 
followed up by Hale & Swuste (1998). Their suggestion is to introduce a mid-range type 
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of rule that prescribes procedures for arriving at decisions about IF-THEN rules. These 
rules limit the freedom to choose how decisions are arrived at regarding the translations 
between goal-oriented rules and prescriptive rules. An example of this latter solution is 
found in directives and standards issued by EU (See for instance the European Directive 
of Machinery Safety (CEN, 1991). The same is seen, for instance, in later changes in 
standards issued by the ISO where there is an increased emphasis upon processes (See for 
instance the ISO 9000 publications)  
 
In this study the hierarchy of rule solutions will distinguish between high order-, mid 
range- and low order rules. The high order rules are the rules directed at management and 
decision-making, i.e. internal control and goal-oriented rules. The mid range rules are 
rules that combine feedback and feed forward control such as the described triggering 
requirements or procedures for arriving at prescriptive rules such as described by Hale & 
Swuste (1998). i.e. triggering requirements. Low order rules are the prescriptive rules 
such as the ones traditionally dominating the Norwegian railway system.  
 
3.3.1.2 Inherent requirements in the solutions 
 
Inherent in the rule solution there are different requirements to rule-imposer’s and rule-
follower’s competency.  
 
With respect to the goal-oriented rule solution Hale (1990) argues that general principles 
such as objectives can be formulated quite generally. To develop such rules it is not 
necessary that the rule-imposer possess detailed knowledge of the context of the rules, the 
emphasis is upon the results of the regulated activities.  
 
Regarding the rule-follower, Rasmussen (1983) distinguishes between skill-, rule-, and 
knowledge based levels of functioning. Hale & Swuste (1998) discuss this distinction and 
links goal-oriented rules to the knowledge based levels. According to Rasmussen & 
Svedung (2000), this level of functioning requires understanding of the relational, causal 
structure of the work system, that is, a correct mental model of system. Furthermore, it 
requires knowledge about system goals, safety conditions and regulatory constraints on 
performance. Rasmussen & Svedung (2000) argue that at this level the control is based 
on deduction of rules for action. This also requires time to think and decide. Baumard 
(1999) considers the construction of mental models to be a learning process. In 
accordance with this Reason (1997) argues that the discretionary feedback output control 
associated with goal-oriented rules is based on training and experiences.  
 
With respect to the prescriptive rule solution Hale (1990) argues that the condition IF 
must be possible to perceive and understand, the actors has to be familiar with it and it 
has to equate the reality. This put demands on the competency of both the rule-imposer 
and the rule-follower.  
 
Regarding the rule-imposer, Hale (1990) finds that prescriptive rules require good 
understanding of the context of the rules by the rule-imposer. The rule imposer has to 
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posit the ability to define safe actions/states in advance (Hale & Swuste, 1998). This also 
requires that it is possible to foresee what a safe action or state is. Reason et al. (1998) 
add that the immense variety of potentially hazardous situations requires that much of the 
fine control for safe behavior is delivered at the level of the individual work group. 
Further, prescriptive rules necessitate the ability to modify the rules in accordance to 
changing conditions. It is a challenge to follow up such rules under rapidly changing 
conditions (Rasmussen, 1997). Hale (1990) warns that an organization that becomes too 
obsessed with codifying the existing situations may trap itself into a lack of flexibility or 
the belief that it has developed its rules once and for all.  
 
Regarding the rule-follower, Hale & Swuste (1998) state that procedures and work 
instructions, i.e. prescriptive rules are in accordance with the skill- and rule-based levels 
of functioning of Rasmussen (1983). Rasmussen & Svedung (2000) argue that at the 
skill-based level of functioning control is based on sensory-motor routines that relate to 
familiar circumstances. Competence at this level is achieved by development of a 
repertoire of dynamic behavioral patterns that are synchronized effectively with the 
behavior of the workspace. Accordingly this level of functioning requires little time to 
think. At the rule based level of functioning control is based on the actors’ choice of two 
or more familiar patterns. The rule based level requires enough competencies to 
recognize the situation, knowledge of suitable alternative actions, the ability to choose the 
right option and to carry this action through. Hence, when risk control is based on 
prescriptive rules, the requirement to the rule-followers’ competency is to perform 
routines quickly and smoothly and/or to recognize the situation sufficiently to make the 
right choice between known options for action. Reason (1997) argues that the longer and 
more intensive an individual’s training is the less likely it is that this person is governed 
by rigid feed forward controls and conversely. 
 
With respect to the two mid range rule solutions these contain different requirements. The 
mixed solution including both feed forward and feedback control principles. Accordingly 
it requires that the rule-imposer has both the ability to formulate objectives and possess 
enough contextual knowledge to be able to express what safe actions or conditions are. 
The rule-followers must posses the qualifications required for both goal-oriented and 
prescriptive rules.  
 
Concerning the procedural rules for decision-making the content of such rules as 
described by Hale & Swuste (1998) implies that the rule-imposer might be able to define 
the people who must be involved in the decision, the methods to be used for searching, 
the parameters which must be considered in judging the appropriateness of the course of 
action etc. The rule-follower must be able to apply the required methods, define the 
course of action and judge the appropriateness of the latter with respect to the parameters.  
 
3.3.1.3 Suitability of rule solutions for different contexts 
 
As already revealed in Chapter 1, goal-oriented rules are considered to be more flexible 
and adaptive to changing conditions than prescriptive rules (Becker, 2002; Maidment, 
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2002; Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason et al. 1998). They don’t 
contain prescriptions made in advance about how to proceed safely (Hale & Swuste, 1998) 
 
Becker (2002) comments upon the development towards increased use of goal-oriented 
rules in legislation. He argues that one of the driving arguments is that goal-oriented rules 
will keep pace with technological change and permit better adaptation to the increased 
competition on the worldwide markets. Further Reason et al. (1998) find that this solution 
is often necessary when tasks are complex. Such tasks that are non-routine, poorly 
structured and unpredictable do not lend themselves to proceduralization. This is because 
there are too many exceptional cases. Hale (1990) argues that goal-oriented rules can be 
useful in situations where there is a danger of erosion of the more prescriptive rules. His 
examples of such situations are when there are conflicting interests between actors and/or 
where the value of the rules cannot be shown in the short term.  
 
The requirements of the goal-oriented rules discussed above to characteristics of the rule-
imposers and rule-followers competency can also be seen as important contextual factors 
that makes goal-oriented rules more or less suitable to the actual context. Furthermore, 
this type of rules requires that there is sufficient time to translate goal-oriented rules into 
prescriptive action or state rules.  
 
The prescriptive rules are based on preplanned control and require predictability 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). The decision how to proceed safety is taken in advance 
(Hale & Swuste, 1998). Tasks which are routine, repetitive and easy to perform lend 
themselves to rules (Reason et al., 1998). Hence, prescriptive rules require some degree 
of stability but little time to think when the tasks are performed (Rasmussen & Svedung, 
2000). Minzberg (1979) consider standardization of work processes and standardization 
of skills to be important coordination mechanisms in bureaucracies with predictable 
environments. As will be further elaborated in the next subsection, Perrow (1999) also 
discuss coordination in his Normal Accident theory. He finds that centralized 
coordination, i.e. prescriptive rules issued from a central level of an organizational system 
is necessary when a system is linear with tight coupling. 
 
The requirements of the prescriptive rules discussed above to characteristics of the rule-
imposers and rule-followers competency can also be seen as important contextual factors 
that makes prescriptive rules more or less suitable to the actual context.  
 
One challenge with prescriptive rules is that it is difficult to develop rules to cover all 
dangerous situations. Building upon Ashby’s law of requisite variety, Reason (1997) 
argues that the procedures necessary to govern safe behavior will always be less than the 
possible variety of unsafe situations. It is also impossible to foresee all local 
contingencies of the future work context (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). 
 
As Section 2.1 revealed, there are ongoing organizational changes in the Norwegian 
railway system. In general these have moved it towards a less stable, more competitive 
system.  The competition implies that the organization face a potentially, more hostile 
environment. According to Minzberg (1979) such conditions might make the system less 
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predictable and standardization of the work processes and skills must be able to react 
faster to follow up the development. If not, the system must look for alternative 
coordination mechanisms in the activities.  
 
However, the challenge of reduced stability in the Norwegian railway system is not 
necessarily solved with the introduction of more outcome-oriented rules. Outcome-
oriented rules are more flexible regarding alternative solutions for work processes and 
competency as long as outcomes of activities are in accordance with the requirements in 
the rules. This can be seen as if the main coordination mechanism of the safety work 
moves towards more standardization of outputs. The problem is that according to 
Minzberg (1979) this coordination mechanism also calls for stability.  
 
3.3.1.4 Changing rule solutions 
 
All together the discussions in this section illustrate that the plan for the projects to move 
from low level prescriptive rules towards mid range triggering requirements and higher 
level goal-oriented rules is rather challenging. First, it represents a change in the control 
principle and hence in the focus of the rule development. The outcome of activities is the 
main factor that receives attention. Second, the suggested rule solutions require different 
competencies by the rule-imposers. The development of prescriptive rules requires good 
knowledge of how things have to be done to achieve safe performance in a given context. 
The development of more outcome-oriented rules require more general understanding of 
the safety purpose of the activities; it is necessary to know why activities have to be done. 
Third the suggested rule solutions require different competencies by the rule-followers as 
well. The rule-follower has to possess and be able to use mental models of the system 
function to search for suitable solutions that fulfill the requirements of the rules. Fourth, 
the higher order solutions require certain conditions of the situations. The situation must 
be understandable, there must be time enough to decide what to do and if safe decisions 
require special conditions in the given context. In addition the suggested solutions might 
not solve the challenges of less predictable conditions. 
 
Hence, to choose rule solutions is complicated. Different conditions must be taken into 
consideration. In the projects of the study, preferences for rule solutions were given in 
advance. What if the solution does not fit the actual conditions? 
 
3.3.2 Rule solution and hierarchical position of rule-imposer and -follower 
 
The second and third hierarchical dimensions to be discussed are the hierarchical 
positions of the rule-imposer and the rule-follower. In the following it will be elaborated 
that there might be some parallels between these positions and rule solutions. However, it 
will also be elaborated that when choosing rule solutions for the actual situations there 
are other factors than these hierarchical positions that can come into play. 
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3.3.2.1 Indications of links between rules’ hierarchy and organizational hierarchies 
 
One of the purposes of the projects was to develop the rules in accordance with changed 
responsibilities in the Norwegian railway system. As already indicated, there are two 
main actors involved here; the rule-imposer and the rule-follower (Hale & Swuste, 1998). 
The rule-imposer creates rules that are imposed upon the rule-follower. The rules restrict 
the action freedom of the rule-follower. To be able to impose the rules, the rule-imposer 
must have authority over the rule-follower. 
 
Many theorists apply a hierarchical approach to organizational systems (See for instance 
Hale & Swuste, 1998; Rasmussen, 1997). At the top is the macro level of national and 
international systems that includes political and regulatory institutions. The mid range 
levels or meso levels include company or industry levels, in other words the management. 
The lowest levels called the micro levels, relate to small work groups and individuals.  
 
In hierarchical systems the power of the rule-imposer to impose rules upon the rule-
follower is usually related to their placing on the hierarchy, i.e. the rule-imposer is 
positioned at a higher level than the rule-follower.   
 
In the 1960s and 1970s there was a trend that advocated for framework rules formulated 
as goals, to be filled in lower down in the system hierarchy with detailed action rules 
(Hale et al., 2003). The internal control principles can be associated with this trend. As 
revealed in Chapter 1, these principles imply a logical chain of inferences between 
authorities, companies and parties (Flagstad, 1995).  
 
Hale & Swuste (1998) ask who is best placed in what types of situations to impose what 
level of limitation. Furthermore, Hale et al. (2003) find that to decide which of the 
overarching rules that needs to be explicitly defined and imposed to one degree or 
another on the system actors are the step in rule development that is most controversial 
and where there is least guidance.  
 
Hale et al. (1997) distinguish between three levels of activity. At the execution level the 
actions of those involved directly influence the occurrence and control of the hazards 
(deviation). The system structure and management level is concerned with the overall 
principles of the safety management system, how it is set up and maintained and how it 
functions. The planning, organization and procedure level is concerned with devising and 
formalizing the actions to be taken at the execution level in respect to the whole range of 
expected hazards. They underlines that these three levels are abstractions that are not to 
be seen as contiguous with the levels of the organizational hierarchy. On this foundation 
Hale & Swuste (1998) find goal setting and evaluation to be linked to the highest level of 
the safety management system, policy development and procedures to the mid range and 
execution of work instructions to the lowest. They avoid any specification of who the 
rule- imposers and rule-followers are.  
 
Hale et al. (2003) follow up these discussions of safety rule management. They 
summarize the general proposal that goals should be set high in the organization. These 
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should be translated in a level below into procedures for arriving at decisions. Where 
necessary, as close as possible to the work floor (or other on-line risk control point) the 
goals should be translated into specific action steps. Only when there are overarching 
reasons action/state rules should be specified high in the organization.  
 
Reason (1997) provides and additional argument for this approach. He argues that the 
balance between feed forward and feedback control modes will depend on an individual’s 
position within the hierarchy. The higher the individual’s position within the organization, 
the harder it is to proceduralize the job. In relatively bureaucratic organizations Reason 
expects top management to operate mainly by feedback driven output controls, with the 
reverse being true for those at the “sharp end”. Middle management and first-line 
supervisors would occupy intermediate positions. Accordingly they fit the solutions that 
mix feed forward and feedback principles.   
 
The preceding discussions can also be related to the rule-imposer’s proximity and 
knowledge of the actual context already discussed in the previous subsection. As 
discussed, general principles and objectives are not context specific and do not require 
context specific knowledge to the same extent as prescriptions. For this reason Hale 
(1990) argues that such rules can be worked out centrally, i.e. at the higher organizational 
levels. The context specific prescriptive rules must be worked out more locally. If not, 
they will have too many exceptions to be useful. Along with this, Hale & Swuste (1998) 
argue that the more rapidly innovation takes place in a system, the lower the level at 
which the translation to action/state rules needs to be.  
 
Hale et al. (2003) go further and discuss where the expertise lies. They argue that detailed 
rules for risk control of a given technology can only be written by experts with deep 
experience of designing or operating that technology. There is a question whether the 
government regulator has or can buy such expertise. They also ask what expertise is 
brought to bear and in which way in testing the appropriateness and applicability of the 
rules. 
 
These discussions raise the question of participation in the rule development. Hale (1990) 
argues that detailed rules formulated at the central level will be represented as being 
imposed from outside by people who have no understanding of the realities of the 
specific situations. This implies that participation might influence the attitudes towards 
the rules and hence the motivation to comply. Hale et al. (2003) suggest to involve the 
rule-followers in rule development and reviewing the rule system.  
 
Hopkins (2000) argues that framework rules leave more responsibility to the actors 
themselves to decide their means in the safety work and require active employee 
participation. He finds this to be on line with the democratic development. As presented 
in Chapter 1 the internal control principles also includes elements of participation and 
industrial democracy (Hovden, 1998a).  
 
The discussions above indicate a link between the hierarchy of rule solutions and 
organizational hierarchies. The hypothesis is that a high position of rule-imposer in the 
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system’s organizational hierarchy calls for higher order rule solutions directed at rule-
followers at lower levels. The lower levels in the organizational hierarchy translate these 
rules into lower level prescriptive action/state rules.  
 
The incitements to the projects of the study fit in with this hypothesis: The Traffic-rule 
project with a rule-imposer positioned high up in the organizational hierarchy of the 
Norwegian railway system has got an incitement to apply goal-oriented rules positioned 
high up in the rules’ hierarchy. The Maintenance-rule project with a rule-imposer at a mid 
range position has got an incitement to apply the mid range rule solution of triggering 
requirements. 
 
However, in the theory presented above it remains a question at what level of the 
organizational hierarchies the translations from higher level rule solutions to lower should 
occur. The discussions above have also revealed that the link between the two hierarchies 
is not simple and straight forward.  
 
3.3.2.2 Factors confusing hierarchical links 
 
Theory discusses several elements that confuse the links between rules’ hierarchy and 
organizational hierarchies.  
 
A hierarchical organizational structure? 
 
The hierarchical structure of a system can be questioned. The above discussions of Hale 
and his associates refer to hierarchies of activities or functions associated with safety 
management systems (Hale et al., 1997; Hale & Swuste, 1998; Hale et al., 2003). These 
do not necessarily parallel organizational hierarchies. Furthermore, Minzberg (1979) has 
illustrated that organizations might consist of at least five interacting parts. He sees the 
organization as a system of flow processes where the different flows can be in many 
directions that do not necessarily parallel the organizational hierarchy. The flow of formal 
authority might have a hierarchical structure while the operating work-flow, the flow of 
control information and decisions and the flow of staff information might have other 
features. Further he points to the important role of the flow of informal communication, 
work constellations and ad hoc decision processes. Lave & Wenger (1991) illustrate that 
there might exist important communities of practice based on what their members 
understand as important. These do not necessarily follow the formal organizational 
structures and division of tasks. In addition, the increasing reorientation from hierarchical 
systems towards more horizontal organizing and coordination and networking confuse 
the hierarchical picture (Ellström, 2001a).  
 
Even though the Norwegian railway system has a tradition of a bureaucratic hierarchical 
organizational structure, the theories of Minzberg (1979) and Lave & Wenger (1991) 
illustrate that there might have been and still can be important flow processes and 
communities of practice that follow other structures. For instance, Section 
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2.2.demonstrates that the rule-developers of the former NSB often included a dialogue 
with their network within the organization in their modification work. The network was 
influenced by recruitment patterns and the educational system of the organization. 
Further, the division of the system into separate organizations and the increased use of 
subcontractors might result in different organizational solutions.  
 
Characteristics of the system 
 
The Norwegian railway system as such also holds certain conditions. In his Normal 
Accident theory, Perrow (1999) argues that technical systems can be evaluated with 
respect to two characteristics. The first of these is the system’s degree of complexity 
versus linearity. This refers to the system’s spacing of equipment and subsystems and 
their connections, access to substitutes when equipment or subsystems fail, features of 
control systems, features of information flow and the involved actors’ understanding of 
the system. The second is that of tight or loose coupling. This refers to the system’s 
vulnerability for delays and changes in the order of sequences, delays in supplies, 
equipment and personnel. It also refers to the system’s access to and form of buffers, 
redundancies and substitutes and the limitations it puts upon possible methods to achieve 
goals. Furthermore, Perrow (1999) discusses the position of the railways along these axes 
and considers the complexity of railways as linear and the coupling as tight. As revealed, 
he argues that systems characterized by linearity and tight coupling are best when their 
coordination is centralized. Hence, his theory supports the practice of the former NSB 
with extensive use of centrally issued prescriptive rules.  
 
Hale & Swuste (1998) build upon this theory of Perrow. They argue that when there is 
much interaction between individuals and small groups, it is important that these 
individuals or groups follow the same rules and the individuals or groups are spread over 
different physical regions or different organizations, action/state rules must be agreed and 
imposed at high levels of the system. Hale et al. (2003) discuss this and consider railways 
to be such a system. Also, in contradiction to the hierarchical approach, many of the 
Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI) at the European level are written as 
specific action rules (European Commission, 2004b). However, Hale et al. argue that to 
harmonize detailed rules across a distributed system will require that extra efforts to 
involve and inform the rule-followers of how and why the final rules have been arrived at. 
 
The ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system seem to influence its position 
regarding the characteristics of complexity versus linearity as described by Perrow (1999). 
In spite of linearity in activities, the division of the system and the new actors might 
create more complex communication patterns. The communication might be even more 
complex because the new organizations might develop different types of organizational 
structures. New actors, division of the system, pressure on costs of education and training 
and a less stable work force might also make the actors themselves experience the system 
as more complex than before. In addition the increased emphasis on cost-efficiency might 
cause a development towards tighter coupling of the regulated areas. This is apparent in 
reduced staffing and tighter timeframes that allow for less slack. According to Perrow 
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this development might create a tension between the modes of centralization and 
decentralization. This happens in a time when the division of the railway system also 
reduces the system orientation (DG Energy and Transport, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, LaPorte & Consolini (1991) have studied organizational preconditions to 
safe and reliable operations in “High Reliability Organizations” (hereafter labeled HRO). 
These are organizations operating in high-risk contexts where prevailing structural 
properties of work tasks are ones of high complexity and tight coupling. These 
organizations had a work force of highly trained experts who were involved in intense 
consultation, mutual checking and communication about safe actions. Rosness (2001) 
termed this recovery capability “organizational redundancy”. According to LaPorte & 
Consolini flexibility is one of the defining properties of such organizations. They related 
flexibility to resilience and competence that made it possible to switch between different 
modes of operation dependent on requirements of the situation.  
 
Rosness (2003) discuss that the detailed prescriptive Traffic safety rules of the 
Norwegian railway system are a means to build organizational redundancy, i.e. to build a 
setting where most erroneous actions are detected and corrected by other actors before 
they lead to an accident. Further, with reference to Perrow’s Normal Accident theory he 
discusses the role of detailed prescriptive rules as a means to coordinate safety critical 
activities when the technology is tightly coupled such as in the Norwegian railway system.  
 
In addition, as revealed in Chapter 2 the work force of the system has been highly trained 
railway personnel. In some activities organizational conditions allowed for mutual 
checking and communication for instance in the former practice where there were two 
engine drivers in trains. However, as demonstrated the demands of cost-efficiency has 
caused pressure to shorten the railway education including the trainee periods and staff 
reductions, for instance as seen in the reduction of the number of engine drivers from two 
to one22.  
 
Translation of rules and democratic elements 
 
The task to translate goal-oriented rules at the lower organizational levels and the 
democratic element of this can be questioned. As already revealed when discussing the 
inherent requirement of the different rule solutions, the translation from higher order 
goal-oriented rules to prescriptive rules implies a possibility to foresee potential 
dangerous situations and to identify what safe actions/states are. This includes that those 
involved in the task are capable of functioning at a knowledge based level. The 
translation also requires that there is sufficient time to make proper decisions. (See for 
instance Hale 1990; Hale & Swuste, 1998; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). 
 
One challenge with the goal-oriented rules discussed in the Norwegian oil industry is that 
a to abstract and academic rule form might weaken possibilities for lay opinions (Hovden, 
2002). In Norway inclusion of the lay opinion of the employees is regulated by law in the 
                                                 
22 Information from interviewees 
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Working Environment Act (Arbeidsmiljøloven) (Friberg, 1995). As mentioned in Chapter 
2, the Norwegian railway system has had a tradition to involve highly competent rail 
professionals in the rule modification work of rules directed at traffic safety, but not trade 
unions or operative staff in a more democratic sense. Furthermore, the Inspectorate has 
not emphasized the democratic elements in their application of the internal control 
principles on this field.   
 
In addition, Hale et al. (2003) find that in the Dutch railway system, there is no such thing 
as a cohesive work group. This is attributed to the distributed nature of the system with 
constant traveling of the majority of the staff, limitations upon communication and the 
recent division of former monopolist into different companies. As will be described in 
Chapter 5 this is also a problem for the Norwegian railway system. 
 
There is a question of trust when translating goal-oriented rules. Kirwan et al. (2002) 
question whether to discover and define risk is a task for the regulator or the regulated. 
They conclude that the preference seems to be placing this task with the creator and 
manager of the risk, not on the regulator. However, they raise the question whether this is 
satisfactory. They ask if actors can be trusted to discover and reveal their own problems, 
when this causes them to incur the costs to control them. The accident reports of the two 
recent serious railway accidents have also raised this question to the Norwegian railway 
system (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2000b). Furthermore, Rosness (2004a) questions 
whether competing organizations such as those of the Norwegian railway system are the 
most relevant actors to be responsible for the coordination and cooperation of risk  
control. 
 
Rasmussen (1997) discusses the relationship between the rule-followers and their context. 
He argues that there is a danger that pressures of efficiency and least efforts might cause 
migration towards the boundaries of safe performance. Rasmussen & Svedung (2000) 
follow up this thinking and find it necessary to identify the decision-makers and actors 
who are involved in the control of the productive processes at the relevant levels of the 
system. The ongoing changes in the Norwegian railway system with organizational 
changes, division of the former system and new actors might make it more difficult to get 
an overview of decision-makers. 
 
Inherent in the ongoing privatization process of the Norwegian railway system there is 
also an intention to prepare conditions that enhance competition. This includes making it 
possible for new actors to enter the field and to make the existing actors able to compete. 
Becker (2002) argues that it is not a simple task for the regulated organizations to follow 
up goal-oriented rules imposed upon them with local rules. Accordingly, the use of goal-
oriented rules might favor organizations that already possess rules that can be seen to 
follow up goal oriented rules.   
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A potential problem for the cases 
 
Even though the suggested rule solutions fit neatly into a hierarchical thinking of rule 
solutions and organizational hierarchies, the discussions above demonstrate that there 
might be a question of their suitability to the actual conditions. This raises the question 
for the study whether the cases faced the problem that the suggested rule solution did not 
fit the actual conditions. If yes, the follow up question becomes how they solved this 
problem.  
 
3.3.3 A hierarchical top-down approach to the development of rule systems 
 
The last element of the hierarchical approach is the direction of the task to develop rule 
systems. Should the development be driven deductive top-down or inductive bottom-up, 
in other words, should the development start with the higher order central rules and end 
with derived lower level prescriptive rules or the opposite? Or may be the development 
should combine the two approaches such as the internal control principles does?  
 
There are many incitements in favor of a deductive top-down approach to rule 
development. First, when higher order rules are applied at the governmental level, this 
approach is often labeled self-regulation (Hopkins, 2000; Reason, 1997). It is up to the 
enterprise to work out how to achieve safety, the governments provide a legislative 
framework to achieve this outcome and remain willing to take enforcement action when 
necessary (Hopkins, 2000).  
 
Second, Hale (1990), Hale & Swuste (1998) present the thesis to see the rule as a 
progressive limitation of freedom of choice; limiting first the goals, then how decisions 
are arrived at and finally limiting the actions themselves.   
 
Third, Reason (1997) argues that the stage reached in the organization’s life history will 
influence the opportunities for feed forward and feedback control modes. In the early 
stages the work will be governed mainly by trial and error and feedback control where the 
focus is on zero deviations between output measures and organizational goals. As 
organizational learning proceeds and the work becomes increasingly standardized, feed 
forward controls start to dominate feedback controls.   
 
Fourth, as discussed, this approach is also an inherent element in the internal control 
principle (Flagstad, 1995; Hovden, 1998a). This implies a deductive top down approach 
to rule development. As both Hovden and Hopkins (2000) discuss, if democratic 
elements are included in the rule development, there might also be an inductive bottom-
up element in this approach. However, the introduction to the Norwegian railway system 
revealed that this element is weak in the application of internal control principles upon 
traffic safety. Therefore, one can say that here the deductive top-down approach 
dominates.  
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Fifth, a degree of central top-down regulation is inevitable in order to achieve 
harmonization and allow inter-operability within the EU (European Commission, 2004b).  
 
These five points constitutes the fundament for a hypothesis for this study that the 
projects will apply a deductive top-down approach to the rule development. 
 
However, like many other elderly systems, the Norwegian railway system already has 
rules in the lower order prescriptive form but lack the higher order rules. The theory of 
Minzberg (1979) discussed above, indicates that these might have an important role in the 
system’s coordination of activities. Also, Chapter 2 showed that the rules have an 
important role in the system’s knowledge management, in particular regarding the 
education of railway professionals.  
 
All together this discussion of the strategy for rule development and the situation in the 
Norwegian railway system illustrates a problem for the project. Which strategy to choose 
for rule development with incitements for a top-down strategy in a context where 
prescriptive rules already exists?  
 
3.3.4 Problems revealed in theory 
 
This theoretical introduction has so far enlightened four different elements of what is 
labeled a hierarchical approach to rule development in this study. They represent different 
types of hierarchy and the theory provides normative suggestions for solutions.  
 
However, the theory illustrates that these normative suggestions are not simple and 
straightforward and the discussions above have revealed that a number of conditions 
might influence the modification work. An overview of the elements of the hierarchical 
approach, the normative suggestions and associated problems are illustrated in Table 3.1 
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Table 3.1  Hierarchies inherent in what is labeled the hierarchical approach, 
normative implications and related problems 
 
Name of 
hierarchy 
Type of hierarchy Normative 
implications 
Problems revealed 
Rule 
solution 
Type of rule solution:  
o High level 
management- and 
goal-oriented rules 
o Mid range mixed 
solutions or 
decision rules  
o Low level 
prescriptive rules  
Different rule solutions 
require different 
competency both from 
rule-imposer and rule-
follower. 
 
The rule solutions differ 
in their suitability to 
different contexts  
 
The rule solutions differ 
in their vulnerability to 
contextual changes 
Position of 
rule-
imposer 
Level of authority of 
the rule-imposer:  
o High level 
international and 
governmental 
level  
o Mid range 
company and 
management level  
o Low level 
operative 
management 
High level rule-imposers 
impose high level rules 
 
Mid range rule-imposers 
impose mid range rules 
 
Low level rule-imposers 
impose low level rules 
What if the suggested rule 
solutions do not fit the actual 
situation with respect to  
o Competency of rule-
imposer  
o Competency of rule-
follower 
o Rule context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direction of 
rule 
development  
Type of rule solution 
to use as starting point 
for the rule 
development 
Start at higher order 
rules and deduce lower 
level rules from these 
What work strategy to choose 
if low level rules already 
exist? 
 
 
3.4 The risk-based approach  
 
Safety rules are directed at the control of risk. As revealed in Chapter 1 the internal 
control and the hierarchical approach to rule modification requires some kind of risk 
assessment in the work to identify risks and decide means for their control. Further, as 
revealed in Chapter 2 the projects are directly required to apply risk analyses as decision 
support in the modification work.  
 
However, this requirement needs a more thorough introduction. One reason is that the 
concepts of risk and risk-based can have different meanings. Another reason is that there 
exist different methods for risk analyses. In addition the requirement to apply risk 
analyses represents a change in the rule modification tradition of the Norwegian railway 
system that might solve some problems but not all.  
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 3.4.1 Meanings of risk and risk-based 
 
The fact that the concept of risk might have different meanings implies that there might 
be different conceptions of the term represented in the modification work. Furthermore, 
in the projects the application of risk analyses in rule modification work was not specified. 
Below, theory upon these issues will be elaborated.  
 
3.4.1.1 The concept of risk 
 
Due to the central role of the concept of risk it is a problem that there is no commonly 
accepted definition for the term “risk”. Klinke & Renn (2001) discuss that the different 
meanings given to the term creates the immediate danger that when talking about risk, 
everybody talks about something different. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, this is 
also a challenge for the Norwegian railway system.  
 
The different understandings of risk can be linked to history. Lupton (1999) argues that 
the concept of risk has changed its contents over time in accordance with the historical 
development and changing views of dangers, preventive means and perspectives upon 
rationality. She illustrates that the concept might range from the inclusion of everything 
to the perspective where risk is defined as probability multiplied with consequence. 
Shrader-Frechette (1991) links these extremes of the concept to the debate over what 
methodological norms, if any, guarantee the rationality of risk evaluation. The analysts 
are arrayed on a spectrum extending from the cultural relativists to the naïve positivists. 
According to her, the cultural relativists hold the position that risk evaluation is wholly 
relative, in other words the risk concept might include everything. They attempt to reduce 
risk to a sociological construct. On the other hand she finds that the naïve-positivists, 
maintain that risk evaluation is objective, in the sense that different risks may be 
evaluated according to the same rule, for example a rule stipulating that risks below a 
certain level of probability are insignificant, in other words the risk is a calculated entity.  
 
In the risk assessment tradition that is derived from the nuclear and oil industries the two 
main dimensions of risk are the probability of occurrence of an unwanted event and the 
consequence of the anticipated unwanted event (Rausand & Øien, 2004). This has also 
been adapted to railways. SAMNET, a thematic network with the purpose to accompany 
EU harmonization in the railway transport field are on line with this and defines risk as 
“Likelihood of an event occurring and its consequences” (European Commission, 2003a, 
p 8).   
 
However, the Norwegian railway system has a long history. To cover the historical 
development of the risk concept that is most probably reflected in the Norwegian Railway 
system, a wider definition is needed for the study. Klinke & Renn (2001) provide an 
alternative. They argue that all risk concepts share the distinction between reality and 
possibility and offer a definition of risk. According to them:  
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“Risk refers to the possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences 
that affect aspects of what humans value.” 
(Klinke and Renn, 2001, p 160)  
 
This definition will be applied in the study. However, regarding the term “what humans 
value”, the study will limit itself to look into risks that can cause accidents that harms 
people, railway material, railway infrastructure, properties outside the railways or 
environment, i.e. accidents mentioned in the Norwegian Railway Act 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 1993). The discussion of the concept raises the question 
whether a wide inclusive or a narrow risk analytic definition of risk is applied in the 
modification work of the projects.   
 
3.4.1.2 Risk-based and risk informed 
 
The question of what is meant by the requirement that the projects’ rule development 
should be based on risk analyses can be understood as if the results of the risk analyses 
serve as the core fundament for the decisions, i.e. it is completely risk-based. However, 
the limitations of risk analyses are highly recognized (See for instance Aven, 2003; 
Chapman & Dimitrijevic, 1999; Jaeger et al. 2001; Klinke & Renn 2001; Perrow, 1999; 
Rausand & Øien, 2004; Rouhiainen, 1993; Shrader-Frechette 1991). Therefore additional 
approaches are commonly used as decision support, for instance occurrence of accidents, 
redundancy and diversity of equipment and operator reliability (Chapman & Dimitrijevic, 
1999). This means that risk analyses are seen as a useful but not sufficient instrument to 
support decision-making; it needs to be supplemented with additional strategies (Aven, 
2003; Jaeger et al. 2001; Klinke & Renn 2001; Perrow, 1999; Shrader-Frechette 1991). 
 
To emphasize the fact that risk information is not the sole basis for decision-making, the 
term “risk informed” is used for instance by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NCR) (Apostolakis & Vesely (1999). Chapman & Dimitrijevic (1999) provide the 
following definition of risk-informed regulation: 
 
“A regulatory approach in which deterministic principles and operating 
experience are used together with the analytical insights derived from probalistic 
safety or risk assessments to focus plant and regulatory attention on design and 
operational issues most important to safety and public health.” 
 
     (Chapman & Dimitrijevic, 1999, p 251) 
 
This illustrates that within the risk-based approach to rule modification, the risk analyses 
can be given different roles, i.e. the risk analysis results can be seen as the core 
foundation for the modification work or they can represent a supplement to the existing 
tradition.  
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When discussing probalistic risk assessment, Apostolakis & Vesely (1999) illustrate how 
this approach has focused on obtaining and managing dominant risk contributors. Those 
contributors that were not dominant were given low priority and did not attract much 
attention. Probalistic risk assessment can also be instrumental in identifying an 
unnecessary regulatory burden (Apostolakis & Vesely, 1999; Vesely, 1999).  
 
The discussion above raises the question how the projects combined the existing 
evolutionary and practice oriented modification tradition with the requirement to apply 
risk analyses. This question is linked to the focus of attention in the modification work 
and the status of the risk analysis results compared to other possible inputs to the 
processes.  
 
3.4.2 Risk analytic methodology 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the risk-based approach belongs to the analytic 
management strategies developed for large-scale accidents (Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen & Svedung 2000). According to Rausand & Øien (2004), the influential oil 
industry builds upon methodology developed for the nuclear power industry. They 
explain that risk analysis is a method to identify and evaluate the possibility of unwanted 
events (also called accidental events) that can lead to damage upon humans, environment 
and material values. It can be qualitative and/or quantitative and have different levels of 
detail. They find the three core questions of a risk analysis to be: 
a. What unwanted events might occur? 
b. What are the causes of the occurrence of each unwanted event? 
c. What can the consequences become if the unwanted events occur? 
 
Rausand & Øien (2004) present the most commonly used methods. Checklists, 
Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), FMECA (Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality 
Analysis), HAZOP (Hazard an Operability Study) and Accident statistics are commonly 
used methods to answer question (a). Fault Tree Analysis, Reliability Block Diagrams, 
Influence diagram, FMECA and data banks are commonly used methods to answer 
question (b). Event Tree Analysis, Consequence estimates, Reliability calculations, 
Models for evacuation and Simulation are commonly used methods to answer question 
(c).  
 
Further, they comment that what are considered to be risk analytic methods varies 
between the different uses of these. In one connection a method can be called a reliability 
analyses while the same method can be called a risk analytic method in another. The term 
RAMS-method is commonly used (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety). 
For instance many industries have implemented the RCM (Reliability Centered 
Maintenance) methodology to improve the cost-effectiveness and control of maintenance 
and hence to improve both availability and safety (Høyland & Rausand, 1994). 
 
The research of SAMRAIL has revealed that the risk management approaches used by 
the railways are very similar to each other (European Commission, 2004c). They identify 
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six main steps in these approaches. Generally, a Bow Tie Model is used to explain these 
steps. The hazardous event occupies the center of the Bow Tie. Its left hand side contains 
the causes that potentially lead to the hazardous event. Also shown on this side are the 
controls or barriers to the hazard, i.e. preventive controls. The right hand side of the Bow 
Tie contains the event tree, which shows various outcomes that can potentially occur and 
the controls and barriers that are in place to limit or reduce their consequences. These are 
also called reactive controls or mitigation measures.  
 
The SAMRAIL research illustrates that the preference of the studied European railways 
is for effective proactive control measures but reactive control is also essential to 
minimize harm in case a hazardous event accidentally slips through (European 
Commission, 2004c). The three types of risk analytic methods most commonly used are 
quantitative, qualitative and semi-qualitative. It is believed that there is no uniformity or 
consistency in their application. As selection criteria for control measures to address risk 
acceptance, different risk acceptance principles were used. Presently, scenarios used to 
identify hazards are not consistent with each other.  
 
When discussing safety rule modifications, the SAMRAIL project suggests defining all 
of the significant ways in which the railway system can deviate from its ideal and safe 
operation (scenarios), so that accidents or other damage occurs (European Commission, 
2004b). Based on this, risk analysis decisions must be made about which control 
measures can and will be taken to eliminate, prevent and mitigate the effects of these 
scenarios. The project considers that an important question to be resolved is the scope of 
the analyses, the coverage of potentially harmful results and hence the scope of the 
defined scenarios.  
 
In the studies of safety rule modifications in European railways, the SAMRAIL project 
found that there is a lack of systematic identification of risk scenarios on a formal level. 
Typically people with a lot of experience within the railway system have the job to 
develop and write rules. Experience is a great advantage. However there is not much 
system and no theoretical education present in these matters. (European Commission, 
2004c). 
 
With respect to the question of the quality of the risk analyses, Rausand & Øien (2004) 
argue that the stronger the ownership to the analyses is at each level of the system, the 
better the quality of the analyses will be. They consider it important that the authorities 
deal actively with the analyses and the analytic processes. When the Safety case regime 
was introduced for the British railway system, Railtrack required that the highest levels of 
the traffic operators’ management were able to present and explain their safety case and 
to answer related questions (Maidment, 1998). Rausand & Øien (2004) comment that 
inherent in such a requirement of ownership to the top there is also another requirement. 
This is that the management ensures involvement of people with sufficient competency of 
both the railway system itself and risk analytic methodology in the work. They range the 
railway competency as the most important. The Synthesis of the SAMRAIL findings 
comments that the use of standard risk analytic techniques and tools in the railway sector 
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requires special knowledge and that their effectiveness depends upon experience 
(European Commission, 2004c). 
 
Furthermore, uncertainty is a problem for the risk analytic methods and it is not fully 
solved (Aven, 2003; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Scrader-Frechette, 1991). A related problem 
is that most risk analytic methods have their main focus on the direct cause of unwanted 
events and give limited attention to the underlying causes, for instance organizational 
changes (Rausand & Øien, 2004). 
 
The discussion of the different risk analytic methods and the quality of the risk analyses 
raises the question of trust in the risk analytic methodology and results. The question of 
trust is also related to the attitudes of the participants. Rausand & Øien (2004) comment 
that risk analysis will always influence attitudes of the participants in the work. They also 
comment that this might be the most important result of the analyses.  
 
This discussion about risk analytic methods and results implies that risk analyses can 
result in other results than conclusions drawn from other sources of knowledge. This 
raises the question whether the risk analyses fit in with the risk perception of those 
involved in the work or not. An associated question is how these people solve such 
problems if they occur.  
 
3.4.3 What is new?  
 
As revealed in Chapter 1 and 2, the internal control principle and the hierarchical 
approach applied in the Norwegian railway system calls for some kind of risk assessment 
as decision support in rule modifications. However, in theory the arguments for a risk-
based approach go further than this.  
 
The most important argument has parallels to the ongoing changes of the Norwegian 
railway system with the related changes. As already revealed in Chapter 1, Rasmussen 
(1997) and Rasmussen & Svedung (2000) argue that under conditions of rapid change the 
empirical management strategy faces problems. As the experiences of the past might not 
be suitable for the present situation they recommend more analytic management 
strategies. When control measures are introduced on the basis of risk analyses, the input 
to the control is not obtained directly by measuring the system performance, but 
indirectly through anticipation (Kjellén, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, the privatization process of the Norwegian railway system has created a 
more competitive environment for the system. As already touched upon in Subsection 
3.3.2 Rasmussen (1997) argues that under such conditions there is pressure from the 
combination of increased efficiency and least efforts that might cause the behavior of the 
involved actors to migrate towards the boundaries of safe performance. He sees the 
analytic strategy as a means to counteract such a development. 
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An important attribute of risk analyses is that they are systematic (Kjellén, 2000). 
Therefore, performing risk analyses implies a transfer of knowledge into the norms for 
the systematizing of the chosen risk analytic method, i.e. knowledge will be included and 
organized in accordance with the framework of the method. Further, implicit in the role 
that risk analyses play in internal control and the requirement that they are systematic, is 
a requirement that they are documented in a written form. Many methods provide ready- 
made schemas for the work. Hence, one can expect that the introduction of risk analyses 
to rule modification will influence the focus of attention and the organizing of knowledge 
about regulated activities and related risks. One can also expect the derived information 
to be transferred into a written form. Theories of knowledge will be further elaborated in 
Section 3.5. 
 
However, in spite of the evolutionary and often experience-based rule tradition of the 
Norwegian Railway system, risk assessment was not a completely new approach for the 
system. As illustrated in Chapter 2, attempts were made to foresee risks when new 
technology was introduced and followed up with accident preventive steps, for instance 
by introducing rules. Risk assessment was also not new to railway systems in general, a 
primitive form of risk assessment had been practiced (Perrow, 1999). What was new was 
the introduction of the very academic and expert dominated risk assessment methods 
primarily developed for the oil industry. As revealed above, to perform analyses of good 
quality it is necessary that the rule-developers possess good knowledge of their 
methodology (European Commission, 2004c; Rausand & Øien, 2004). Further, the new 
methods represent an increased emphasis upon the future and a systematizing of 
knowledge in accordance with chosen methods (Kjellén, 2002). 
 
 
3.4.4 Problems revealed in theory 
 
This theoretical introduction to the risk-based approach has demonstrated that it is 
followed with some problems. An overview of the new aspects of the risk-based 
approach, normative implications and revealed problems are illustrated in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 New aspects of the risk-based approach, normative implications and 
revealed problems. 
 
New aspects Normative implications Problems revealed 
New definition of the risk 
concept  
Apply a less inclusive concept 
of risk than before as fundament 
for the work  
What risk perspective to apply; 
a wide inclusive definition or 
the narrow risk analytic? 
Risk analyses as decision 
support in modification 
processes 
Use the risk analysis results as 
input to the rule modification, 
either as the core input or as one 
of more inputs. 
How to combine expert 
dominated risk analyses with 
rule development in an 
evolutionary practice oriented 
modification tradition?  
 
What if the risk analyses do not 
fit the risk perception of those 
involved in the modification 
work? 
 
 
3.5 Knowledge and rationality   
 
In both the hierarchical and risk-based approaches decision-making is a central topic. 
Higher order outcome-oriented rules require decisions about what actions fulfill the 
requirements. The risk analyses are supposed to serve as support to these decisions.  
 
As already indicated in Chapter 1, perspectives upon rationality and decision-making are 
related to perspectives of knowledge (March, 1994). This means that the increased 
emphasis upon rationalistic, choice based decision-making that the new approaches 
represents, also implies a change in knowledge perspectives. Therefore the introduction 
to theory of knowledge will start with an introduction to perspectives of both rationality 
and knowledge.  
 
A central concept for the study is railway knowledge. This concept will be elaborated 
throughout this subsection and described more thoroughly in Subsection 3.5.6. 
 
3.5.1 Perspectives of knowledge and rationality  
 
As indicated, theory discusses different perspectives upon knowledge and rationality. 
However, theory also discusses limitations of different perspectives. These discussions 
will be elaborated here. Finally, the positions of the Norwegian railway system and the 
hierarchical and risk-based approaches within these perspectives will also be discussed. 
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3.5.1.1 Different perspectives upon knowledge and rationality 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the former NSB had a bureaucratic tradition and its rule 
tradition fits in with the descriptions that Weber (2000) has given of such systems. He 
finds that in bureaucracies there is a strong belief in validity of legal laws and in objective 
competence that builds upon rationalistic rules. The normative ideal is judgments based 
on expert knowledge. As Chapter 2 revealed, in the Railway tradition the experts have 
been railway personnel who are respected in the system for their professional skills based 
on extensive practical experiences and railway educations or courses. Some held also 
external technical educations. They developed rules that gave rather comprehensive 
descriptions of what to do at the operative level. 
 
Schön (1991) discusses professional knowledge applied in different fields including 
bureaucracies. He links this knowledge to technical rationality. This is a rationality that 
he describes as instrumental problem solving that is made rigorous by the application of 
scientific theory and technique. He argues that the systematic knowledge base of a 
profession of technical rationality is thought to have four essential properties. It is 
specialized, firmly bounded, scientific and standardized. The expertise is grounded in a 
cumulative empirical knowledge about the means best suited to chosen ends in stable 
contexts. Further, he finds that professional knowledge is seen as consisting of a 
hierarchy. Here “general principles” occupy the highest level and “concrete problem 
solving” the lowest. 
 
However, Schön (1991) discusses how professionals think in action by reflective 
conversation with the situation, i.e. how they think in concrete problem solving situations 
at the lowest knowledge level. He demonstrates that when professionals discover 
phenomena that are incongruent with the initial problem setting they inquire into these. 
Evolving hypotheses are tested by experimental actions which also function as moves for 
shaping the situation and as probes for exploring it. Continuity of inquiry entails a 
continual interweaving of thinking and doing. He labels this form of rationality as 
Reflection-in-Action.  
 
March (1994) sums up later theoretical discussions of rationality in relation to decision-
making. He points to the views of rationalistic theories of choice based decision-making 
and the modified version of limited or bounded rationality. These forms of decision-
making are preference based and supposed to apply the logic of consequence. This means 
to analyze possible alternatives and to choose between them in accordance with their 
contribution to preset goals or preferred consequences. Hence it is linked to utility. He 
argues that the logic of consequence makes great demands on the abilities of individuals 
and institutions to anticipate the future and to form useful preferences.  
 
This scientific nature resembles the highest level of technical rationality of Schön (1991) 
described above. The strategy here is “First thinking and then acting” and Ellström (1996) 
labels the knowledge perspective of this tradition “rationalistic”. He finds the dominating 
knowledge base of rationalistic knowledge to be theoretical and explicit and the treatment 
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of information to be analytical. In later discussions the highest level of technical 
rationality and choice based decision-making will be labeled “rationalistic”. Drawing 
upon the terminology of Ellström, the associated knowledge perspective will also be 
called “rationalistic”. Explicit, theoretical knowledge grounded upon this perspective will 
be called “rationalistic knowledge”.   
 
March (1994) also points to the view of rule- and identity based decision-making. He 
links this to the logic of appropriateness that is to establish identities and to match rules to 
recognized situations. The logic of appropriateness puts great demands on the abilities of 
individuals and institutions to learn from the past and to form useful identities. Here the 
past is seen as imposing itself on the present through retention of experience in routines. 
Rules are seen as residue of the past. He argues that the rule- and identity based approach 
to decision-making fits with modern experiences of socialization and education of 
individuals into rules associated with the different roles of the decision-makers. The 
emphasis upon the dialogue with the actual situation resembles the Reflection-in-Action 
that Schön (1991) identified for concrete problem solving. The strategy here is to build 
upon familiarity and experience and Ellström (1996) labels the knowledge perspective of 
this tradition “intuitively-contextual”. Here Ellström finds the dominating knowledge 
base to be experience-based and implicit or in other words tacit. The information 
treatment is intuitively. In later discussions rationality that parallels Reflection-in-Action 
and rule- and identity based decision-making will be labeled “rule- and identity based”. 
Again, drawing upon the terminology of Ellström, the associated knowledge perspective 
will also be called “intuitively-contextual”. Tacit, practical knowledge grounded upon 
this perspective will be called “intuitively-contextual knowledge”.   
 
Ellström (1996) underlines that his two categories of knowledge perspectives is a 
simplification. They represent complementary ideal typical views that are not mutually 
exclusive. Furthermore, March (1994) argue that both choice based and rule- and identity 
based forms of decision-making processes organize an interaction between personal 
commitment and social justification. He finds that choice based decision-making can be 
seen as a special form of rule- and identity based decision-making where the choices are 
made according to the rules of rationality. 
 
3.5.1.2 Limitations of the discussed perspectives and calls for alternatives 
 
Jaeger et al. (2001), Perrow (1999) and Schrader-Frechette (1991) discuss the role of the 
rational choice based tradition in the work of accident prevention and risk assessment. 
They show how this perspective is linked to considerations for economic utility. Their 
conclusion is that this rationality is not sufficient to deal with all types of risk. The 
tradition is criticized for not giving attention to the way risks are actually generated in 
organizations. Furthermore, they demonstrate the danger that concerns for cost-efficiency 
might confuse the attention to safety and that this approach might not take the interests of 
potential victims into consideration. In addition, March (1994) claims that within the 
theories of choice based decision-making, there is a tendency to ignore the rich processes 
by which rules are created, maintained, interpreted, changed and ignored. 
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The criticism of the rationalistic approach to decision-making both in general and in 
relation to risk assessments, has created discussions of alternatives. These have the 
common feature that they recommend to combine different perspectives in to take 
advantage of their potential gains.  
 
March (1994) finds the logics of consequence and the logic of appropriateness are not 
distinguished by differences in their status as thoughtful action. He argues for a 
combination of the two logics.  
 
On the same track Ezioni (1967) argues for a combination of rationalities and proposes a 
method of Mixed-Scanning. His approach extends the incrementalistic trial- and-error 
decision-making discussed by Lindblom (1959) under the heading “Muddling through”. 
However, as LaPorte & Consolini (1991) discuss this approach is only acceptable under 
certain conditions. This is when errors resulting from operational or policy discussions 
are limited and the consequences are bearable and reversible, with the costs less than the 
values of the improvements learned from feedback analyses. If not they find that the 
alternative is to strive for trials without error. 
 
Shrader-Frechette (1991) argues for procedural reforms that includes risk negotiation and 
adversary assessment. Her advice is to take advantage different perspectives including 
those of risk analytic expert and potential victims. Perrow (1999) argues for an 
introduction of a third type of rationality that he labels social and cultural rationality. This 
emphasizes diversity and social bounding. Jaeger et al. (2001) also argue for supplying 
the rationality of the risk assessments with rationalities of other knowledge traditions. 
This solution makes it possible to take advantage of other forms of intelligence that might 
give positive contributions. However, they do not find these knowledge traditions mature 
enough to take over for the rational actor paradigm.  
 
Klinke & Renn (2001) discuss the challenges of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity or 
ambivalence. Regarding complexity they direct the attention towards expert based risk 
assessment. If the problem includes uncertainty they focus on knowledge acquisition and 
advice a broader involvement. If ambiguity is also a problem, they call for even more 
discursive strategies that also include representatives of potential victims. 
 
Accordingly, these theories advocate for inclusion of different perspectives and actors in 
the safety work, and in particular under conditions of complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity. They also advocate for a search for decision-making process where the 
different perspectives, knowledge resources and interests associated with the actual risk 
are represented and participate in discussions, i.e. a discursive strategy. Klinke & Renn 
(2001) suggests that such a strategy might include strategies for consensus building, 
confidence building, introducing substitutes, improving knowledge and contingency 
management.  
 
These theories have the core focus on environmental risk. However, their reasoning has 
parallels to the ongoing development within the railways. Furthermore, the Lillestrøm 
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accident where the whole center of the city could have blown up, provided an example of 
how extensive the consequences of rail accidents can be. 
 
3.5.1.3 The perspectives of the Norwegian railway system and the new approaches 
 
The Norwegian railway system can be seen to combine different perspectives of 
rationality and knowledge. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the bureaucratic tradition of the 
system was influenced by technical rationality that involved different levels of knowledge 
such as Schön (1991) describes. For instance this is seen in the recruitment of both 
engineers with a theoretical education, the internal education system and the use of 
accumulated knowledge derived from experiences with the system. Prescriptive rules 
held a strong position.  
 
Chapter 2 also revealed that in the rule development the system has strived for increased 
safety. However, it also paid attention to practical concerns. The rule-developers had the 
task to decide what could possibly make the rail traffic run safe and smooth. This implies 
that an anticipatory element and logic of consequence was applied. Accordingly the 
rationalistic perspective of decision-making has been operative. The decisions were 
influenced by the theoretical and practical knowledge of those involved in the work. 
Experience-based intuitively-contextual knowledge of the practical railway field was 
combined with academic knowledge from the engineering field. 
 
However, the introduction to the Norwegian railway system demonstrated that extensive 
practical training and trust was required to get the necessary position as railway expert 
and participate in the rule development. Accordingly, practical knowledge had a high 
status and the participants were well adapted or socialized to the railway system. Those 
participating in the rule development based the work upon cumulative empirical 
knowledge of the system’s functions and risks that they themselves and their network 
possessed. To a great extent this knowledge was derived from experiences with operative 
actions and dangers and concrete problem solving. They used this comprehensive 
knowledge and understanding of the railway system’s functions to analyze and anticipate 
possible effects of alternative strategies for increased safety.   
 
The problem solving that was demonstrated in the work of rule development gives 
associations to the descriptions that Schön (1991) provides of Reflection-in-Action. The 
descriptions also show that logic of appropriateness and accumulated practical knowledge 
has held strong positions in the rule development. Accordingly, in spite of its rationalistic 
elements the rule development has been dominated by rule- and identity based decision-
making where intuitively-contextual knowledge has been the main contributor. This 
conclusion is supported by Perrow (1999) who comment that in general risk assessments 
of railways held a primitive form compared to the more academic tradition of risk 
assessments founded on perspectives of absolute rationality. 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 1 and the previous sections of this chapter, the 
hierarchical and risk-based approaches are grounded in the rationalistic choice based 
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decision-making tradition. Hence, the introduction of these approaches to rule 
modification implies a strengthening of rationalistic decision-making and knowledge in 
the processes.  
 
Regarding the hierarchical approach, the background for its application in traffic safety 
has been linked to a deductive strategy where the lower order rules are supposed to be 
derived from those at the higher orders. Furthermore, it requires that the higher order 
rule-imposers are able to specify goals of importance for safety. It also requires that the 
rule-followers are able to translate these rules into decisions about how to fulfill the goals. 
Accordingly, the rule-followers must be able to answer questions of how they identified 
their risks and how they have elaborated possible means to control risk, the efficiency of 
these means and chosen between the alternatives.  
 
Regarding the requirement of a risk-based approach this implies to apply the rationalistic 
procedures of risk analytic methods. As already discussed in Section 2.2 and 3.4, 
academic risk analytic experts with backgrounds from the oil industry hold strong 
positions in this field. Chosen methods provide a framework that defines which elements 
of knowledge will be taken into consideration and how these elements are systematized, 
expressed and documented.  
 
To summarize, the dominating perspectives of rationality and knowledge in the rule 
tradition of the Norwegian railway system can be contrasted with the dominating 
perspectives of the hierarchical and risk-based approaches like this: 
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R 
A Hierarchical and 
risk-based 
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T 
I 
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A The tradition of 
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railway system 
L Rule- and  
I identity based 
T 
Y 
Figure 3.2  The positions of the tradition of the Norwegian railway system 
And the hierarchical and risk-based approaches with respect to 
rationality- and knowledge perspectives 
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However, the figure represents a simplification. As discussed, the system has also had 
rationalistic elements and particularly in the form associated with technical rationality. 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates that the introduction of the two approaches can be seen as a 
strengthening of rationalistic, choice based decision-making in the predominantly rule- 
and identity based railway tradition. Furthermore, it can be seen as a strengthening of the 
rationalistic knowledge perspective in the predominantly intuitively-contextual tradition. 
Accordingly, the projects are left with the question of what knowledge base to apply as 
decision support in the rule development. The question to the study therefore becomes: 
What knowledge perspective(s) were applied in the modification work? 
 
3.5.2 Differences in status of knowledge 
 
The balance between rationalistic and intuitively-contextual knowledge and their 
different status is a subject for discussions in the literature. Schön (1991) is one 
contributor to these discussions. He argues that the general principles of professional 
knowledge in technical rationality occupy the highest status while the concrete problem 
solving holds the lowest. Further he argues that his theory of how professionals reflect 
and learn in action changes the status of professional experts with respect to their claim of 
authority and extraordinary knowledge that is isolated from action. Instead they have to 
accompany the professionals in their reflection in their actions in a reflective 
conversation. Here the professional expert recognizes that the expertise is embedded in a 
context of meanings where both the practitioner and the expert have a capability to know 
and plan.  The expert join the practitioner in inquiring into problematic situations that 
needs to be solved. According to him practitioner may become reflective researchers  in 
situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and conflict.  
 
Perby (1995) attacks the dominance of analytical thinking.  The world of professional 
knowledge does not follow the logic that is connected to the analytical way of thinking 
where knowledge is divided, separated and bounded. She argues that the development of 
knowledge does not necessarily follow the “academic sequences”. Practitioners think in 
terms of practical situations.  Much like Schön (1991) she finds that the professional 
knowledge is characterized by an unbroken wholeness of issues related to each other and 
connections that are essential to the practice and thereby impossible to separate.  
 
However, the rationalistic knowledge is also seen to have an important role. Learning by 
experience appears to presuppose explicit knowledge that can not be acquired by 
experience. Zuboff (1988) argues that theoretical knowledge about production states 
improved the workers’ ability to understand information from the production process 
about variables and their interaction.  Ellström (2001b) explains that learning by 
experience presupposes conceptual tools and explicit knowledge about the task and the 
work process. This can be used by the learning subject to identify and interpret 
experiences. Schön (1991) argues that there are kinds of research which can be 
undertaken outside the immediate context of practice in order to enhance the 
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practitioners’ capacity for reflection-in-action. He mentions four different directions that 
this research that he labels reflective can have. First, it can be directed towards the ways 
in which practitioner frames problems and roles. Second, it can serve a function of 
accumulating and describing theories of action, modes or phenomena or techniques of 
control. Third, it can study fundamental methods of inquiry and overarching theories. 
Fourth, it can study the process of reflection in action.  
 
This discussion implies that both rationalistic and intuitively-contextual knowledge seems 
to be important for good performance and hence for the task to develop good rules. As 
already discussed in Chapter 2 and the previous subsection, the expertise of the 
Norwegian railway system has been based on a combination of technical education and 
railway education and extensive practical experience has had a high status. The 
discussion of Ryggvik (2004) presented in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.2.2 illustrates that the 
Inspectorate and their emphasis upon the new approaches introduced another expertise to 
the modification work. This expertise had a highly rationalistic background originating 
from another context that according to the argumentation of Schön (1983/1991) and 
Perby (1995) often is associated with the highest status. The high status of the knowledge 
tradition of the new approaches leads to a hypothesis that this tradition will have a strong 
position in the modification work of the projects.  
 
3.5.3 Differences in descriptions of knowledge 
 
The discussions of Schön, (1991) and Perby (1995) in the two previous subsections 
demonstrates that different perspectives upon rationality and knowledge can be 
associated with different ways of expressing knowledge. The expertise of technical 
rationality described by Schön is concerned about providing description of general 
principles. These are rather context free and needs to become translated into the actual 
context. Furthermore, as Perby argues the rationalistic way of thinking divides knowledge, 
separates it from its context and makes it bounded. 
 
On the other hand, Schön (1991) and Perby (1995) find that the concrete problem solving 
where the general principles are translated into the actual contexts and the wholeness is 
taken into consideration is given less attention. Baumard (1999) argues that organizations 
generally reduce their rich knowledge to information, measures and standards. The 
production of knowledge is subject to this reduction of complexity. He points at the 
problem that organizations manage the codification of knowledge rather than knowledge. 
 
In addition, referring to his own terminology of absolute rationality and social and 
cultural rationality Perrow (1999) argues that different rationalities are associated with 
different types of descriptions of the system in focus. According to him, both absolute 
and bounded rationality create quantitative, precise, logically consistent, economical and 
value-free descriptions of the system. He classifies these descriptions as thin compared 
the descriptions that he associated with the social and cultural rationality. According to 
him, this type of rationality emphasizes diversity and cultural bounding. This creates 
thick descriptions where subjective dimensions and cultural values are recognized.  
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These theories indicate that the higher status and general emphasis upon rationalistic 
rationality and knowledge together with the tendency to reduce rich knowledge, represent 
forces that can pull the Norwegian railway system in a direction towards less context 
related, more rationalistic thin descriptions of the system. As revealed, the hierarchical 
and risk-based approaches also represent forces of the same direction. First, the projects 
started out with incitements to apply goal-oriented rules and triggering requirements as 
rule solutions. These solutions represent more abstract and thinner descriptions than the 
prescriptive rules. Second, the selection and systemization of knowledge that the risk 
analyses represent might reduce and divide thick descriptions of the reality. This happens 
in a period where the ongoing changes of the system have put the educational system 
under pressure to reduce the varied practice that also contributes with thick descriptions. 
 
Perrow (1999) links the forms of describing systems to his Normal Accidents Theory. 
The thin descriptions are consistent with component failure accidents. These are 
accidents caused by failures that are predictable and understandable and in an expected 
production sequence. He argues that complex and tightly coupled systems are exposed to 
system accidents that involve different parts, units and subsystems of a system. 
According to him, thick descriptions reflect the nature of such accidents as the thick 
descriptions show skepticism about man-made systems and institutions and emphasize 
social bonding and the tentative, ambiguous nature of experience.  
 
Perrow (1999) classifies rail transport as systems dominated by linear interactions with 
tight coupling. As already discussed in Subsection 3.3.2, the current development of the 
Norwegian Railway system indicates that the system is moving in a more complex and 
tight direction. Based on the Normal Accidents Theory one could therefore expect the 
preference for descriptions of the system to move from thin to thick. However, the 
introduction of the new approaches seems to represent a move in the opposite direction. If 
that is the case, Normal Accident Theory indicates that the combination of a move 
towards a more complex and tightly coupled railway system and thinner descriptions of 
that very system might make the system more prone to system accidents. 
 
Also, at the more individual level and as already revealed in Subsection 3.3.1, Rasmussen 
& Svedung (2000) underline the importance of mental models of system function at the 
knowledge based level of functioning. This is the type of functioning required from the 
higher order rules. These are less visible in the thin descriptions of rationalistic 
knowledge.  
 
This discussion indicates that there are forces that might pull the Norwegian railway 
system towards rationalistic thinner descriptions at the same time as the current 
development of the system calls for thick descriptions. Accordingly, a hypothesis for the 
study is that the projects will emphasis thin and written descriptions of the system, the 
activities and associated risks. 
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3.5.4 Creation of organizational knowledge  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to the study, safety rule modifications can be seen both 
as a result of and as a part of a learning process, i.e. they are closely related to knowledge 
creation. Hence they are both dependent upon learning and represent potential for a 
positive contribution to railway knowledge. However, a SAMRAIL report discussing 
organizational learning from accident and incident reporting argues that the increased 
organizational complexity of railways in Europe has created barriers for organizational 
learning (European Commission, 2004a). The report underlines the importance of finding 
solutions that counteract the negative impact of the reorganization of the railway systems 
upon former learning arrangements. This directs the attention towards conditions for 
knowledge creation in the projects. 
 
Below, theory of knowledge creation is discussed and related to the conditions of the 
Norwegian railway system.   
 
3.5.4.1 Learning through transition between knowledge forms 
 
In the theoretical discussions there has been increasing interest in the different forms that 
knowledge can have and their functions. Polanyi (1966b) emphasized tacit knowledge. 
Based on this distinction from explicit knowledge, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) argue that 
knowledge may be created by a continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit 
knowledge and describe four transitions between these two knowledge forms. The 
creation of organizational knowledge is the integration of these transformation processes, 
and develops along the dimensions of tacit and explicit knowledge and from the 
individual to the organization. They argue that none of the four forms of knowledge is 
sufficient in itself.  
 
Baumard (1999) has developed the theories of Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) with 
discussions of the interplay between the individual and collective tacit and explicit 
knowledge. He distinguishes between four inseparable types of knowledge. These are 
individual explicit knowledge, collective explicit knowledge, collective tacit knowledge 
and individual tacit knowledge. He argues that tacit knowledge plays a central role in our 
learning processes, although we are not conscious of it. He also finds that tacit knowledge 
is also instrumental to foster “unlearning” by consciously conferring upon knowledge that 
is by nature unconcious. He provides this illustration of the types of knowledge and their 
interaction:  
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Figure 3.3 Four inseparable types of knowledge (Baumard, 1999, p 66, Figure 3.1, 
reproduced with author’s permission.) 
 
 
The arrows of influence in this figure of Baumard illustrate that the process of developing 
safety rules can be a process of learning and transferring collective and individual tacit 
knowledge and explicit individual knowledge into collective explicit knowledge.   
 
According to Baumard (1999) the means for transitions from tacit to explicit might be an 
individual or a collectivity that functions as an articulator. This presupposes an 
organizational configuration to facilitate it. He also argues that changes can cause 
ambiguity that lead to articulation. In addition knowledge forms might compete and come 
into conflict with each other and cause ambiguity during transition processes. An 
articulator or a reader of the knowledge that is visible to some and invisible to others 
might solve this ambiguity.  
 
The modification projects might represent organizational configurations such as 
transitions of knowledge require. Rule modifications imply changes that can cause 
ambiguity. Also, as discussed in Section 3.3, 3.4 and this section, the ambitions to 
introduce hierarchical and risk-based approaches to the rule modification represent 
additional elements of change.  
 
However, the aim to make tacit knowledge explicit and to share tacit knowledge is 
opposed; all knowledge cannot be codified and made explicit and the two forms serve 
different functions (Baumard, 1999; Perby, 1995). Baumard (1999) finds it useful for 
organizations to change between dominating forms of knowledge according to the 
situation of the organization. He argues that the tacit knowledge does not need to be 
verbalized to be acted. Sometimes the tacit resources are most influential when left aside 
from the explication process of organizations. Further, he resists prescriptions which 
enforce tacit knowledge into destructive explanations. When remaining tacit they give 
more space for experimentation and action, a situation that might create learning and 
knowledge of new solutions. According to him one of the essential roles of tacit 
knowledge is the maintenance of organizational flexibility.  
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Ellström (2001b) underlines this dilemma of the codification or non codification of 
knowledge into rules. He shows that from a learning perspective there are different 
meanings regarding the question of formalization or publishing written rules and 
instructions. These range from considering formalization as likely to seriously impede 
organizational learning to viewing formalization as an important condition for quality 
development and organizational learning. 
 
The interaction between knowledge forms and the role of tacit knowledge can also be 
associated with the discussions of rule-followers’ competency and related needs for rules 
and suitability of different rule solutions that were discussed in the sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
No rules and higher order abstract rule solutions give freedom to make tacit knowledge 
come into play and for experimentation. The more rigid prescriptive rules limit this 
freedom. However, tacit knowledge might also play an important role in the ability to 
recognize the situations where rules are relevant (Hale, 1990; Rasmussen & Svedung, 
2000).  
 
The freedom to apply tacit knowledge that the higher order rule solutions allow for might 
be a two edged sword. The purpose of prescriptive rules is to limit the action space. 
Again this actualizes the question of LaPorte & Consolini (1991) about striving for trials 
without errors discussed in Subsection 3.5.1. As touched upon in Subsection 3.3.2, 
Rasmussen (1997) has illustrated that experimentation of involved actors might cause a 
migration towards the boundaries of safe performance. The prescriptive rules might 
prevent dangerous choices that can contribute to such a development. On the other hand, 
Rasmussen (1997) illustrates that the flexibility can be very useful for the adaptation to 
changing conditions and coping with the boundaries. However, this requires that the 
actors hold mental maps sufficient to understand the full consequences of their actions. 
As Rasmussen points out, this requires that they have the capability to function at the 
knowledge based level. Further this requires that they receive sufficient information 
about the status of the system to have full and updated mental maps and time to decide.  
 
Taken together these discussions reveal that rule modifications represent an opportunity 
for knowledge transformation and learning. However, this requires that individual and 
collective, tacit and explicit knowledge are taken into consideration and that the 
knowledge forms can interact. The increased emphasis upon rationalistic knowledge of 
the development and the new approaches has raised the hypotheses that the projects will 
emphasis thin descriptions and written knowledge. This implies a favoritism of the 
collective and explicit knowledge form. This favoritism and the discussions above raise 
the question: What knowledge forms were emphasized in the modification work of the 
projects?  
 
3.5.4.2 Learning through feedback and inquiries 
 
Other theories emphasize the important role that feedback and inquiries play in 
organizational learning. Important exponents for this perspective are Argyris & Schön 
(1996) According to them organizational learning can be approached with a feedback 
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perspective where evaluation of outcomes and inquiry into these and problematic 
organizational situations are important elements. Individual inquiry feeds into and helps 
to shape organizational inquiry carried out by individuals. According to them an 
organization’s learning system must contain feedback upon results of action. In addition, 
most organizations must develop their organizational ability from defensive to productive. 
The means to achieve productive learning suggested by Argyris & Schön resemble the 
ideals of rationality. This means to turn tacit knowledge into explicit and to develop it in 
accordance with the results of the inquiries. An open dialogue based on trust and 
confidence is emphasized. Ellström (2002) underlines the importance of time and 
knowledge as learning resources. 
 
In theories of organizational learning the results are evaluated with respect to the 
character of changes in organizational practice. These characters are often classified as 
higher or lower orders of learning where the higher orders represent the most substantial 
changes and are considered the most difficult to achieve (Argyris & Schön, 1996; 
Ellström, 2001b; Hedberg, 1981). Hedberg (1981) calls irreversible substantial changes 
“turnaround learning”.   
 
Ellström (2001b) is concerned that the notion of feedback seems to have a somewhat 
paradoxical function in relation to learning. He distinguishes between adaptive and 
developmental forms of learning. While feedback is necessary in relation to adaptive 
forms of learning, it is both difficult to achieve and might impede the more 
developmental forms of learning.   
 
The feedback perspective is also much applied in safety work (Kjellén (2000). As 
illustrated when discussing the practical experience-based tradition of the railway system, 
the feedback approach has been used in the Norwegian railway system, in particular in 
relation to experienced accidents. SAMRAIL research focusing upon Safety management 
systems revealed three learning systems, that is to say systems for feedback (European 
Commission, 2003b). These are first the auditing and management reviews, second the 
inspections and the monitoring of technical and behavioral risk barriers and controls and 
third the incident and accident registration and analyses. In addition the SAMRAIL 
research upon regulations, roles of rules and their unification revealed that instructors can 
contribute with feedback upon the efficiency of existing rules (European Commission, 
2004b).  
 
Hale et al. (2003) have included a feedback learning loop in their framework for research 
upon safety rule modification in the Dutch railways. Their studies revealed that the 
geographically distributed nature of the system makes it difficult to organize feedback 
about existing rules. This framework is further elaborated in the SAMRAIL study 
referred to above (European Commission, 2004b). In the European railways included in 
that study, unclosed learning loops were revealed.  
 
In addition, an open dialogue might be a challenge for safety rule modifications. When 
discussing safety regulations, Kirwan et al. (2002) argue that the nature of the regulatory 
relationship is difficult. The reason is that it can contribute to a lack of trust or an 
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adversarial relationship between regulator and the regulated, i.e. the rule-imposer and the 
rule-follower.  
 
On this background three questions can be phrased: First, did the modification processes 
include inquiries and feedback loops? Second, what knowledge served as the main source 
in the modification work? Third, what were the conditions for reflections in the projects?  
 
3.5.4.3 Learning agencies and communities of practice as means 
 
The SAMRAIL research upon accident and incident reporting underlines the importance 
of creating learning agencies that consist of peoples who have the assigned task to learn 
for the organization (European Commission, 2004a). Their role is to look into matters of 
concern and generate a lesson-to-learn and a learning product. The report underlines the 
importance of closed learning loops to make the learning agency function as intended.  
 
Further this SAMRAIL research has illustrated how motivated railway people from 
different companies are setting up informal networks in European railways (European 
Commission, 2004a). This is done to foster learning from each other despite lacking 
formalized provisions. In Lave & Wenger’s terminology introduced in Subsection 3.3.2, 
they can be said to have established “communities of practice” (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
According to Wenger (1998) such communities are characterized by being mostly 
informal and distinct from organizational units. They differ from a network in the sense 
that they are not just a set of relationships; they are “about” something. A community of 
practice exists because it produces shared practice as members engage in a collective 
process of learning. Communities of practice go through stages of development. The 
community of practice’s life cycle is determined by the value it provides to its members. 
Wenger considers such communities to be a company’s most versatile and dynamic 
knowledge resource and that they form the basis for an organization’s ability to know and 
learn.  
 
With reference to the argument that safety rule modification can be seen both as a part of 
and a result of learning processes, this triggers the question: Did the projects play any 
role as learning agencies or communities of practice? 
 
3.5.5 The mutable and fragile knowledge 
 
The argument that modification processes can be both seen as a result of and a part of 
organizational learning directs the attention towards the storing of organizational 
knowledge.  
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3.5.5.1 Endangered knowledge and organizational memory 
 
Storing of organizational knowledge is of particular interest for the study and for railways. 
Chapter 2 revealed a concern among members of the Norwegian railway system that 
ongoing changes might endanger important safety relevant knowledge. Storing of 
organizational knowledge is also a more general concern. For instance, the SAMRAIL 
report upon accident and incident reporting argues that ongoing changes in European 
railways have scattered relevant competent employees over many parties (European 
Commission, 2004a). However, this can also be seen as a positive contribution to 
distribution of knowledge. Another example is provided from Wolmar (2001). In his 
discussions of the Hatfield accident, he argues that the deregulation process in United 
Kingdom had a serious impact on knowledge and information processing. He exemplifies 
how this has resulted in overreactions with regulatory constraints after accidents. 
 
Concerns for the dynamics of knowledge are also discussed in theory. Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1995) argue that knowledge is essentially related to human action, i.e. 
knowledge is context specific and relational in that it depends on the situation and is 
created in social interaction among people. Starbuck (1992) notes that “creating, applying 
and preserving knowledge intertwine and complement each other. At least over long 
periods, merely storing knowledge does not preserve it. For old knowledge to have 
meaning, people must relate it to their current problems and activities”. Baumard (1999) 
reflects upon this and concludes that knowledge is a mutable and fragile organizational 
entity. He finds that the sense of knowledge is derived from its application, and is lost 
once it is removed from the context of its utility. When the knowledge is out of the 
dynamics of its utilization, there is no knowledge which is more or less intense, or 
valuable, than any other. Brown & Duguid (1991) are on line with this. They reject 
transfer models of knowledge that isolate knowledge from practice.  
 
Stein (1995) has provided a review upon organizational memory and defines the concept 
as “….the means by which knowledge from the past is brought to bear on present 
activities, thus resulting in higher or lower levels of organizational effectiveness.” He 
distinguishes memories from information because memories are time functions that have 
intended and unintended effects. Rules are classified as concrete and prescriptive 
organizational knowledge, that is to say encoded knowledge for later transmissions.  
 
3.5.5.2 Challenges of the Norwegian railway system 
 
Regarding these concerns for the dynamics of knowledge and organizational memories, 
there are some challenges that seem to be of particular relevance for safety rule 
modifications in the Norwegian railway system.  
 
First, there is the challenge discussed above, that knowledge is time function dependent 
upon context. The emphasis upon the more academic and abstract knowledge both 
generally, in the educational development of the Norwegian railway system and inherent 
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in the new approaches to rule modification, might weaken the linkage of knowledge to its 
context and direct utility. The SAMRAIL report upon accident and incident reporting 
suggests developing procedures for revising regulations, rules and work practices as 
means to enhance organizational memory (European Commission, 2004a). In addition 
and as already mentioned, the report suggests creating learning agencies. In the report it 
is argued that the closer these are to the actual context, the more they will be able to 
compensate for the loss of context that might have occurred when information is 
transferred in an organization.  
 
Furthermore, the changing conditions of the Norwegian railway system might change the 
context. Stein (1995) points to the fact that organizational memory might produce barriers 
against learning, especially double loop learning. He underlines the importance of this 
element under changing conditions where the existing knowledge might be outdated. The 
ongoing changes in the railway systems might create situations where knowledge based 
on experiences from the past are irrelevant or even dangerous. For instance Hale et al. 
(2003) argue that the development of increased interoperability has made companies used 
to one national set of rules to operate on networks in other countries with other operating 
philosophies and safety rules. As revealed in Subsection 2.2.2, this situation is also 
apparent in the Norwegian railway system. 
 
Second, knowledge is dependent upon social interaction (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
The ongoing changes and in particular the division of the Norwegian railway system, new 
recruitment patterns and departing employees might remove former constellations and 
patterns of interaction among people. However, the previous subsection also 
demonstrated that the development can create new constellations, for instance 
communities of practice as described by SAMRAIL (European Commission, 2004a)  
 
Patterns of social interaction might have consequences for the overview and access to the 
inherent knowledge of a system. Stein (1995) considered memories to be maintained if an 
organization has access to its knowledge and expertise. He demonstrates how easily 
organizational memories can be damaged.  
 
Third, changes in context and patterns of social interaction are particularly challenging 
for tacit knowledge. Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) explain that organizational learning 
often leads to systems or means that address explicit knowledge According to them this is 
only the tip of the knowledge iceberg. Further, Baumard (1999) argues that it is rarely 
recognized that non-codifiable knowledge could be collective. When the knowledge is 
tacit, it is therefore difficult to truly know the processes of acquiring, preserving and 
using this type of knowledge. Further he finds it difficult to reach any consensus about 
what constitutes generic knowledge and to achieve a good circulation of it.  
 
The stable conditions, the emphasis upon practical experience and the stable work force 
in the former NSB implied rather good conditions for addressing tacit knowledge. These 
conditions make it reasonable to believe that this knowledge was rather collective too. 
However, as already discussed these conditions are now changing in the Norwegian 
railway system.  
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Fourth, the tacit knowledge of the Norwegian railway system might also be influenced by 
the fact that it is in a transition phase that can be experienced as a threat to peoples or 
groups. Baumard (1999) underlines that tacit knowledge is not necessarily unconscious. 
He distinguishes between the notion of knowing more than one can express of Polanyi 
(1966a) and knowing more than one wants to say.  He illustrates how each actor will 
articulate their particular and tacit knowledge in a collective codification that enables 
them to position themselves according to common objectives. For instance actors might 
express and withhold knowledge according to incitements in their work conditions. 
Furthermore, this is related to what knowledge receives attention in more general terms. 
According to Krippendorff (1975), what knowledge is retained is reflective of group 
values. In addition Douglas (1986) illustrated that social systems systematically select 
some types of information for encoding and not others.  
 
This discussion indicates that values, norms and reward system of the Norwegian railway 
system and the society in general will influence what knowledge becomes included in the 
modification processes. Here the privatization process and the higher status and increased 
emphasis upon the rationalistic theoretical knowledge perspective might come into play, 
i.e. the more practical and tacit intuitively-contextual knowledge might be less 
emphasized.  
 
Fifth, the discussion above revealed that knowledge must be applied to be kept alive. This 
might also be a challenge for the projects. According to Stein (1995) organizational 
memories can be recalled to support decision-making and problem solving under certain 
conditions. One condition is that an inquirer is motivated to retrieve information if the 
inquirer values what has been done in previous contexts. The indications of changed 
status of knowledge and ongoing changes of the Norwegian Railway system might 
impede this condition. Another condition is that the desired information exists and the 
inquirer is aware of this. As presented in Chapter 2, there is a general concern that 
information and knowledge is lost. Furthermore, this requires an overview of what 
information there is.  This is a condition that will depend on who became involved in the 
work and their background. A third condition is that the inquirer has the ability to search, 
locate and decode the desired information. Again, this requires an overview of where 
knowledge exists and enough know-how to decode the information. Finally, a fourth 
condition is that the cost to locate the information is less than re-computing the solution 
from scratch. He finds that retrieval of dysfunctional methods, values or prejudices is a 
case in point. Like Baumard (1999), Stein (1995) points to the fact that not all forms of 
knowledge maintained by the organizations are voluntarily retrievable. 
 
This discussion about organizational memory and the Norwegian railway system can be 
summarized in two questions that has links to previous questions: The firsts is: How did 
the project include existing railway knowledge in the work? The second is: How did the 
project store railway knowledge in organizational memory?  
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3.5.6 What is railway knowledge? 
 
The study is concerned with the influence of safety rule modification with hierarchical 
and risk-based approaches upon railway knowledge. In this study the term “railway 
knowledge” is used about the understanding of functions and interactions of the railway 
system. As the study concentrates upon safety and safety rule modification, the use of the 
expression will be limited to generic knowledge about issues of concern for these two 
topics. In particular this includes knowledge of the system itself, its activities and their 
interactions, the inherent risks and preventive means. It also includes knowledge about 
ongoing changes and current trends.  
 
In the study railway knowledge will be seen to include the four knowledge forms 
presented by Baumard (1999) individual explicit knowledge, collective explicit 
knowledge, collective tacit knowledge and individual tacit knowledge. However, as 
discussed in Subsection 6.5.1 this knowledge is predominantly intuitively-contextual. 
Hence tacit knowledge holds a strong position. 
 
In the following discussions I will also apply the term “knowledge of regulated area”. 
This is applied for the more specific knowledge about functions and interaction of the 
subsystems that the rules of the four cases refer to. One element in this knowledge is the 
knowledge about “context and function of the rules”. This refers to knowledge about the 
history and argumentation behind the rules and their intended function. Another element 
is “rule specific knowledge”. This refers to the knowledge directly expressed in the rule 
texts themselves. All levels include knowledge of railway safety. 
 
This study also applies the term “risk analytic knowledge”. This refers to knowledge of 
risk analytic methods and their application. 
 
3.5.7 Problems revealed in theory 
 
This theoretical introduction to theory of rationality and knowledge and the discussions 
about the Norwegian railway system has illustrated that the hierarchical and risk based 
approaches represent a strengthening of choice based rationality in this system. This 
implies a strengthening of the rationalistic knowledge perspective. An overview of the 
new aspects of the approaches and normative implications are illustrated in Table 3.3. 
Furthermore, in the Table the questions raised throughout the chapter are reduced into 
three overarching problems to be discussed in the study.  
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Table 3.3  New aspects with increased emphasis upon rationalistic knowledge, 
normative implications and associated problems 
 
New aspects Normative implications Problems revealed 
Hierarchical approach 
 
 
Risk-based approach  
 
Increased emphasis upon 
rationalistic choice based 
decision-making 
 
Increased emphasis upon 
rationalistic knowledge 
when developing rules 
 
Synthesize and systematize 
knowledge in accordance with 
the higher order rule solution and 
the applied risk analytic methods 
o Thin descriptions 
o Explicit knowledge 
o Academic, expert based 
knowledge 
 
What knowledge base to apply as 
decision support?  
 
Did increased emphasis upon the 
rationalistic knowledge 
perspective change the 
predominantly intuitively-
contextual railway knowledge? 
 
How did railway knowledge 
become stored in organizational 
memory?  
 
 
  
 
 
3.6 Research questions revisited and revealed problems 
 
The overall research question of this thesis is:  
 
How did the Norwegian Railway system respond to new requirements for safety rule 
modifications? 
 
Regarding the sub-questions, the theoretical discussions of this chapter have revealed the 
following problems: 
 
1) The hierarchical approach: 
 
What work strategy to choose if low level rules already exist? 
 
What if the suggested rule solutions do not fit the actual situation with respect to;  
• Competency of rule-imposer  
• Competency of rule-follower 
• Rule context 
 
 
2) The risk-based approach: 
 
What risk perspective to apply; a wide inclusive definition or the narrow risk analytic? 
 
How to combine expert dominated risk analyses with rule development in an 
evolutionary practice oriented modification tradition?  
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What if the risk analyses do not fit the risk perception of those involved in the 
modification work? 
 
3) The influence of new requirements upon railway knowledge: 
 
What knowledge base to apply as decision support?  
 
Did increased emphasis upon the rationalistic knowledge perspective change the 
predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge? 
 
How did railway knowledge become stored in organizational memory?  
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4 Methods and material 
 
4.1 Methodological approach and research design 
 
The overall purpose of the study is to increase knowledge of safety rule modification. In 
the introduction I argued for an explorative and qualitative approach. Further I argued for 
empirical studies of contemporary and real rule modification processes. Accordingly the 
search of the study has been for systematic patterns and essences of the modification 
processes. Hence the research strategy is related to interpretivism and social anthropology 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Meaning and interpretation of possible research material 
about rule modification processes was of interest, i.e. the study has been influenced by 
hermeneutics (Wormnæs, 1987).  
 
My prior knowledge has been brought to the research situation and will influence 
findings and interpretations (see Appendix B). Therefore it is important to describe what I 
have done in a way that makes the reader trust the results of the work and to make them 
able to make an independent evaluation of the findings.  
 
4.1.1 Implications of the research questions for the research strategy 
 
Safety rule modification can be described as a process with various process qualities. In 
addition, the study has been interested in the effect of the processes upon railway 
knowledge. Therefore the research questions are both descriptive and analytic.  
 
The research questions make it important to look for and describe elements that influence 
the processes and their results. By asking “how” I looked for descriptions of relevant 
processes in a context. The research focused on the qualities of the processes that 
influence the implementation of the new rationalistic approaches and railway knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, the study has been concerned with causal explanations for the development 
of the processes and its results, i.e. “why” questions. Because the research paid attention 
to the influence of the process and practical implications, there were also evaluative and 
developmental intentions. This contained a description of reality and comparison of 
reality to the intentions of the projects and to theory of knowledge and organizational 
learning. All together this shows that the overall research question for this thesis 
contained search for elements, descriptions of processes, explanations, evaluations and a 
discussion of possible development. However, the main purpose was to increase 
understanding, not to evaluate. 
 
The strategy for the study was a mixture of case studies and grounded theory.  According 
to Yin (1994) a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life-context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and the relevant behaviors cannot be 
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manipulated. He argues that case studies have a distinctive place in evaluation research. 
He also argues that case studies appear to be the best strategy when the main questions 
are “how” and “why”.  
 
For case studies, theory development as a part of the design phase is essential (Yin, 1994). 
As Chapter 1 illustrates, the research has a purpose. Chapter 3 contributed with 
theoretical problems to elaborate and a few hypotheses. This means that it was necessary 
to keep an open and flexible approach regarding what variables to study. Grounded 
theory is suitable to identify and categorize elements and explore the relationships 
between them (Miles & Huberman, 1994). According to Strauss & Corbin (1998) 
grounded theory represents both an approach to qualitative research and techniques and 
procedures for this type of research. The method takes advantage of the researcher’s prior 
knowledge. By procedures for systematic verification and validation of the results of the 
analyses, the method is developed to overcome the problem of the influence of the 
researcher. The study drew upon grounded theory in the analytic work.  
 
The arguments for the chosen approach were also the main arguments for not choosing 
other research methods. The focus of this study has been on naturally occurring, rather 
ordinary events in a natural setting. The purpose has been to give a handle on what is 
going on in modification processes. The processes were dependent on the context, 
conditions that cannot be controlled by the researcher. Further, there were not many 
modification processes run in parallel and the processes involved only a limited number 
of people in the main work. As argued, the limited scientific knowledge gave limited 
possibilities to develop theoretical hypotheses in advance. Hence the processes could not 
provide a foundation for controlled studies testing hypotheses with quantitative data by 
statistical analyses. More flexible strategies were required.  
 
The modification processes had already started when the study began. Therefore more 
collaborative strategies such as action research and collaborative action research were not 
in question (Miles & Huberman, 1994). However, as the modification processes were still 
going on during the interviews and I discussed my preliminary analytic results with the 
project leaders (see section 4.3), there might be a possibility that my questions influenced 
later development of the work. The feedback upon the preliminary analyses influenced 
the further progression of the study both with respect to data collection and analysis. 
 
4.1.2 Research design 
 
The study is based on two ongoing projects of rule modification in the Norwegian 
railway system that represented four cases of safety rule modification. As shown in 
Chapter 2, the four cases had interesting similarities and differences. This offered some 
opportunities. First, each of the projects could be used as a single case study and used for 
“pattern matching” (Yin, 1994). Second, the Maintenance-rule cases gave the opportunity 
to conduct both a holistic and an embedded case study because they all belonged to the 
Maintenance-rule project (Yin, 1994).   
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4.1.2.1 Plans for data collection 
 
Because of the wish for a flexible approach where elements and relationships that showed 
up in the field could be investigated, only qualitative methods were planned for the data 
collection. From the beginning I recognized two main potential sources for information. 
First, the projects involved people with different roles both in the projects and in the 
railway system. Second, there were documents related to the cases.  
 
According to Whyte & Whyte (1984) interviews are used to obtain data about events and 
attitudes, and help us to interpret the significance of what we observe. Melia (1997) asks 
whether interview data are to be regarded as straight accounts of the interviewee’s 
experiences or stories about that experience told as an exercise in self-presentation by the 
interviewees. This question can also be raised about written documentation that the 
participants produced. Further she argues that the effects of interaction between the 
interviewee and the interviewer cannot be denied. I chose to base the work on these data 
sources and to follow her advice to see interviews as a means of gaining insight into a 
world beyond the story that the interviewees and the documents told. In accordance with 
this advice I saw data from interviews and documentation as a means to get a handle on a 
more complex set of ideas than the ones that the interviewees are talking about. 
 
I found it most both practical and suitable to interview the involved actors one by one. 
Group interviews could also have given desired information. However, the potential 
interviewees were busy and distributed all over the geographical area covered by the 
Railway system. Further they held different positions and interests. 
 
I did not want to decide in advance what parameters to investigate and thereby limit the 
study. This gave me a lot of freedom in the data collection phase, but it made it also 
necessary to make sure that the collected data were relevant for the purpose of the study. 
This has two aspects. It had to be secured that leads that were of minor significance for 
the purpose of the study were not followed and that important data were not overlooked.  
 
Therefore I developed interview guides for the interviews. According to Leiulfsrud & 
Hvinden (1996) such guides signalize the focus of the interview that the researcher wants. 
At the same time the interviewee, at least partly, has the opportunity to lead the interview 
into other tracks. Further they give the researcher an opportunity to prepare him- or 
herself in advance.  
 
From the beginning, a standard interview guide was developed on the background of 
research questions and theory. The plan was to supplement this guide with special 
questions related to the roles and expected knowledge of the interviewees. The guide had 
an open structure that made it possible to explore phenomena that were not thought of in 
advance. It represented an opportunity to make sure that central themes were covered. 
 
All together 77 questions were developed for the guide. These were divided between 12 
sections. For many of these follow-up questions were prepared. The core content of the 
questions was directed towards the background of the actors, their attitudes towards risk 
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and safety, the safety work and the rule modification, their own role and participation in 
the work and their experiences. As the purpose of the study was to gather their 
understanding of the modification processes, the hierarchical and risk-based approaches 
were not stressed specifically. The intention was to integrate these subjects into the core 
questions. The guide also got a front page containing issues to be covered in the 
introduction to the interview and an end page with issues for rounding off the interview. 
The translated version of the standard interview guide is found in Appendix C. 
Reflections associated with each group of questions are presented in Appendix D. 
 
I knew that the Traffic-rule project and the Overarching Maintenance project were rather 
well documented. The large amount of documents made it necessary to select the most 
central documents of the projects and for my research. Therefore I decided to ask the two 
project leaders for documents that described the background, purpose, development of the 
projects and topics of interest for my work.  
 
4.1.2.2 Plans for data analyzes 
 
The plan was to analyze the data in parallel with the data collection, so that the collected 
data could fuel the further data collection. Additionally, a qualitative approach was 
chosen for the analyzing. Miles & Huberman (1994) define qualitative analysis as 
consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing/verification.  
 
In parallel with the development of the research questions and the interview guide, a one 
page coding schema with preliminary concepts was developed. When almost all the 
interviews related to the Traffic-rule project were finished, this coding schema was 
developed into an analytic schema in the form of a matrix. An overview of the main 
headings is presented in Section 4.3, Table 4.4, page 94. The analytic schema in its full 
form is presented in Appendix E. To prevent bias from my prior knowledge of the 
Railway system, I decided to verify preliminary analytic results describing the 
modification processes and early causal explanations by the two project leaders, i.e. the 
leader of the Traffic-rule case and the joint leader of the Maintenance-rule cases.  
 
Initially the intention was to follow the whole modification processes until the new rules 
were fully implemented in their planned context.  
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
In the beginning, official approval for the study was approved from the involved railway 
organizations. I also had meetings with the two project leaders;  the leader of the Traffic-
rule case and the leader of the Overarching Maintenance project. Here plans for the study 
and opportunities of information from existing documents, useful interviewees and status 
and planned progression of the projects were discussed. In addition, selection of cases 
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within the Maintenance-rule project was discussed. The plans were met with very 
positive attitudes. Free access was given to all information that the study needed.  
 
As planned, data were mainly collected by interviews and document collection. First, 
initial data were collected from the Traffic-rule case. Thereafter the collection was done 
in parallel for both projects. For practical reasons, some of the data collection had to be 
made before analyzes of the already collected data were made, not in parallel as planned. 
With few exceptions the data collection was conducted intensively during four 3-5 days 
visits. The whole data collection period lasted for a period of one year.  
 
The interviewees provided useful information about further data collection, both 
regarding people with special insight into actual issues and regarding written 
documentation. I also used my former network and knowledge of the system to discuss 
strategies to approach the field and potential sources for information.  
 
In addition I got the opportunity to participate in meetings where railway safety was 
discussed, both in Norway and Denmark. 
 
Due to the progress of the projects, the research had to be limited to follow the processes 
of developing the rules without looking into the implementation process. As already 
mentioned the Traffic-rule case could only be followed until the transfer to the 
Inspectorate. 
 
In the following a presentation of the selection of cases, data sources and the data 
collection methods are presented. 
 
4.2.1 The selection of cases and interviewees 
 
The overall reason for the choice of the cases was that they were expected to serve the 
purpose and objectives of the study, see the introduction to the study in Chapter 1. 
Further they were chosen because they coincided with the study.  
 
Interviews became the main source of information. Since the main focus of the research 
is on the rule modification process, I decided to focus on the people of the four cases that 
were directly involved in the core activities of rule development.  
 
Below the selection of the cases and interviewees are presented more in detail. 
 
4.2.1.1 The Traffic-rule case 
 
The Traffic-rule project included only one case of safety rule modification.  
 
The case had already worked for more than two years when it was chosen for the study. 
The first contact with the case was established in spring 2003. The main data collection 
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was done in the last 8 months before it was transferred to the Inspectorate. This means 
that parts of the information are given as reflections during the process, parts in 
retrospective perspective.  
 
The organizing of the case 
 
The case was administrated by the Traffic safety department of the Rail Administration 
and organized according to the guidance for project organizations of this organization. 
Figure 4.1 shows the organizational map that the project developed. 
 
2. Inspectorate 2. Rail Administration 
Line management Line management 
Report 
 
Figure 4.1 Formal organization of the Traffic-rule project23.  
   
                                                 
23 Project logg  695 
Report 
6. Cooperation 
Project/Inspectorate 
8. Board of the branch   
10. Resource people 
12. Formulation of rules, 
juridical aspects 
14. Infrastructure    
7. Quality assurance group 
9. Safety Management  
11. Nordic/International 
harmonizing 
13. Formulation of rules, 
philological aspects 
15. “Mobile equipment” 
16. “Human factors”    17. Education and training 
5. Project group 
 
(Also called the 
work group in the 
study) 
        Report 
(Only if disagreement occurs) 
3. Steering Committee 4. Board of the project 
Status report 
every 2. month 
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In Figure 4.1, the elements of the organization that became included in the study are 
marked in gray. Many people were represented in more than one activity, i.e. in more 
than one box. 
 
The intended function, the status, the number of participants and the number of 
interviewees from each element of Figure 4.1 are as follows: 
1&2. The line management of the Rail Administration and the Inspectorate receive 
monthly reports about progression, economy and the development of the content of 
the work. The two people responsible for the project in these organizations, i.e. the 
Safety director of the Rail Administration and the Director of the Inspectorate were 
responsible for the reporting to their respective organizations.  
Interviewed: The two people responsible. 
3. The Steering committee was responsible for the final decisions about use of resources, 
organization, staffing, progression, methods and approval of the final results of the 
work. The committee consisted of the Safety director of the Rail Administration and 
the Director of the Inspectorate, the responsible person for the project in the Traffic 
safety department of the Rail Administration and the leader of the project.  
Interviewed: Four out of four possible. 
4. The Board of the project had an advisory function for the Steering committee. The 
board included the members of the Steering committee, representatives of the traffic 
operators and one representative of the Danish Rail Administration (Banestyrelsen).  
Interviewed: Six out of twelve possible (some turnover in the group). 
5. The Project group (also called the work group in the study) was responsible for the 
practical work of the project, either by themselves or by engaging others. The group 
had five members including the Project leader. Their background will be described in 
Subsection 5.2.2. 
Interviewed: Six out of seven possible (some turnover in the group). 
6. The group for Cooperation between the Project and the Inspectorate were established 
for clarifying issues that occurred during the progression of the work. Participation 
depended upon which issues were at stake. The project leader was a permanent 
member. From the Inspectorate usually one lawyer and one railway professional 
participated.  
Interviewed: Nine out of twelve possible. 
7. The Quality insurance group was responsible for reviewing use of methods and 
concluding presentations from the Project group. The task was performed by the 
Board of the project, the Board of the branch and the Resource People. 
Interviewed: See the actual groups 
8. The members of the Board of the branch had a function to contribute with railway 
knowledge about the regulated activities. It consisted of representatives from the 
different activities, mainly people who had extensive operative experiences and now 
had administrative functions in their respective organizations.  
Interviewed: Fourteen out of twenty five possible (some turnover in the group). 
9. The element of Safety Management was handled by the project leader who had 
experience with safety management. 
Interviewed: One out of one possible 
10. The project engaged Resource people and scientists for different tasks.  
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Interviewed: 3 out of 17 possible.(Their written reports were studied.) 
11. The person responsible for the project in the Traffic safety department of the Rail 
Administration was responsible for the international harmonizing and cooperation. 
Interviewed: One out of one possible 
12. The juridical aspects of the formulation of rules were handled by the lawyers involved 
in the group for Cooperation between the Project and the Inspectorate. 
Interviewed: Two out of two possible 
13. The philological aspects of the formulation of rules were handled by the secretary of 
the Project group. 
Interviewed: One out of one possible 
14. The questions regarding infrastructure were handled by the Project group who 
consulted key people and their network. 
Interviewed: Six out of seven possible (some turnover in the group). 
15. The questions about Mobile equipment such as trains were handled by the Project 
group who consulted key people and their network. 
Interviewed: Six out of seven possible (some turnover in the group). 
16. At an early stage of the work the project engaged one external expert of “Human 
factors” 
Not interviewed for practical reasons; he was working abroad during the data-
collection. 
17. Due to delays in the project, the planning of education and training for the 
implementation of modified rules did not start during the study.  
 
The choice of interviewees 
 
When choosing interviewees, I decided to start out with the most influential groups that 
were involved in the work. To decide upon this, the organizational map of Figure 4.1 and 
advice from the project leader were followed. Furthermore, the Project leader gave advice 
about which people could be useful for information. This advice appeared to be very 
valuable. To prevent bias I decided to interview representatives from as many subgroups 
as possible and when possible some supplementary people from the groups.  
 
In total 24 persons directly involved in the case were interviewed. This number is lower 
than the sum of interviewed participants in each of the elements of the project 
organization presented above. The explanation is that many people held several roles in 
the project and therefore were repeatedly presented at different places.  
 
Additionally 6 persons were interviewed for background information. These were 
involved in the professional education, the management of the core rule-followers and the 
safety work of the regulated activities. To find the people with most relevant information, 
I followed the advice of my interviewees and my own knowledge of the organization. 
 
The total number of interviewees was 30. Out of these four persons had been involved in 
former modification processes of the rules.  
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The interviewees held different positions within the Railway system, see Table 4.1. Also 
in this table some people hold more than one position; again the total number is higher 
than the number of interviewees. The interviewee characteristics of the people are shown 
in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.1  Main positions of interviewed people including people not directly 
involved in the Traffic-rule project  
(Note: Some people held more than one role.) 
 
Positions of 
interviewees 
and their 
organizational 
belonging 
Inspec-
torate 
Rail 
admin-
istration 
Traffic 
operators 
Accident 
Investig-
ation  
Board 
Others Total 
Upper 
management 
(Director level) 
1 1 2 0 0 4
Middle 
management 
0 2 0 0 0 2
1. line 
management 
0 3 1 0 0 4
Operative staff 0 0 1 0 0 1
Safety staff 3 6 6 1 0 16
Educational 
staff 
0 1 2 0 0 3
Contracted staff  0 0 0 0 5 5
 
The table illustrates that the study involved a rather differentiated group with respect to 
roles and functions in the Railway system. However, the operative staff is the least 
represented. This is due to their limited representation in the organized work. As the 
study focus on the process from the participants view, I find the representation of 
interviewees satisfactory for analytic purposes.  
 
In addition to the interviews, I had seven meetings involving four persons and 
participated in two group meetings. These involved people from the Norwegian Railway 
system.  The main purpose was to get background information and to verify my findings. 
Information from these meetings is included.  
 
I knew two of the interviewees previously. 
 
4.2.1.2 The Maintenance-rule cases 
 
The other three cases belonged to the Overarching Maintenance project that was a pure 
Rail Administration project. As mentioned this study limits itself to look into the part of 
the project that is related to rule modification, the so-called Maintenance-rule project.  
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Also, the work of the Maintenance-rule cases had started before the study; approximately 
6 months before the first contact was made. The study follows the work until the rules 
were carried into effect January 1/1 2003. The main data collection was done during the 
last three months of the project and the following three months after the rules was 
effected. This also means that here the information is given partly as reflections during 
the process and partly in retrospective perspective.  
 
The organizing of the Maintenance-rule cases 
 
The Overarching Maintenance project was also organized according to the guidance for 
project organizing of the Rail Administration. The formal structure of the project is 
shown in Figure 4.2. Here the Maintenance-rule project is marked in gray. As the cases 
were subprojects of the Maintenance-rule project, they are not illustrated in the 
organizational map.   
 
Project 
responsible 
Board of the 
project 
Competence strategy 
Governing documents 
Project 
leader 
Board of the 
branch  
Project hotel 
Data Maintenance-
rule project 
Optimizing of 
preventive 
maintenance 
Strategic 
decision 
support 
Model for 
budgetary  
distribution 
catching 
Figure 4.2 Formal organization of the Overarching Maintenance project. 
The Maintenance-rule project is marked with gray color. 
 
The Maintenance-rule project and the cases had a rather simple and informal 
organizational structure compared to the Traffic rule case. Also the cases involved fewer 
people.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.4.2, the Maintenance-rules were organized according to the 
four main systems of the infrastructure, i.e. the Substructure, the Superstructure, the 
Power-supply and Signaling and interlocking.  
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The study limited itself to look into the processes of three Maintenance-rule cases. To 
choose cases for the study the leader of the Overarching Maintenance project and the 
present leader of the Maintenance-rule project were asked for advice. The selection 
criteria presented for them were: People involved in the work that had shown special 
interest or had strong opinions about the ongoing work, cases that were particularly 
illustrative of the processes or had different challenges related to rule modification. The 
cases were chosen according to their advice. The information that appeared during the 
interviews both about the chosen cases and the others, verified their opinion.  
 
The cases and the number of participants and interviewees are as follows: 
• Sub- and Superstructure work closely together, but the rule modifications of the fields 
were divided. As the modification of the Superstructure rules involved more actors 
than the Substructure, this case was chosen for the study and labeled the 
“Superstructure case”.  
 
Most of the work of the Superstructure case was performed by two people. These 
were the two people at the Head office in the Technical department in the Rail 
Administration who were involved in regular rule modifications. One of these had the 
responsibility for the rules. The case had an established Board of the Branch. This 
board was also consulted during the work of risk analyses and rule development.  
Interviewed: The two people who performed the work. 
 
• Power-supply consisted of three subsystems. Out of these, one was chosen as a 
representative for this system and labeled the “Power-supply case”. The choice was 
made because the leader of this case had been much engaged in discussions of the 
Maintenance-rule project and out of practical reasons.  
 
In the work of Power-supply case two people did most of the work. One was the 
responsible for the rules at the Head office in the Technical department in the Rail 
Administration. He was also involved in regular rule modifications. The other was a 
person who was contracted from another part of the Rail Administration to perform 
the rule writing. The case also involved different people to participate in the risk 
analyses. These were involved according to their specific knowledge about the 
equipment to be analyzed 
Interviewed: The two most involved people from whom one had participated in the 
risk analytic work. 
:  
• The Signaling and interlocking was the third case to represent the Maintenance-rule 
project. This case became labeled the “Signal case” in the study. As this case had 
been a pilot for the Maintenance-rule cases it was of special interest.  
 
In the rule development there were two main actors. One was the responsible for the 
rules at the Head office in the Technical department in the Rail Administration. He 
was also involved in regular rule modifications. The other was a person who was 
contracted to perform the task.  
Interviewed: Both 
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As this case had a function as a pilot for the Maintenance-rule cases and the risk 
analytic work was isolated from the rule modification, one person involved in the risk 
analytic group was included in the study. He was chosen both on the background of 
recommendations and for practical reasons. 
 
To some extent the cases had different contexts and processes. Therefore the 
Maintenance-rule cases are both treated together as a group and separately in the study; 
together when the issue at stake reveals no differences of importance between the cases 
and separately when there are important differences.  
 
The rest of the Maintenance-rule project and the Overarching Maintenance project served 
as a context for the work.  
 
The choice of interviewees 
 
The presentation of the cases above reveals that the main actors directly involved in the 
modification work of the cases were interviewed, in total 7 persons. Because of their 
central role in the work, I also decided to interview the project leader of the Overarching 
Maintenance project and the former and current project leaders of the Maintenance-rule 
project. Based on advices I also interviewed one external risk analytic expert contracted 
by the Overarching Maintenance project and one auditor. (The two latter are categorized 
as “Others” in Table 4.2.) 
 
The leader of the Maintenance-rule project was also the leader of the former Permanent 
rule modification project that traditionally had modified the existing rules.  
 
The total number of interviewees was 12. Except for contracted staff, all were employed 
by the Technical department of the Rail Administration. An overview of the studied 
groups, their number of participants and the number of interviews are given in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2  The main positions of interviewed actors in the studied cases of the 
Maintenance-rule project. 
 
Positions of 
interviewees 
and their 
distribution in 
cases 
Signal Power-
supply 
Super 
structure 
Others 
 
Total 
Upper  
Management  
(Director level) 
0 0 0 0 0
Middle  
Management 
1 1 2 3  7
Involved in  
operative 
activities 
1 0 0 0 1
Safety staff 0 0 0 1 1
Educational  
Staff 
0 0 0 0 0
Contracted staff 1 1 0 1  3
 
 
The table illustrates that the study of these cases involved a smaller group of people who 
were less differentiated regarding roles and functions in the Railway system compared to 
the Traffic-rule case. Also in these cases the distribution of interviewees was according to 
the involvement in the project. As the upper management, the operative staff and the 
safety staff were not directly involved in the modification work they are not represented 
in the study. The only exception is the person involved in auditions who can be seen to 
represent the safety staff. Furthermore, the educational system was neither represented 
nor followed up for these cases. The reason is that the core education of most rule-
followers is/was external, see Chapter 5, Subsection 5.3.2. With respect to the focus of 
the study I also find the representation of interviewees satisfactory for these cases.  
 
In addition to the interviews, I had three meetings involving two persons. Again, the 
purpose was mainly to get background information and to verify my findings. 
Information from these meetings is included.  
 
I knew three of the interviewees previously. 
 
4.2.1.3 Interviewee characteristics 
 
A total of 41 persons out of 43 asked were interviewed for this research. (One person was 
represented in both the Traffic-rule case and the Maintenance-rule cases) No one refused 
to be interviewed. For practical reasons, two interviews had to be cancelled. Table 4.3 
shows the different characteristics of those interviewed. 
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Table 4.3  The interviewee characteristics of the two projects 
 
 Traffic-rule 
project 
Maintenance 
project 
Both projects 
Mean age 45.9 38,0 43,7 
No. of men 24 12 35  
(one person 
represented in both 
projects)  
No. of women 6 0 6 
No. with 
external 
technical 
education  
12 12 23 
(one person 
represented in both 
projects) 
No. with 
internal rail – 
education 
16 0 16 
No. with other 
education 
2 0 2 
 
Everyone interviewed was Norwegian. As can be seen from the table, the two projects 
had rather different profiles regarding age, gender and educational background. 
 
4.2.2 Data collection by interview 
 
In the data collection most emphasis was given to the interviews. The interviewees were 
questioned in the topics of the interview guides. They were encouraged to open subjects 
they found particularly important. 
 
4.2.2.1 The interview guide  
 
Prior to the data collection, the first edition of the standard guide was tested on two 
experienced researchers in safety management. These researchers have carried out several 
research projects within the Norwegian railway system.  
 
The standard interview guide was used as basis for the development of guides adapted to 
the roles and expected knowledge of the interviewees. In this work I used my prior 
knowledge of the system. The guides were used during the interviews. The intention to 
integrate questions about the hierarchical and risk-based approaches into the core 
questions was followed.  
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After the first interviews the standard guide was evaluated, both on the background of my 
own impression of the interviews and feedback from the interviewees. This only resulted 
in minor changes. The guides were also developed during the data collection period 
reflecting increased insight. 
 
4.2.2.2 Accomplishment of interviews 
 
The interviews were carried out in either the office of the interviewee or in meeting 
rooms that the interviewee had arranged. For practical reasons one interview was 
arranged privately. No other persons participated in the interviews. The interviews 
averaged 1 ½ - 2 hours, but ranged from 40 minutes to 3 ½ hours.  
 
Each interview started with an introduction of the research project and my background. 
Further, an agreement for the use of the data was made.  
 
All interviews were performed by me. During the interviews, the guide was used as a 
guideline, not as a questionnaire. To encourage the interviewees, I tried to make the 
interview situation more like a conversation. Therefore, the same questions were asked in 
different ways. During the interviews the hierarchical and risk-based approaches were 
discussed thoroughly. The interviewees were very concerned about the introduction of 
the new approaches. Therefore these topics were usually opened by the interviewees.  
 
Except for two interviews, all were recorded. One of these was at the very beginning of 
the work and I was hesitant to use recording equipment. In the other, the interviewee did 
not approve of my use of the equipment. Some of the interviewees admitted that they 
became a little disturbed by the recording, while others took no account. Sometimes, the 
interviewees asked that particular sequences of the interview would not be quoted. In a 
few instances the recorder was tuned off when sensitive information was given. This 
usually happened when the interviewees wanted to tell anecdotes that they considered 
sensitive for the reputation of the railway system, other people or themselves.  
 
On only two occasions were there problems with the recording. The data was later 
reconstructed by the help of the interviewees.  
 
Most of the recorded interviews were fully transcribed to text files. The conversations 
were written as accurately as possible. Nonverbal communication such as laugher and 
pauses that might influence the understanding of the written text was also added. A few 
of the interviews of the most peripheral actors were transferred from the tapes to text files 
as thematical reports; 30 interviews were fully transcribed and 11 thematically reported. 
All transcription was done by me.  
 
All interviewees were offered their transcription or report. Many of them wanted this and 
some came up with comments. 
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4.2.3 Data collection by documents 
 
The document studies played an important role in achieving insight into the formal 
conditions of the project. This refers to the organizing, goals, philosophies, requirements, 
development and principled discussions and decisions. This information was used both in 
the presentation of the projects and was important as background knowledge when the 
interviews were planned and carried out.  
 
Due to the large amount of project documentation and in particular in the Traffic-rule 
project, it was not practical to go through it all. As planned, the project leaders were 
asked to provide documents that they considered the main project documents describing 
the background, the purpose and the development of the projects and topics of interest for 
the research. Document lists for the Traffic-rule projects were also collected. I did not 
detect any strategies to hide documents from me. As the work developed I asked for more 
documentation that covered issues of special interest. 
 
For the Traffic-rule project the later selections of papers were related to the 
communication between the Inspectorate and the project, the performed change analyses 
and reports related to principled decisions. The most up-to-date study plans for engine 
drivers and traffic control were also collected. Further a report from an audit that the 
Inspectorate did of the project was collected. For the Maintenance project the later 
selections were related to the internal work of the sub-groups for rule modification and 
the performed change analyses.  
 
To get an impression of the framework of the work, the safety management system of the 
Rail Administration was briefly studied. 
 
The requests for more documentation were always positively met.  
 
 I believe the selection of documents was satisfactory for analytic purposes. 
 
4.2.4 Other sources of information 
 
Because I already had a personal network in the system, it was natural to contact these 
people for advice about the potential for conducting the research in the system and how to 
approach it. These contacts contributed with useful information that made it easy to make 
contact with the projects and to get the necessary permission for the research. This was 
especially true in the beginning of the work. All personal contacts were and are open and 
above board. 
 
The communication to achieve the necessary permission for the research was made by 
telephone, E-mail and face to face meetings. During this communication my research and 
topics related to this were discussed. The communication also provided useful 
information. 
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During the data collection period I had the opportunity to participate in the following 
activities:  
• A seminar related to a project of the International Union of Railways (UIC) 
named “Safety culture at interfaces” arranged by SINTEF Technology and 
Society 
• A one day meeting for instructors of engine drivers  
• A two day seminar for the safety staff of the Rail Administration and a half day 
seminar about rail safety 
• A half day seminar about rail safety arranged by SINTEF Technology and Society  
 
In addition I was invited to the Danish Transport Research Institute for one week. During 
this week, meetings with representatives of Danish National Railway Administration and 
DSB (the traffic operator originating back to the former governmental Danish State 
Railway) were arranged for me.  
 
Immediately after all the contacts field notes were made.  All e-mails were stored. All 
together these provided valuable impressions of safety work in general and the role of 
rules and rule modification in particular. This also helped to generate propositions that 
could be further investigated in documents and interviews. 
 
4.3 Analyses 
 
Both the collected written documentation of the projects and the transcribed interviews 
gave a huge amount of data. It was therefore necessary to find a way to approach it.  
 
As mentioned in 4.1.2, an initial one-page coding schema with preliminary concepts was 
developed. This schema was influenced by the developing research questions, literature 
on quantitative analyses (especially Miles & Huberman, 1994), the studies of theory and 
the project documentation made in the early phase of the study. The purpose of this was 
to keep in mind the analytic work when performing the interviews and to enhance 
sensitivity in the early stage of work with the data.  
 
The coding schema was developed into the analytic schema on the background of the 
experiences of the concepts, the initial data collection and a perspective of the 
modifications as processes that could be divided into sequences. This was inspired by 
Strauss & Corbin (1998). The analytic schema with its main headings is shown in Table 
4.4 below. As mentioned, the full version is shown in Appendix D. 
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Table 4.4  The main headings of the analytic schema  
 
     What were the 
intentions of the 
project? 
What happened in 
the project? 
Why and with 
what 
consequences? 
Other comments 
Consequences for 
railway knowledge 
1.Introduction 
Presentation of the 
rule projects 
    
2. How are the 
processes of 
developing the 
rules run and why? 
    
3. What are the 
underlying 
perspectives 
dominating the 
ongoing 
modification of 
safety rules? 
    
4. What are the 
chosen rule 
solution 
    
5. Unclassified 
issues 
    
 
 
In the schema the horizontal axis contained headings that made it possible to compare the 
initial intentions with the actual path of the process, causal explanations and hypotheses 
about consequences for railway knowledge. The vertical axis contained headings related 
to the context and history of the project and the actual rules, the progression of the work, 
the use of risk analyses and the choice of rule solutions in particular, the involved actors 
and their perspectives and the chosen rule solution. In addition there was one row for 
unclassified issues.  
 
When almost all the interviews related to the cases were finished, the transcripts of the 
interviews and the written documents of each case were worked through. The preliminary 
findings were summarized and filled into the analytic schema. The use of the analytic 
schema proved very helpful. It both developed my existing knowledge into explicit 
knowledge and revealed where more information had to be collected.  
 
When this was done, information that could be related to individuals was removed from 
the schemas. These were then sent to the two leaders  of the modification projects, i.e. to 
the leader of the Traffic-rule case and the leader of the Maintenance-rule project. In a 
following meeting we worked through the matrices, the project leaders supplemented 
missing information and verified the analytic results. A few misunderstandings were 
revealed and corrected. This process also showed that some information was still missing. 
Hence it gave input to further data collection. In this process the preliminary analyses was 
developed with respect to categories and became more nuanced. This gave the analytic 
schema more subheadings.  
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Based on the developed analytic schema more thorough analyzes followed. Here the 
verified initial results were compared and contrasted both with respect to information 
received from different sources within each case and between the cases. In parallel with 
the analyses I also started to write the thesis. The writing helped clarify my growing 
knowledge. Thus, the writing contributed to the analytic work. During this work some 
issues appeared to become of greater than expected importance. As my awareness of 
these improved, I had to turn back to the transcrips several times.  
 
The content of the analytic schemas was then transferred into matrices and displays 
inspired by Miles & Huberman (1994).  
 
At the end of the writing of the study, I went back to the raw data to verify the analytic 
work. 
 
During this process I had to prepare a paper for PSAM 7/Esrel 2004. This was based on 
findings from the Traffic-rule case. The process of developing this paper also helped in 
relating my preliminary findings to the theory of organizational learning and knowledge. 
The paper was discussed with the project leader of this case. 
 
4.4 Research quality 
 
In the literature of methodology, questions related to the quality of qualitative research 
are discussed (See for instance Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Kvale, 1996; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998, Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this study the main objective has 
been to create understanding and insight into the phenomenon of rule modification. The 
issue of quality raises the question whether the study answers the research questions and 
particularly enlightens the revealed problems. The study has contributed with some 
descriptions and explanations of the development within the studied modification 
processes. The main question to be answered here is whether these are trustworthy and 
applicable. 
 
4.4.1 Objectivity/Confirmability 
 
The main source for information in this research is qualitative interviews and written 
documentation from the cases. This raises the question whether the conclusions depend 
on the subject and conditions of the inquiry, rather than on the inquirer (Guba & Lincoln, 
1981). To approach this question, the preliminary analytic results were verified by the 
project leaders of the Traffic-rule case and of the Maintenance-rule project. Further I 
went back to the raw data at the end of the study to verify my results.  
 
However, the conclusions are also influenced by me because I did all of the work. Kvale 
(1996) argues that interviews are neither objective nor subjective. The essence of the 
qualitative interview is inter-subjective interaction. Strauss & Corbin (1998) point at the 
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problem to retain a balance between objectivity and sensitivity. The interaction between 
the scientist and the data both during data collection and analyses makes the researcher 
influenced by the data and the data influenced by the researcher. Therefore the steps 
described above were supplemented with comparison and verification of the information 
extracted from the documents and interviews. This was used to confront myself with my 
own assumptions and the assumptions of the interviewees. This particularly important as 
I had prior knowledge of the Railway system, had used my network and the initial data 
collection was based on advice from the project leaders.  
 
4.4.2 Reliability/Dependability 
 
The studied processes have been dependent on the context of the cases when the 
modification processes developed. As illustrated this context is undergoing changes. The 
reliability criterion presupposes stability, consistency and predictability whereas the 
notion of dependability acknowledges that change is always taking place.  
 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) discuss dependability. They argue that to demonstrate 
dependability the researcher has to take into account both factors of instability and of 
phenomenal or design induced change. Further, Strauss & Corbin (1998) discuss 
reproducibility and argue that it is difficult to reproduce social phenomena. They argue 
that given the theoretical perspective of the original researcher, the use of the same 
general rules for data collection and analyses and the same conditions, other researchers 
should be able to come up with the same or similar theoretical explanations of the 
phenomena being studied. By providing thorough descriptions of the theoretical approach, 
the context of the cases, the data collection and the analyses I have tried to illustrate the 
dependability of the cases and the way the study is performed. However, the 
reproducibility has not been tested. Such a test could have revealed whether my work has 
been biased by my prior knowledge of the railway system or not. 
 
4.4.3 Internal validity/Credibility 
 
Kvale (1996) discusses validity and argues that this concerns whether the research 
investigates what it intended to do. Therefore an illustration of the relationship between 
the research questions, the data collection, analyses and the presentation of data is of vital 
importance. In this study the development of research questions, data collection, analyses 
and the presentation of data have been an iterative process where the elements have 
influenced each other. Hence, these elements were not preplanned in detail when the 
work started. However, during this development the choices have been made in loyalty to 
the overall intention to contribute with increased understanding of modification processes 
as seen from the perspective of the participants. 
 
Validity and the related credibility, might be increased by triangulating different data 
sources. (See for instance Yin, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994, Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Different cases were chosen for the study. Further, a large number of interviewees 
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holding different roles and functions were chosen as interviewees. Information from the 
documents and in particular, minutes from meetings, were triangulated with the 
information from my interviewees. This functioned as compensation for not participating 
in the modification processes and for the rather short duration of the interviews, i.e. two 
aspects of credibility discussed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). The triangulation also built 
upon the analytic approach of Straus & Corbin (1998) where comparison of data from the 
different sources is an important element.  
 
One challenge here is the handling of diverging results (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As 
will be illustrated in Part II, such instances are revealed and discussed with respect to 
possible explanations. Therefore it has also been necessary to give context-rich and 
detailed descriptions of the cases. This process can also be associated with the advice of 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) to enhance credibility by negative case analyses.  
 
One question is whether the portrait given of the cases is ”authentic” (Miles & Huberman 
(1994). Strauss & Corbin (1998) use the concept ”saturated” when no more new and 
important factors emerge from data collection and analyses. However, the literature 
reveals that this concept is problematic (Miles & Hubermann, 1994; Melia, 1997).  
 
I also found the concepts “authentic” and “saturated” problematic. To counter that 
important information may have been lost, I followed up the issues where I felt uncertain 
in later interviews. As the Traffic rule case involved much more people than the 
Maintenance-rule cases, this case had much better possibilities for this and for 
enlightening the work from different perspectives.  
 
The involvement of the project leaders in the verification of the preliminary analyses 
results was also done as an attempt to verify the preliminary research findings and to 
reveal weaknesses. Together with the discussions of the conference paper for PSAM 
7/Esrel 2004 with the project leader of the Traffic-rule case, this can also be seen as 
member checks as discussed by Lincoln & Guba (1985). However, this might also be a 
dangerous path. The results might be more influenced by these people than of others. 
Hence this might cause bias in their favor. The comparison of these preliminary results 
with later interviews, inclusion of more interviewees in the study and the review of data 
were means to counteract this.  
 
The involvement of the project leaders in selection of interviewees and documents might 
also have been a source of bias. However, these selections were supplemented with other 
sources that did not indicate that this was a problem. As mentioned I did not get the 
impression of any hidden strategies.  
 
Much of the study is based on interviews. Referential adequacy is attended to by taping 
interview and transcribing the central ones in detail and the rest as summaries (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2005). Further the collected documents are systematized and the verified initial 
analyses and flow charts are stored. Memos containing own reflections are also stored. 
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Kvale (1996) discusses validity in relation to transcription of interviews. He argues that 
this represents a translation from oral to written language where the conversation is 
decontextualized. To counteract this, I included a brief description of the interview 
situation in the transcriptions of each person. Further, I tried to describe emotional 
expressions in the transcriptions. However, this does not give a full picture of the 
communication during the interviews. 
 
I did not participate in any systematic peer debriefing as advised by Lincoln & Guba 
(1985) However, I engaged myself in discussions with different colleagues, fellow PhD 
students and my mentors.  
 
4.4.4 External validity/Transferability 
 
The issue here is whether the conclusions of the study have any larger import (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). To establish external validity of results one has to know both the 
sending and the receiving context, which is in fact a question of transferability (Lincoln 
& Guba (1985). Again the rather detailed descriptions in this thesis are a means to 
illustrate the sending context for comparison with eventual receiving contexts. Whether 
these are judged as sufficient might be depend on the evaluator’s research tradition and 
what phenomena he or she is interested in (Wulff, 1997).   
 
As all cases belong to the Norwegian Railway system and occured in a special period of 
transformation of this system, this implies some restrictions regarding transferability. 
However there are also many similarities between the features of this transformation and 
other processes influenced by New Public Management. Many of these are also under 
pressure for increased use of outcome-oriented rules and increased use of a risk-based 
approach. Further, the Norwegian railway system has many similarities with the railway 
systems in other countries.  
 
Strauss & Corbin (1998) are more concerned about the explanatory power of the research 
than of generalizability. The philosophy is to see what can be learned from one case 
about other cases. The procedure of comparing implies registration of both similarities 
and differences and to see how relevant the results of one case might be for another case 
or where the cases might be different.  
 
In the study, there are some variations built into the choice of cases, interviewees and 
documentation. Even though I have not developed one clear theory, I have attempted to 
provide explanations for the results that can contribute to increased understanding of 
other modification processes.  
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PART II: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Part II consists of a combination of results and discussions. The first chapter provides a 
short presentation of the context of the four cases that the two projects represent. The 
following three chapters answer the research questions. These chapters are organized 
according to the problems revealed in Chapter 3; each subsection presents, discusses and 
gives concluding remarks to one problem.  The last subsection of the chapters provides 
the main conclusions of the actual research questions and associated problems.  
 
This study follows the rule development of the Traffic-rule project until the work was 
transferred to the Inspectorate. The Maintenance-rule project is followed until the 
implementation date of the rules. Plans for future rule management that were developed 
until these times are included. 
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5 Contexts of the cases 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of elements in the near contexts of the 
four studied cases that influenced their modification processes. 
 
5.1 Traditions and plans for the future 
 
The overall purpose of the study is to increase the knowledge about safety rule revisions. 
As the studied modification processes appeared to be a part of a continuous process of 
rule development that influenced the work, a brief description of the modification 
traditions of the cases and plans for the future is necessary. 
 
5.1.1 Modification traditions 
 
The cases were rooted in the historical development of the Norwegian railway system 
described in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the rule sets to be modified had been developed on 
the basis of an extensive understanding of the applied technology and the interactions 
within the regulated areas and associated risks. Furthermore, many interviewees reported 
that rules had often become modified after unwanted events and accidents. They also 
reported that rules were modified when the technology of infrastructure or equipment was 
changed or new solutions introduced. These changes could happen as a result of 
discussions of anticipated consequences of planned changes or as a result of experience 
with the changes. In addition, the international development of railway regulations has 
influenced, in particular, regulations associated with the same technical solutions as 
applied at the Norwegian railway system.  
 
When rules were modified all cases had the tradition of taking advantage of knowledge in 
rule-developers’ network. Many interviewees also reported that these networks provided 
useful feedback to existing rules. As the eldest interviewee who had worked with rule 
modifications for many years expressed it: “We did not have any system for receiving 
feedback. We had some of these eager souls who you know, for instance an engine driver 
who you had taught in the school, who call you up.”  He explained that they called 
because he was well known in the system.  
 
When found necessary modifications of the Traffic-rules were usually done by the staff 
of the former Safety Office of NSB. The general pattern was that these people recognized 
needs for changes in the rules due to technological changes and evolving knowledge, 
particularly from accidents and unwanted events. Before changes in existing rules or new 
rules were implemented, the solutions were often tried out in practice in the form of 
Safety directives, S-directives, for short. Sometimes more fundamental changes were 
made in the rule set. The most extensive changes were made in 1964 when remote control 
was introduced for coordination of traffic operations and in 1997 when it was decided 
that the remote control was used to such an extent that it was decided that the rules had to 
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be grounded upon this principle. The latest change was made by a project group. The 
documentation of earlier modification processes was scarce.  
 
For the Maintenance-rules there had been a tradition to revise the rules every year with 
1st of January as the date for implementation. Additional changes were made when found 
necessary. A group at the Head Office of the Rail Administration performed the work. 
The interviewees representing this group explained that during the year they collected 
information from those operating in the practical field and about the development of 
technology to be maintained. This knowledge was used when revising the rules. The 
people performing the work were mainly engineers. To track changes in the rules, a 
special schema was developed where the changes were documented. 
 
As revealed in Chapter 2, the rules of the Traffic-rule case consisted of a major rule set 
and a set of supplementary advisory rules. They were all prescriptive, and they had not 
been accompanied by goal-oriented formulations or textbooks. The rules of the 
Maintenance-rule cases were all prescriptive, but they had different contents. They were 
accompanied by textbooks.  
 
Both the Traffic-rules and the Maintenance-rules were developed for internal use in the 
former NSB and served both traffic safety and other purposes. The rules were not 
developed to function as isolated rules. They had bee a part of the entire rule system of 
NSB.  
 
5.1.2 Plans for the future 
 
There plans for future management of the cases’ rule sets differed. 
 
5.1.2.1 Uncertainty of the Traffic-rules 
 
According to the project leader of the Traffic-rule case, the case developed the traffic- 
rules for the current needs. Due to ongoing developments within the Norwegian Railway 
system and of international laws and regulations for Railways, especially related to the 
harmonizing processes within EU, he expected the rules to be rather temporary.  
 
However, the plans for future management of the traffic-rules were unsettled. In the final 
report of this case it is suggested to develop a strategic plan for the future development of 
this rule set 24 . The report argues that it is necessary to coordinate the technical 
development, the international rule development and the development of the traffic-rules. 
The Inspectorate will be responsible for future approvals of deviations and modifications 
of the traffic-rules. The interviewees of the Inspectorate did not report any clear strategic 
plans for future rule modifications of the organization, but the organization has 
established a forum for communication with involved actors at the organizational level. 
                                                 
24 Project log 1208 
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Here the organizations have the opportunity to discuss subjects associated with the 
Traffic-rules. Furthermore, the Director of the Audit department of the Inspectorate 
reported that after audits, the auditors made notes about revealed weaknesses in existing 
rules. Also, the Director of this organization considered it important to find good 
solutions for revealing weaknesses in the rules.  
  
5.1.2.2 Continuous discussions of the Maintenance-rules 
 
As per the Traffic-rules, the Maintenance-rules were also developed for the current 
situation. The interviewees expected that the technical development of the infrastructure 
and the ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system would require future rule 
modifications. 
 
However, the situation for the future management of the Maintenance-rules was different 
from that of the Traffic-rules. The project leader of the Overarching Maintenance project 
explained that the Overarching Maintenance project developed a plan to make the 
Maintenance-rules a part of interaction processes between hierarchical levels of the Rail 
Administration. This was developed as a separate plan in parallel with the work of the 
Maintenance-rule cases. Here the rules are supposed to be subject to discussions and 
development in accordance with evolving knowledge and experienced needs of the 
practical field.  
 
According to the plan, lower management levels of the Rail Administration can impose 
rules for their fields as long as these do not reduce safety. They should also not counteract 
rules issued by rule-imposers positioned at higher levels in the organizational hierarchy 
of the Norwegian railway system nor international laws and regulations.  
 
Decision rules were formulated to handle situations where existing rules are inappropriate 
and rule changes or deviations are necessary. The plan is to link requirements to 
processes of rule change or deviation to the hierarchical position of the rule-imposer and 
the safety ranging of the rules. Rules imposed from rule-imposers with high positions or 
that are safety relevant require more formal proceedings than rules issued by rule-
imposers at lower levels and rules with no safety relevance. Furthermore, decisions for 
deviations or modifications of such rules must be taken at higher organizational levels.  
 
Before decisions of deviances and modifications are accepted, the consequences for risk 
control have to be analyzed and the conclusion must demonstrate that risk control is not 
reduced. As tools to support these processes, the Overarching Maintenance project 
initiated development of data programs. These were not ready when the rules were 
implemented. 
 
During the work of the Maintenance-rule cases the Rail Administration also developed its 
Management system. This system has a hierarchical structure. The Maintenance-rules 
became subdocuments of the highest level of this system. The Management system also 
had one special section for safety. This required that the safety management of the Rail 
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Administration must be based on risk analyses. Future rule development has to be in 
accordance with the governing principles of this Management system. This implied to 
apply risk analyses in the modification work in accordance with prescriptions in the 
section for safety. It also implied a requirement to use risk analyses as evidence that rule 
changes or permission to deviate from rules do not represent reduced safety. 
 
5.2 Organizing of the work and characteristics of the rule-imposers  
 
Chapter 3 revealed some theoretical problems to be elaborated in the study. The 
discussions of the both the hierarchical and the risk based approach directed the attention 
towards the competency of the rule-imposers. The discussions of the hierarchical 
approach also directed the attention to their positions in the organizational hierarchies and 
the safety management systems. The discussions of knowledge and rationality reveal that 
the organizing of the work might influence the knowledge base for the modification work 
and conditions for changes in the railway knowledge. Therefore, in the following the 
hierarchical positions of the rule-imposers, the competency- and experience base that was 
included in the work and how the modification work was organized will be elaborated. 
 
5.2.1 Hierarchical position of the rule-imposers 
 
The cases were not directly involved in the decisions about the hierarchical positioning of 
their rule-imposers in the organizational hierarchy of the Norwegian railway system. 
Therefore these decisions are not studied here. However, the research touches upon their 
consequences. 
 
When the former NSB was divided, the rule-imposer of the Traffic-rules became the Rail 
Administration. As the Traffic-rules functioned at a national level, the function as rule-
imposer of these rules soon became a matter for discussions. In 2001, that is to say during 
the work of the Traffic-rule case, the function became transferred from the Rail 
Administration to the Inspectorate. This meant that the role as rule-imposer was moved 
from the upper mid range level to the highest and strategic level in the Norwegian railway 
system’s organizational hierarchy. Accordingly, the rules had the status of national 
regulations. Above these were national laws and international laws and regulations.  
 
Also the Maintenance-rules came under the responsibility of the Rail Administration 
when NSB was divided. The rule-imposer of the Maintenance-rules became the 
Technical department at the Head Office of the Rail Administration. This means that the 
function as rule-imposer became positioned at the mid range and planning level in the 
Norwegian Railway system, below the Inspectorate and the upper management of the 
Rail Administration. This position was not changed during the modification work.  
 
The modification work was delegated to some people performing the task. Who they 
were and how their work was organized differed between the cases.  
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As revealed in Subsection 4.2.1, the modification work of the Traffic-rule case was 
organized as a project according to the guidance for project organizations of the Rail 
Administration and had an extensive and formalized organizational structure, in particular 
regarding involvement of the management level of the rule-imposer, the rule-follower 
and for communication channels. When it was decided that the Inspectorate should have 
the function as rule-imposer, the organization became more involved in the work. 
  
The complex organizational structure with so many involved actors required that the 
Traffic-rule case developed written documentation of its processes, in particular agenda 
papers and minutes from meetings. These present issues of concern, arguments and 
decisions.  
 
Subsection 4.2.1 also revealed that the organizing of the Overarching Maintenance 
project followed the guidance for project organizations of the Rail Administration. The 
Maintenance-rule cases can be seen as work groups of the Maintenance-rule project that 
again is a subproject of the Overarching Maintenance project. At the level of the 
Maintenance-rule project and the studied cases these had an informal organizational 
structure with few requirements to involvement and documentation of the process. 
Agenda papers and minutes from meetings were limited. They mostly covered 
discussions of principle matters or issues that needed coordination such as the aim of a 
more unified rule system for maintenance activities.   
 
5.2.2 Competency and experience base of the core participants of the work 
 
The interviews revealed that the cases differed in their organizing and inclusion of 
competency and experience on behalf of the rule-imposers. 
 
In the Traffic-rule case, the five people of the work group did the practical work. These 
were involved both in the risk analyses and the rule development. The Maintenance-rule 
cases organized the task of rule development differently. In the Superstructure case the 
two people involved in the regular modifications did the rule development and the risk 
analyses together. They also involved their Board of the branch that consisted of skilled 
and experienced rule- followers representing the different geographical regions of the 
Norwegian railway system. In the Power-supply case the rule-responsible delegated the 
task to develop the rules to a hired person. Depending on the technical equipment to be 
analyzed, he also involved different people in the risk analyses. Also, in the Signal case 
the rule-responsible delegated the task to develop the rules to a hired person. A special 
group of skilled and experienced rule followers were established to perform the risk 
analyses. As will be discussed in Section 7.2, in these cases the overlap and interaction 
between the people performing the risk analyses and the rule development varied.  
 
All four cases involved people that had experience with former rule modifications of the 
actual rules.  
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The interviewees revealed that cases included different railway knowledge. With respect 
to formal railway related educations, the educations represented in the work group of the 
Traffic-rule case included both external technical and administrative education and more 
internal practice-oriented railway education. The Maintenance-rule cases included mainly 
external technical education. With respect to included railway experience, the experience-
base of the group performing the work of the Traffic-rule case was varied and extensive. 
It included experience from the practical operative level, at the mid range administrative 
level and from safety work. The participants of the Maintenance-rule cases had most of 
their experience bases in the mid range administrative level. However, the risk analytic 
work included people from the practical field. These were chosen on the background of 
their reputation as very skilled professionals. 
 
This implies that all cases included both intuitively-contextual knowledge and 
rationalistic railway knowledge. However, the Traffic-rule cases held the strongest 
elements of intuitively-contextual railway knowledge. 
 
Regarding risk analytic competency, the inclusion of formal education and experience 
varied. One member of the work group of the Traffic-rule case had courses in risk 
analytic methods. When this person left the work group a risk analytic expert was 
engaged. In the Maintenance-rule cases only one person in the Signal case had prior 
education in the chosen risk analytic method. This case was also chosen as a pilot case for 
the Maintenance-rule project. None of the people with former experience with rule 
modification had experience of risk-based rule modifications.  
 
5.2.3 Supporting knowledge resources 
 
In several aspects the opportunities to draw upon knowledge of others varied. First, the 
Traffic-rule case started before the Maintenance-rule cases and the Rail Administration 
developed its Management system between their starting points. The cases of the 
Maintenance-rule project also started at different times. Hence the cases had different 
opportunities to lean upon others’ work and experiences. This also gave the cases 
different access to ready-made decisions to draw upon, for instance, defined top events 
and risk analytic methods.  
 
Second, the Traffic-rule case had more formalized resource groups to draw upon than the 
Maintenance-rule cases. The interviewees revealed that the most important were the 
Steering committee of the project, the Board of the project, the Board of the branch and 
the Cooperation committee between the Project and the Inspectorate, see Subsection 4.2.1. 
Among the Maintenance-rule cases, the Superstructure case had a Board of the branch 
that it included. The other cases did not have such operative boards during the 
modification period but as revealed the cases involved skilled professionals representing 
the rule-followers. As Maintenance-rule cases were a part of the same rule project they 
could use each other as resource groups. 
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Third, all cases had established systems for communication with the organizations of the 
rule-followers. However, these systems were different between the Traffic-rule case and 
the cases of the Maintenance-rule project. The Traffic-rule case had formalized 
interaction with the organizations of the rule-followers through the Board of the project 
and the Board of the branch. The organizations were mainly represented by 
administrative staff, not the rule-followers themselves who were the operative staff. 
Through the established system for rule modifications, the Maintenance-rule cases had 
already established communication with rule-followers and the work built upon this 
tradition. 
 
Fourth, the Traffic-rule case had better access to economic funds than the Maintenance-
rule cases and could hire in expertise. As a pilot project, the Signal case had a little better 
opportunity to take advantage of external risk analytic experts hired by the Overarching 
Maintenance project than the other cases, see Section 7.2. This person was also hired by 
the Traffic-rule case when they developed their methods. 
 
Fifth, the interviewees demonstrated that the people involved took advantage of their 
personal networks. They also showed that long lasting, varied practice in the railway 
system and many involved actors implied a rich network for the cases to draw upon. 
Accordingly the Traffic-rule case had a richer network than the Maintenance-rule cases. 
 
In accordance with the established practice of the safety work, the affected trade unions 
were not directly involved in the organizing of any of the cases. Furthermore, the users of 
rail services such as passengers and senders and receivers of cargo were not represented. 
 
5.2.4 Organizational conditions of the work 
 
The cases differed regarding conditions for interactions, cooperation and concentration. 
The Traffic-rule case had a common place where they performed their work. The work 
group of this case was employed for the work on half time basis.  
 
The main actors of the Maintenance case were given the work as an extra task, but the 
task was closely related to their regular duties. The contracted people performing the 
work for the Power-supply case and the Signal case were hired on an hourly basis. The 
people who were responsible for the rules of these cases at the Head Office of the Rail 
Administration coordinated the work. To some extent they also participated. The hired 
people were not located together with these rule-responsible people. The two people who 
performed the regular rule modification of the Superstructure case also did the work of 
this rule modification. They were located close together.  As the Signal case had a role as 
a pilot project the participants of the risk analytic work group had some allocated time for 
the task.  
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5.3 Characteristics of the rule-followers  
 
The discussions of the hierarchical approach in Chapter 3 also directed the attention 
towards characteristics of the rule-followers. In particular, the attention was directed 
towards two issues. One issue was whom they were with respect to positions in the 
organizational hierarchies and the safety management systems, the other was their 
competency- and experience base. In the following these issues will be elaborated. 
 
5.3.1 Hierarchical position of the rule-followers 
 
The Traffic-rules were directed at rule-followers involved in operative activities. These 
were mainly engine drivers, traffic controllers, train dispatchers, shunting personnel and 
personnel responsible for work safety. These groups of staff are positioned at the lowest 
level of the organizational hierarchy of the Norwegian railway system. The engine drivers 
were constant traveling within the geographically distributed system. The personnel 
responsible for work safety were also a rather mobile group. 
 
The Maintenance-rules were directed at the managers of the operative work and those 
actually performing the tasks. These were the line managers, i.e. the lower level 
management responsible for planning the maintenance activities of each line, the leaders 
of the different occupational groups and sometimes also those performing the practical 
work, that is to say the executive level. In other words, the rules were directed at rule-
followers positioned at the three lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy of the 
Norwegian railway system. Those performing the practical work were a rather mobile 
group, but most commonly within the framework of their region. 
 
At the beginning of the work, it was discussed in the Traffic-rule case that the rules 
should be directed more towards the traffic operators than they did for the time being. 
Only when found necessary for safety reasons should they be directed towards operative 
staff. The Maintenance-rule cases discussed that the main rule-followers should be the 
line manager, i.e. those rule-followers that held the highest position among rule-followers 
of existing rules. As the responsible for the rules of the Superstructure explained:  
 
“…to put it bluntly, there has been an understanding or somebody has said that 
we write the rules for the line manager; the owner of the infrastructure. Then he 
is supposed to order the job. Accordingly the one performing the job does not 
need to know the rules very well. But in practice it is not like that …. Until now 
the line manager has ordered a job and said: “Do this and this and do it in 
accordance with the rules.” Then it is evident that those who will do the task have 
to know the rules to the point!” 
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5.3.2 Competency and experience base of the rule-followers 
 
Traditionally the rule-followers of the rule sets of each case were rather homogenous and 
had an extensive understanding of the processes of the Norwegian railway system. The 
interviewees were concerned that the ongoing privatization processes were changing this. 
This matter will be elaborated upon further in Chapter 6.  
 
The interviews revealed that the core rule-followers of the Traffic-rule case had their 
professional education in the internal educational system of the Railway system. Here the 
rules and knowledge of their context and intended function have served as the fundament 
of the education. The education has included extensive trainee programs. Accordingly a 
practical approach has been emphasized. The duration of the educations has been 
shortened and the educational system is under discussion.  
 
The core rule-followers of the Maintenance-rules had predominantly external technical 
educations, often with a rationalistic academic approach. Traditionally external educated 
rule-followers had to undergo railway related courses when they started in the railway 
system. Also in these courses the rules and knowledge of their context and intended 
function played an important role. The rule-followers also had to have extensive practice 
before they were considered competent enough to take the full responsibility for the 
railway tasks. However, some interviewees were concerned that this practice is now not 
followed up to the same extent as before.  
 
Many interviewees considered the rule-followers’ knowledge of the context and the 
function of the rules as important for safe performance. This was associated with 
possibilities for correct rule use, attitudes towards compliance and discoveries of rule 
weaknesses.   
 
5.4 Other stakeholders  
 
Interviewees of both the Traffic-rule case and the Maintenance-rule cases revealed that 
there were other stakeholders in the rule modifications than just the rule-imposers and the 
rule-followers. However, the results revealed that these were not subject to their main 
concerns in the modification work. 
 
The stakeholders that the interviewees mentioned most often were those responsible for 
controls and audits of performance, the timetables for the traffic operation, those involved 
in the educational systems and those involved in the control of the qualifications of the 
staff, i.e. the planning level. It was also mentioned that the content of rules could be of 
relevance for eventual subcontractors. 
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5.5 Characteristics of the rules’ context   
 
When discussing the hierarchical approach and knowledge in Chapter 3 the attention was 
also directed towards characteristics of the rules’ context. This was particularly evident in 
the discussions about rule solutions with associated control principles and requirements to 
preplanning of activities and coordination. Below, the factors that appeared to be 
important for the studied modification processes are described.  
 
5.5.1 Organizational development 
 
The organizational conditions of the rules’ context were changing due to the ongoing 
move towards privatization. 
 
The Traffic-rules’ area of regulation had become divided. First, NSB was divided into the 
Rail Administration that were given the responsibility for traffic control and coordination 
and the NSB that remained as a traffic operator. Second the remaining NSB was divided 
into different companies. Many interviewees were concerned that this had divided 
competency and reduced the opportunity to have and overview and understand the 
complex interactions between different activities of the system. As one member of the 
work group expressed it: 
 
”Every time we have made such a step we have lost some of the whole and the 
thinking of the totality. Now, in a period we have been doing our own thing.”  
 
“…in other words, boxed thinking instead of the former NSB where everybody 
was thinking the same. We were all there for those who entered and left the train 
and for those who were sending goods etc. And if everybody had continued this 
way of thinking you would also have more safety philosophy in the thinking.”  
 
In addition to the division of NSB, new operators were also introduced.  
 
In the Maintenance-rules’ areas of regulation, the most important feature was discussions 
of outsourcing and exposure of activities to competition. This had increased the emphasis 
on cost-efficiency and led to reorganization of some activities and outsourcing of other. 
This had divided groups that earlier had closely cooperated into different groups. Some of 
these groups became divided into buyers and suppliers of services. A few interviewees 
expressed an expectation that use of the rules might be extended to regulate the interests 
between the Rail Administration and subcontractors or suppliers.  
 
5.5.2 Geographical differences 
 
The rules of the cases have been developed for a geographically distributed system that 
covers different conditions. Throughout Norway there are significant differences in 
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environment and climate. The climate also changes dramatically during the year. 
Accordingly the context for the activities of the rules varies. 
 
Except for urban areas and stations, most of the infrastructure consists of single tracks. 
There are differences in the technological standards and energy supplies of the lines that 
create differences in recovery aids in cases of mistakes and failures. As already revealed, 
one of the purposes of the Maintenance-rule project was to remove unnecessary 
maintenance that had resulted in different standards of infrastructure25. There is also an 
ongoing technological development that opened for new solutions in all four regulated 
areas. For example, remote control has gradually been introduced on the different lines. 
This has resulted in different relevance of some Traffic-rules in different areas. The 
suppliers of technical equipment to the infrastructure develop their products and there are 
differences in the introduction of these. The development with introduction of new actors 
and suppliers will most probably create even more differentiated technical solutions. 
 
In addition, the traffic volume and density varies with the population and infrastructure of 
the geographical areas. This is also undergoing change and there were examples of both 
increases and decreases in the regions. There was also increased attention to the 
relationship between traffic volume and economy, i.e. cost-efficiency.  
 
One interviewee of the Maintenance-rule cases explained the consequences of these 
geographical differences like this: “In general, rigid systems will be met with distrust 
because the railway system is as differentiated as it is”.  
 
5.5.3 Slack  
 
The activities of both traffic operation regulated by the Traffic-rules and maintenance 
activities regulated by the Maintenance-rules were related to the time schedule for the 
traffic performance. The schedule regulated the activities of the traffic operation most 
directly.  
 
Traditionally there have been some periods of slack in the time schedules. Some of the 
interviewees explained that delays have been possible but unpopular, both among the 
employees of the railway system and the customers. Delays have also been considered to 
represent a dangerous situation. The privatization processes has increased the focus of 
both the organizations of the Railway system and the customers upon precise traffic 
performance. The increased emphasis upon cost-efficiency has also contributed to tighter 
time schedules. In all, this has contributed to reduced slack in the activities. 
 
                                                 
25 Homepage of the Overarching Maintenance project 
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5.5.4 Coordination and communication 
 
The rules of the cases regulate activities with different requirements to coordination, 
communication and levels of functioning:  
 
The Traffic-rules regulate traffic operations. The interviewees described how this activity 
involves many actors and organizations that interact with each other. Their safety is 
dependent upon the performance of the other actors. Many of the activities do not give 
time for thinking and/or consultation before acting and have to follow a rather rigid 
pattern of sequences. Many of the tasks are performed by lone people, for instance trains 
transporting goods are staffed with only one person; the driver. Therefore, to perform the 
tasks safely they found that the different activities have to be coordinated.  
 
However, due to the geographically distributed nature of the system and the technical 
solutions there are limited possibilities for communication between the involved actors. 
The coordination and the communication have therefore been centralized in the Control 
centers. This means that the Control centers function as a common mode for 
communication between the actors. Accordingly, the communication between the actors 
becomes indirect and there are limited opportunities for feedback during the course of 
actions. Misunderstandings in the communication between the coordinators and the actors 
on the track and unforeseen actions can cause accidents. Therefore, the interviewees 
argued that communication has to be unambiguous and the actions of the actors have to 
be in accordance with the prescriptions of the rules.  
 
The Maintenance-rules regulate the maintenance activities of one organization, i.e. the 
Rail Administration. When it is necessary to coordinate the maintenance activities with 
other actors on the tracks, the Maintenance activities are also regulated by the Traffic-
rules. This means that the Maintenance-rules regulate the maintenance activities as such 
within one organization and the Traffic-rules coordinate the maintenance activities with 
other activities run by other actors on the line.  
 
The interviewees explained that many of the maintenance activities are performed by 
groups. Some activities are also performed by lone people, for instance control functions. 
The tasks need to be coordinated with other actors on the track. This coordination is 
regulated by the Traffic-rules. As the traffic density of the different lines is very variable, 
the need for coordination of activities with other actors is very variable.  
 
When it comes to the maintenance activities as such that are regulated by the 
maintenance rules, these usually require less coordination than traffic operation regulated 
by the traffic rules. Furthermore, they hold better opportunities for communication and 
consultation, time to think and feedback. This is especially the case when the work is 
performed by groups. During the work on the track the maintenance radio communication 
system, the train radio system and mobile phones are used to communicate with others. 
Therefore, with some exceptions this area of regulation is less dependent on strict 
communication patterns, predictable actions and gives the actors more time and freedom 
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to choose how to perform the activities as long as they do not conflict with the Traffic-
rules.  
 
5.5.5 Differences between the Maintenance-rule cases 
 
The interviewees of the Maintenance-rule cases explained that these regulated areas held 
different characteristics.  
 
First, the equipment of the Signal system has traditionally had the status as being most 
safety critical, the Superstructure system mid range and the Power-supply system the 
least. This was related to the risk potential in case of failure of the equipment.  
 
Second, the equipment to be maintained by the cases differed in number of components 
and also the number of suppliers of the items. The Power-supply area had the highest, 
Signal was in the mean and Superstructure the lowest.  
 
Third, the cases differed in the easiness to identify and delimit the items and to identify 
their status regarding failures. The items and their status were generally easier to identify 
for the Signal- and Power-supply cases than for the Superstructure case. 
 
Fourth, the equipment of the cases differed regarding rate of change in technical solutions. 
The Signal and Power-supply had more rapid changes in solutions than the 
Superstructure. 
 
5.5.6 Consequences of the ongoing transformations 
 
All consequences of the ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system were still not 
clear during the work of the cases. The interviewees provided their expectations and 
concerns but they also expressed that they did not feel that they were able to foresee the 
development. All together, this made the situation of the regulated areas rather 
ambiguous. Furthermore, the decreased homogeneity among the rule-followers and 
changes in the educational system might make the rule-followers experience the contexts 
for application of the rules with different levels of clarity; the better understanding of the 
regulated area, the less experience of ambiguity and vice versa.  
 
The interviewees did not expect a decrease in the dynamics of these changes in the near 
future. For instance, they expected the privatization processes to go on, tenders were 
invited for traffic operation and maintenance activities. There was therefore a general 
concern for an adaptive rule management system among the interviewees representing 
both traffic operation and maintenance. The Traffic-rule case was especially concerned 
about the need to control the quality of the performance of the different traffic operators, 
the competency of the personnel at the operative level and the danger that knowledge 
might be lost. The Maintenance-rule cases were especially concerned to have the 
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opportunity to run the maintenance activities cost-effectively, to adapt the rules to the 
actual situation and at the same time keep control with the quality of safety critical items.  
 
5.5.7 International development 
 
The cases were also affected by international development. In parallel with the work of 
the Traffic-rule case, also Sweden and the EU were developing rules for traffic operation. 
The case was concerned about the development of TSIs within  EU26. There was also 
communication with the Swedish project for rule development called the TRI-project 
because there are cross national traffic operations between Sweden and Norway.   
 
Interviewees from the Maintenance-rule cases also reported that they followed the 
international development of rules, especially within the EU. They had an established 
practice to pay attention to both rules that were directly developed for railway activities 
and rules that were associated with their regulated areas. 
                                                 
26 Project logg  1208, page 19 
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6 Hierarchical approach with a process of reverse invention 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is directed at the first of the three main research questions of this study:   
 
How was a hierarchical approach to rule modification adapted? 
 
The theory presented in Section 3.3 revealed two problems for the adaptation of the 
hierarchical approach. The first problem is linked to the work strategy for the new 
approach. The second is associated with the efficiency of conclusion derived from the 
new approach compared to the intentions of safe traffic performance.  
 
The two following sections present results and discussions of these problems one by one. 
The structure of the presentation is shown in Table 6.1. The final section presents the 
conclusions of the research question.  
 
Table 6.1 Structure for presentation of problems with results and discussions: 
 
 Problem with answer Result Discussion 
S 
t 
r 
a 
t 
e 
g 
y 
Section 6.2, answer to the question of  Problem 1:  
 
What work strategy to choose if low level rules 
already exist? 
 
A strategy of reverse invention for rule development 
6.2.1 A cautious 
approach based on 
railway 
knowledge and 
existing rules  
 
6.2.2 The strategy 
of reverse invention 
 
6.2.3 Concluding 
remarks 
E 
v 
a 
l 
u 
a 
t 
i 
o 
n 
Section 6.3, answers to the questions of  Problem 2: 
 
What if the suggested rule solutions do not fit the 
actual situation with respect to  
1. Competency of rule-imposer  
2. Competency of rule-follower 
3. Rule context? 
 
Choice of rule solutions with concerns for rules’ 
context and rule-followers. 
6.3.1 Rule 
solutions out of 
concerns for rules’ 
context and rule-
followers 
6.3.2 The 
persistence of 
prescriptive rules 
 
6.3.3 Concluding 
remarks 
 
As revealed in Chapter 2, the two projects had low-level prescriptive rules directed at the 
operative staff of the Norwegian railway system from before. This staff was positioned at 
a low level of the organizational hierarchy of the system. The projects were aiming at 
higher order outcome-oriented rules, in the Traffic-rule project in the form of high order 
goal-oriented rules and the Maintenance-rule project in the form of mid range triggering 
requirements. These rule solutions fit in with the positions of the rule-imposers in the 
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organizational hierarchy; the rule-imposer of the Traffic-rule project had a high position 
and the rule-imposers of the Maintenance-rule project had a mid range position.   
 
The ambitions of the projects to introduce outcome-oriented rules were not only in 
accordance with the hierarchical approach. They were also in line with a general trend 
within railways. Here there is an ongoing shift away from prescriptive rules towards 
performance-based controls, i.e. from a feed forward mode of control towards a feedback 
control. (Reason, 1997; Becker, 2002; Maidment, 2002).  
 
6.2 A strategy of reverse invention for rule development 
 
The first problem at stake is what work strategy to choose to follow up the intentions of 
outcome-oriented rules when there already exist low order prescriptive rules. As will be 
discussed below, all four cases of the two projects tried to follow up the intention to 
develop higher order rules. However, in these attempts the cases did not follow the 
deductive top-down strategy as expected. Furthermore, the cases questioned the proposed 
rule solutions that paralleled the hierarchical position of the rule imposer in the 
organizational hierarchy.  
 
6.2.1 A cautious approach based on railway knowledge and existing rules 
 
Ths presentation of the results of the cases is divided between the results of the Traffic 
rule case and the Maintenance-rule cases. The results of the Maintenance-rule cases are 
presented together because there were only minor differences in the results of these. 
 
6.2.1.1 The developmental process of the Traffic-rule case 
 
The Traffic-rule case did not implement goal-oriented rules; it stayed with the 
prescriptive rule tradition. However, the case made attempts to develop such rules.  
 
Attempts to develop goal-oriented rules 
 
At the beginning of the attempts to develop goal-oriented rules, the case intended to start 
from scratch and base these upon the overall purpose of safe traffic performance and risk 
analyses. As the work proceeded, the participants did not find this to be a good solution. 
Therefore they decided to change the work strategy and build the goal-oriented rules 
upon existing prescriptive rules. As one participant of the work group expressed it:  
 
“When were sitting in the preparatory meeting I really believed that we had to 
start from scratch (to develop the rules, my comment). But during the course I 
understood, and I also think I influenced, that we had to keep the old (rules, my 
comment) and write the new out of that. And I think I participated in that process. 
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But I really did believe that we should manage to start at scratch, but that had to 
be reversed!” 
 
The main reason for the changes in the strategy was that the competency of the former 
rule-developers was highly respected by the participants of the work and it was 
experienced as both risky and a waste not to build upon this knowledge. One member of 
the work group described the work processes of earlier rule development processes and 
the trust in the competency of their participants like this:”… the point was that there were 
skilled people sitting around a table discussing advantages and disadvantages with the 
rules. In a way I consider this to be analytic, but it was not put into a system, it was not 
presented in an analytic way.”  
 
Accordingly, in the development of the goal-oriented rules the work group used existing 
prescriptive rules as starting point instead of risk analysis results as basis for the work. To 
decide upon goals, they inquired into the intended function of existing prescriptive rules, 
their context and their efficiency compared to their intentions. When available, risk 
analyses were used as a supplement. This strategy was also convenient for the 
progression of the work because the risk analytic work became much more time 
consuming than expected.  
 
The results of the inquiries and discussions and the available risk analyses were used as 
input to development of goal-oriented rules. The work group did not find it easy to settle 
goals and found that they had to discuss existing rules and detailed railway knowledge 
before they were able to formulate goal-oriented rules. As one interviewee expressed it: 
“…it is very difficult to make goal-oriented rules without going into details. Sometimes 
one must make the detailed rules to be able to see that; yes, then it is this that must be the 
goal-oriented rule.” 
 
The work group also discussed the goal-oriented rule suggestions with their network and 
the resource groups and in particular the Board of the project and the Board of the branch.  
 
Abandoning the goal-oriented rule solution 
 
However, in spite of these serious attempts to develop goal-oriented rules, the case soon 
started to question this rule solution. 
 
Already in the beginning, the Traffic-rule case was concerned about rules’ efficiency as a 
contribution to safety. It engaged external researchers to collect information about the 
rule-followers’ experiences and views of strengths and weaknesses in existing rules. 
Furthermore, the researchers collected information about rule-followers’ opinions 
regarding future needs for rules and what they considered as good rules. A review of 
literature with relevance for the task to formulate rules was also provided. The core 
conclusions of the report were that the rule system had to be unambiguous, easy to 
understand, easy to approach and have a practical handy physical form27.  
                                                 
27 SINTEF report for the Traffic rule project, no STF38 F03408 
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As the work proceeded, the participants in the modification work were very concerned 
about the ability of the goal-oriented rule solutions to prevent accidents. The work group 
of the case inquired into and discussed the efficiency of this rule solution to serve this 
function within the group itself, with the network of its members, the Board of the project 
and the Board of the branch. The group did not trust that this rule solution was capable of 
securing safety to the same extent as the existing prescriptive rules could. One member of 
the work group provided this description of their growing concern:  
 
“We started with some processes: To drive trains and prepare trains. We started 
with some thoughts that we also continued when building up the rules. But it did 
not work.... We agreed that those who made these (the previous rules, my 
comment) were not stupid either! So it became a natural consequence in a way.”  
 
Therefore, the work group argued for less dramatic changes in the rule system. They 
wanted to keep the existing prescriptive rule solution and to experiment with goal-
oriented formulations either as overarching rules that could serve as reference for the 
prescriptive rules, or in the textbook that was planned to follow the rules. Their 
argumentation built upon results of the inquiries and discussions. Much of this 
argumentation became written into agenda papers and minutes from meetings. The 
argumentation of the work group was accepted by the Board of the project. As the Safety 
director of the Rail Administration expressed it: “The challenge was to see that one could 
not be as ambitious as first planned. It was one of these meetings with reality.”  Many 
interviewees spontaneously mentioned that the railway competency that the members of 
the work group posited was highly respected. Therefore, there was no reason to question 
their professional judgments.  
 
The result of the decision was that the Traffic-rule case stayed with the tradition of 
prescriptive rules. One consequence of this was that the core rule-followers continued to 
be the operative staff positioned at the lowest level of the organizational hierarchy of the 
railway system. This happened in spite of the transfer of the function as rule-imposer 
from the Rail Administration to the higher positioned Inspectorate. The plan to introduce 
goal-oriented formulations, preferably in the textbook, remained a question until late in 
the project. Then the Inspectorate decided to cancel the plan because of limited resources 
for its development. 
 
The development of prescriptive rules 
 
Also in the development of the existing prescriptive rules the Traffic-rule case used the 
overall goal of safe traffic performance and existing prescriptive rules as the major 
foundation for the work. The work group inquired into the rules’ original context, their 
intended function and their efficiency to fulfill these intentions in the current context. 
Again, they used each other, the network of its members and its resource groups for 
inquiries and discussions. In particular they included the Board of the project and the 
Board of the branch for discussions and feedback upon the evolving rules. The members 
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of these boards also discussed the evolving work with their own networks. One of the 
participants in the Board of the branch gave this typical description of her function and 
her use of own knowledge and network: “It (her function, my comment) is to attend to the 
rule sets or the rules; their content for users in traffic management, or in other words for 
train dispatchers and traffic controllers. I can see it by myself because I have that 
experience. At the same time I have a network that I can use as a supplement.”  
 
The work group also arranged meetings with people who were expected to have 
objections to the evolving rules. Furthermore, the work was checked against reports of 
unwanted events and accidents. At the Euorpean level, the project followed and discussed 
the ongoing development of TSIs. Finally, to prevent bias and to reveal safety status after 
the changes compared to status in the beginning, the developed rules were reviewed by 
future rule-followers who were active in or close to the operative field, i.e. a so-called 
change analysis or HUL-analyses. The basic principle of these analyses was to decide 
whether the rule changes had made the risk higher, unchanged or lower. (The name HUL 
refers to the first letters of high, unchanged or lower.) The work group also checked that 
no new or changed rules came in conflict with old rules in such a way that adherence to 
old rules could result in dangerous situations. The trade unions were kept informed but 
not included in a systematic way. 
 
The interviewees of the work group explained that feedback was discussed in the group. 
Decision criteria were not explicitly formulated in advance. The professional judgments 
of the participants and their trust in the quality of the feedback served as the fundament 
for the decisions. When found reasonable, feedback was taken into account. The 
Inspectorate will be responsible for the formal hearing process before the implementation 
of the rules. 
 
Most commonly the participants of the work reported that their main and most useful 
contributors were representatives of the operative and educational staff. One interviewee 
found the questions of the Inspectorate’s lawyers who were unfamiliar with the railway 
activities and terminology to be important for clarification of vagueness and ambiguity in 
evolving rule texts.  
 
Modification results 
 
The described modification process did not result in fundamental changes in the main 
rules that served the purpose of safety. In the formulations of these rules this case used 
the verbs “shall” and “must”28. This is in line with the tradition to consider these rules to 
be safety rules where strict compliance with the rules is necessary. In a few instances the 
verb “can” was used to show opportunities for exceptions and simplifications under 
                                                 
28 In Norwegian the verb “skal” is used. This means mandatory in accordance with the definition of 
ENV50129. “Must” is a translation of the Norwegian verb “må” that also means “have to”. This verb is 
also mandatory. 
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special conditions29.  Supplementary advisory rules and rules that were seldom in use 
were removed. 
 
One interviewee expressed a concern for the cautious attitude towards changes in the 
rules that case demonstrated. She asked if dangers associated with unchanged rules 
should not have been analyzed. 
 
The main arguments for changes of existing rules were written and stored in a database. 
 
Difficulties to retrieve knowledge 
 
Some of the interviewees reported that the inquiries had revealed instances where 
knowledge of existing rules’ original context and intended function was difficult to 
retrieve. The main reason was considered to be that this knowledge had not been written 
down when the rules were made. Furthermore, organizational changes and downsizing 
with staff reductions had made this knowledge scattered around within the organization A 
few examples were given where such knowledge was lost because people had left the 
organization. Because the work group had participants who had worked in the system for 
decades and with different functions, they were both very skilled railway professionals 
and had a strong network. Furthermore, the work group took advantage of the knowledge 
of their resource groups and in particular the Board of the branch that also consisted of 
very experienced railway professionals with strong networks. Therefore, retrieval of 
knowledge was not reported as a serious problem for the case. 
 
Articulation and combination of knowledge 
 
The inquiries that the work stimulated caused an articulation of knowledge and 
knowledge from different sources was discussed and combined. The organizing of the 
work group where the members had scheduled time for the work and were located 
together made it possible for the group members to cooperate very closely. Furthermore, 
they could take advantage of each other’s network and the different resource groups. This 
was found to be positive for the work. One member of the group described the 
discussions like this: “We had many fruitful discussions, but I cannot say that we had any 
– not as I remember, at least not at my level or position – experiences of large conflicts.” 
 
6.2.1.2 The developmental process of the Maintenance-rule cases 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases implemented the intended higher order rule solutions of 
triggering requirements. When found necessary these were supplemented with 
prescriptive rules, mainly in the form of work instructions.  
 
                                                 
29 The verb “can” is a translation of  the Norwegian verb “kan”. 
 120
The development of triggering requirements 
 
From the beginning, the intention of the Maintenance-rule projects was to base the 
development of triggering requirements upon goals formulated at higher levels of the Rail 
Administration’s organizational hierarchy, their safety management system and risk 
analysis results. However, this did not happen. The project leader of the Overarching 
Maintenance project explained that when developing the triggering requirements, the 
cases did not follow a logic structural approach in the work. Instead they used existing 
rules as a starting point because they were rather sure that these covered up the laws and 
requirements of the authorities. In addition, the work built upon existing knowledge and 
experience. 
 
The cases also revealed other reasons for this strategy. One reason was the late timing of 
the final decision to apply risk analyses in the modification work. When this decision was 
made the Power-supply case had already started the work of rule development and the 
Superstructure case had already finished their work. Accordingly, the rule development 
that was done before these decisions could not be based upon risk analysis results. The 
different use of the risk analyses will be elaborated in Chapter 7. 
 
Based on the encouragement to “think new”, the Power-supply case and the 
Superstructure case began the development of triggering requirements with attempts to 
define the state of the technical equipment that defined needs for maintenance activities. 
However, the participants of the developmental work did not find this to be a good 
solution. The main reason revealed was that they respected the competency of former 
rule-developers. This made them also respect the inherent knowledge of the rules and 
they found it important for safe performance. Accordingly, they wanted to bring this 
knowledge forward to the new triggering requirements. One exception was found in the 
Power-supply case where some of the existing rules were maintenance instructions 
provided by the equipment’s suppliers. If these were considered to serve the interests of 
the supplier instead of interests of the Rail Administration and safety, they were given 
limited attention.  
 
In the Signal case the risk analyses were finished before the rule development started. In 
spite of this, the case decided upon the same strategy as the other cases. The rule writer of 
this case tried to develop triggering requirements on the background of the risk analyses. 
However, as the work proceeded, he and the rule-responsible at the Head Office of the 
Rail Administration changed their mind. The rule writer provided this description of the 
processes: “Gradually, we have seen that the descriptions of instructions inherent in the 
rules of today have a rather great value as input to the rules. Then you transfer the points 
of the checklists in the instructions into triggering requirements.”  
 
In the work to develop the triggering requirements, the cases inquired into knowledge of 
the standard that the prescriptions of the existing rules were aiming at and under what 
conditions, in other words; the intended function and context of the rules. They also 
inquired into their efficiency compared to their intentions. One of the interviewees 
explained that: “Some of the triggering requirements have been tacit knowledge.”  
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The people involved in the rule writing transformed rule specific knowledge and the 
results of the inquiries into triggering requirements. However, sometimes these cases also 
found it difficult to define outcome-oriented rules. The rule-responsible of the Signal case 
summarized the experiences from the work like this:  
 
“…what I would say in hindsight, it is that all such processes (processes of rule 
development, my comment) should be almost like an iteration; that one starts top-
down to see if it is possible to come down to the lowest level. And then you start 
from the bottom and build upwards again to see if it suits with the frames one 
made. It is a general consideration I suppose, that if you start in one end and go 
downwards, then it will become a mismatch at the lowest level. Or opposite, if you 
start at the lowest level without looking upwards, then it does not fit the frames 
one wants.”  
 
Furthermore, the different cases faced different challenges. The Signal case found that it 
was not possible to settle triggering requirements for all of their items. The Power-supply 
case found it challenging to find a practicable solution for their many components and 
suppliers that had developed maintenance manuals for their equipment. This case decided 
to relate the rules to their first level of subcomponents and to give priority to the rules that 
became classified as safety critical. This case also found that the function of triggering 
requirements could be questioned because they were sometimes squeezed between 
requirements of the authorities and the prescriptive rules. The Superstructure case faced 
some problems to define clear triggering requirements for some of their items. The reason 
was that their status was difficult to define in simple terms.  
 
The Maintenance-rule cases also used the results of the inquiries to supplement the 
triggering requirements with so called “explanatory texts”. These provided explanations 
of the intended purpose of the triggering requirements. The explanatory texts were placed 
in direct relation to the rules. 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases were also concerned about the efficiency of the rules and at 
the beginning it had a plan to invite rule-followers to comment upon existing rules. Of 
practical reasons, this plan was not followed up. However, the project received indirect 
information through a project about knowledge and competency run by the Overarching 
Maintenance project. The suggestions of the report from this project were that the rules 
must be adapted to the new ideas of decentralized decision-making that are introduced in 
the Rail Administration 30 . Furthermore, the report emphasizes that rules cannot 
compensate for professional judgment. This fits in with the plan of the cases to use 
triggering requirements as the main rule solution. 
 
                                                 
30 SINTEF report for the Overarching Maintenance project, no STF38 F02902  
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Prescriptive rules as supplement to triggering requirements 
 
However, as the work proceeded, the participants of the Maintenance-rule cases also 
became concerned about the efficiency of the triggering requirements as a means to 
prevent accidents. These concerns took another form than they had in the Traffic-rule 
case. Because these cases had the possibility to supplement their triggering requirements 
with prescriptive rules, the main inquiries and discussions about rule solutions were not 
whether to accept or reject triggering requirement as a rule solution.  Instead they became 
concentrated around the need to supplement these rules with prescriptive rules.  
 
The question about the need for prescriptive rules stimulated inquiries into railway 
knowledge and discussions about the results of these. Again, the focus of attention was 
their original context, intended function and their efficiency to fulfill these. This work 
was integrated in the work with the triggering requirements. Therefore, the inquiries and 
the discussions of the cases followed the same patterns for investigations and cooperation 
as described above.  
 
The existing prescriptive rule tradition appeared to be more persistent than expected. The 
surviving prescriptive rules received the status as appendixes to the triggering 
requirements, i.e. they had a subordinated role. The project leader of the Overarching 
Maintenance project did not define them as formal rules. The leader of the Maintenance-
rule project considered triggering requirements to be most useful for those controlling the 
work and the prescriptive rules to be most useful for the operative staff. Accordingly the 
hierarchy of the rule solution paralleled the organizational position of the rule-imposer 
and the rule-follower in the organizational hierarchy, i.e. the mid range triggering 
requirements for the mid range rule-imposer responsible for control and the low order 
prescriptive rules for the low level staff responsible for the quality of the practical 
performance.  
 
The major reason the participants of the work gave for the persistence of the prescriptive 
rules was that they were suspicious about the ability of the triggering requirements to 
prevent accidents compared to the prescriptive rules that they had experience with. 
Therefore they wanted to bring forward the latter rules, especially because they built 
upon and were in accordance with trusted railway knowledge. One of the rule writers 
explained it this way:  
 
“I do feel that it is very important to bring forward the history related those 
requirements that are in the existing work instructions. I feel that there will not be 
enough time to just remove them and say that it is not necessary to bring them 
further. Then I feel it is better to bring them forward into the new rule set as a 
first round until we get more experience with it”  
 
This explanation is also in accordance with the general impression of the head of the 
Maintenance-rule project. He explained some of the difficulties to give up the existing 
prescriptive tradition like this: “It (triggering requirements, my comment) is difficult to 
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apply upon many things Therefore it often becomes supplemented. It is difficult to simply 
give up what one has; in a way what one has becomes continued.”  
 
The leader of the Overarching Maintenance project also commented that it was easier to 
limit the rule sets to only contain triggering requirements when there was less acute risk. 
 
The development of prescriptive rules 
 
When the prescriptive rules were developed, the existing prescriptive rules were used at 
the starting point just as they did for the triggering requirements. Risk analyses were used 
as a supplement to the work when they were available. Furthermore, as the work 
followed the development of the triggering requirements, it followed the same patterns 
for inquiries, discussions and cooperation that the cases revealed for their development.  
 
The use of verbs 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases had also an additional task in their modification work. The 
decision of the Overarching Maintenance project that the use of verbs in the rule texts 
should be differentiated was followed up. To distinguish between safety related rules and 
other rules in the rule sets, the verb “shall” was used for rules related to safety and 
regulations of the authorities31. In addition the safety related rules were given a special 
marking; a “tag”. The verb “should” was used for the other purposes32. Also in this task 
the cases followed the described patterns for inquiries and discussions. 
 
Feedback upon the work 
 
Those directly involved in the rule development searched for feedback upon the evolving 
triggering requirements and prescriptive rules. They used each other and their network. 
As one interviewee explained:  
 
“Then I send it to those who I know have opinions about it, and preferably those 
who I know will come up with comments – those who I know really care. And may 
be I send it to those who I know will not come up with comments, but who will 
complain afterwards. Then they have at least had their opportunity to come up 
with their opinion.”  
 
In addition the Superstructure case used its Board of the branch for feedback upon their 
work. The cases also compared their work with the development of accident reports from 
accidents and unwanted events.  
 
                                                 
31 In Norwegian the verb “skal” is used. This means mandatory in accordance with the definition of 
ENV50129. 
32 In Norwegian the verb “bør” is used. This means recommended in accordance with the ENV50129  
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At the end, the Maintenance-rule project organized a joint two-step hearing process. First 
the rules were presented for rule-followers in each region and discussed. Shortly after, the 
rules were sent to each region for formal hearing. According to the interviewees, the 
regions differed in the efforts they put into the hearing work and who they involved. 
Furthermore, interviewees from two of the cases mentioned that they were disappointed 
that they did not receive more comments upon the triggering requirements. The 
Maintenance-rule project performed change analyses to reveal the safety status after the 
changes compared to the status at the beginning. Also in these analyses the rule changes 
were judged with respect to their contribution to higher, unchanged or lower risk. These 
engaged different people for the different cases. The trade unions were not incorporated 
in the processes in any systematic way. 
 
Also in the Maintenance-rule cases, the feedback was discussed and incorporated in the 
rules when found reasonable by the people involved in the developmental work. Again, 
the decisions were based on the professional judgments of the participants without preset 
criteria.  
 
The interviewees of these cases also found the operative staff to be the most useful 
contributors to the modification work.  
 
To some extent the cases wrote the main arguments for changes in the prescriptive rules 
and stored them in databases.  
 
Difficulties to retrieve knowledge 
 
In the inquiries the Maintenance-rule cases found that some knowledge about context and 
intended function of existing rules was difficult to retrieve. The interviewees gave the 
same explanation for this as those reported for the Traffic-rule case. A few interviewees 
said that problems in retrieving such knowledge made it difficult to judge the relevance 
or quality of these rules. The leader of the Maintenance-rule project explained that the 
rule-developers had a lot of respect for the railway knowledge of their predecessors. 
Furthermore they did not always feel confident that they themselves had the full overview 
of all of the rules’ functions. Therefore, they were hesitant to change or remove rules 
where they felt that knowledge of the rules’ original context and intended function was 
limited.  
 
Different conditions for articulation and combination of knowledge 
 
The organizing of the cases differed and this made their conditions for the inquiries and 
discussions of the evolving work very different. The Signal case hired an external 
consultant for the rule writing. He performed much of this task by himself. However, as 
he was a former employee of the regulated area, he used his network for inquiries about 
the context and intended function of the rules and their efficiency. He also used this 
network for discussions about the evolving triggering requirements. He reported to the 
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rule-responsible at the Head Office of the Rail Administration. The work was under time 
pressure. 
 
The Power-supply case also hired a consultant from another department of the Rail 
Administration for the rule development. He did much of the rule development alone. 
This consultant had also worked in the regulated area before. He interviewed experienced 
staff from his network about the context and intended function of existing rules and their 
experiences with the rules. He also discussed the results of the evolving work with this 
network and the rule-responsible at the Head Office. The work was under time pressure. 
 
In the Superstructure case the majority of the work involved the rule-responsible and the 
railway professional that usually cooperated in the management of the rules. As rule 
modifications were seen as a part of their responsibility they did not get specific time for 
the task. These two people were located together. This made it possible for them to use 
each other and cooperate in the inquiries, discussions and the developmental work of the 
rules. The two rule writers also involved their network and the Board of the branch in the 
inquiries and the discussions of the evolving work.  
 
Accordingly the conditions for articulation of railway knowledge and combination of 
knowledge from different sources varied between the cases. 
 
6.2.2 The strategy of reverse invention   
 
In the presented results a common pattern can be seen: First, the cases explored and 
evaluated the elements of the hierarchical approach. The results of these processes made 
the cases abandon the suggestions derived from the hierarchical approach. Instead they 
built the rule development upon existing railway knowledge and rules. Below, these 
findings are discussed and related to theory. 
 
6.2.2.1 Exploring and evaluating the hierarchical approach 
 
In their modification work the cases took the hierarchical approach into account. All 
cases intended to develop rule solutions at a level of the rule hierarchy that matched the 
positions of the rule-imposers in the organizational hierarchy of the Norwegian railway 
system. Two out of four cases intended to develop higher order outcome-oriented rules 
with the help of risk analysis results. From the beginning, the two others were not given 
this opportunity. Furthermore, all four cases intended to deduce lower order prescriptive 
rules from the outcome-oriented rules if found necessary.  
 
The top-down approach to the rule development would have applied a choice based mode 
of decision-making as discussed by March (1994). According to the ideals of this form of 
decision-making, the starting point of the work would have been preferences formulated 
as goals that were derived from risk analyses. Then the work should have proceeded into 
inquiries of alternative means to achieve these goals. Prescriptive rules might have 
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appeared as one means. This is in accordance with the encouragements to the cases to 
“think new” and the idea to start the work from scratch. This is also in accordance with 
discussions of Lindblom (1959). He argues that the rationalistic strategy implies that 
decisions have to start from new fundamentals each time. They only build upon the past 
when experiences are embodied in a theory. The decision-makers are always prepared to 
start from the ground up, i.e. from scratch.  
 
Furthermore, the proposed outcome-oriented rule solutions built upon the feedback 
control principle. The rule specific knowledge encoded in such rules is knowledge about 
wanted outcomes or what to achieve. When applying this principle the rule-followers are 
supposed to choose the best solutions based on feedback upon their activities where the 
goals of the rules are used as reference. Furthermore, they are supposed to explore 
possible means to bring forward a development towards the goals and to implement the 
best means in their activities. Therefore, this control principle can also be associated with 
the choice based decision-making discussed by March (1994).  
 
All cases made serious attempts to follow up their intentions. In this way the ideals of the 
hierarchical approach were explored. However, the cases soon started to question these 
ideals. The main reason was that they did not bring forward existing railway knowledge, 
including existing rules, and that the ability of the suggested rule solutions to prevent 
serious accidents became an issue of concern. Therefore they inquired into railway 
knowledge to judge the efficiency of hierarchical ideals. Accordingly, railway knowledge 
served as a reference for good solutions in the evaluation of the hierarchical approach.  
 
6.2.2.2 Abandoning suggestions for the hierarchical approach; building upon the 
existing 
 
The main conclusion that the cases made from the inquiries was that the existing railway 
knowledge and in particular the knowledge associated with exiting prescriptive rules was 
too valuable for safety to be abandoned.  
 
Therefore, the cases did not approve the deductive top-down strategy as suggested for the 
hierarchical approach. Chapter 2 revealed that, the Norwegian railway system had a long 
history where a prescriptive rule tradition had evolved. The development of the rules 
gives association to the arguments of Reason (1997) that the stage reached in the 
organization’s life history will influence the opportunities for feed forward and feedback 
control. In other words, the system has had a long enough history to develop prescriptive 
rules in accordance with feed forward control principles. Furthermore, the participants of 
the studied modification processes found this tradition valuable to build upon for the 
purpose of safe performance. The prescriptive rules were seen as important elements in 
the Norwegian railway system’s organizational memory as discussed by Stein (1995).  
 
Instead, the cases decided to apply another type of rationality in their developmental 
work. This was based on an inductive bottom-up strategy where the existing prescriptive 
rules were used as the starting point for rule development. This made it possible to build 
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upon the accumulated knowledge associated with the prescriptive rules and in particular 
knowledge about their former and existing context, their intended function and the 
experiences of their efficiency to fulfill these intentions. In March’s terminology, the 
work became based upon a more rule- and identity based type of decision-making (March, 
1994). The existing rules and associated knowledge served as a fundament to judge what 
was considered to be appropriate outcomes of the regulated activities. In this way, 
knowledge associated with existing rules was brought forth into the new descriptions of 
wanted outcomes and the work did not have to start from scratch. This can be seen as a 
cautious strategy to fulfill the requirement of outcome-oriented rules in a prescriptive rule 
tradition.  
 
The change in work strategy from a deductive top-down approach to the rule 
development towards the inductive bottom-up approach means that the cases left the 
dominating rationalistic form of rationality of the hierarchical approach. The work was 
brought in accordance with existing railway knowledge  
 
Furthermore, the inquiries that the cases made into railway knowledge made them 
cautious to replace existing prescriptive rules with outcome-oriented rules or change them. 
In particular, they were cautious if they did not feel confident that they had sufficient 
knowledge of the original context and intended function of these rules. Therefore, the 
prescriptive rules appeared to be more persistent than expected. In the Traffic-rule case 
the outcome-oriented rule solution was abandoned and the prescriptive rules became the 
only solution. In the Maintenance-rule cases the triggering requirements had more 
appendixes with prescriptive rules than intended.  
 
The persistence of the prescriptive rules means that the cases were hesitant to change the 
rule specific knowledge encoded into written rules from “what to do” towards 
“outcomes” or what to achieve. To draw upon discussions of rationality and knowledge, 
they were hesitant to abandon thick descriptions of the necessary activities for safe 
performance for rationalistic thin descriptions of their intended outcome (Baumard, 1999; 
Perby, 1995; Perrow, 1999; Schön, 1991). 
 
This implies that they were hesitant to leave the rule- and identity based decision-making 
of the prescriptive rules and to base the activities of the regulated area upon the 
rationalistic decision-making of outcome-oriented rules. The results reveal that the cases 
found the feed forward control principle to be important for safe performance. In other 
words, they wanted rule-followers to work according to the principles of rule- and 
identity based decision-making (March, 1994).  
 
The cautious bottom-up strategy and the unintended strong position of the prescriptive 
rules mean that the cases left the dominating rationalistic form of rationality of the 
hierarchical approach. Knowledge associated with the existing prescriptive rules was 
brought forward indirectly and directly: indirectly by the use of prescriptive rules as 
starting point for the development of outcome-oriented rules and directly by the survival 
of the prescriptive rules. In this way the work was brought in accordance with existing 
railway knowledge.  
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Cautiousness associated with changes is also discussed in the safety literature. When 
discussing High Reliability Organizations, LaPorte, & Consolini (1991) warn against 
experimenting when the consequences of the experiments might be dangerous situations. 
Becker (2002) argues that the transition period between two regulation systems might be 
very dangerous and introduce new risk. According to Becker increased regulatory 
attention is needed in such cases, instead of reliance on a good track record in the past.  
 
However, the results also revealed that all cases wanted outcome-oriented formulations 
together with the prescriptive rules. The decision of the Traffic-rule case to abandon the 
textbook where such formulations were planned to be an important element, was made 
out of resource concerns, not because the idea of outcome formulations was completely 
rejected. Therefore, the results also reveal that the cases found rules building upon 
principles of choice based decision-making communicating what to achieve, to be useful. 
 
The arguments that the cases used for the different rule solutions will be elaborated upon 
in the next section. The discussions of rationality and knowledge will be extended in 
Chapter 8. 
 
6.2.2.3 Railway knowledge as a reference for good solutions 
 
The persistence of the prescriptive rule solutions that the cases demonstrated implies that 
the cases representing the rule-imposers, took the responsibility to translate intended 
outcomes into action/state rules such as discussed by Hale and his associates (Hale, 1990; 
Hale & Swuste, 1998; Hale et al, 2003). The Traffic rule case made this translation on the 
basis of the overall goal of safe traffic performance. The Maintenance-rule cases both 
developed triggering requirements on the basis of goals formulated at higher levels of the 
Rail Administration’s organizational hierarchy and their safety management system. 
They also translated some of these into more prescriptive action state rules.  
 
The decision processes of the strategy for the rule development and the choice of rule 
solutions revealed that railway knowledge served as a reference for the good solution and 
that the cases preferred solutions that were in accordance with this knowledge. First, this 
knowledge was used to judge the appropriateness of the deductive top-down approach to 
the development of outcome-oriented rules. Second, it was used as a reference to judge 
the appropriateness of rule solutions. Third, this knowledge, with the existing prescriptive 
rules, was used as the basis for the development of both outcome-oriented rules and 
prescriptive rules and in the evaluation of the quality of the evolving rules. In particular 
knowledge of the rules’ original context and intended function and their efficiency in the 
current context appeared to be important. This knowledge was necessary to judge the 
relevance of the existing prescriptive rules that appeared so central to the work and to 
reveal needs for modifications.  
 
When contradictions between the railway knowledge and the solutions of the hierarchical 
approach occurred, the first appeared to engender most trust. Accordingly the decisions 
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were brought in accordance with railway knowledge. One can say that the processes built 
consensus around the validity of railway knowledge. This also demonstrates that the 
railway knowledge, including existing rules that were included in the work, was very 
important for the quality of the work.  
 
The fact that the work group of the Traffic-rule case got acceptance for their 
argumentation in favor of prescriptive rules, demonstrates that the confidence in the 
group’s railway knowledge was high. This was attributed to the composition of the work 
group. In the beginning, the case intended to develop an outcome-oriented rule solution 
that is supposed to require less knowledge of details in rules’ context than prescriptive 
rules (Hale, 1990). In spite of this, the case had engaged a work group that possessed 
extensive, updated and varied railway knowledge. The extensive and varied practice of 
the participants made the work group possess a wide network that was included in the 
work. 
 
The closeness to the rules’ context and the rule-followers was also strengthened by the 
established resource groups for the case. However, even though many of the 
representatives of these groups had railway educations for the operative fields, most of 
them held administrative positions. Accordingly, the executive staff was poorly 
represented in these resource groups and their trade unions were also not involved. 
Therefore the closeness to the rule-followers was not established in the more democratic 
sense like the more general trend discussed by, for instance, Hopkins (2000). Such an 
element might have made it easier to involve, inform and explain why the final rules have 
been arrived at (Hale et al., 2003). However, it might also have introduced more opinions 
and other motives and hence caused more conflicts. 
 
Taken together, the Traffic-rule case had the capability to develop both outcome-oriented 
and prescriptive rules in the IF-THEN form suitable for the current situation as Hale 
(1990) discusses. Furthermore, they had the ability to judge the appropriateness of rule 
solutions for the actual situation. With reference to the question of Hale et al. (2003) 
whether the government regulator has or can buy in sufficient expertise for the work, one 
can say that the answer is yes in this case. The competency and the network that the case 
took advantage of had evolved over time in the former stable NSB-organization. 
 
As the Maintenance-rule cases could play upon different rule solutions in their 
modification work, they did not have to argue heavily for their choices. Hence, the 
confidence in their judgments cannot be confirmed to the same extent as in the Traffic-
rule case. 
 
Chapter 5 has revealed also that the Maintenance-rule cases possessed strong railway 
knowledge. However, neither through education nor through practice was this knowledge 
strongly linked to the context of the different regulated areas to the same extent as the 
knowledge of the Traffic-rule case. Furthermore, the work of each case included 
relatively few people. Accordingly, the network involved in the work did not appear as 
rich as the network of the Traffic-rule case. Among the cases, the Superstructure case 
appeared to have the strongest context related knowledge as this case included their 
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Board of the branch in their work. The hearing process also created an interface between 
the rule solutions and knowledge of the rules’ context. In spite of this, one cannot say that 
these cases included the rule-followers in a democratic sense as Hopkins (2000) discusses.  
 
The main rule solution of the Maintenance-rule cases, i.e. the technical triggering 
requirements, is not as concrete as the prescriptive rules of the Traffic-rule case. 
Accordingly they are not as dependent upon context specific railway knowledge as these 
(Hale, 1990). However, these cases also made extensive use of prescriptive rules and 
these rules were used as starting point for the development of triggering requirements and 
the judgments of the need for prescriptive rules. Therefore, these cases needed extensive 
knowledge of the regulated areas too.  
 
The conditions of these cases indicate that they had less access to extensive and updated 
railway knowledge than the Traffic-rule case. This might be one explanation as to why 
these cases also expressed more concerns for limited access to the original knowledge of 
rules’ context and intended function than the Traffic-rule case. As revealed, this created 
problems for the modification work regarding the judgments of rules’ relevance and 
modification needs and a precautionary attitude towards changes.  
 
The question of the relevance of existing prescriptive rules for the actual situation is 
especially important due to the ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system. March 
(1994) suggests that rules represent an impact of the past upon the present; they can be 
seen as residue of the past. The past can also be encoded in the future by environmental 
selection of rules. In this process, the composition of the rule change but not the 
individual rules. According to March, the learning process that change rules as a result of 
experience must include information about what happened, why it happened, and whether 
what happened was satisfactory or unsatisfactory. He finds that this is not always possible 
to achieve and learning might be limited.  
 
The difficulties to retrieve knowledge about the original context and intended function of 
the existing rules and the importance of this knowledge in the work demonstrate that this 
is a relevant concern. Taken to the edge, this might have contributed to a development 
where the modification work was based upon false assumptions, i.e. assumptions that 
were not in accordance with the actual situation. However, through the feedback 
processes that the cases initiated for the evolving rules, they took steps to counteract this 
danger. Still, this discussion demonstrates that extensive use of prescriptive rules as 
starting point for the work might be vulnerable for rapidly changing conditions with poor 
feedback upon their relevance and efficiency to achieve their intentions. This also 
actualizes the question raised by one of the interviewees about performing analyses about 
the consequences of no changes in existing rules. 
 
6.2.2.4 The rigidity of chosen solutions: Implications for future modifications 
 
The processes associated with the hierarchical approach and the chosen rule solutions 
might have implications for future rule modifications. 
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The rule solutions of the cases with extensive use of prescriptive rules and the verb 
“shall” represent rigid rule solutions that require strict adherence. As Minzberg (1979) 
argues, the chosen rule solutions require fast reactions to follow up the development with 
updated rules. Bourrier (1998) discusses how organizational designs can facilitate 
necessary rule changes. The issue is how the need to adjust and correct policies and 
procedures is handled in the organizations, because this will have consequences for the 
need to violate rules. The need to violate rules will again have consequences for the 
possibility for open flow of information that is important for the organizations’ ability to 
learn and develop. 
 
This represents a challenge in the current dynamic and competitive context of the 
Norwegian railway system. In general, dynamic contexts make it more difficult to define 
the conditions for prescriptive rules, i.e. the IF condition (Hale, 1990). Further, it makes it 
more difficult to proceduralize the tasks (Reason, 1997). 
 
For the Traffic-rules, the communication of future needs for modification and deviance 
will be dependent both upon the communication channels within the regulated 
organizations and between these organizations and the Inspectorate. These 
communication channels have to cover a rather long distance between the hierarchical 
positions of the rule-imposer and the rule-followers. They were still not settled and 
systematized when the data collection of this study was finished, except for the 
communication channels that the internal control principle provides. Hence there are also 
uncertainties related to future feedback loops upon the efficiency of the existing rules. 
Accordingly, there are also uncertainties regarding learning loops that might contribute to 
improvement of the rules as discussed by March (1994). In addition there were 
uncertainties regarding the continuity of the future development of the rules as the 
modification work became transferred from the Project to the Inspectorate. 
 
For the Maintenance-rules there already exists a tradition for communication between the 
rule-imposer and the rule-follower. The planned system for a continuous dialogue about 
the rules provided by the other sub group of the Overarching Maintenance project might 
be one way to counteract negative effects of the constraints upon flexibility that the 
prescriptive rules and “shall” formulations represent. This system might also strengthen 
the context specific knowledge of the rule-imposer. In addition these plans give a more 
active role to the rule-followers themselves. The planned system also provides decision 
rules related to changes and deviance from the rules. This is in accordance with the 
suggestions of Hale & Swuste (1998) to establish rules for the translation of goals into 
action/state rules. The Maintenance-rule cases have also the advantage that when it comes 
to those responsible for the modification of the rules for the respective fields, there are no 
plans for changes in the staff involved in the studied modification processes and future 
processes. This allows for more accumulation of knowledge.  
 
The discussion above reveals the paradox that the rule-imposer of the Traffic-rules, i.e. 
the Inspectorate, with the greatest challenges had the least plans for communication with 
the rule-followers and for future management of the rules.  
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The ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system are also a problem for the 
important role that the network of the work participants had for retrieval of knowledge. 
The ongoing changes might change the conditions for the development and survival of 
such networks. The networks were concerned about safety, i.e. they were “about” 
something. Accordingly, in Lave & Wenger’s terminology there seems to be a 
community of practice for safety where the members develop knowledge within the 
Railway system (Lave & Wenger, 1991). As Wenger (1998) suggests, such communities 
are fragile and are weakened as soon as their content receive less attention. As will be 
revealed in the next section, there are indications that increased emphasis upon 
competition and cost-efficiency competed with the emphasis upon safety. These networks 
were also primarily based on contacts and knowledge from the time before the ongoing 
privatization process. Hence, if no counteractive steps are taken, the changes might 
endanger communities of practice about safety that could be useful for future rule 
modifications. 
 
6.2.2.5 Influence upon railway knowledge 
 
The impact from the hierarchical approach upon railway knowledge will be elaborated 
upon, and discussed in Chapter 8. However, at this stage I want to draw attention to some 
results of particular interest for the later discussions.  
 
First, the inquiries into railway knowledge and the following discussions made 
knowledge from different sources become more articulated, combined and shared 
between more people. However, the way the cases organized the work created different 
conditions for inquiries and hence inclusion of knowledge and to what extent knowledge 
became articulated and shared.  
 
Second, the inquiries revealed that fundamental knowledge of the existing prescriptive 
rules about their context and intended function had become weakened over time. In 
particular, this knowledge was undermined by the ongoing organizational changes where 
people had changed their positions or left the system. This problem is not unique to the 
Norwegian railway system, it is also revealed in other European railways (Hale et al., 
2003; European Commission, 2004b).   
 
Third, selections of included knowledge became encoded into written texts. Some of it 
was expressed in the rule formulations. Some of it was expressed in the argumentation for 
rule changes and stored in databases. In addition, selections of the railway knowledge that 
were central in the argumentation for the chosen rule solutions were encoded into the 
written texts of agenda papers and minutes from meetings. These are stored in electronic 
archives. 
 
 133
6.2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The four studied modification processes did not follow the ideals of the hierarchical 
approach. Instead the modification work of all the cases turned into processes that I have 
called ‘reverse invention’ in this study.  
 
In the process of reverse invention the cases explored and evaluated the rationalistic 
ideals of the hierarchical approach. In the exploration and evaluation of their ideals, the 
major concern was their ability to include railway knowledge seen as important for 
prevention of unwanted events and accidents in the modification work, and the rule 
solutions. Railway knowledge served as a source for information gathering and as a 
reference for evaluation.  
 
When divergences occurred in the evaluations, these were inquired into. Bringing the 
strategy and the rule solutions into accordance with railway knowledge solved such 
problems.  
 
Railway knowledge, and in particular rule specific knowledge of existing prescriptive 
rules and knowledge about their context and intended function, served as fundament for 
the rule development. When available, risk analyses contributed as a supplement. The 
process of reverse invention is illustrated in Figure 6.1 below. 
 
Pheno-
menon 
The adaptation of all cases to the hierarchical approach Conse- 
quences 
 
 
 
Reverse 
invention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Railway 
knowledge and 
prescriptive 
rules were 
persistent out 
of concerns for 
safety. 
 
Explored  
strategy and 
conclusions  
of hierarchical  
approach 
 
Abandoned 
rationalistic  
ideals 
Built rules on  
railway know- 
ledge with  
risk analyses as 
supplement
 
Evaluated  
strategy and 
conclusions 
Direction of the process
 
Figure 6.1 The strategy of reverse invention for the hierarchical approach. 
 
The circles demonstrate the stages of the process. Their overlap illustrates that there were 
overlap between the stages. The arrow from left to right demonstrates the direction of 
development for the process. 
 
The main elements in the development towards the strategy of reverse invention were as 
follows:  
 
• None of the cases used the ideals of a deductive top-down strategy of the 
hierarchical approach to rule development in practice. The main reason was that 
this method did not include knowledge associated with the existing prescriptive 
rules.  
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• Instead, all cases chose an inductive bottom-up strategy. Knowledge about 
context, intended function and the experience of the efficiency of the rules to 
fulfill these intentions was inquired into and used as the basis for formulations of 
wanted outcomes.  
 
• The bottom-up strategy made it possible to build the outcome-oriented rules upon 
knowledge associated with existing prescriptive rules, and in particular 
knowledge of these rules’ context and intended function. This knowledge was 
inquired into and discussed. When the rule formulations were made, the rule 
specific knowledge prescribing what to do became reduced into outcome-oriented 
rule formulations describing what to achieve. 
 
• However, the anticipated ability of these outcome-oriented rules to ensure safe 
performance was also evaluated. Accordingly, the rule solutions of the 
hierarchical approach stimulated questions to railway knowledge, i.e. this 
knowledge became inquired into and railway knowledge served as reference for 
good rule solutions. 
 
• The results of the inquiries were that the ability of the outcome-oriented rules to 
prevent unwanted events and accidents became doubted. On the other hand, the 
existing prescriptive rules that had been developed over time by highly respected 
railway professionals received increased trust.  
 
• Therefore, the prescriptive rules appeared surprisingly persistent compared to the 
intention of the projects. One case abandoned the outcome-oriented rule solution 
and kept prescriptive rules. This case wanted to supplement the rules with 
formulations of outcomes but had to cancel the idea. Three cases chose outcome-
oriented triggering requirements combined with prescriptive rules. The number of 
the latter exceeded the intentions of the work.  
 
• The persistence of prescriptive rules implies that the rule imposer took the 
responsibility to translate formulations of outcomes into prescriptive action/state 
rules. There was no explicit decision-rule for this task. The applied rule was to use 
available railway knowledge as reference for good solutions. 
 
The inquiries revealed that knowledge about the original context and intended function of 
existing prescriptive rules was not always easy to retrieve. This made it difficult to judge 
their relevance for the current context. This was less evident in the Traffic-rule case that 
possessed the strongest knowledge sources than it was in the Maintenance-rule cases.  
 
The theory of March (1994) and the problems associated with difficulties to retrieve 
knowledge of rules’ context and intended function, implies that when conditions are 
changing, the process of reverse invention and the prescriptive rule solution is vulnerable. 
Without feedback about the development of prescriptive rules’ context and their 
efficiency to fulfill their intention, the work might be based upon outdated knowledge. 
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This might result in irrelevant or dangerous rules. It is therefore a paradox that the case 
that chose prescriptive rules as the rule principle has the weakest plans for future 
feedback processes. 
 
Through the inquiries and discussions that the hierarchical approach stimulated, railway 
knowledge became articulated, shared and knowledge from different sources became 
combined. Selections of this knowledge were encoded into written texts. These findings 
will be followed up in Chapter 8. 
 
6.3 Choice of rules with concerns for rules’ context and rule-followers 
 
The second problem to be discussed regarding the adaptation of the hierarchical approach 
is the suitability of rule solutions to the actual situation. In spite of the intentions and the 
attempts to develop outcome-oriented rules, the previous section revealed that existing 
prescriptive rules became more persistent than planned. Below, the main arguments of 
the cases for different rule solutions will be presented and discussed.   
 
6.3.1 Prescriptive rules out of concerns for rules’ context and rule-followers  
 
The presentation of results starts with results associated with the surprising persistence of 
the prescriptive rules. Also here the results of the Traffic rule case are provided separately 
while the results of the Maintenance-rule cases are presented together. Then the main 
reasons that the cases provided for positive attitudes towards outcome oriented rules will 
be presented. At the end, the limited attention that the cases showed for rule-imposers’ 
characteristics will be elaborated.  
 
6.3.1.1 The survival of prescriptive rules in the Traffic-rule case 
Needs for coordination and severity of accidents 
 
The major argument for prescriptive rules of all interviewees from the Traffic-rule case 
was that mistakes by the staff could lead to serious accidents. This was mainly attributed 
to the characteristics of the system for traffic operation where different actors operate 
together and their safety is dependent upon others’ decisions and actions. The extensive 
use of single track in the Norwegian railway system with the potential for head-on 
collisions was seen to make the system particularly vulnerable. An additional factor was 
limited access to technical solutions for communication between the involved actors and 
for feedback to them during their course of actions. This made it necessary that the actors 
knew exactly what other actors were about to do. One member of the Board of the project 
said: “And regarding those topics where they have to interact, there must be no doubt 
about how the other will perceive what one says and how to react. One is operating on 
the same track, whether one likes it or not.”  
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In addition, many activities were seen to require immediate decisions and/or actions. 
Accordingly, they allowed for limited time to think or for consultation with others. These 
characteristics were judged to make central coordination of the activities of the traffic 
operation necessary. They were also judged to make it necessary to preplan the action of 
the actors in detail and to prevent any kind of misunderstanding in communication. For 
these reasons, all interviewees of the case found prescriptive rules to be necessary for safe 
traffic operation. However, the final report of the project recommended increasing the use 
of technical solutions such as Automatic Train Control (ATC). By some interviewees this 
solution was seen to imply a reduced need for prescriptive rules. The reason given was 
that the introduction of ATC was considered to function as a barrier against human 
mistakes that was otherwise were prevented by prescriptive rules.  
 
Responsibility and rule followers’ wishes 
 
The potential of mistakes to cause severe accidents also created an attitude that the 
responsibility for safety should not be left to individuals directly involved in the activities. 
As one member of the work group explained:  “…because wrong actions give such 
extensive consequence,  it cannot be up to each one how to manage a situation and the 
other actors that also are part of the picture have to know what procedures that come 
into play.”. 
 
This was also the main explanation the interviewees gave for their observation that the 
rule-followers themselves wanted prescriptive rules. As one member of the Board of the 
project said : “…what I learned a bit about during those discussions (about rule solutions, 
my comment) was that it was the operative staff who wanted precise procedures that 
released them from making judgments that could mean that they might make mistakes.”  
 
The impression that the rule-followers wanted prescriptive rules was confirmed by the 
report of the external researchers who inquired into the rule-followers’ opinions about 
rules33.  
 
Some of the interviewees also associated this wish of the rule-followers to be covered by 
rules with the practice of the former NSB to sanction mistakes of the staff in the operative 
field and especially if they had or could have led to serious accidents. As a means to be 
able to learn from accidents and unwanted events, the organizations involved in traffic 
operation now tried to counteract this practice. However, as some interviewees pointed 
out, the question of guilt and sanctions is taken over by external bodies such as the 
Inspectorate, the Accident Investigation Board, the court and the media. The latter two 
were especially attributed to experiences from the two accidents in the year 2000. 
 
                                                 
33 SINTEF report for the Traffic rule project, no STF38 F03408  
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Rule-followers’ background 
 
Many of the interviewees were concerned about the characteristics of the rule-followers 
themselves. In particular they were concerned that such a fundamental change of rule 
principle that a change from prescriptive to goal-oriented rules represented, also 
represented a change in the rule- and knowledge tradition of the rule-followers. They 
argued that this would have to be accounted for if outcome-oriented rules should be 
introduced. The report concerning rule-followers’ opinions about rules also 
recommended a restrictive attitude towards changes in terminology34. The argument here 
was that rule-followers had invested much in getting to know existing rules. The report 
also underlined that if the structure of the rules is changed, it is necessary to make 
educational steps for the rule-followers.  
 
The representatives of the case found it difficult to cover these concerns through a short 
introduction course. Also, they found it unrealistic to carry out a more extensive 
educational program in the current situation of the railway system. As the Safety director 
of the Rail Administration expressed it: ”…when we see that we cannot allocate more 
than two days for education for each person, it limits how visionary you can be, how 
extensive you can make the changes.”  
 
The main explanation to the problem of allocating time for an introduction course was a 
combination of scarce personnel and limited access to replacement staff, and pressure for 
stable traffic performance. Furthermore, the work group argued that the education and 
training of the entire staff must be completed within a limited period of time. If not, the 
new knowledge might be forgotten before it is brought into practice. The group also 
argued that the rules must be introduced at the same time in the whole system. 
 
Worries for rule followers’ competency and motivation 
 
The influence of the ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system upon the 
characteristics of the rule-followers was also an issue of concern. Many interviewees both 
from the work group and representatives from the different actors expressed a concern 
that the future competency and motivation of the core rule-followers were rather 
uncertain. They were worried that the changes could lead to reduced competency and 
motivation and that this would be in disfavor of safety. The arguments were that the 
introduction of new traffic operators and new recruitment patterns of staff created a more 
differentiated staff regarding educational background and socialization.  
 
The worries about the competency and motivation of the rule-followers were 
strengthened by the use of abstract goal-oriented formulations in the new regulation for 
education (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2002). One interviewee argued that this had 
created a concern that issues of importance for safety should stay unregulated.  
 
                                                 
34 SINTEF report for the Traffic rule project, no STF38 F03408 
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Furthermore, there was also a worry among many interviewees that increased pressure 
from economic considerations might influence the educational programs for the staff, for 
instance the duration of trainee programs. The member of the Board of the branch who 
generally advocated goal-oriented rules provided a representative description of these 
concerns:  
 
“Yes, I do see the other side here. Now that there might gradually come more 
traffic operators here that might wish to make this as simple as possible and 
therefore do not give enough attention to safety, who reduce this to the level of 
least effort, then it will be better with detailed prescriptive rules that say:  If you 
are going to drive trains in Norway, it has to be done in this way, you have to act 
according to this. In return, this gives us, as the others who travel along the track, 
a feeling of safety. One thing is what we are doing and how we drive our trains, 
but after all we are meeting trains on the tracks too. So I do see that there it might 
be an advantage to apply prescriptive rules. 
 
International rule development 
 
As revealed, the work group followed the development of the parallel rules for trans-
national traffic within EU, i.e. the TSIs. The group found that here as well, the 
development was in the direction of rather prescriptive rule solutions. However, as the 
implementation of these rules was expected to need time, this was not an important 
argument in the discussions.  
 
6.3.1.2 The survival of prescriptive rules in the Maintenance-rule cases 
Needs to follow an exact procedure and severity of accidents 
 
Also in the Maintenance-rule cases the major reason given by the interviewees for the 
persistence of prescriptive rules was when mistakes made by staff could lead to severe 
accidents. However, here this was not associated with a need for preplanned activities 
because the system required central coordination. Instead, this was associated with 
situations where the safety of traffic operation was dependent upon the quality of 
maintenance activities and where this quality was dependent upon the way the task was 
done. For example, the rule-responsible of the Superstructure case explained: “The 
reason why it is detailed is also that it is one exact work procedure, you have to follow 
one particular procedure there. If not it will turn out wrongly.”  The rule-responsible of 
the Power-supply provided another example: “If you are going to measure transition 
resistance to earth, you have to do it so and so, if not you will not get it right.”  
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Responsibility and rule followers’ wish 
 
The interviewees of the Maintenance-rule cases also experienced that rule-followers 
wanted prescriptive rules when their activities were associated with serious risk. Again 
the explanations were the former tradition with sanctions of mistakes and the function of 
the Inspectorate, the Accident Investigation Board, the court and the media. The 
expectations were considered to be highest among the rule-followers of the Signal case. 
The main explanation for this was that traditionally their work had been considered the 
most critical for safety as failures here could lead to head on collisions. The expectations 
were least among the rule-followers of the Power-supply case as drop outs here made the 
system stand still. Hence, risks associated with moving trains were eliminated. However, 
because there were serious accident scenarios associated with stationary trains as well, 
this conclusion was questioned.   
 
Rule followers’ background 
 
In the Maintenance-rule cases the interviewees also revealed that the persistence of 
prescriptive rules was linked to characteristics of the rule-followers. The leader of the 
Overarching Maintenance project believed that a thorough understanding of safety was 
necessary for triggering requirements and that competency was their Achilles heel. 
Therefore, he also believed that triggering requirements had to be related to a strategy for 
competency. In accordance with this, the leader of the Maintenance-rule project 
commented that there might not be enough discussions about requirements to the rule-
followers’ competency in the discussions of triggering requirements as a rule solution. 
 
Worries for rule followers’ competency and motivation 
 
Also in these cases many of the interviewees expressed concerns that the ongoing 
changes of the Norwegian railway system had a negative effect upon rule-followers’ 
competency and motivation for safety. The main arguments here were the development 
towards a recruitment and promotion pattern where railway experience was less 
emphasized, a reduction of introduction-courses for staff without railway educations and 
an increase in the turnover of staff. There were also concerns that existing structures for 
discussions about work performance and peer review that had been seen to make rules 
unnecessary, were being,  or would be, broken up. These changes had released pressure 
from the organization towards more prescriptive rules as compensation for reduced 
competency. One interviewee expressed his concerns like this:  
 
”I am very skeptical about the world we live in now, where you are supposed to 
have rules and procedures for everything you do. It is almost as if there is a belief 
that one can fire everybody and then employ the first 300 coming along Carl 
Johan (the main street, my comment) and tell them: Here are the procedures, run 
the enterprise! Because here is written all that you have to do.”  
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This quotation is also an example of the general skepticism revealed among the 
interviewees towards the attitude that rules can be sufficient to counteract a negative 
development in the competency of the operative staff. The leader of the Overarching 
Maintenance project believed that it was only possible to transfer a limited part of the 
necessary competency into rules. To be able to transfer knowledge he found it necessary 
to have continuity, history and to include practice.  
 
The cases provided examples where rule-follower’s attitudes towards the prescriptive 
rules were associated with the pressure of cost-efficiency and flexibility. Some 
interviewees had experienced that rule-followers had been resistant to a reduction of 
prescriptive rules because they found them useful to counteract pressure from interests of 
cost-efficiency. The attitude of the leader of the Maintenance-rule project was that this 
problem had to be faced with other means than prescriptive rules. However, one 
interviewee of the Superstructure case also referred to the opposite, where they received a 
wish to loosen up restrictive prescriptive rules to keep up with pressure from cost-
efficiency. This attitude towards safety related rules was also rejected. 
 
The responsible person for the rules of Power-supply, i.e. the case with very many 
components, found that to develop prescriptive rules at the central level was effective 
because it could ease the burden of rule development at the local level of the Rail 
Administration.   
 
International rule development 
 
There existed prescriptive external rules at both national and international levels that 
were linked to railway activities. Accordingly, they had to be followed up by the railways. 
For instance, such rules existed for electricity and electrical equipment.  
 
6.3.1.3 Outcome orientation due to rule-followers’ education and motivation 
 
In spite of the persistence of the prescriptive rules that all cases demonstrated, many of 
the interviewees found that outcome-oriented rules or formulations could serve two 
interlinked functions of relevance for safety: the function as knowledge communicator 
and a function in motivation. 
 
Arguments of the Traffic rule case 
 
Many of the participants in the work of the Traffic-rule case, and in particular those 
involved in educational tasks, found that goal-oriented formulations were important for 
the communication about the purpose of prescriptive rules. This was considered to be 
useful for the understanding of the function of prescriptive rules. This was again 
associated with rule-followers’ motivation for compliance with these. By the time there 
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was still a plan to develop goal-oriented formulations, the Safety director of the Rail 
Administration provided this demonstrative description of this aspect: 
 
“And I believe that if one understands why the rule is there, what it is for, what 
function it is supposed to fill, then one will follow the rule much better. It is now 
in the Traffic-rule project that they are going to add such descriptions of functions 
to the rules to create this understanding. And new generations require that. If one 
does not know why, one no longer accepts to follow slavishly what is written. And 
also it is such learning that I do believe is very important, that learning is not only 
to memorize psalms, but also in a way to understand what is behind it.”  
 
Furthermore, the goal-oriented formulations were considered useful as a reference for 
evaluations of the practical applications of the prescriptive rules and for evaluation of 
their relevance when their context was changing. The latter was seen as an important 
element for the ability to judge needs for rule modifications in the future. In addition the 
Project leader considered that to supplement prescriptive rules with goal-oriented 
formulations could prepare the rule-followers for increased use of goal-oriented rules in 
the future.  
 
The informant who most strongly advocated goal-oriented rules added an additional 
argument that is not so closely related to the rule followers’ education and motivation. 
This is that the flexibility of such rules makes it easier to introduce new technology that 
can improve safety. 
 
Arguments of the Maintenance-rule cases 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases introduced triggering requirements as planned. As already 
touched upon, these were seen as most useful for the control of the quality of the 
maintenance activities, i.e. in the judgments whether the activities were sufficient to 
achieve the quality of the infrastructure that the rules defined. Accordingly they were 
seen as an important reference for those with control functions regarding the maintenance 
activities.  
 
However, the needs for triggering requirements were also associated with their ability to 
communicate the purpose of the prescribed activities. Instances were reported where the 
organizational changes with changes in the conditions for cooperation and discussion also 
increased the interest for outcome-oriented rules. The main reason was the same as one of 
the arguments for prescriptive rules, that former trusted and highly competent 
professional groups had been split up, outsourced or changed. Traditionally such groups 
had been considered capable of taking the responsibility for judgments of conditions that 
should trigger maintenance activities. Therefore, to ensure the quality of the railway 
infrastructure, the conditions that should trigger activities had to be expressed more 
formally in rules. As one interviewee of the Signal case explained it: 
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“In the old days the five people involved in the activity sat together in 
professional meetings and discussed what we should check and how to interpret 
what was written here, what we can accept. Today when everybody can do it 
(perform the activity, my comment) we must have something written because 
everybody thinks in different ways. So if you do not have any clear rules, you will 
clearly get different standards, it depends on who is out checking.”  
 
And he underlined: 
 
”…because that element of meeting caused that they did not need to have 
triggering requirements for everything, because then they had discussed it and 
knew completely clearly what was wrong. But today when everybody is supposed 
to do such activities, then you need clearer requirements.”  
 
The explanatory texts following the triggering requirements were supposed to strengthen 
their effect. The leader of the Overarching Maintenance project explained that one of the 
purposes of these texts was to prevent short cuts regarding rule compliance. The leader of 
the Maintenance-rule project also saw these texts as important for the knowledge about 
the purpose of the rules. He found this knowledge to be useful both for the rule-
follower’s understanding of the necessity of compliance with the rules and for future 
judgments of the rules’ relevance and needs for modification.  
 
Also, these cases found that the triggering requirements could serve as reference for 
future judgments about the quality of prescriptive rules. 
 
6.3.1.4 Limited attention to the characteristics of the rule-imposer 
 
The presented results imply that the rule-imposers of all of the cases had the task to 
define prescriptive rules. The Maintenance-rule cases also had the task to formulate 
required outcomes as an IF condition in the triggering requirements. In spite of this, the 
characteristics of the rule-imposer were not given much attention when discussing rule 
solutions. However, some interviewees provided reflections about the issue.  
 
Relevance of rule solutions for the hierarchical position of the rule-imposer 
 
When rule solutions were discussed, there were some concerns for the relevance of the 
rule solutions for the hierarchical position of the rule-imposer in the organizational 
structure of the Norwegian railway system. The Traffic-rule case discussed if the existing 
prescriptive and very detailed rules as well as rules that had been included for more 
educational purposes, were suitable for the responsibilities of an Inspectorate. The major 
concerns were whether it was better to leave these rules to more local judgments and if 
they were related to matters of internal responsibilities of the organizations involved in 
traffic operation. As one member of the work group expressed it:  
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“But I felt that the discussion was more into questions of roles, whether the 
Inspectorate shall determine the goal-oriented rules and then the traffic operators 
shall determine the prescriptive rules or if – this is where I feel the discussion was. 
One did agree that details had to be described somewhere, it was only a question 
of who to throw the ball to.”   
 
If the discussions concluded that these rules regulated issues that could be left to the 
organizations involved in the activities to control or they were developed for educational 
purposes, they were removed.  
 
Also the Maintenance-rule cases related the existing rules to the hierarchical level of the 
rule-imposer. Before the work of the cases started, the Overarching Maintenance project 
had decided that the role as rule-imposer of the higher order triggering requirements and 
their attachments should be positioned at the central level of the Head Office of the Rail 
Administration. These rules could be supplemented at the lower organizational levels as 
long as these did not counteract rules at higher levels. Accordingly, these cases also had 
to decide what had to be regulated at the central level of the organization and what could 
be left to local judgments and decisions at lower levels of the organization’s hierarchy. 
The Overarching Maintenance project set decision rules for these choices. This was not to 
delegate safety critical judgments and rules that were considered as means to fulfill 
regulations issued by authorities.  
 
Railway knowledge of the rule-imposers 
 
Another topic that was discussed was the railway knowledge of the rule-imposers. 
Representatives of all cases found railway knowledge to be important for the ability to 
manage rules.  
 
Regarding the Traffic-rule case, many of the representatives of the Inspectorate itself 
were concerned about the railway knowledge. The Director of legal matters in the 
Inspectorate explained his concerns for the requirement to competency as a result of the 
chosen prescriptive and detailed rule solution like this: 
 
“There are some challenges regarding the level of details (in the prescriptive 
rules, my comment). As you say, because the competency is not equally shared 
here, one expects that an enterprise has more detailed competency about their 
activities than an authority. So this has consequences for how one frames the 
rules. And this is just the great challenge here, that one goes all the way down to 
details and this requires that we also have the competency.  
 
Many of the interviewees that did not represent the Inspectorate were also worried about 
the limited railway background represented in the Inspectorate. It was seen as a great 
advantage that the organization had lately improved its railway knowledge through 
recruitment of personnel with Railway education and experience. However, the 
possibility of these people keeping their knowledge updated was also questioned. This 
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was associated with their distance to the rules’ context and their control function that 
could represent a hindrance for open communication. In particular the combined effect of 
the requirement for public access to written documents of the authorities and the potential 
for negative effects from negative publicity upon reputation in a competitive environment 
were seen as a problem.  
 
Many of the interviewees from the Maintenance-rule cases also underlined the 
importance of rule-imposers’ competency. Representatives of all cases found that this 
required a good system for communication between the rule-imposer and the rule-
followers and their context. Therefore they were positive towards the plans for 
communication about the rules of the Overarching Maintenance project. Those who had 
rule management as a permanent task at the Rail Administration’s Head Office were very 
open about their limited opportunities to follow the detailed development of the regulated 
areas. As one rule-responsible expressed it:   
 
“There are many of us sitting at desks here. We have to admit that we do not have 
the full knowledge about everything that happens out there. And we have to - we 
absolutely need their experience to make good rules, almost regardless of what 
level they are at. Of course, if it is supposed to be at the most paramount goal-
oriented levels, one can almost say that the railway shall function safely and well, 
then we might be able to manage.”  
 
Another pointed to the fact that the personnel managing the rules at the Head Office were 
mainly theorists while the rule-followers were practitioners. 
 
In addition the rule-responsible of the Power-supply case who had many components and 
suppliers of equipment to deal with, were concerned about the division of competency 
between the Rail Administration and these suppliers:  
 
“And here you are supposed to make evaluations about everything. First of all, 
there is the task to find people who are competent and have insight into all of this. 
Anyhow, I do not possess the competency of all this in detail, and then there is 
also a question of how deeply into detail one should go in all this. We might have 
a switch and a power breaker where the supplier has experts who are experts only 
on components within this switch and who know it. And it is clear that if we are to 
make triggering requirements and so on for this, then we do not have the 
competency for that in all possible ways. So we must, as much as possible, base 
our work upon the suppliers and their experience, but to communicate with them 
in a good way also requires experience.”   
 
6.3.1.5 A summary of the main considerations 
 
The results above reveal that there were both similarities and differences between the 
cases in their considerations of rule principles. In Table 6.1 below the main findings of 
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the cases are summarized and compared. As the major differences were between the 
Traffic-rule case and the Maintenance-rule cases, the latter are presented together. 
 
Table 6.2 The main considerations of the cases in their judgments of rule solutions 
 
Rule  
principle 
Considerations Traffic  
rule  
Mainte-
nance  
rule  
Seriousness of potential accidents + + 
Characteristics of rules’ context   
• Dependency upon other actors for safe 
performance 
+ - 
• Constraints upon communication + - 
• Limited time for thinking and consultation + - 
• Dangers associated with misunderstandings + - 
• Activities have to be done in a particular way  + + 
• Rule-followers should not be left alone with 
responsibility 
+ - 
Characteristics of rule-followers   
• Competency + + 
• Rule tradition + + 
• Preferences + + 
Characteristics of implementation phase   
• Constraints upon time for educational means + - 
• Changes must be implemented simultaneous 
in the whole system 
+ - 
Characteristics of ongoing changes    
• New actors and competition   
o Emphasis upon cost efficiency + + 
o Less homogenous work force + + 
o Reduced railway knowledge of rule-
followers 
+ + 
o Reduced motivation for safety + + 
• Organizational changes   
o Changes in structures for work 
organization and cooperation 
- + 
Pre-
scriptive 
o Knowledge leaves the organization + + 
Communication of purposes with prescriptive rules + + 
• Strengthening of rule-followers’ competency + + 
• Strengthening of rule-followers’ motivation 
for compliance with prescriptive rules 
+ + 
• Reference for control of performance - + 
Outcome  
oriented 
Goal-
oriented 
or 
triggering 
require-
ments 
• Reference for evaluation of quality of 
prescriptive rules and modification needs  
+ + 
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In Table 6.2 the sign + means that the consideration was given attention in the case/cases 
and the sign – that it was given limited or no attention. The Table demonstrates that the 
considerations in favor of prescriptive rules were more evident in the Traffic-rule case 
than in the Maintenance-rule cases. This difference was particularly evident regarding 
conditions in the rules’ context. 
 
6.3.2 The persistence of prescriptive rules  
 
The cases’ argumentation for their rule solutions has strong links to safety theory. In the 
following it will be discussed that generally theory gives support to the rule solutions of 
the cases. However, the discussions also reveal that there might be some potential 
dangers associated with them. The discussions converge around the requirement to 
coordination in the linear and tight coupled railway system, the characteristics of the rule-
followers and the characteristics of the rule-imposers. 
 
6.3.2.1 Severity of potential accidents and requirements to coordination in a tight 
coupled system 
 
The interviewees revealed that the cases were concerned about conditions in the rules’ 
context in their choice of rule solution. To achieve safe traffic performance they found 
that there were conditions in the contexts that made it necessary to constrain the decisions 
and action of the rule-followers with prescriptive rules. However, the argumentation of 
the cases differed. Chapter 5 also revealed that the context of the different rule sets held 
different conditions.  
 
Coordination and conditions for feedback 
 
In the argumentation for their prescriptive rule solution, the Traffic-rule case gave much 
attention to issues that can be associated with needs for coordination of the many 
activities and actors involved in traffic operation.  
 
The issue of coordination of the Maintenance-rule cases was different. The rules to be 
modified by these cases were directed at the maintenance activities, i.e. activities 
responsible for the quality of the infrastructure of the system. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
when these activities are performed on the tracks the coordination of these activities with 
other activities and actors are regulated by the Traffic rules. However, this element of 
coordination was not striking among the informants of the Maintenance-rule cases.  
 
Instead, the issue of coordination was evident in the argumentation for the modification 
project as such. One of the intentions of the Maintenance-rule project was to develop 
rules that contributed to a coordination of the maintenance activities with a cost/effective 
purpose. The prescriptive IF-THEN element as described by Hale (1990) of the 
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Triggering requirements was associated with this purpose. The IF-condition was 
supposed to function as a tool for defining more common standards. However, the 
concerns of the informants were more directed at the need for detailed rules concretizing 
what was required in the THEN condition. This need was associated with the need to 
perform the activity in a certain way to achieve the required standard of the IF condition.  
 
One issue of concern that was connected to coordination in the argumentation of the 
Traffic-rule case was communication. First, there were limited possibilities for direct 
communication and feedback between the involved actors during the traffic operation. 
Second, misunderstandings in communication were associated with danger. As Chapter 5 
revealed, the traffic operation is controlled centrally by Control centers and the 
communication between the involved actors goes through this center. Several actors 
operated on the same tracks that often had single lines. They were also often operating 
alone. To achieve safe performance these actors were considered very dependent upon 
the activities of each other.  
 
The pictures of the Maintenance-rule cases were more differentiated. As discussed above 
the standards defined in the IF-condition of the triggering requirements can be seen as a 
reference for feedback to the maintenance work. Also, Chapter 5 revealed that during the 
task the actors could apply different means for communication. In addition, much of the 
maintenance work is organized around work groups. This gives better opportunities for 
communication and peer consulting and direct feedback. However, the ongoing changes 
of the Norwegian railway system appeared to influence the organizing of work in groups.  
 
The different conditions for coordination through communication and hence for direct 
feedback during the course of actions of the involved actors are discussed in theory. 
Weak communication opportunities call for preplanned activities, i.e. prescriptive rules 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason, 1997). Clear prescriptive rules 
for communication are considered necessary when misunderstandings between the 
interacting actors might lead to accidents (Hale (1990). The international discussions 
related to Traffic-rules are also concerned about the dangers that misunderstandings 
during traffic operation might create. This is a concern in the current development TSIs 
within EU and in particular associated with traffic across borders (Weill- Fassina et al., 
2003). However, as revealed the TSIs were not a central issue in the modification work of 
the Traffic rule case 
 
Communication is also considered important for the opportunity to function at the 
knowledge-based level discussed by Rasmussen (1983) and Rasmussen & Svedung 
(2000). This level of functioning requires opportunities for access to information, 
inquiries and peer consultation and feedback during the task.  
 
On this background, Reason (1997) argues that opportunities for communication will 
influence the balance between feed forward and feedback-control modes. Hale et al. 
(2003) discuss Dutch railways and are in line with this stance. They discuss the situation 
when prescriptive rules are necessary as a part of the apparatus to render the behavior of 
the various people sufficiently predictable for an open loop operation to succeed. In such 
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situations they find it necessary to specify rules high in the system. In their studies of the 
Duch railway system they find that this system still works to a significant extent on open 
loop, i.e. feed forward control, with a considerable delay in feedback. 
 
According to these discussions, the conditions for communication give support to the rule 
solutions of the cases. The Traffic-rule case, with the weakest conditions for direct 
feedback, abandoned the outcome-oriented rule solutions and stayed with prescriptive 
rules. The Maintenance-rule cases that generally had better conditions for communication 
about the maintenance activities chose a mixed solution. This solution also fit in with the 
underlying intention to harmonize the standards for maintenance activities across the 
distributed infrastructure of the railway system. Harmonization of rules was also one of 
the arguments for prescriptive rules in the Power-supply case, but here and additional 
reason was provided. Centrally developed prescriptive rules were considered to ease the 
burden of rule development in the regions. 
 
However, the ongoing changes of the railway system represent a problem here. Hale et al. 
(2003) argue that open loop systems can operate very effectively in a range of situations 
of the railway system, provided they remain reliable and hence predictable. However, in 
the existing situation of the Dutch Railway system they find that all the requirements for 
an open loop system are problematic. Their arguments parallel the ongoing changes 
described for the Norwegian railway system. These are staff reduction, privatization and 
decentralization, a move away from the ‘family tradition’ of employment and lifelong 
employment. To solve this problem they argue for changes in the railway system that 
increase the opportunities for closed loop, feedback control. In particular, they point at 
the need to increase the number of communication channels and their ability to be used, 
both by improved technology and by a change in the culture to fully utilize 
communication possibilities.  
 
Like Hale et al. (2003) the project leader of the Traffic-rule case suggested to look at the 
development of rules and the development of technology in relation to each other. His 
suggestion of increased use of ATC might have improved the feedback system to the 
actors on the tracks and hence one of the conditions for outcome-oriented rule solutions. 
 
Time for thinking, planning and reflection 
  
Another issue of concern of the Traffic-rule case was that many of the activities of traffic 
operation require immediate action which implies limited time to think, plan or reflect 
upon how to proceed safely. This concern was not given much attention among the 
interviewees of the Maintenance-rule cases. Chapter 5 also revealed that this aspect is not 
as paramount in the maintenance activities that generally have more time for planning 
and reflection. However, due to the need to coordinate these activities with other 
activities on the track, the work is sometimes under time pressure, especially in the areas 
with high traffic density. Furthermore, in general the increased emphasis upon cost-
efficiency and the reduction of “slack” might reduce the rule-followers’ time for thinking, 
planning and reflecting. 
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The knowledge based level of function that outcome-oriented rules require demands more 
time to think than the rule based (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2002). As Hale (1990) and 
Hale & Swuste (1998) argued; such rules need to be translated into action/state rules. 
Hale and Reason (1997) discuss the time span for the execution of the rules, i.e. from 
seconds to minutes to longer periods. According to them situations with short time spans 
require more preplanned activities and accordingly more detailed and concrete rules 
based on feed-forward control principles. Hence, traffic operation seems to be more 
dependent upon preplanning and prescriptive rules than the maintenance activities. The 
majority of maintenance activities give time to translate outcome oriented rules into 
action/state rules. A reduction of slack might reduce the time to think in activities of all 
cases and hence make them more dependent upon preplanning, i.e. upon prescriptions 
about what to do. Again, this gives support to the solutions of the cases. 
 
Coordination, coupling and linearity 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Perrow (1999) classified railways as linear and tight coupled 
systems. However, the discussion above reveals that this classification needs to be 
nuanced. As traffic operation often require faster decision-making than the Maintenance-
rule activities, the subsystem for traffic operation can be seen as more tightly coupled 
than the subsystem of the maintenance activities.  
 
According to Perrow (1999), systems characterized by linearity and tight coupling can 
best be coordinated centrally. Rosness (2003) discussed the results of the investigation 
among the rule-followers of the Traffic-rules regarding centralization. He argues that this 
supports prescriptive rule solutions. Systems characterized with linearity and looser 
coupling such as the Maintenance-rule cases can be coordinated either centrally or 
decentrally. Hence the Maintenance-rule cases should be more open for mixed solutions. 
Accordingly, also this theory gives support to the rule solutions of the cases.  
 
However, this might be changed in the future. As already indicated, the ongoing changes 
of Norwegian railway systems seem to be going in a direction towards a more complex 
and tighter coupled system. With reference to the theory of Perrow (1999), this might 
create tension between the modes of centralization and decentralization. This indicates 
that outcome-oriented rules might be more important in the future. This gives support to 
the wish of the Traffic-rule case to develop outcome-oriented formulations for 
educational and motivational purposes. This could have started the work of the rule-
imposer to formulate intended outcomes. Furthermore, as the project leader argued, it 
could have made the rule-followers more prepared for the responsibilities and 
requirements of decentralized coordination. For the same reasons, this gives strengthened 
support to the Maintenance-rule cases’ acceptance of triggering requirements.  
 
This move of the Norwegian railway system towards more complexity and tighter 
coupling of the system might imply that it will need more of the characteristics of an 
HRO as discussed by LaPorte & Consolini (1991) in the future. However, the 
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characteristics of HROs are weak or are being weakened in the Norwegian railway 
system. First, pressure upon cost-efficiency is likely to reduce the redundancy of the 
system. Second, there is a general wish to reduce the use of safety rules. As safety rules 
can be seen as a means to build in organizational redundancy, this might weaken this 
characteristic (Rosness, 2003). Accordingly the solution of the Traffic-rule case to use 
prescriptive rules and the surprising persistence of the Maintenance-rule cases, can be 
seen as the means to build in redundancy. The distinction in the use of verbs and the 
tagging of safety relevant rules of the Maintenance-rule cases can also be seen as such a 
means. Third, the cases revealed that there is a growing concern for the education and 
training of the rule-followers of the regulated areas. In addition, the pressure upon slack 
and redundancy might weaken the available time to think and existing communication 
channels used for consultation, mutual checking and feedback that are seen as important 
features of HROs.  
 
Support to the chosen rule solutions 
 
The general conclusion of the discussions above about the rules’ contexts is that theory 
supports the precautionary attitude of the cases toward the rule solutions of the 
hierarchical approach and also their choice of rule solutions. The theory also implies that 
to safely implement the ideals of the hierarchical approach it would have been necessary 
to look into the close relationship between control principles and characteristics of the 
system. It would also have required changes in conditions that did not fit in with the 
wanted rule solution.  
 
6.3.2.2 Characteristics of the rule-followers and context for implementation 
 
Another important argument given for the persistence of the prescriptive rules was the 
characteristics of the rule-followers.  
 
Rule-followers’ competency 
 
The characteristic that was given most attention was the rule-followers’ competency. This 
was particularly evident in the Traffic-rule case. The intended move of this case from 
prescriptive to goal-oriented rules also represented the most ambitious change of the 
cases as the Maintenance-rule could supplement the triggering requirements with 
prescriptive rules.  
 
As several authors presented in Chapter 3 discuss, it is important that the type of 
decision-making is suitable to the knowledge base of the decision-maker (Hale & Swuste, 
1998; Rasmussen, 1983; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason, 1997). This implies that 
the required type of decision-making that rules impose upon the rule-follower should be 
coherent with their knowledge base. These authors discuss that prescriptive rules require 
the ability to perceive and understand which rule is suitable for the actual situation and 
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the ability to perform the required actions. In the terminology of Rasmussen (1983) and 
Rasmussen & Svedung (2000) this means behavior at skill- and rule-based levels of 
functioning. Their discussions also imply that outcome-oriented rules require a more 
extensive understanding of the function of the Norwegian railway system based on 
mental models. This is necessary for the translation of such rules into action/state rules 
for safe performance Hale & Swuste (1998). In the terminology of Rasmussen and 
Rasmussen & Svedung this means a knowledge-based level of functioning.  
 
Accordingly, the suggested goal-oriented rule solution of the Traffic-rule case implied an 
extensive change in the level of behavioral function; from skill- and rule-based to 
knowledge-based. This also implied that the rule-followers had to achieve the ability to 
function at the knowledge-based level. This would require both educational steps and 
changes in control systems into a state with better conditions for feedback and time to 
think. In particular, opportunities for communication with other actors involved in 
activities and peer consultation appeared to be important elements. 
 
The Traffic-rule case judged that to adapt the functioning of the rule-followers into the 
requirements of goal-oriented rules would require educational means and training. The 
case also judged that the current context for the implementation phase of the rules did not 
allow for a sufficient extent thoroughness of this. This was also an important argument in 
their decision to stay with prescriptive rules. This implies that the willingness to change 
the principle was associated with the conditions of the implementation phase of the rules.  
 
However, the use of the rules to explain the function of the system during the education 
of the rule-followers, the emphasis upon varied practice, the recruitment pattern and the 
stability of the staff represented the potential for a more extensive understanding of the 
system. This is knowledge that can be activated for knowledge-based levels of 
functioning.  
 
Also, the educational tradition of the rail professionals of this field is supported by Hale 
& Swuste (1998). They argue that when prescriptive rules are implemented at a high level 
of a system’s organizational hierarchy it is necessary to involve and inform the rule 
followers of how and why rules have been arrived at.   
 
The suggested rule solution of the Maintenance-rule cases combining different rule 
solutions allowed for all levels of behavioral functioning. Still, the leadership of the 
Maintenance-rule cases were concerned that the introduction of triggering requirements 
represented a change in the requirements to rule-followers’ competency. However, 
because these cases were cautious about removing the existing prescriptive rules, the total 
solution did not require a dramatic change for the rule-followers. In addition the rule-
followers of these cases had a more traditional academic background based on education 
outside the system than those of the Traffic rule case. Accordingly they were more used 
to abstract theoretical formulations such as the outcome-oriented rules represents. This 
also means that the competency of these rule-followers did not build as much upon the 
prescriptive rule tradition. Implicit in this tradition there is also less emphasis on practical 
experience and socialization into the railway system. These discussions provide an 
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explanation as to why the Maintenance-rule cases were both cautious about removing 
existing prescriptive rules and accepted the triggering requirements. The discussions also 
provide a possible explanation why these cases were not so concerned about educational 
means in the implementation phase. 
 
These discussions also direct attention towards the concerns of the cases for the negative 
development of rule-followers’ competency. It is a paradox that the introduction of 
outcome-oriented rules requiring a knowledge-based behavior came in a situation where 
there was a general concern for a negative development of rule-followers’ knowledge. 
The concern for the level of education and training is not limited to the Norwegian 
Railway system; Hale et al. (2003) discuss the same problem in the Dutch railway system.  
 
The results also revealed that concerns for rule-followers’ competency stimulated wishes 
for more rules and in particular prescriptive rules. Reason (1997) argues that the safety 
rules constitute an important role as a record of the organization’s learning about its 
operational dangers that the rules serve. He finds this crucial for the dissemination of 
safety knowledge throughout the system.  
 
The dynamic context with increased emphasis upon cost-efficiency 
 
The use of the verbs “shall” or “must” in the traffic rules and the distinction in the use of 
verbs for safety rules and the safety tagging in the Maintenance-rules strengthened the 
rigidity of safety rules. The ongoing changes in the Norwegian railway system with 
increased emphasis upon cost-efficiency also stimulated wishes for more rigid rules as a 
means to counteract this pressure.  
 
These findings give associations to Rasmussen’s theory that pressures of efficiency and 
minimum efforts might cause migration towards the boundaries of safe performance 
(Rasmussen, 1997). This also gives associations to a concern in the research of Vaughan 
(1996). She claims that in ill-structured problem contexts what is to be regarded as risk 
and in particular what is judged as acceptable risk, becomes a question of social 
negotiation rather than an objective property of artifacts or technical systems. With 
reference to these theories, more rigid rules can be seen as a means to give clear 
instructions about what to do and at the same time signaling that deviation from the rules 
is not accepted, the migration is prevented, at least where rules exist. To distinguish the 
use of verb is in line with the suggestions that Elling (1991) provided after his studies of 
rules and rule writing in Dutch railways, steelworks and chemical companies (Source in 
Dutch, referred to in Hale et al. 2003).  
 
However, as Reason (1997) points out, the collection of rules will never be wholly 
comprehensive or universally applicable. Hence there is still a danger of migration. 
Furthermore, as Rasmussen (1997) argues it might be difficult to keep prescriptive rules 
updated and ensure compliance in such situations, in particular when the context is 
dynamic and competitive. In addition, Hale (1990) argues that when the context is 
 153
dynamic and changing it might be difficult for the rule-followers to perceive and 
recognize the IF-condition of prescriptive rules.  
 
These concerns for the problems of prescriptive rules also give support to the positive 
attitudes of the cases towards increased emphasis upon outcomes. Rasmussen (1997) 
argues that functional abstractions such as goal-oriented formulations might contribute to 
make boundaries of safe performance more explicit. Further as Hale (1990) argues, when 
there is a danger for erosion of compliance with rules, “BECAUSE” formulations might 
be useful to communicate expectations and explain why compliance to rules is important. 
These might be formulated as goals. One of the arguments for increased use of goal-
oriented legislation in German railways is the increased emphasis upon cost-efficiency 
(Becker, 2002). 
 
Accordingly it is a paradox that the idea of goal-oriented formulations was not kept in 
one form or another for the Traffic-rule case. Again, the discussions give support to the 
regret of the Traffic-rule case that the planned textbook with goal-oriented formulations 
had to be cancelled. As the leader of the project argued, this could also have prepared for 
increased use of goal-oriented rules in the future. This also gives support to the solution 
with triggering requirements and explanatory texts of the Maintenance-rule cases.  
 
Rule solutions and hierarchical positioning of rule-followers 
 
The hierarchical positioning of the rule-followers in the systems for safety management 
and different contents of the rule solutions is discussed by Hale & al. (1997). In their 
terminology, one could say that the goal-oriented rules of the Traffic-rule case indicate an 
increased focus upon system structure and management; a focus suitable a high position 
in the hierarchy. However, the target group of this case became the same as before, the 
executive and lowest level in the hierarchy. According to the theory of Hale et al. this 
calls for a focus upon execution, just as the chosen rule solution of this case did. 
 
The situation of the Maintenance-rule cases was different. The mixed rule solution of 
triggering requirements supplemented with prescriptive rules had focus both upon 
planning, organization and procedures and upon execution when found necessary. With 
reference to Hale & al. (1997) this fits in with the hierarchical position of the rule-
followers of these cases.  
 
The relationship between the core rule-followers of the cases and the chosen rule 
solutions is also consistent with the expectations Reason (1997). The rule-followers of the 
traffic rules are at the sharp end and the chosen rule solution is based on the feed forward 
principle. The rule-followers of the Maintenance-rules consists of middle management 
and first-line supervisors and the chosen rule solution occupy intermediate positions 
along the prescriptive-discretionary continuum.  
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Rule solutions and requirements to comply 
 
One characteristic of the rule-followers that influenced the choice of rule solutions was 
that the rule-followers themselves wanted prescriptive rules. Theory gives support to the 
explanation given for this wish. According to Hale & Swuste (1998), the request for rules 
might be dependent on the situation. The more compliance is stressed, the more the rules 
are used as a basis for assessing behavior by punishment or reward, and the more dispute 
between parties over the behavior expressed in the rules, the more pressure there is to 
define the rule at a management or regulatory level in terms that are easily measurable 
and verifiable. This reduces the complication and expense, of disputes of interpretation.  
 
Support to the chosen rule solutions 
 
The discussions above about characteristics of the rule-followers also give support to the 
rule solutions and the arguments of the cases behind these. The discussed theory implies 
that to safely implement the ideals of the hierarchical approach, it would have been 
necessary to look into the close relationship between rule solutions and characteristics of 
the rule-followers. It would also have required preparing for potential needs for changes 
in rule-followers’ competency.  
 
6.3.2.3 Characteristics of the rule-imposers 
 
The decision about the role as rule-imposer was done outside the project. However, to a 
great extent the choices of rule solutions of the cases imply that the rule-imposer took the 
task to define risk and to translate more or less specified goals about safety into 
action/state rules (Hale& Swuste, 1998). 
 
Rule imposers’ competency 
 
When deciding upon rule solutions the cases did not give much attention to requirements 
of competency of rule-imposer. This is surprising as the results revealed that confidence 
in the competency and in particular the railway knowledge of the participants of the 
modification processes was very important for the processes and the solutions.  
 
Furthermore, the processes and the extensive use of prescriptive rules and the use of the 
verb “shall” in the cases rule solutions implies that the question of Kirwan et al. (2002) 
about the responsibility for defining risk is given to the rule-imposer. This is in line with 
the general attitude of the Norwegian railway system where safety is not considered to be 
an issue for negotiation. However, Kirwan et al. argue that the task to discover and define 
risk should be placed with the creator and manager of the risk, not on the regulator. 
 
The cases demonstrated that to define risk required extensive contextual knowledge. In 
addition, the use of prescriptive rules in all cases also requires that the rule-imposer has 
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enough knowledge to define what safe activities are. Also the technical triggering 
requirements of the Maintenance-rule cases require that the rule-imposer has sufficient 
knowledge to define the necessary standards of equipment to control identified risk.  
 
Vaughan (1996) reveals that confidence in the rule-followers’ competency might be a 
challenge. She builds up argumentation that shows how autonomy and dependence 
function as constraints on the regulatory process and the regulators’ opportunity for 
acquiring and interpreting information on the author’s side. Regulators tend to become 
dependent upon the regulated organizations to help them acquire and interpret 
information. As a result, both the regulator and the regulated generally try to avoid 
adversarial encounters and favor negotiation and bargaining over conflict and 
confrontation. With reference to Vaughan’s (1996) theories of ‘normalization of 
deviance’ this might decrease safety.  
 
One reason for the limited attention to the rule-imposers’ competency might be that this 
has not been a serious problem before. The former rule-developers were respected for 
their context specific knowledge, i.e. railway knowledge. Another reason might have 
been that the participants of the modification processes studied here were rather strong in 
this aspect. A third reason might be that this was not expressed explicitly in the initial 
documents for the cases.  
 
Challenges for the future 
 
However, some interviewees provided reflection about the need for context specific 
knowledge for the future management of the chosen rule solution. They also provided 
reflections about the challenges associated with this need. These concerns are also 
supported by theory discussing rule solutions (Hale, 1990; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason & 
al. 1998). The rule-imposer of the Traffic-rule case, with the largest organizational 
distance to the rules’ context, did not report concrete plans for future management of their 
competency. The dynamic system for the rule management of the Maintenance-rule cases 
can be seen as a means to ensure the future competency of the rule-imposers of these 
cases.  
 
6.3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The persistence of the prescriptive rule solution demonstrates that the cases did not 
follow up the intention of the project; they did not choose rule solutions that paralleled 
the hierarchy of rule solutions with the position of the rule-imposer in the organizational 
hierarchy. However, the solutions paralleled the positions of the rule-followers in the 
hierarchy of the safety-management systems as discussed by Hale et al. (1997). 
Furthermore, all cases found rule solutions that gave attention both to prescriptions about 
what to do and to intended outcomes of these activities useful for the purpose of safety.  
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The major concern of the cases in their choice of rule solutions appeared to be 
characteristics of the rules’ context. The chosen solutions were in accordance with their 
concerns. The most important factors were the severity of potential accidents, the need to 
follow distinct procedures to achieve safe results of activities, limited opportunities for 
feedback to the involved actors and that outcome-oriented rules were not seen as capable 
of coordinating activities of different actors in a tightly coupled system. Theory about 
control principles (Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason, 1997) and 
about characteristics of systems (LaPorte & Consolini; Perrow, 1999; Rosness, 2003) 
give support to the chosen rule solutions and the argumentation behind these.  
 
However, this theory also indicates that the ongoing development of the Norwegian 
railway system with more diversity, less predictability and an increased emphasis upon 
cost-efficiency will increase the need to focus upon outcomes and feedback control 
principles. The theory implies that such a development will require better conditions for 
feedback, communication and time to think in the future. It is a danger that the 
privatization process with increased emphasis upon cost-efficiency seems to reduce the 
latter condition. 
 
Another important concern of the cases was the characteristics of the rule-followers and 
conditions for implementation of rule changes. The most important factors were the 
competency of the rule-followers and the rule tradition combined with constraints upon 
introduction programs for the changes. Theory that combines theory of control principles 
with requirements to the rule-followers’ knowledge gives support to this concern (Hale & 
Swuste, 1998; Rasmussen, 1983; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Reason, 1997). Also, this 
theory gives support to the concerns that a move towards outcome-oriented rules needs to 
be followed by a plan for preparation of the rule-followers for the change. It is therefore 
also strange that the plan for goal-oriented formulations was abandoned in the Traffic-
rule case. Both the results and theory imply that such a plan needs to take the sanctioning 
function of the Inspectorate, the Accident Investigation Board, the court and the media 
into consideration (Hale & Swuste; 1998). 
 
The characteristics of the rule-imposers were not an important concern for the choice of 
the rule solutions. However, interviewees, and in particular those representing the rule-
imposers, were concerned that the extensive use of prescriptive rules implied 
requirements to the competency of the rule-imposers. They considered this to be a 
challenge for the future. This concern is also supported by theory discussing rule 
solutions and rule-imposers’ competency (Hale, 1990; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason & al. 
1998; Vaughan, 1996) 
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6.4 Conclusions to the hierarchical approach 
 
6.4.1 Main conclusion 
 
The four studied modification processes did not follow the intentions of a hierarchical 
approach. Instead, the modification work of the cases turned into processes that I have 
called reverse invention. Here the ideals of the hierarchical approach were carefully 
explored and evaluated and the solutions were adapted to existing railway knowledge. 
The process of reverse invention made it possible to build the modification work upon 
existing railway knowledge and in particular knowledge associated with the pre-existing 
prescriptive rules. When available, risk analyses contributed as a supplement.  
 
Regarding the incitements to a deductive top-down strategy to rule development, this was 
left by all cases. Instead they applied an inductive bottom-up strategy. Here rule specific 
knowledge of existing prescriptive rules and associated knowledge about these rules’ 
context and intended function served at the main fundament for the development.  
 
Regarding the suggested rule solutions of the cases that paralleled the hierarchical 
positions of the rule-imposers in the organizational hierarchy of the Norwegian railway 
system, the cases showed a precautionary attitude. Instead of accepting these rule 
solutions as face value, the cases carefully judged their anticipated ability to prevent 
unwanted events and accidents. Railway knowledge was used as reference in the 
judgments and the solutions were chosen in accordance with this knowledge, not with 
reference to the hierarchical positions of the rule-imposers. The position of the chosen 
rule solutions in rules’ hierarchy fit in with the hierarchical position of the rule-followers 
in the railway system’s safety management system as discussed by Hale & al. (1997)  
 
Existing prescriptive rules became more persistent than expected. This implies that the 
rule-followers took the responsibility to define risk and translate more or less explicit 
goals into action/state rules. The main reasons for the persistence were concerns for the 
characteristics of rules’ context, the rule-follower and constraints upon the 
implementation phase of the rules. Characteristics of the rule-imposers were given 
limited attention. However, there were concerns about the ability of the rule-imposers to 
maintain sufficient railway knowledge for future management of the rules.  
 
All cases also found attention to outcomes to be useful for safety. The main arguments 
here were their usefulness for educational purposes and competency of rule-followers, the 
rule-followers’ motivation for compliance with the rules and the rule-imposers’ control 
function.   
 
Theory upon control principles and system characteristics give support to the safety 
concerns of the cases and the chosen rule solutions. Theory upon the requirements of 
control principles and systems’ characteristics upon rule-followers’ competency also give 
support to the concerns about rule-followers competency and rule tradition. Furthermore, 
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theory about the requirements of rule solutions to rule-imposers’ competency give 
support to some interviewees’ concerns about rule-imposers’ future railway knowledge. 
 
If the Norwegian railway system continues to develop in a direction that will require 
increased use of outcome-oriented rules, the concerns of the cases and theory implies that 
this development needs to be followed by a preparation of the rule-followers for this 
change and an improvement of the conditions for feedback and time to think. 
Furthermore, as Hale & Swuste (1998) suggests, it might be wise to develop decision 
rules for the translation of such rules into action/state rules. 
 
6.4.2 The theoretical problems 
 
The conclusions of the revealed problems are as follows:  
 
 
1. What work strategy to choose if low level rules already exist? 
 
All cases applied the strategy of reverse invention based on railway knowledge and where 
existing prescriptive rules and associated knowledge served as the main element. In the 
development of both outcome-oriented and prescriptive rule solutions, the cases applied 
an inductive bottom-up strategy where the former prescriptive rules were used as starting 
point for the work. This process inquired into railway knowledge and in particular the 
context and the intended function of these rules. Furthermore, it made it possible to build 
upon and pursue existing railway knowledge. However, it appeared difficult to evaluate 
the relevance of existing prescriptive rules when knowledge of their original context and 
intended function was not accessible.  
 
 
2. What if the suggested rule solutions do not fit the actual situation?  
 
The Traffic-rule case faced the problem that it did not find the suggested goal-oriented 
rule solution suitable for the characteristics of the rules’ context, the rule-followers and 
the implementation phase of the rules. The case chose the solution that they found most 
suitable for safe performance under the actual conditions, i.e. the former prescriptive rule 
solution. The plan to develop goal-oriented formulations for educational purposes and as 
a strategy to prepare for future introduction of goal-oriented rules was abandoned because 
of limited resources. The case regretted this decision.  
 
The Maintenance-rule cases could apply both prescriptive and outcome-oriented solutions. 
Hence, these cases did not face the problem that the intended rule solution did not fit the 
actual situation. However, the case made more extensive use of prescriptive rules than 
planned. This was done out of concerns for safety. These cases also developed 
explanatory texts for their outcome-oriented rules. 
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The hierarchical position of the chosen rule solutions in the rules’ hierarchy paralleled the 
positions of the rule-followers in the hierarchy of the safety-management systems as 
discussed by Hale et al. (1997). 
 
6.4.3 Needs for further research 
 
The results of the hierarchical approach raise some questions for further research: 
 
First, the findings of the process of reverse invention contradict the general rationalistic 
principles of the hierarchical approach. Due to the interest for these principles in 
literature and in practice, it is of interest to study if the process of reverse invention is 
applied in other contexts than the Norwegian railway system. It is also interesting to see 
if there exist alternative processes for the meeting of the requirements of the hierarchical 
approach. Furthermore, the strengths and weaknesses of the process of reverse invention 
regarding safety should be elaborated upon and evaluated.  
 
Second, the strengths and weaknesses of the inductive bottom-up strategy to rule 
development compared to the deductive top-down strategy should be followed up with 
comparative studies. Furthermore, the third alternative of an iterative process between the 
two strategies that one interviewee suggested should be elaborated upon. 
  
Third, the main arguments that the cases applied to explain their choices of rule solutions 
and that also deviated from the general hierarchical principles were supported by 
literature discussing rule context and characteristics of the rule-followers. However, it is 
still interesting to study if the arguments for the chosen rule solutions count for 
alternative contexts. Furthermore, it is interesting to elaborate if other modification 
processes pay attention to alternative conditions. Follow-up studies that evaluate the 
ability of the chosen rule solutions to prevent unwanted events and accidents are also of 
interest. 
 
Fourth, the studied cases were not in position to decide who the rule-imposers of their 
rules should be. Therefore, there are still many questions associated with the discussion 
about who is best placed in what types of situations to impose what level of limitation 
(Hale & Swuste, 1998). 
 
Fifth, the discussions and requirements of rule solutions and requirements of the rule 
solutions to rule-imposers’ competency, imply that the rule-imposer must possess rather 
extensive knowledge about the rules’ contexts. Potential solutions to achieve contextual 
knowledge and to manage future needs for rule modifications should be elaborated upon.  
 
Finally, if the ongoing changes of the Norwegian railway system continue, this will imply 
a dynamic, tighter and more complex context for future rules. The discussions above 
revealed that this might imply increased use of outcome-oriented rules. At the same time 
the results revealed that the characteristics of the rule context and the rule-followers are 
not prepared for this rule solution. Possible solutions for more coordinated developmental 
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activities where characteristics of rules’ context, rule-followers and the implementation 
phase are taken into consideration should be elaborated upon. The Traffic-rule case 
provided one example of a possible solution where technological solutions for 
management of traffic control parallel the rule development.  
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7 Risk-based approach with a process of reverse invention 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is directed at the second of the three sub questions of the study: 
 
How was the risk-based approach to rule modification adapted? 
 
For the adaptation of the risk-based approach, the theory presented in Section 3.4 
revealed three problems. Again, the first problem is linked to the work strategy for the 
new approach. The second is associated with the efficiency of conclusions derived from 
the new approaches compared to the intentions of safe performance. The third is a special 
concern revealed from the discussions of the theory compared to the cases’ starting point.  
 
This chapter follows the same structure as the previous and presents results and 
discussions of the problems one by one. The structure of this presentation is shown in 
Table 7.1. The final section of the chapter presents the conclusions to the research 
question.  
 
Table 7.1 Structure for presentation of problems with results and discussions:  
 
 Problem with answer Result Discussion 
S 
t 
r 
a 
t 
e 
g 
y 
Section 7.2, answer to the question of  Problem 1:  
 
How to combine expert dominated risk analyses 
with rule development in an evolutionary practice 
oriented modification tradition?  
 
Four solutions with a strategy of reverse invention 
with railway knowledge as reference  
7.2.1 Four 
combinations based 
on railway 
knowledge and 
existing rules 
 
7.2.2 Reverse 
invention with 
different functions 
of risk analyses  
 
7.2.3 Concluding 
remarks 
E 
v 
a 
l 
u 
a 
t 
i 
o 
n 
Section 7.3, answer to the question of Problem 2: 
 
What if the risk analyses do not fit the risk 
perception of those involved in the modification 
work? 
 
Evaluation of risk analyses with concerns for their 
ability to include 
7.3.1 Evaluation of 
risk analyses with 
railway knowledge 
as reference 
 
7.3.2 Persistent 
railway knowledge 
out of concerns for 
complexity  
 
7.3.3 Concluding 
remarks 
C 
o 
n 
c 
e 
r 
n 
Section 7.4, answer to the question of  Problem 3:  
 
What risk perspective to apply; a wide inclusive 
definition or the narrow risk analytic? 
 
Modification work with a wide inclusive 
perspective of risk 
7.4.1 Focus upon 
safety and an 
inclusive perception 
of risk.  
7.4.2 The wide 
inclusive risk 
perspective 
 
7.3.3 Concluding 
remarks 
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As revealed in Chapter 2, all cases of this study had to use risk analyses in their rule 
modifications. The content of this requirement was not clarified and could therefore mean 
both risk-based and risk informed.  
 
The method for the risk analyses and the top events that were used as the starting point 
for these was decided in advance for the Maintenance-rule cases but not for the Traffic-
rule case. 
 
7.2 Four solutions with a strategy of reverse invention  
 
The first problem to be highlighted in this chapter is how the cases combined the expert 
dominated risk analyses with the rule development in an evolutionary practice oriented 
modification tradition.  
 
In the following it will be revealed and discussed that all cases followed up the ambition 
to apply risk analyses in their modification work. However, they combined risk analyses 
with the rule development in four different ways. The different ways gave the risk 
analyses different functions in the rule development. In none of the cases did the risk 
analyses serve as the main fundament for the rule development. The cases questioned the 
trustworthiness of the risk analyses compared to the trustworthiness of railway 
knowledge. 
 
7.2.1 Four combinations based on railway knowledge and existing rules  
 
The presentation of the results of the cases is divided between the results of the Traffic 
rule case and the Maintenance rule cases. Furthermore, the study revealed that there were 
both common features of the Maintenance rule cases and differences. Therefore, again 
common features of these cases are presented together. The special features are presented 
separately for each case. 
 
7.2.1.1 The Traffic-rule case: Interactive and iterative 
Choosing risk analytic method and building risk analytic competency 
 
For the Traffic-rule case no decisions were taken in advance about what risk analytic 
method to apply in the modification work. To find a suitable method the work group 
consulted external risk analytic experts who represented different risk analytic 
approaches. The work group explored and evaluated the suitability of different methods 
for their modification work and the regulated area35. The members of the work group 
discussed the analytical approaches with each other, with their network and with resource 
                                                 
35 Project logg 577-IA 
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groups. The major concern was the ability of the methods to cover aspects that these 
actors considered important for safe traffic performance, i.e. their railway knowledge 
served as reference for good methodological solutions. 
 
They settled on a risk analytic method that became applied in the work. Here top events 
were used as starting point for event trees and fault trees where safety critical functions 
were identified at the level of sub-top events. Existing and eventually missing barriers 
were analyzed against hazards36. The work group defined top events for the analyses. 
Accident statistics played an important role in the work to define these.  
 
The chosen risk analytic method took advantage of both qualitative and quantitative data. 
It appeared difficult to retrieve trustworthy quantitative data at the lower levels of the 
analyses. Accordingly the analyses became more qualitative at these levels. 
 
From the beginning, one of the participants of the work group possessed both railway 
knowledge and knowledge of risk analytic methodology. Furthermore, the members of 
the case participated in risk analytic courses. The inquiries into different risk analytic 
methods and their suitability for the regulated area contributed with additional 
competency. The core contributors of risk analytic knowledge were external experts. The 
project leader explained that the case preferred to develop the risk analytic competency of 
railway personnel instead of developing the railway competency of external risk analytic 
experts. Later in the process the risk analytic knowledge of the work group was 
strengthened by the employment of a risk analytic expert who also possessed experiences 
from the Norwegian railway system.  
 
Progression of the work 
 
The intention of the Traffic-rule case was to undertake the risk analyses first and then 
proceed to the rule writing. Therefore the work group started their work with the risk 
analyses. One of the group members explained the impact of this decision: “No, we 
started with the analyses first and I think that was the right decision. We might say that 
we were never finished with the analyses because this is a dynamic world and we came 
up with new elements. However, it gave us the ballast to think in terms of barriers.”   
 
To ensure the quality of the initial analyses the case engaged an external expert to review 
them. The Board of the branch was also engaged to review some analyses. 
 
During this initial work the scope and preconditions for the analyses gradually evolved. 
These were rather wide and no stop rules for the analyses were settled in advance. The 
risk analytic expert of the work group explained that this made those involved in the work 
rather confident that the analyses covered the elements that they considered important for 
the development of unwanted events and accidents. As the people involved became more 
experienced, they found themselves more capable to judge what was considered “good 
                                                 
36 Project logg 689 
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enough” as the project leader expressed it. In these judgments their railway knowledge 
served as reference for the evaluations.  
 
The work to decide upon a suitable risk analytic method and to perform the initial risk 
analyses appeared to be much more time consuming than expected and the work became 
delayed. The interviewees reported two major reasons for this. The most important reason 
was the wide scope for the analyses that made the analytic work very extensive. Another 
was that the context of the rules was changing so new elements had to be taken into 
consideration.  
 
To accelerate the progression of the work, the case decided to start the rule development 
before the risk analyses were finished. In the following work the two tasks evolved in 
parallel. The leadership of the case found this to be an acceptable solution because the 
railway knowledge of the work group and the knowledge associated with existing rules 
was considered to serve as a foundation for the work. The work group itself considered 
existing railway knowledge and existing rules to be a more reliable fundament for the 
work than the risk analyses. For example, many members explained that the existing rules 
had been developed over years on the background of development in the technology and 
experience. The testing of these rules over time with good results made these rules so 
trustworthy that it was not reasonable to change them without very good cause. Some of 
them questioned if the risk analyses were a good enough reason because their results did 
not give a sufficient picture of the complex interactions of the activities of the Norwegian 
railway system. One of the engaged risk analytic experts gave support to this. He had 
experienced that participants of the work group had such rich cognitive maps of the 
railways that it was impossible to transfer these into the risk analyses.  
 
The system of the chosen risk analytic method served as a framework for collection and 
selection of railway knowledge for the analyses. The evolving scopes for the analyses 
also influenced which knowledge achieved attention. Therefore, the framework and the 
scope influenced which questions were raised in connection with the analytic work and 
hence which knowledge was inquired into and seen as relevant for this task. Accordingly, 
the framework contributed to a selection of railway knowledge, i.e. some became 
included and some excluded. Furthermore, the framework was used to structure the 
included railway knowledge under the headings of the top events in accordance with its 
steps and concepts of the analyses, such as, for example, safety critical functions and 
barriers. This structure was also used when the risk analyses were transformed into the 
written texts of the analyses. These texts were stored in a database.  
 
In the following work the activities went back and forth between risk analyses and rule 
development and the two tasks interacted. The project leader explained that the results of 
the inquiries into railway knowledge that the risk analyses stimulated and the results of 
the analyses gave information to, and raised questions to, the rule development. For 
example, those performing risk analyses could walk into the office of the rule writers and 
ask whether issues they were concerned about were taken into consideration in the rule 
texts. The inquiries of the rule development also gave information to and questioned the 
risk analyses in the same way. This was enhanced by the organizing of the work that 
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opened opportunities for interaction and close cooperation between the members of the 
work group.  
 
Also in these processes the main contributors of railway knowledge were the work group 
itself, their network and resource groups. Furthermore, the work group searched for 
feedback to their evolving work. The main contributors from the network were railway 
personnel holding different functions that could see the rules from different points of 
views. The main contributors from the resource groups were the Board of the branch. 
However, one interviewee argued that it was difficult for people with limited experience 
with risk analyses to give feedback upon these.  
 
The members of the work group found that the overlapping and interaction between the 
two activities gave flexibility to the work and opportunities to take advantage of new 
information and lessons learned during the work. This contributed to a development and 
refinement of both the methods for the risk analyses and for their combination with the 
rule development. This also contributed to the rule development. One member of the 
work group explained how the achieved knowledge of the risk analytic methodology 
made them think of their practical knowledge in another way. As he said: “Also we (who 
mainly worked with the rule development, my comment) started to think of barriers. And 
we understood when reading a rule, that it might not be good enough.”  
 
As the work proceeded, the work group structured the interaction between the risk 
analyses and the rule development into a described method for this combination37. A 
summary of the method is provided in Appendix F. The processes were divided into 
stages with defined meeting points between the risk analyses and the rule development. 
The project leader characterized this as “…a method that came out of a process that 
adjusted itself on the way.” However, the informal interaction also continued during the 
work. Also, the time pressure of the case made the steps of the method more overlapping 
than the method describes. 
 
Many of the participants of the work explained that the overlapping and interaction of the 
risk analyses and the rule development gave the risk analyses different functions in the 
modification work; they provided information and they corrected and validated the 
evolving rules. One member of the Board of the project explained that as the work of the 
risk analytic work gradually became delayed and the rule development proceeded, the 
risk analyses were increasingly used to verify the evolving rules. 
 
Therefore the process for combining risk analyses with rule development of this case can 
be characterized as “interactive and iterative”. This is illustrated below in Figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1  The interactive and iterative process of the Traffic-rule case 
 
 
In Figure 7.1, the arrows show how the initial risk analyses and existing rules served as 
input to the initial rule development and that in the following work the rule development 
and the risk analyses interacted.  
 
Evaluations of results 
 
The participants of the work group also evaluated the evolving work after the initial 
phase. The major concern was the ability of the risk analyses to cover the knowledge that 
the involved actors had of conditions they considered important for safe traffic 
performance. Again, they drew upon railway knowledge of their own, each other and 
their network and the Board of the branch for feedback. This implies that the risk 
analyses were evaluated with railway knowledge as reference.  
 
The members of the work group reported that they seldom disagreed with each other. If 
disagreements occurred these were concerning details. The project leader explained that 
the common pattern was that conclusions of risk analyses confirmed railway knowledge 
and existing rules. When this happened, the confidence in the actual railway knowledge, 
the rules and the risk analyses achieved increased trust. On the few occasions where 
divergences occurred in the conclusions, the common reaction was to question whether 
something of importance was left out of the analyses and to review it. In this way the 
conclusions of the risk analyses and the railway knowledge were brought in accordance 
with each other. When this happened the confidence was strengthened in the railway 
knowledge, the rules and the risk analyses. Therefore, the risk analyses contributed to the 
persistence of existing rules and railway knowledge described in Chapter 6. 
 
As the work proceeded, the case decided to follow-up issues of concern with HAZOP 
analyses. Furthermore, as revealed the case decided to perform change analyses, i.e. HUL 
analyses. At the end of the project the Board of the branch was invited to review the main 
risk analyses and the modified rules. The work group also checked the analytic work 
against statistics as well as unwanted events and accidents that occurred during the work.  
Initial risk analyse    Risk analyses 
Rule writing Intital rule writing 
Risk analyses 
Existing rules 
Modified 
rules 
Rule writing 
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The interviewees of the Traffic-rule case explained that the different feedback on the 
work was discussed within the work group. The professional judgments of the 
participants and their trust in the quality of the feedback served as the fundament for the 
decisions to take the feedback into account. 
 
7.2.1.2 Common features of the Maintenance-rule cases  
Choosing risk analytic method and building risk analytic competency 
 
For the Maintenance-rule cases the method for the risk analyses was settled in advance by 
the Overarching Maintenance-rule project. This was done because the method was 
supposed to serve as a fundament in the future management system for the maintenance 
activities. 
 
In line with the, then settled, steering documents of the Rail Administration,  the analyses 
of these cases also used top events as starting point for analyses with event trees and fault 
trees. The Overarching Maintenance project decided that the cases should apply a 
modified version of RCM analyses in combination with FMECA. One difference from 
the traditional RCM method was a generic approach where the analyses should be 
combined with local analyses when the plan for interaction processes between 
hierarchical levels of the organization was implemented. Other differences were a risk 
model based on barriers and use of models when deciding maintenance intervals. The 
method combined qualitative and quantitative data. 
 
The Overarching Maintenance project arranged introduction courses in the chosen risk 
analytic method. These courses had participants from each of the regulated areas. The 
Signal case was given the role as a pilot for the cases. The main participants were the 
rule- responsible of each case and some railway personnel with long experience within 
the respective regulated areas.  
 
During the courses and seminars the participants made their initial generic risk analyses. 
The analyses were done separately for each of the fields. The scopes for the analyses of 
the cases were settled and the methods tried out for the respective fields. The scopes were 
defined rather precisely and narrow. The cases received feedback from the teachers. 
Follow-up seminars were also arranged for the participants during their work. The 
courses and seminars were run by hired external consultants that were RCM analyses 
experts. Accordingly, these cases followed the same strategy as the Traffic rule case; to 
strengthen railway competency with knowledge of risk analytic methodology and not 
vice versa. 
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Progression of the work 
 
There were some differences in the way the cases performed the risk analyses and 
combined them with the rule development. The most important difference was the timing 
of the risk analyses and the rule development. This will be elaborated under the following 
three headings. As the project leader of the Maintenance-rule project explained:  
 
”…the analyses have been performed for each of the main systems of the 
infrastructure. There was not a common platform when the work started. One 
branch (i.e. the cases, my comment) had heard a bit about how it was supposed to 
be while another branch had some other words and so on. And then the branches 
had also interpreted it a bit differently and then one started in different ways. So 
maybe already at that time the foundation for differences was laid.” 
 
He also explained that this made the cases perform the task in different sequences. Some 
started to write the rules according a framework that the Maintenance-rule project had 
developed and then they started to perform risk analyses while other started from scratch 
with the risk analyses.  
 
Also, in these cases the chosen risk analytic method and the scope for the analyses 
influenced the collection and selection of railway knowledge for the analyses. As one 
interviewee explained: “The risk analyses represented a new way of collecting 
information.”  Accordingly, again the framework and the scope contributed to an 
inclusion and exclusion of railway knowledge. The framework of the analyses was also 
used to structure the included railway knowledge under the headings of the top events in 
accordance with its steps and concepts of the analyses and transforming the analyses into 
written texts. These cases also stored their risk analyses in a database. One interviewee 
commented upon this process like this: “The risk analyses have been a tool to transfer 
existing knowledge into a new format.” 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases followed the same pattern as the Traffic-rule case, to 
compare risk analyses with railway knowledge to reveal if the analyses included the 
knowledge seen as important to recognize development towards unwanted events or 
accidents. Again the most important knowledge was the knowledge of those directly 
involved in the work. However, they also contacted their network and in particular 
representatives of the rule-followers who were known to be very competent in their 
respective fields. Accordingly, railway knowledge was used as reference for the risk 
analyses. There were some differences in the feedback processes that will be elaborated 
under the next headings.  
 
Again the results revealed that the comparisons seldom reveal conflicting results. One of 
the rule-developers provided the following representative explanation for this 
phenomenon: “So at this first stage, it is natural that you end up with much of the same 
as there already is in the rules because there are many of the same people and much of 
the same thinking behind it.” The leader of the Maintenance-rule project supplemented 
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this picture:”…but sooner or later the issue of experience comes into the picture. Anyhow, 
one knows that one has to do it or has to do it in a special way.”  
 
The leader of the Maintenance-rule project also reported that when the risk analyses gave 
support to the rules and the railway knowledge, the confidence in both increased. This 
was verified by some other interviewees too.  
 
The cases also reported that the risk analyses diverged from the railway knowledge of 
those participating in the work or that they gave surprising results. As one interviewee 
said: “When we looked through it, we started to ask questions like: ”Is this right?” 
and ”Can it really be like this?”  
 
In such instances the cases inquired into the reasons for conflicting or unexpected results. 
One interviewee described the challenge like this:  
 
“And then (when results conflicted, my comment) we have to discuss if it is right 
that we have this requirement in the rules or if the rules are wrong. Or is it that 
something has been forgotten and the RCM analyses have to be revised? There 
should be some interactions here to make it conform.”  
 
In the choice of strategy for these inquiries, the confidence in the involved railway 
knowledge and the risk analysis results played the most important role. As will be 
discussed in the next section, most commonly railway knowledge commanded more 
confidence than the risk analyses. One participant reflected upon the choice of strategy:  
 
“In a way it is right to compare with the old maintenance manuals. Because then 
you can check if you have forgotten something. But what is the reason for not 
forgetting something? Is it that you have forgotten or did you consider it to be 
right? And if you considered it wrong you should not include it in the RCM 
analyses. If you do, the RCM as method, has lost its purpose.” 
 
A few instances were reported where the inquiries led to changed railway knowledge. 
Most commonly this happened when the railway knowledge was already questioned and 
when the analyses questioned the necessity of maintenance activities that the rules 
required. 
 
Many of the participants also discussed the use of the risk analyses in the decisions of the 
necessity of rules and of the choice of verbs for the rules. This will be elaborated in the 
next Section. 
 
Evaluation of results 
 
In the end, the Maintenance-rule project organized a joint two-step hearing process. 
Together with the rules, the risk analytical approach was presented to rule-followers in 
meetings with each region of the Rail Administration and discussed. Shortly after, the 
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analyses were sent to each region for a formal hearing together with the rules. The 
regions differed in how much effort they put into the hearing work and who they involved. 
One interviewee argued that the feedback was influenced by the fact that most of those 
who provided comments had limited knowledge of the chosen risk analytic methodology. 
In addition, the cases looked into statistics and reports of unwanted events and accidents. 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases also discussed the feedback and when this was found 
reasonable by the people involved in the developmental work, it was incorporated in the 
rules. Again, the decisions were based on the professional judgments of the participants 
without preset criteria, i.e. their railway knowledge served as reference. 
 
As revealed, the Maintenance-rule project performed change analyses based on the HUL 
principle, as did the Traffic-rule case. These analyses were performed by different people. 
The project leader of the Overarching Maintenance project did not consider these as risk 
analyses but as risk estimation.  
 
7.2.1.3 Special features of the Signal case: Sequential 
 
As a pilot project the Signal case was the first case to try the risk analytic method for 
their regulated area. This work became more extensive and time consuming than 
expected.  
 
The risk analytic work group of the Signal case had one participant with prior knowledge 
of the chosen risk analytic method. The members of this work group cooperated closely 
and drew upon each other’s competency. This was done in meetings between the 
participants. These were possible to arrange because the status as pilot project for the 
Maintenance-rule cases had provided the group with extra resources of time and money.  
As a pilot case, their application of the risk analytic methods and the risk analyses in the 
modification work was discussed within the Overarching Maintenance project, the 
Maintenance-rule project and in the risk analytic courses. Also, the group took advantage 
of the railway knowledge of their network in the operative field. 
 
The work of the risk analytic work group of the Signal case was influenced by existing 
rules and greatly built upon the participants’ railway knowledge. The rule-developer of 
the Signal case described the function of the railway knowledge in the analytic work like 
this: “Through their experience and competency, they in a way validated that the 
maintenance activities of today’s the work instructions and that were brought forth are 
relevant.”  
 
The risk analytic group finished the analytic work before the rule-developer started his 
work. The continuity of the work was broken between these two tasks because the rule-
responsible gave the task to develop the rules to the external consultant alone. However, 
there was some communication between the people involved in the two tasks.   
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As this case finished the risk analyses before the rule development, the case could have 
based the rule development solely on their results. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
the rule-developer based much of the rule development upon his general railway 
knowledge and his knowledge of the existing rules and their context. Also the risk 
analysis results provided from the risk analytic group contributed. When he felt his 
knowledge was insufficient, he made inquiries into the knowledge of his network and in 
particular among rule followers. Due to the time consumption of the analytic work, the 
rule development came under time pressure. Therefore the rule-developer felt that there 
was limited time to look into the background of the rules. He did not consider this to be a 
serious problem because he had confidence in the competency of the former rule-
developers and that the rules had good reasons. He also had confidence in the 
competency of the risk analytic group.  
 
Due to the break in the continuity of personnel involved in the work, the process of this 
case can be characterized as “sequential” and illustrated like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 The sequential process of the Signal case 
 
 
In Figure 7.2, the arrows show how the risk analyses were finished as a separate task 
before the rule development started and that existing rules served as input to the rule 
development together with these analyses. The vertical line illustrates that the two tasks 
were performed without overlap of the tasks or the personnel.  
 
When the risk analyses and the rules were subject to the final hearing process, it appeared 
that there were some inconsistencies between the risk analyses and the rules. The leader 
of the risk analytic group felt that this demonstration of divergences to the rule-followers 
reduced their confidence in both the risk analyses and the proposed rules.  
He believed that closer cooperation between the risk analytic group and the rule-
developer would have prevented this.  
 
Personnel discontinuity 
Rule writing 
Existing rules 
Risk analyses 
Modified 
rules 
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Both the rule-responsible and the other participants regretted that time pressure had 
limited the involvement of the rule-responsible in the work. He saw his main role as a 
coordinator and communicator between the people involved in the two tasks.  
 
7.2.1.4 Special features of the Power-supply case: Stepwise and iterative 
 
Because the rule-responsible for the case at the Head Office delegated the work little by 
little to the hired consultant, the work of this case became divided into subtasks. When 
the subtasks were reported to rule-responsible, their results were discussed and the rule-
responsible gave feedback on the work.  
 
Much of the rule development was performed before the analytic work. As revealed in 
Chapter 6, the hired consultant did the work almost alone and used his general railway 
knowledge and knowledge of the rules and their context. When in doubt, he consulted his 
network. He also sent preliminary results to his network for comments. When the 
decision to apply analyses in the modification work of this case was made, the risk 
analyses contributed to the rule development; either with information or with feedback.  
 
The Power-supply case applied the risk analytic method that was settled by the 
Overarching Maintenance project. As already revealed, the case involved different people 
in the analyses. These were chosen on the basis of good knowledge about the actual 
equipment to be analyzed and associated maintenance tasks. None of the participants of 
the risk analytic work had former education in the actual risk analytic method. It also 
varied who participated in the risk analytic course and the seminars.  
 
The case faced challenges with the level of detail for the analyses and the work became 
time consuming. This case was also complicated by the many suppliers of equipment. 
Therefore the case decided to relate their work to the first level of subcomponents. 
Furthermore, the case did not finish their risk analyses before the rules were approved. 
Priority was given to elements considered important for safety. The plan was to continue 
the risk analytic work after the rule writing.  
 
The process of this case can be characterized as “stepwise and iterative” and can be 
illustrated like this: 
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Figure 7.3  The stepwise and iterative process of the Power-supply case 
 
 
In Figure 7.3, the arrows show how the existing rules served as the main input to the rule 
development and that the risk analyses supplemented the work when they were done. The 
vertical lines illustrate the milestones of the work where subtasks were reported, 
discussed and new task delegated. The last arrow of risk analyses continues after the 
modified rules and ends with a question mark because the analyses were not finished 
when the rules were approved. 
 
The hired consultant who developed the rules found that the work would have been better 
for the development of the work if there had been a more holistic plan and if the tasks had 
been related more to each other from the beginning. Like the work group of the Traffic-
rule case, the rule-developer of the Power-supply case found the iterative development 
useful.  
 
7.2.1.5 Special features of the Superstructure case: Sequential and validating 
 
The Superstructure case also applied the risk analytic method settled by the Overarching 
Maintenance project. 
 
Neither of the two core participants of the work had prior knowledge of the chosen risk 
analytic method. The participants divided the participation in the introduction course 
between each other. When they participated in the course it was not yet settled that this 
case should apply risk analyses in the modification work. This was due to doubts 
concerning the suitability of the method for this field. 
 
Rule writing 
Risk analyses 
Modified 
rules 
? 
Risk analyses Existing rules 
new tasks 
Rule writing 
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As the decision to apply risk analyses was decided late for the Superstructure case, the 
work group of this case had to use available knowledge as foundation for the 
modification work. When developing the rules, the two participants of the work used 
their own knowledge, their network of among rule-followers and their Board of the 
branch.  The organizing of the case also made it possible for the two people involved to 
cooperate closely and to give feedback to each others’ work.  
 
Because this case started the rule writing rather early compared to the other cases, they 
were the main contributors to the development of a common framework for the 
organizing of the Maintenance-rules. 
 
When the Maintenance-rule project decided that the case should perform risk analyses, 
this was done by the same people who developed the rules. During the analyses they 
followed the same patterns for retrieval of knowledge and cooperation as they did when 
developing the rules.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the results were compared to the modified rules. Accordingly 
the risk analyses gave feedback to the rules and were not a part of the core process of rule 
development.  No serious contradictions occurred and the risk analyses validated the 
modified rules. 
 
The process of this case can therefore be characterized as “sequential and validating” and 
illustrated like this: 
 
Rule writing Risk analyses Existing rules 
Modified 
rules
 
Figure 7.4  The validating process of the Superstructure case 
 
 
In Figure 7.4, the arrows show how the existing rules served as input to the rule 
development and that the risk analyses gave feedback to the modified rules.  
 
One of the two participants reflected upon the validating function that the risk analyses 
had in the work. He said:  
 
“…now it sounds like we have put the RCM aside, but I really do not feel that it is 
what we are doing, at least you validate some things. And if you get a completely 
different result, you have to review your in data (of the risk analyses, my 
comment). Partly this is a kind of method for numerical calculations too.  
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The two-step hearing process at the end of the Maintenance-rule project was also used as 
 
7.2.2 Reverse invention with different functions of risk analyses  
lso in introduction of the risk-based approach the pattern of reverse invention can be 
 
7.2.2.1 Exploring and evaluating the risks based approach  
nly the Traffic-rule case had the task of deciding which risk analytic method they 
he chosen method included methods that could provide answers to all of the tree 
or the Maintenance-rule cases the method was chosen in advance by the Overarching 
a hearing process for both the rules and the analyses.  
 
 
A
seen. First, the cases explored and tried out the principles of risk assessment, the chosen 
methods and the combination of these with rule development. Then the cases performed 
the rule development but not with risk analyses as the main fundament. As revealed in 
both in the previous chapter and in the results of this section, the rule development was 
done on existing railway knowledge and rules. Furthermore, the four different ways of 
applying risk analyses in the modification work gave the analyses very different functions. 
In the following, these findings will be discussed and related to theory. 
 
 
O
should apply in the work. The results revealed that the case elaborated different 
readymade risk analytic methods. On this foundation they developed their own method 
that combined some of the readymade methods. In their choice of method, the main 
concern was whether the method covered issues seen as important for safe traffic 
performance or not. Again, the railway knowledge of participants of the work group, their 
network and their resource groups served as reference for good solutions. To draw upon 
the theory of March (1994) once more, this decision held strong elements of logic of 
appropriateness. 
 
T
questions to risk analyses presented Rausand & Øien (2004) (see Subsection 3.4.2) The 
use of Accident statistics, Fault Tree Analyses and the focus upon barriers reveals that the 
method included most elements from their two first questions about which unwanted 
events might occur and what could cause and/or prevent these. The third question about 
consequences of the events was given some attention through the Event tree analyses.   
 
F
Maintenance project. This method built upon the principles of the Management system of 
the Rail Administration. The chosen method included RCM analyses in combination with 
FMECA analyses and attention is given to the technical components of the systems. Also 
here barriers against accidents were given attention. According to Rausand & Øien 
(2004), these are methods that have been developed for the purpose of maintenance 
activities and that emphasize cost-efficiency. The method of these cases was also capable 
of answering the three questions of Rausand & Øien. The chosen solutions include 
methods that according to Rausand & Øien are associated with identifying which 
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unwanted events might occur and what could cause and/or prevent these. The element of 
barriers can also be associated with their third question about consequences of events. 
 
The emphasis upon cost-efficiency of the methods of these cases fits in with the increased 
emphasis upon cost-efficiency in maintenance activities and is in accordance with the 
intention of the Overarching Maintenance project. It also fits in with the plan of the 
project that the risk-based approach should ensure that the activities and limitations that 
the rules imposed were really necessary. Also Apostolakis & Vesely (1999) argue that 
risk analyses can be introduced for the purpose of removing burdens of unnecessary or 
rigid rules.  
 
The fact that the chosen risk analytic methods of all four cases answered all the questions 
of Rausand & Øien (2004) also implies that their methods contained elements of both 
sides of the “Bow Tie Model” that SAMRAIL describe (European Commission 2004c). 
The two first questions contain the elements of the left side of the model that contains the 
causes that potentially lead to hazardous events and their controls or barriers to the 
hazards. The last question contains the elements of the right side of the model with 
various outcomes that can potentially occur and the controls and barriers to limit or 
reduce the consequences. SAMRAIL finds this solution to be in accordance with the 
general trend within European railways. 
 
When it comes to choice of methods for combining risk analyses and rule development, 
the different cases had different conditions. The most important factors that influenced 
the choice of methods were the timing of decisions to apply risk analyses in the work and 
the progression of the work. However, confidence in rule-developers’ railway knowledge 
and existing rules also influenced the decision. 
 
7.2.2.2 Abandoning the ideals of the risk-based approach with different combinations of 
risk analyses and rule writing  
 
The results reveal that all cases applied risk analyses in their modification work. However, 
only one of the four cases followed the rationalistic ideals to finish the risk analyses 
before the rule development started. Also, in the previous chapter it was demonstrated 
that the major foundation of the rule development was the existing rules and railway 
knowledge. The solutions of the cases made it possible to build upon the trusted existing 
railway knowledge and still include risk analyses in the processes.  
 
When risk analyses were available they served as an additional element in the decisions. 
This means that the cases gave the requirement of a risk-based approach to the rule 
development, a content that fits with the description Chapman & Dimitrijev (1999) gave 
of the risk-informed regulatory approach (see Subsection 3.4.1).   
 
Furthermore, with reference to the discussions of Rasmussen (1997) about different 
strategies for different types of accidents, the strategies of the cases were dominated by 
the traditional evolutionary strategy where knowledge derived from experiences with the 
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railway system and past accidents served as the main input to the rule development. The 
way the cases used the risk analyses means that this tradition was supplemented with the 
analytical strategy. According to his theories, the supplement with risk analyses and their 
anticipatory elements is useful in dynamic contexts. Accordingly, to supplement the 
existing tradition with risk analyses fit in with the more dynamic context of the 
Norwegian railway system.   
 
The different solutions of the cases for the use of risk analyses in the work gave the risk 
analyses different functions in the rule development: 
 
In the interactive and iterative process of the Traffic-rule case, the results of the risk 
analyses gave information to the rule development. Furthermore, risk analyses were used 
to elaborate matters of concern. Risk analyses were also used to give feedback upon the 
quality of the evolving rules and to reveal potential dangers created by changes in the 
rules. In addition, the organizing of the work caused that the process of the risk analyses 
raised questions and collected knowledge that were directly fed into the process of the 
rule development. Accordingly, the risk analyses provided both information through its 
written schemas and knowledge through the interactive processes with the rule 
development.  
 
The Signal case had a sequential process where the continuity of the personnel was 
broken between the risk analytic work and the rule development work. Accordingly, the 
function of the risk analyses was limited to provide information to the rule development. 
This information was mainly limited to the written information that the schemas of the 
risk analyses provided. 
 
The stepwise and iterative process of the Power-supply case meant the risk analyses had 
three functions. First, the results of the analyses gave input to the rule development. 
Second, they served as feedback to the quality of the rules. Third, the organizing of the 
work created meeting points where the risk analyses raised questions and collected 
knowledge that were fed into the process of the rule development. Accordingly, the risk 
analyses provided both information through its written schemas and knowledge through 
the meeting points.  
 
The findings of the validating process of the Superstructure case revealed that in this case, 
the function of the risk analyses was to give feedback upon the quality of the modified 
rules. This feedback had the form of the written schemas of the risk analyses. As no 
important divergences were revealed, this function developed into one of validation.  
 
Together the four cases showed that the risk analyses had functions where they provided 
knowledge, information, ensured quality of evolving rules and validated existing or 
modified rules. 
 
It is worth noting that in the two iterative cases, i.e. the Traffic-rule case and the Power-
supply case, the rule development also had a function regarding the risk analytic work. 
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First, the rule development raised questions to the risk analyses. Second, inquiries related 
to the rule development contributed with knowledge to the analytic processes. 
 
The most evident reasons for the different functions were factors that influenced the 
timing of the risk analyses and the rule development. The order of the rule development 
and the risk analytic activities influenced how much the risk analyses could possibly 
influence the rule development. However, there were two underlying issues that allowed 
for the differences in the solutions. One was that the existing rules and railway 
knowledge was considered trustworthy enough to develop existing rules on this 
foundation. Another was that the risk analyses were considered as supplement to the 
existing evolutionary modification tradition, and too doubtful to replace the evolutionary 
rules and knowledge. Therefore, the work had to be based upon the evolutionary rules 
and knowledge anyway.  
 
In addition, the organizing of the work influenced how much the participants of the risk 
analytic work interacted with the participants of the work of the rule development. As 
Baumard (1999) and Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) argue knowledge has to be related to 
context and social interaction. Therefore the organizing of the work influenced to what 
extent the information of the written risk analyses were followed by supplementary 
knowledge.  
 
7.2.2.3 Railway knowledge as reference for the quality of the risk analyses  
 
The Traffic-rule case that could choose its own risk analytic method, compared different 
methods with their railway knowledge of the complex interactions of the regulated area 
and developed their method on this background. Furthermore, all cases compared the risk 
analyses with this railway knowledge. The purpose of the comparison was to control that 
known risk was included. Accordingly, railway knowledge again served as reference for 
good quality. Usually the risk analyses and the railway knowledge provided the same 
conclusions. When this happened, the confidence in both railway knowledge and risk 
analyses increased among the participants of the work and they experienced it as a 
validation of both knowledge sources. 
 
It is not surprising that the risk analyses and railway knowledge often reached the same 
conclusions as it was railway knowledge that served as the main input to the risk analyses. 
Also, the top events that served as the starting point for the risk analyses had served as 
the fundament for many of the existing rules.  
 
Due to the educational background and the practical experience of the main participants 
in the work and their network, the knowledge that the risk analyses could draw upon was 
rather extensive. With reference to discussions of Kørte et al. (2002) the operational 
environments of the regulated areas provided process knowledge and experience data that 
served as input data to the risk analyses. The analytical processes dealt with these inputs 
and information and transformed it into the framework of the risk analyses. In addition, it 
is reasonable to believe that the risk analytic work was given more or less conscious 
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feedback from the railway knowledge during its development, in particular in the two 
iterative cases. However, depending upon chosen risk analytic method and the scope for 
the analyses, only selections of available railway knowledge were included in the 
analyses.  
 
If the risk analyses and the railway knowledge had conflicting conclusions, the reason for 
this result was questioned and inquiries initiated. In the next section it will be elaborated 
that the risk analysis results were less trusted than the railway knowledge. Therefore the 
most common strategy for the inquiries was to review the risk analyses. The major 
concern was whether the analyses had excluded important railway knowledge. When 
weaknesses in the analyses were revealed, the analyses were adjusted to the railway 
knowledge. Through this strategy the risk analyses were brought in accordance with the 
railway knowledge and consensus was established. When consensus was reached, the 
participants experienced this as if the risk analyses and the railway knowledge validated 
each other. Accordingly, also conflicting conclusions resulted in increased confidence in 
both. 
 
Accordingly, like the hierarchical approach, the risk-based approach also increased the 
confidence in existing rules and railway knowledge. The discussions above make it 
reasonable to ask whether the risk analyses influenced the rule development. Even though 
the main fundament of the rule development was the existing rules and railway 
knowledge, I would say yes. One reason is that the confidence in both the analytic results 
and the railway knowledge increased. This made both existing rules and existing railway 
knowledge persistent. Another reason is that the introduction to risk analytic methods 
influenced the thinking and attention of those involved in the work. However, the impact 
of the analyses was not as extensive as the ambitions in the initial documents of the 
projects. Furthermore, as Chapter 6 revealed, they did not contribute to a dramatic 
reduction in the number of rules.  
 
The processes discussed above imply that the risk analyses had limited ability to reveal 
risks that was not already known in the existing railway knowledge. This gives 
associations to Turner’s theory about disaster incubation (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). He 
describes disaster incubation as a discrepancy between the state of affaires and the 
culturally taken for granted. He argues that accidents arise from the interaction of a chain 
of unanticipated errors and misunderstood events in complex and ill structured state of 
affairs. In this development he is concerned about the link between power and officially 
approved knowledge.  
 
The way railway knowledge functioned as reference for good solutions indicates that the 
approved knowledge in the modification work was the railway knowledge. This 
knowledge is based on the tradition of the Norwegian railway system. As already 
discussed the ongoing changes of the system have made the system more complex and 
difficult to overview. Therefore this knowledge might have problems to grasp a 
development of disaster incubation. This raises the question whether it would be wise to 
supplement railway knowledge with other knowledge both in the risk analyses and the 
development of rules. 
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The results revealed that the risk analyses represented a selection of knowledge that fit 
into the framework of the risk analytic method. The type of risk analyses applied in the 
studied cases directs much of the attention at the operative levels of the system. This is 
particularly evident in the type chosen for the Maintenance rule cases that focus at the 
system’s components. Accordingly, the selection of knowledge of the risk analyses will 
disfavor knowledge associated with other levels of the system.  
 
Reason (1997) argues that different actors’ decisions and actions can produce latent 
conditions or patogens.  These might lie dormant for a time until they combine with local 
circumstances and active failures and penetrate the system’s many layers of defenses and 
an accident occurs. Reason claims that patogens arise from strategic decision and other 
top-level decisions and that they are present in all systems. 
 
As the chosen risk analytic methods do not emphasize strategic and top-level decisions, 
they will have difficulties to reveal risks associated with decisions that might lead to 
latent conditions such as discussed by Reason (1997). The increased emphasis upon risk 
analyses at the level of authorities implies that the risk analyses might play a more 
important role in future rule modifications. This might result in reduced approval of 
railway knowledge that includes knowledge of the complex interactions of different 
levels of the railway system. If no means are taken that maintain attention to different 
levels, this can increase the risk of latent conditions in the system.  
 
7.2.2.4 Influence upon railway knowledge  
 
The impact from the risk-based approach upon railway knowledge will be elaborated and 
discussed in Chapter 8. At this stage attention is drawn to some results.  
 
First, results revealed that the railway knowledge was extended with risk analytic 
knowledge. This was done trough the introduction of risk analytic methods to the 
participants of the work and their experience with the performance of risk analyses in the 
regulated areas. The different applications of the risk analyses in the rule development 
also developed knowledge about the use and function of risk analyses in combination 
with rule development. 
 
Second, the introduction and accomplishment of the risk analyses initiated inquiries into 
railway knowledge. The focus of attention for the inquiries was dependent upon the 
framework of the chosen risk analytic method and the definition of scope for the analyses. 
The framework of the risk analytic method and the scope for the analyses also influenced 
the further discussion of the achieved knowledge and the selection of information that 
was transformed into the schemas of the analyses.  Through these processes knowledge 
from different sources became more articulated, combined and shared between people.  
 
Third, the work of the cases was organized differently. They differed with respect to how 
many people were included and who they were, what networks they had access to and 
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how they were organized for interaction and cooperation. Accordingly, the organizing 
influenced what railway knowledge was included and to what extent it was articulated, 
combined and shared.   
 
Fourth, the results revealed that the framework of the risk analyses and their schemas 
caused that selections of included knowledge became encoded into written texts. These 
written texts became stored in databases.   
 
Hence the risk-based approach directed attention to selections of railway knowledge that 
fit into the frameworks and the scope of the risk analyses. Furthermore, the approach 
influenced what knowledge became encoded into written texts for storage in databases. 
As the frameworks for risk analyses and associated schemas have evolved out of a 
rationalistic knowledge perspective, this implies that attention was given to railway 
knowledge that suited this perspective. Accordingly, it was predominantly rationalistic 
knowledge that became encoded into these written texts. Furthermore, this implies that 
more knowledge received attention in the analyses of the Traffic-rule case with wider 
scope than in the analyses of the Maintenance-rule cases with narrower scope.  
 
This raises the question of what knowledge received little attention. The discussions of 
Jaeger et al.(2001), Perrow (1999) and Schrader-Frechette (1991) presented in Section 
3.5 indicates that the richer intuitively-contextual knowledge might suffer. According to 
them this knowledge requires thick descriptions and is difficult to operationalize in 
economic terms. Therefore it might be difficult to adapt this knowledge into the 
framework of the risk analyses. 
 
7.2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
When the four studied modification processes introduced risk analyses in their work, they 
did not follow rationalistic ideals of the risk-based approach. Instead the modification 
work of all cases turned into processes that can also be classified under the label of 
“reverse invention” 
 
In this process of reverse invention the cases explored and evaluated solutions for the use 
of risk analyses in the rule development. The major concern was the ability of the 
analytic methods and their combination with the rule development, to include knowledge 
known as important for revealing mechanisms that could lead to unwanted events or 
accidents. Railway knowledge served as source for information gathering and as a 
reference for evaluation.  
 
The exploration and evaluation of solutions were constrained by conditions that 
influenced timing of the two tasks. Three out of four cases were not able to finish risk 
analyses before the rule development started. This decision to start rule development 
without completed analyses was based on strong confidence in existing rules and access 
to railway knowledge within the cases. Also, the last case had such confidence in existing 
 183
rules and railway knowledge that they decided to base the rule development upon this 
fundament in combination with information from the risk analyses.  
 
The results of the risk analyses were evaluated with railway knowledge as reference. 
When risk analyses contradicted railway knowledge, inquiries were provoked. The main 
strategy was to question the risk analyses and bring them in accordance with the rules and 
the railway knowledge. The process of reverse invention for the risk-based approach is 
demonstrated below in Figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5 The strategy of reverse invention for the risk-based approach. 
 
Also in Figure 7.5 the circles demonstrate the stages of the process. Their overlap 
illustrates that there were overlap between the stages. The arrow from left to right 
demonstrates the direction of development for the process. 
 
The main elements in the development towards the strategy of reverse invention were as 
follows:  
 
• None of the cases used the risk analyses as fundament for rule development. The 
main reasons were timing of the tasks combined with strong confidence in 
existing rules and railway knowledge. The latter knowledge was seen as more 
inclusive than knowledge derived from risk analyses. The exploration and 
evaluation of the risk analyses and their methods stimulated inquiries into railway 
knowledge. 
 
• Instead, all cases used knowledge associated with the rules and railway 
knowledge as fundament for the work. When available, the risk analyses served as 
a supplement. The cases included the risk analyses in the modification work in 
four different ways. This gave the risk analyses different functions; they provided 
knowledge and information, ensured the quality of evolving rules and validated 
existing or modified rules.  
 
• The strategies for inclusion of risk analyses in the modification work made it 
possible to build the development upon existing rules and railway knowledge. In 
Rasmussen’s terminology the strategy for rule development became mainly 
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evolutionary, but with more or less analytic elements (Rasmussen, 1997). The 
cases gave the requirement to apply risk analyses in rule development a “risk 
informed” content (Chapman & Dimitrijev, 1999). 
 
• The ability of the risk analyses to reveal mechanisms that the participants found 
important for the prevention of unwanted events or accidents were also evaluated 
with railway knowledge as reference. This stimulated inquiries into this 
knowledge. 
 
• When the risk analyses were not in accordance with railway knowledge, the risk 
analyses had the least trust. They became revised and brought in accordance with 
railway knowledge. 
 
• When consensus between risk analyses and railway knowledge was reached, both 
achieved increased trust. 
 
The risk analytic methods of the cases had their core elements in common. These were to 
use top events as the starting point for both fault tree and event tree analyses, 
identification and analyses of safety critical factors including analyses of barriers.  
 
The introduction of the risk-based approach influenced rule development because it 
increased the confidence in existing rules and railway knowledge and influenced the 
thinking of those who developed the rules. 
 
Through the inquiries and discussions that the risk-based approach stimulated, railway 
knowledge became articulated, shared and knowledge from different sources became 
combined. Selections of this knowledge were encoded into written texts. In addition, all 
cases supplemented the competency of participating railway personnel with knowledge of 
risk analyses. These findings will be followed-up in Chapter 8. 
 
7.3 Evaluation of risk analyses with concerns for their ability to include 
 
The second problem of this Chapter is how to handle a situation where the risk analyses 
do not fit the risk perception of those involved in the modification work. 
 
The previous section has already revealed and discussed that the dominating strategy of 
such a situation was to trust the railway knowledge and suspect that there were 
weaknesses in the risk analyses. Below I will elaborated that the initial phase of the work 
was critical for the confidence in the risk analyses  
 
7.3.1 Evaluation of risk analyses with railway knowledge as reference 
 
In this subsection, the presentation of results starts with results associated with weak 
confidence in risk analysis results for then to go on with the strong confidence in railway 
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knowledge. Finally, findings of the function of risk analyses as a tool to legitimize rule 
solutions and to reduce the regulatory burden will be presented.  
 
7.3.1.1 Weak confidence in risk analysis results   
 
As revealed, the interviewees reported that the analytic results were questioned and 
railway knowledge served as reference for the judgments of their quality. When the 
analyses were not confirmed by railway knowledge it was the risk analyses that were 
mistrusted. The main suspicion was that the risk analyses had not included elements that 
the participants with the background of their railway knowledge considered important in 
the development of unwanted events or accidents. As will be elaborated below, the 
interviewees attributed the suspicion of the risk analyses to three main factors.  
 
Confidence in chosen risk analytic method 
 
One factor was the confidence that the cases had in the suitability of the chosen risk 
analytic method for the regulated area. Most of the interviewees of the Traffic-rule case 
expressed satisfaction with the methods and the combination of these with the rule 
development. However, one of the interviewees from the work group discussed the use of 
top events as the starting point for the analyses. He referred to the criticism that existing 
rules were too experience-based and that the risk analyses were seen as a means to 
counteract this tendency. He said:  
 
“And this is what we have been bullied about, to be so event based. But this is 
exactly what we become when we turn from top events and downwards too 
(Derive the analyses from top events, my comment). We are very event based 
because we use the statistics to prevent events in the future.” 
 
He also reflected upon difficulties associated with the anticipatory intention of the risk 
analyses.  
 
“You cannot be ahead of something you don’t know about. It is impossible to have 
control of what is unknown and abstract, and we don’t manage it now either. We 
are supposed to have control over single errors, or the possibilities for single 
errors. How can we know all the possibilities for single errors, it is impossible!”  
 
Among the Maintenance-rule cases there were some differences. In general, interviewees 
from all cases considered the chosen risk analytic method to be most suitable for the 
Signal case. However, because of a high number of components the case had to limit the 
level of details in the analyses to the level of sub-components. The Power-supply case 
also found the method suitable but had the problem dealing with the high number of 
components provided from different suppliers. To make the work manageable, this case 
also performed the analyses at the level of sub-components. Due to relatively few 
components, the work of the Superstructure was manageable. However, this case faced 
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the problem that some of their components were difficult to delimit and their status 
difficult to decide precisely. As one of the interviewees from this case expressed it:  
 
“…We chose a tool (the risk analytic method, my comment) that was suitable for 
questions like failure or no failure at the level of components and objects. Things 
on the tracks that I work with, are partly very abstract because they are 
geometrical figures, you can’t touch and feel them. You can measure them, but 
you cannot remove and change them. However, you can correct them.”  
 
Furthermore, some interviewees of the Maintenance-rule cases reported that it was 
difficult to retrieve data that the method required for the analyses of old equipment. Also, 
the use of experience data in the analyses made it difficult to analyze new equipment. In 
such instances the analyses had to be based upon anticipations based upon professional 
judgments and guesses. Some interviewees underlined that in such instances it was 
important that the participants held strong practical railway knowledge. Many of the 
interviewees were concerned that the RCM-methodology split the system into 
components and gave little attention to the important interactions between these.  
 
However, many of the interviewees also stated that they saw advantages of the 
introduction of risk analyses, in particular in the long term. The most commonly reported 
advantage was the systematic work and the written documentation that the risk analyses 
represented  
 
Seen together, these results reveal that the two cases that had been most involved in the 
initial exploration of the methods, i.e. the Traffic-rule case and the Signal case, expressed 
most satisfaction with the method. 
 
Confidence in risk analytic competency 
 
A second factor was the confidence in the risk analytic competency of those performing 
the analyses. From the beginning, the work group of the Traffic-rule case did not feel 
fully confident with their risk analytic competency and searched for feedback on their 
method. The case hired an external risk analytic expert to review the initial analyses. 
When the Inspectorate revised the project in April/May 2000, limited risk analytic 
competency was commented upon as a weak point38.  However the competency of the 
work group developed as the participants became more experienced and in particular 
after the employment of the risk analytic expert.  
 
Many of the interviewees of the work groups of the Maintenance cases said that they felt 
unprofessional at the beginning of their analytic work. During the risk analytic course, 
when the cases settled their scope for the analyses and made their initial attempts to apply 
the risk analytic method to their regulated areas, there was an opportunity to use their 
                                                 
38 Audition report about the project from the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate: Statens jernbanetilsyn. 2000. 
Report no 3-00 
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teachers as advisors. Furthermore, they got feedback upon their work during the follow-
up seminars. Also in these cases the participants of the work felt that their competency 
improved when they gained more experience from the work. As one interviewee from the 
Superstructure case expressed it:  
 
“Just now I feel, for my own part, that I would have liked to do the RCM-analyses 
once more. Because when we started with the RCM analyses, we did not know so 
much about RCM and where we were going. So, at least for my own part, it would 
very useful to do the process once more.”  
 
Confidence in scopes for the analyses 
 
A third factor that the interviewees revealed regarding confidence in the risk analyses was 
their confidence in the scopes that were settled for them. The Traffic-rule case felt 
confidence in their scope. This was attributed to the wide scope that made it possible to 
include the complicated interactions of the field. The risk analytic expert that was 
employed in the work group after the work had started reflected upon this. She attributed 
the wide scope to the high competency of the railway experts engaged in the project 
group. The competency made them see all the intertwined interactions of the rail 
activities and the scope were developed to cover these. She thought that the risk analytic 
work would have been easier to cope with and less time consuming if the scope of the 
analyses had been more limited. However, she also thought that then they might have 
been less trusted.  
 
Many of the interviewees from the Maintenance-rule cases expressed some distrust in the 
scope for the risk analyses; they felt that they were defined too narrowly. Hence, they did 
not feel confident that the analyses included important factors that could contribute to the 
development of accidents and unwanted events. One reason for the narrow scope was 
advice from the risk analytic experts to limit the work so it did not become too 
overwhelming. Another reason that also contributed to the limited confidence in them 
was that those performing the analyses had limited experience with the methods when 
they settled the scope. The lack of experience made it difficult for them to foresee the 
consequences of their decisions. The leader of the Maintenance-rule project commented 
upon this: “What I feel is that what level you choose or build upon from the beginning has 
very important consequences for the end result (of the analyses, my comment). But I don’t 
think anybody saw it at the beginning.” In hindsight, he found that the analytic results 
would have been different if they had made other decisions at the beginning. He therefore 
found it reasonable to question the analytic results.  However, this problem was not 
discussed among the interviewees of the Signal case. As revealed this was the case that 
both held the strongest risk analytic competency and for which the risk analytic method 
was considered most suitable. 
 
 188
Overview of main factors influencing confidence in risk analyses 
 
The explanations of the limited confidence in the risk analysis results and the status of the 
cases are summarized in Table 7.2 below. 
 
Table 7.2       Main factors influencing the confidence in risk analyses 
 
Factor Traffic-rule 
case 
Maintenance-
rule cases 
Comments 
Suitability of the 
risk analytic 
method for 
regulated area 
Good Signal: Good 
Power-supply:     
Mid range 
Superstructure: 
Mid range  
The confidence in suitability 
of methods was highest 
among the two cases which 
were involved in the choice of 
these 
Risk analytic 
competency 
Gradually 
developed and 
strengthened 
with risk 
analytic expert 
All cases 
gradually 
developed 
Signal case: 
One person 
with previous 
knowledge 
The confidence in competency 
increased with growing 
experience and inclusion of 
risk analytic expertise 
Width of scope 
for the analyses 
Wide  Narrow Both the Traffic-rule case 
with wide scope and  the 
Signal case with narrow scope 
had more confidence that the 
analyses included important 
knowledge than the two other 
cases with narrow scope 
 
Table 7.2 shows that in general the Traffic-rule case has better results on the factors that 
were considered important for the confidence in risk analysis results than the 
Maintenance-rule cases.  
 
7.3.1.2 Strong confidence in railway knowledge 
 
The weak confidence in risk analysis results can also be associated with a strong 
confidence in railway knowledge.  
 
Confidence in railway knowledge of participants in the work and their predecessors 
 
As already revealed in the presentation of the rule imposers’ characteristics in Section 5.2 
and the results and discussions about the same issue in Section 6.3 all cases involved staff 
with quite extensive railway knowledge. However theses chapters also revealed that there 
were some differences between the cases.  
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The railway knowledge of the work group of the Traffic-rule case included railway 
professionals with updated, extensive and varied practice. Furthermore, the group had a 
higher number of participants and together with the varied practice this implied an 
extensive network. The work group could also take advantage of resource groups that 
included representatives from different actors involved in the regulated activities.  
 
Also many of the interviewees of this case spontaneously expressed that they considered 
the railway competency of the work group to be very strong. In particular, the railway 
competency of the two persons with pure railway background was often mentioned. This 
was attributed to their varied and extensive practice and their closeness to the operative 
field. In addition, the background of the project leader as a former leader in the railway 
system was acknowledged. Also, the railway knowledge of many of the participants of 
the Board of the branch was acknowledged, but some comments were given that many of 
these were not close enough to the operative field. 
 
The presentation of the participants in the work of the Maintenance rule cases reveals that 
their railway knowledge can also be classified as good as all had educations of relevance 
for the regulated areas and experience from the actual fields.  However, there was a lower 
number of participants involved in the work and it was variable as to how updated and 
extensive the practice of the participants were. Furthermore, their practice was generally 
less varied than that of the participants of the Traffic-rule case.  
 
As these Maintenance rule cases involved less people than the Traffic rule case, the cases 
did not contribute with so many opinions about the competency of the involved actors as 
this case. However, the comments that the interviewees gave about themselves and others 
both in their own field and the other fields revealed that also in these cases there were 
confidence in the railway knowledge of the participants.  In particular many expressed a 
strong confidence in the railway knowledge of the risk analytic group of the Signal case 
and the Board of the branch of the Superstructure case. This was attributed to their 
functions at the operative levels of the system. Also, Section 6.3 revealed that many of 
those most involved in the work of these cases spontaneously expressed that they did not 
find their own knowledge of the operative field to be sufficient, it had to be supplemented 
with knowledge from people working at this level. Therefore, their network had an 
important function in the confidence in the railway knowledge of the cases.  
 
In addition, the participants of all cases expressed strong confidence in the railway 
knowledge of former rule-developers. One commonly cited quotation among participants 
from different cases was “The old ones knew what they were doing!”  One interviewee 
explained:  
 
 ”… it is mainly incidents, accidents and unwanted events that have been used for 
learning in the enterprise and that led to changes in the regulations. In former 
days, this was the normal way to work with the regulations. Back then thereto was 
not so much documented risk analyses, but there were extensive risk judgments. 
So I have respect for what they did at that time.”  
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If the participants of the work did not feel that their own knowledge was sufficient they 
inquired into the railway knowledge of other participants of the work, their network or 
when available, their resource groups. However, as Chapter 6 revealed, it was not always 
easy to retrieve knowledge. This was particularly evident in the Maintenance-rule cases. 
 
Overview of main factors influencing confidence in railway knowledge 
 
The explanations of the strong confidence in the railway knowledge and the status of the 
cases are summarized in Table 7.3 below. 
 
 
Table 7.3      Main factors influencing the confidence in railway knowledge 
 
Factor Traffic-rule 
case 
Maintenance-
rule cases 
Comments 
Included people Many, with 
different 
functions 
Few, with more 
homogenous 
functions. The 
risk analytic 
work group of 
the Signal case 
was most 
stabile.  
The confidence in railway 
knowledge was highest in the 
case with the highest number 
of included people who 
represented different functions 
and had better access to 
knowledge resources and 
network 
Practice 
Updated, extensive 
and varied  
 
 
Good Signal case: 
Good 
Power-supply: 
Mid range 
Superstructure: 
Mid range 
The confidence in railway 
knowledge was highest for the 
two cases with good practice  
Formal education Good Good This factor was not given 
much attention  
Confidence in 
former railway 
knowledge of 
former rule-
developers 
High High The high confidence in former 
rule-developers caused a 
cautious attitude towards 
changes or removal of rules 
 
Table 7.3 shows that in general, the Traffic-rule case has better results on the factors that 
were considered important for the confidence in railway knowledge than the 
Maintenance-rule cases. 
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7.3.1.3 Risk analyses as a tool to legitimize rule solutions and reduce the regulatory 
burden 
 
The Traffic-rule case used their risk analyses in the discussions of the necessity of rules. 
Rules were wanted when the risk analyses revealed that the sub top events were not 
sufficiently backed up with technical barriers. The project leader explained that in general 
these conditions were known from before and were often the main reasons for existing 
rules. Furthermore, where barriers were lacking, it appeared that it was difficult to 
introduce any. Also the project did not have the mandate to change the context of the 
rules. Accordingly the risk analyses confirmed the necessity of existing rules.  
 
In the database of the case the rules became linked to risk analyses that showed their 
necessity and function as barriers against accidents. In this way the risk analyses became 
the most important documentation of the necessity of the rules, in a way they represented 
the legitimacy of the rules. The case also supplemented the database with texts that 
explained why changes were made in rules. 
 
As the rules of this case considered safety relevant, the risk analyses did not serve any 
important function in the choice of verbs. As revealed, with few exceptions the verbs 
shall and must was used.  
 
Like the Traffic rule case and independent on the timing of the risk analyses compared to 
the rule development the Maintenance-rule cases used the risk analyses to support their 
judgments of the rules’ necessity. In the databases the written documents of the risk 
analyses were associated with the rules, systematically stored and represented the main 
legitimacy of the rules.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, some interviewees reported instances where the risk 
analyses did not confirm the necessity of the existing rules and that the cases were 
cautious to change or remove rules. They were afraid that changes could have 
consequences that they were not able to see. As the leader of the Maintenance-rule 
project expressed it: “…one (the railway system, my comment) often introduces 
something new but never gets rid of something old. When one makes something new one 
brings with the bag containing all of the old. And then the bag becomes more and more 
heavy”  
 
To distinguish the use of verbs in the rule texts, the Maintenance-rule cases also used the 
risk analyses as a reference for the safety relevance of their rules. However, again the 
decisions were dominated by the railway knowledge. The reason was that this knowledge 
included a more extensive understanding of the interactions of the railway system, the 
participants of the work reported that it was sometimes difficult to exclude anything as 
not being safety relevant. The main reason was that many of the activities and much of 
the technology interacted and influenced each other. As one interviewee said: “…it is 
very difficult when one has to express it:  What is safety? What is meant? How far and 
deep to go? Yes, it is very simple to say safety, but it is a difficult area.”  
 
 192
These examples reveal that the risk analyses functioned as a tool to legitimize existing 
rules but not to reduce the regulatory burden upon the rule followers.  
 
7.3.2 Persistent railway knowledge out of concerns for complexity  
 
The results reveal that the confidence in the included railway knowledge in the work of 
the cases was strong and served as a fundament for the work. When conflicts between 
risk analyses and railway knowledge occurred, the cases refused to make the risk 
analyses overrule this knowledge. Below, the importance of railway knowledge, risk 
analytic knowledge and the chosen risk analytic methods will be discussed. 
 
7.3.2.1 The important railway knowledge 
 
The strong railway knowledge of the cases implies that the risk analytic work had good 
access to one of the two important competencies for the quality of analyses discussed by 
Rausand & Øien (2004) and SAMRAIL (European Commission, 2004c). Accordingly, 
theory supports the concern of the cases for this competency.  
 
However, the main concern for the railway knowledge of the cases was not associated 
with the quality of the analyses but with the ability to judge the complex interactions of 
the regulated areas both as a reference for the risk analyses and as a foundation for the 
work. Anyhow, the strategy to evaluate risk analyses and review risk analyses when they 
provided surprising results, ensured that important railway knowledge became included 
in the analyses. The Traffic-rule case and the risk analytic group of the Signal case that 
had most confidence in the risk analysis results also had strong confidence in the included 
railway knowledge. 
 
A problem occurred if the participants of the work did not manage to retrieve knowledge 
of the context and the intended function of existing rules that the risk analyses 
contradicted. Because the confidence in the competency of predecessors was generally 
higher than the confidence in the risk analysis results, the risk analyses were usually met 
with a cautious strategy where the rules remained unchanged. As already discussed in 
Chapter 6, this might be a dangerous strategy if the conditions have changed to an extent 
where the rules and the knowledge of the former rule-developers have become outdated 
(Rasmussen, 1997).  
 
One of the intentions of the rule modifications was to make the rule sets of the cases 
simpler and more user-friendly. Also, the Maintenance rule case with the emphasis upon 
cost-efficiency wanted to make sure that rules imposed were really necessary. However, 
the cautious pattern that was demonstrated in the cases made it difficult to reduce the 
regulatory burden. As rules can be seen as one form of barriers against accident this 
directs the attention towards the use of barriers or defenses against accidents. Reason 
(1997) discusses the use of successive layers of protection, one behind the other, each 
guarding against the possible breakdown of the one in front. This approach is often called 
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“defenses-in-depth”. He highly recognizes the advantages of this approach but he also 
comes up with a warning that defenses-in-depth are a mixed blessing. He argues that one 
of the more unfortunate consequences is that they make systems more complex, and 
hence more opaque, to the people who manage and operate them. Accordingly, the 
cautious approach might be a two edged sword; it gives the system many layers of 
protection but this might imply that the system also becomes more opaque and hence 
more difficult for the actors to understand and operate safely. This might make it more 
difficult for the different actors to foresee consequences of their decisions and actions. 
 
7.3.2.2 The important risk analytic competency  
 
The participants reported that at the beginning of the work they were concerned about 
their limited knowledge of risk analytic methods and their application. However, 
confidence increased as those performing the analyses became more experienced with the 
method and their application for the regulated areas. Risk analytic competency is the 
second condition that both Rausand & Øien (2004) and SAMRAIL (European 
Commission, 2004c) discuss as important for good quality analyses. Accordingly they 
give support to these concerns of the cases too. Furthermore, Aven (2003) argues that the 
weight that the decision-maker will put on the results of the analyses will depend on the 
confidence he has in the analysts.  
 
In the initial phase of the analytic work all of the cases were organized so that they could 
receive feedback upon their first attempts with risk analyses. This is an important 
condition for learning and improvement (Argyris & Schön, 1996). However, as 
Subsection 7.2.1 demonstrated, in their following work their organizing for feedback 
differed.  
 
The Traffic-rule case and the risk analytic group of the Signal case that had most 
confidence in the risk analysis results also possessed the strongest risk analytic 
competency. These were also the cases that had the best conditions for close interaction 
between the experts of risk analyses and the experts of the actual railway field during the 
analytic work, i.e. for feedback and learning.   
 
The risk analytic competency was also reported as an important explanation when the 
cases suspected that the scope for the analyses had constrained inclusion of important 
railway knowledge in the analyses and hence reduced their quality. One important 
element here was the ability to understand consequences of the choice of scope. The 
hindsight realization that other scope than those applied would have given other 
conclusions for the analyses reduced the confidence in their results.  
 
This also reveals that here there are opportunities for manipulation of risk analysis results. 
Baumard (1999) argues that as knowledge increases, actors can increase their ability to 
outsmart rules to serve their own interests, in other words, they can manipulate the scope 
of the analyses to direct attention towards what suits them the most. However, I did not 
receive any evidence that this happened in the cases. My impression from the study was 
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that those involved in the risk analyses were very concerned about their ability to cover 
the important factors that influenced the development of unwanted events or accidents. 
This implies that if such mechanisms were operating, they operated out of concerns for 
safety.  
 
7.3.2.3 The important choice of risk analytic method 
 
The results reveal that the suitability of the chosen risk analytic methods was experienced 
differently among the cases. The representatives of those two cases who were most 
involved in the choice and development of the methods also expressed most satisfaction 
with these.  
 
One explanation might be that the involvement ensured that the chosen methods were 
appropriate for the regulated area. This is in line with the emphasis that Aven (2003) 
gives to this factor. He argues that the weight that the decision-maker will put on the 
results of the analyses will depend on the confidence he has in the analyses. 
 
A possible additional explanation might be that participation created a stronger ownership 
to the method. As Rausand & Øien (2004) argue, ownership to the analyses at different 
levels of the system can influence their quality. It might be that the users involvement in 
these two cases made them feel more familiar with the methods and that this might have 
caused a more positive attitude, i.e. the involvement strengthened the familiarity and 
ownership to the solution.  
 
This might also have been strengthened by the close interaction these cases had with the 
external risk analytic experts through their participation in the decisions and the 
experimentation with the methods. Hence, they received feedback upon their work and 
could cooperate with the experts in the adaptation of the abstract risk analytic methods to 
the actual context. This might have been a source for learning that improved the 
adaptation of the methods to the respective fields (Argyris & Schön, 1996).  
 
The function of the method in the selection of railway knowledge and its translation into 
written texts and in the legitimizing of the rules will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
7.3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Together, the cases revealed that the initial stage for the risk-based rule modifications 
was highly critical for the confidence in the risk analyses. Firstly, it was at this stage the 
participants in the work were chosen and the organizing of the work was settled. These 
conditions influenced what railway knowledge was included in the work. Secondly, it 
was at this stage the risk analytic methods were chosen and adapted to the regulated areas. 
Thirdly, it was also at this stage that those participating in the work built their risk 
analytic competency and got feedback upon their initial work. Finally, it was at this stage 
the scope of the risk analyses was settled.  
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Furthermore, these results pointed at an underlying concern that influenced confidence in 
the risk analyses. This was the ability of the analyses to take the complex interaction of 
the different activities in the regulated areas into consideration.   
 
7.4 Modification work with a wide inclusive perspective of risk 
 
The third problem of this chapter is what risk perspective to apply to the modification 
work. In the following it will be elaborated that the wide inclusive perceptions of risk of 
railway knowledge dominated the work and the concept of “safety” was commonly 
applied.  
 
7.4.1 Focus upon safety and an inclusive perception of risk  
 
The perspective of risk was both evident in the attitudes of the interviewees and in the 
work itself. 
 
7.4.1.1 Risk perspective of the interviewees 
 
The interviewees were asked how they defined risk. All gave an answer in accordance 
with the risk analytic conception of the term, i.e. the product of probability of occurrence 
and the consequence. However, some interviewees expressed this in a way that made me 
follow-up the question. This revealed that many felt that this was a simplification of their 
understanding of risk. They found this definition to be difficult for the inclusion of the 
complex interactions that might be behind an unwanted event or an accident, an aspect 
that they found important. In particular they were concerned about the interactions within 
the technical system and the needs to coordinate the many actors involved in the activities.  
 
Also the interviewees demonstrated a common pattern where they favored to use the term 
“safety” instead of the term “risk”.  One interviewee described the relationship between 
safety and risk like this: “Safety is to have control upon risk”. Other descriptions were 
“avoid damage on humans, environment and materiel” and “to ensure that activities are 
performed without unwanted events or accidents”.  However, the risk analytic expert who 
was included in both cases experienced the use of the term “safety” was difficult because 
it contained both descriptive and normative elements and was difficult to formalize and 
operationalize.   
 
The Safety director of the Rail Administration also directed the attention towards 
different conceptions of the term “traffic safety”. He found that the Inspectorate applied it 
in a very inclusive way, while many actors in the Rail Administration associated it with 
the traffic rules. Therefore, the concept was difficult for the organization to handle.  
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The wide conception of risk was also evident when the interviewees discussed the 
modification work. This was especially evident in their discussions of the risk analyses. 
As already touched upon, they often reported that the analyses did not go deep enough 
into the underlying causes and the interactions of the railway system that could lead to 
accidents. One interviewee from the Maintenance rule case provided an illustrative 
example that is representative for revealed attitudes of both the Traffic-rule case and the 
Maintenance-rule cases:  
 
“…at least it is difficult for us when we are trying to make it concrete (the 
probabilities and the consequences, my comment). And another thing that I would 
like to mention while I am discussing this, is these barriers. Many of the things we 
have that serve as safety systems are parts of many things or many links. I can 
provide one example, the issue of ATC  that are supposed to stop a train if 
anything goes wrong. ATC is one part of this and the engine driver another and 
then another important issue is whether the safety installation functions and that 
there might be something wrong here. But then there is also another issue called 
emergency disconnection. This is that you in emergency can disconnect the 
contact conductor on the lines where trains are run by electricity and then all the 
trains have to stop…. And then the question becomes: How much safety will you 
attribute to that emergency disconnection? Is this just as safety critical as the 
safety installation as such?  
 
Also, as touched upon, the wide conception of risk was evident in the Maintenance rule 
cases when they discussed the work of classifying the rules into safety relevant and not 
safety relevant. As one interviewee said: 
 
”…the fact that we are marking something as safety related and something as not 
safety related is also difficult. Because there is almost no function in a railway 
system that you cannot figure out that for one or another reason will give you an 
accident if it fails. So complex is the system.” 
 
7.4.1.2 Risk perspective of the work 
 
The results presented in this chapter and the previous one, have already revealed that 
railway knowledge of those who became involved dominated the work. The cases chose 
approaches to their tasks where the work could build upon this knowledge.  
 
The results have also revealed that one reason for the strong position of the railway 
knowledge was that this knowledge has an inclusive perception of risk. This was 
particularly evident in the processes of reverse invention where the rationalistic ideals of 
the hierarchical and risk-based approaches were abandoned and in the risk informed 
content given to the requirement of applying risk analyses in the modification work.  
 
The strong position of the inclusive risk perspective was also demonstrated when the 
scope for the risk analyses were decided and later judged. In the case with wide scope 
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their inclusive nature was one of the explanations for the positive attitude towards the 
analyses of this case. In two out of three Maintenance-rule cases, one reason for the 
cautious attitude towards the risk analyses was seen to be narrow scope. 
 
When the results of the risk analyses contradicted railway knowledge, most commonly 
the risk analyses were suspected to have excluded important information; information 
that the extensive railway knowledge of the participants were able to recognize.  
 
In the presentation of the results associated with the judgment of rules’ necessity it 
appeared that the cases were cautious to remove rules on the basis of risk analyses. The 
main reason was the confidence that the rule-developers had in the included railway 
knowledge and the extensive railway knowledge of their predecessors that made them 
able to see complex interactions in the railway system. However, the decisions of rules’ 
safety relevance were also complicated because of the wide inclusive risk perspective. 
The understanding of how different activities and technology influenced each other made 
it difficult to consider anything as not safety relevant. 
 
7.4.2 The wide inclusive risk perspective  
 
The results presented above imply that both the wide conceptions of risk that were 
associated with railway knowledge and the more narrow risk analytic definitions were 
operative during the modification work. When conflicts between these two perspectives 
occurred, the wide conception of risk or the even more inclusive concept of safety served 
as reference for evaluations of conclusions and solutions. Hence, the modification work 
was brought in accordance with this wide risk perspective. Accordingly, this perspective 
dominated the modification processes.  
 
In relation to the dominant role of the risk perspective associated with railway knowledge, 
I think it is important to be aware of other mechanisms that might come into play in such 
situations, for instance the role of power, private privileges and profits that make systems 
resistant to change and heuristics (See for instance Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996; March, 
1994; Perrow, 1999). These are not elaborated in this study. 
 
However, the fact that the interviewees preferred to present the risk analytic definition of 
risk first gives an impression that the risk analytic definition had higher status and was 
more legitimate than the other. This is also the dominating definition of both the 
Inspectorate and the Rail Administration. The Inspectorate requires that the actors of the 
railway system apply risk analyses and accept criteria, a requirement derived from the 
analytic management strategies that apply the risk analytic definition 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 2001a). The Rail Administration directly applies this 
definition of risk in the Safety-handbook that is a part of their management system.  
 
The results have demonstrated that the risk perspectives became important when the 
cases settled their scope and preconditions. It is interesting that the cases give 
contradicting inputs regarding the satisfaction with wide or narrow scope. Both the 
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Traffic-rule case with the wide scope and the Signal case with more narrow scope 
expressed satisfaction with this. Again one explanation might be that these cases were the 
ones that had been most involved in the choice of methods and that this might have made 
the actors more familiar with them. Furthermore, they had tried out the methods for their 
fields and seen consequences of different scope. Another explanation might be that the 
regulated areas held different features. The maintenance activities of the Signal case do 
not involve as complicated interactions between different actors as the Traffic-rule case. 
This might make the Signal case less dependent on inclusive scope. As already discussed, 
these groups were also seen to hold both the strongest railway knowledge and risk 
analytic competency, that are both considered important for the quality of risk analyses 
(Rausand & Øien, 2004; European Commission, 2004c). 
 
The perspectives upon risk will be further discussed in Chapter 8 when perspectives of 
rationality and knowledge are discussed.  
 
7.4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The participants of the work were well aware of the risk analytic concept of risk and this 
seemed to have the most legitimate status in the system.  
 
However, in words and in practice, the cases reveal a much wider perspective upon the 
concept of risk. Their perspective also included the concept of safety. This wide 
perspective dominated the work. This implies that more of the existing railway 
knowledge about the interactions between activities and technology within the regulated 
areas was included in the work.  
 
7.5 Conclusions to the risk based approach 
 
7.5.1 Main conclusion 
 
The four studied modification processes abandoned the ideals of the risk-based 
approaches in two interrelated ways. First, none of the cases used the risk analyses as the 
main foundation for the rule development. The main reason was that the risk analyses did 
not take existing railway knowledge that was believed to be important for safe 
performance sufficiently into account. Second, only one case finished the analyses before 
the rule development started, two cases developed the risk analyses and the rules in 
parallel as iterative processes and one performed the analyses after the rule writing. The 
main reasons for the differences were the timing of the decision to apply risk analyses, 
time pressure and experience that the risk analytic work stimulated questions to the rules 
and vice versa.  
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Instead, the modification work of all cases turned into processes of reverse invention 
where existing railway knowledge and prescriptive rules were used as the main 
fundament for the work. Accordingly, existing knowledge was brought forth.  
 
However, all four cases performed risk analyses and used these as a supplement in their 
work. The chosen analytic tools built upon the same principles that are commonly used in 
other European railways (European Commission 2004c). The framework of the applied 
tools initiated inquires into railway knowledge and articulation, combination, selection, 
systematizing and documentation of this knowledge.  
 
The evolving risk analyses were evaluated with railway knowledge as reference and 
brought in accordance with this knowledge. Existing railway knowledge became more 
persistent than expected. There were three interacting reasons for this. First, the risk 
analyses were not found to be as capable as the railway knowledge at including the 
underlying causes of potential accidents. This was particularly evident in two out of three 
cases that chose narrow scope for the analyses. However, the work of the case that chose 
wide scope became very extensive. Second, the participants of the work trusted the 
competency of the former rule-developers and the quality of railway knowledge more 
than their own risk analytic knowledge. Third, the cases differed in their experience of 
suitability of the chosen methods for their regulated areas.  
 
Railway knowledge that had support from the risk analyses achieved increased trust 
because support from the analyses was seen as validation. 
 
The four cases combined the risk analyses and the rule development in four different 
ways. Their methods for the combination reflected the timing of the decisions to apply 
risk analyses and the time pressure. They also differed in the degree of interaction 
between risk analyses and rule development. The interaction between the two tasks 
depended upon the organization of the work. One case has provided a written description 
of its method, see Appendix F.  
 
The four different methods gave the risk analyses different functions in the modification 
work; they provided knowledge and information, ensured quality of evolving rules and 
validated existing or modified rules. Accordingly, one can say that the modification 
processes became risk informed, but that the function of the risk information varied.   
 
7.5.2 The theoretical problems 
 
The conclusions of the revealed problems are as follows: 
 
1. How to combine expert-dominated risk analyses with rule development in an 
evolutionary practice-oriented modification tradition?  
 
The strategy for introducing the risk-based approach had characteristics of reverse 
invention with railway knowledge as the main elements. The risk-based approach was 
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given content similar to the use of the concept “risk informed” in the studied modification 
processes (Chapman & Demitrijev, 1999). However, the cases applied the risk analyses 
very differently in their work. This contributed to the use of railway knowledge as the 
main fundament for the work. Furthermore, this gave the risk analyses very different 
functions in the modification processes. These were dependent on the timing of the 
decision to use risk analyses in the work, time pressure and the organizing and the 
interaction of the work.  
 
The risk analysis results were compared to general railway knowledge and the 
conclusions were brought in accordance with each other. This increased the confidence in 
both risk analyses and railway knowledge.  
 
The applied risk analytic methods built upon the same principles that are commonly used 
in other European railways (European Commission 2004c). One case provided one 
systematized and documented method for the combination of risk analyses and rule 
development (See Appendix F). 
 
The introduction of the risk-based approach stimulated inquiries into railway knowledge 
and discussions that made this knowledge become articulated, combined, selected, 
systematized and documented. 
 
 
2. What if the risk analyses do not fit the risk perception of those involved in the 
modification work 
 
When the risk analyses did not fit the risk perception of those involved in the 
modification work, the reason was inquired into. Most commonly the reasons were 
attributed to the ability of the analyses to take the complex interaction of the different 
activities in the regulated areas into consideration. Therefore, the analyses were brought 
into accordance with railway knowledge that included these aspects. The results revealed 
that the initial stage for the risk-based rule modifications were important for the 
confidence in the risk analysis results.  
 
 
3. What risk perspective to apply; a wide inclusive definition or the narrow risk analytic? 
 
Those who participated in the work of the cases were well aware of the risk analytic 
concept of risk and this seemed to have the most legitimate status in the system. However, 
in practice, they revealed a wider perspective upon the term and they preferably applied 
the term “safety”.   
 
7.5.3 Needs for further research 
 
The results of the risk-based approach raise some questions for further research. 
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First, the findings of the process reverse invention also contradict the rationalistic ideals 
of the risk-based approach.  Like for the hierarchical approach, the emphasis upon the use 
of risk analyses in theory and practice makes it interesting to study if this process is 
applied in other contexts where risk analyses are introduced as a tool in rule development. 
For the same reason it is interesting to study if there exist alternative processes and to 
elaborate strengths and weaknesses of the process. 
 
Second, to improve knowledge about risk-informed safety rule modifications, the 
contribution and efficiency of the different applications and functions of the risk analyses 
for the quality of the rules should be explored and evaluated. Furthermore, to explore the 
usability of the different methods for application of risk analyses for other contexts, a 
follow-up study should be performed to reveal how the experiences with the methods are 
incorporated in later modification processes.  
 
Third, the main factors that influenced confidence in the risk analyses were supported by 
theory. As the introduction phase of the studied modification processes appeared to be 
very important for these factors, it is of interest to study how risk analyses are introduced 
in other modification processes.   
 
Fourth, due to the dynamic contexts of the regulated areas, the use of experience data and 
top events in the analyses were an issue of concern. As one of the reasons for introducing 
risk analyses in the modification processes was that existing rules were too experience-
based, it is interesting to follow-up how the analytic results fit in with future statistical 
material.  
  
Fifth, this study has not elaborated on many of the possible explanations for the strong 
position of railway knowledge and the associated risk perspective. For instance, it would 
be interesting to study the role of power, private privileges and profits that make systems 
resistant to change and heuristics would contribute with new understanding (See for 
instance Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996; March, 1994; Perrow, 1999). 
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8 Rule revision as revival of knowledge: Is revived knowledge 
saved? 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is directed at the last of the three sub questions of the study: 
 
How did new requirements influence railway knowledge?    
 
The research question of this chapter and the theoretical framework presented in Section 
3.1 demonstrated an expectation that the introduction of hierarchical and risk-based 
approaches would influence railway knowledge. This chapter will explore this hypothesis.  
 
The theory presented in Section 3.5 revealed three problems of special interest. The 
following sections present results and discussions of these. As this chapter builds upon 
the results presented in the three previous chapters, many of the empirical findings for the 
discussions are already presented and a few discussions have been started. These findings 
and discussions will be summarized and elaborated in this chapter.  
 
The structure of the presentation of results and discussions is shown in Table 8.1 
presented in this and the next page. Again the final section of the chapter presents the 
conclusions to the research question.  
 
 
Table 8.1 Structure for presentation of problems with results and discussions:  
 
Problem with answer Result Discussion 
Section 8.2, answers to the question of 
Problem 1: 
 
What knowledge base to apply as 
decision support?  
 
Railway knowledge served as 
knowledge base 
8.2.1 The combination of 
perspectives upon rationality 
and knowledge  
8.2.2 The strong position of 
railway knowledge 
 
8.2.3 Concluding remarks 
Section 8.3, answers to the question of 
Problem 2: 
 
Did increased emphasis upon the 
rationalistic knowledge perspective 
change the predominantly intuitively-
contextual railway knowledge? 
 
Railway knowledge was revived and 
changed  
8.3.1 Changes in railway 
knowledge  
8.3.2 The revival and 
change of railway 
knowledge   
 
8.3.3 Concluding remarks 
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Problem with answer Result Discussion 
Section 8.4, answers to the question of 
Problem 3: 
 
How did railway knowledge become 
stored in organizational memory?  
 
Revived but saved? Knowledge 
encoded into written form was 
systematically stored other knowledge 
was not. 
8.4.1 Written texts  
systematically stored, weak 
or no systems for the rest. 
 
8.4.2 Written texts 
systematically stored – what 
about the rest? 
 
8.4.3 Concluding remarks  
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Norwegian railway system has been dominated by rule- 
and identity based rationality with the related intuitively-contextual perspective upon 
knowledge. However, there have also been elements of technical rationality with the 
more rationalistic perspectives upon rationality and knowledge. As revealed in Chapter 5, 
the cases built upon this tradition. Chapter 3 also demonstrated that knowledge could be 
transformed and developed, kept alive or lost. 
 
8.2 Railway knowledge served as knowledge base 
 
The first problem concerns which knowledge to apply as decision support in the 
modification processes. Below it will be elaborated that the cases preferred to combine 
the new rationalistic hierarchical and risk-based approaches with the existing 
modification tradition. However, the modification work still became dominated by rule- 
and identity based rationality and predominantly intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge.  
 
8.2.1 The combination of perspectives upon rationality and knowledge  
 
The strong position of rule- and identity based rationality and intuitively-contextual 
railway knowledge and the preference for combining these perspectives was particularly 
evident when the new approaches were introduced and in the choice of solutions for their 
implementation. In the following these issues will be elaborated. 
 
8.2.1.1 Introducing the new approaches 
 
All cases included people in the modification processes who had previous experience 
with modifications of the actual rules. The strategy to involve operative railway personnel 
both directly and indirectly through the network of the participants, made all cases 
include both intuitively-contextual and rationalistic knowledge in the work. This made it 
possible to take advantage of the rich cognitive maps of the practical field. However, due 
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to recruitment patterns and the educational traditions, the area of regulation of the 
Traffic-rule case was more influenced by rule- and identity based rationality and 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge than those of the Maintenance-rule cases. For 
the same reasons, the areas of regulation of the Maintenance-rule cases were more 
influenced by technical rationality and rationalistic knowledge than those of the Traffic-
rule case. These patterns were reflected in the personnel involved in the modification 
work too. In accordance with the tradition of the Norwegian railway system, trade unions 
were not included in the work in a formal way. The users of rail services were also not 
included. 
 
The Norwegian railway system was already familiar with the hierarchical approach, in 
particular from the introduction of internal control and no educational steps were taken 
for its implementation. 
 
The situation of the risk-based approach was different. As the risk analytical competency 
was limited from the beginning of all cases, the leadership of the projects found 
educational steps to be necessary. The chosen strategy of the cases was to supplement the 
railway knowledge with risk analytic knowledge. The cases did this in different ways.  
 
In the Traffic-rule case the competency was developed gradually and related to the actual 
context. This was done by courses, by engaging representatives with different 
methodological approaches and by experimenting with their application at the area of 
regulation. Later also a risk analytical expert was involved in the work group. The 
members of this group worked closely together and took advantage of each other’s 
knowledge.  
 
For the Maintenance-rule cases the competency was developed in an intensive course led 
by external experts. The course included practical training where the participants 
experimented with the application of the methods at the regulated areas and adapted them 
to this context. The railway knowledge of the participants also played an important role. 
The leader of the Overarching Maintenance project found that the courses became a 
meeting place between two types of competencies and where both learned. 
 
In the work to find methods for the inclusion of the new approaches in the modification 
processes, the cases inquired into and discussed railway knowledge, experience from 
former rule modification processes and the new approaches. Alternative methodological 
solutions were explored and evaluated by the members of the work groups but also in 
dialogue with their network and resource groups. Railway knowledge served as a 
reference in the evaluations. Such processes were particularly evident in the Traffic-rule 
case. For the Maintenance-rule cases the management system of the Rail Administration 
and the Overarching Maintenance project provided some preset conditions. However, 
also the Maintenance-rule cases had to find their ways to solve the challenges. In 
hindsight, the leader of the Maintenance-rule project reflected upon these processes and 
said: “Many people think it should have been clearer from the beginning. Instead it 
evolved little by little.”  
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The inquiries, experiments and discussions associated with the introduction of the new 
approaches made railway knowledge in focus more articulated and shared. Furthermore 
knowledge from different sources became combined.  
 
8.2.1.2 Solutions for the new approaches  
 
When it came to solutions for hierarchical and risk-based approaches there were 
differences between the cases.  
 
The solutions for the hierarchical approach 
 
Regarding the hierarchical approach, the cases favored finding solutions that combined 
perspectives of the existing rule tradition with perspectives of this approach. This made 
the cases leave the proposals derived from this approach.  
 
First, this favor of combinations was demonstrated in the attempts to develop higher 
order rules by the inductive bottom-up strategy for developing outcome-oriented rules. 
This strategy caused that the work of developing rules built upon existing prescriptive 
rules and railway knowledge. Furthermore, the participants used railway knowledge as 
reference when judging the rule solutions.  
 
Second, the favor of combination was demonstrated in the choice of rule solutions. The 
Maintenance-rule cases had the opportunity to combine outcome-oriented triggering 
requirements with prescriptive rules and did so. Furthermore, in the discussions of the 
necessity of the prescriptive rules, both railway knowledge and available risk analyses 
was taken into consideration. The Traffic-rule case abandoned the plan for goal-oriented 
rules and stayed with the prescriptive rule solution. However, the case also wanted to 
supplement these rules with goal-oriented formulations for educational purposes of the 
rule-followers. Therefore many of the representatives of this case regretted that this plan 
was left. In all cases railway knowledge played the major role in the argumentation for 
the solutions. Also available risk analysis results contributed. 
  
With respect to changes in the rules, the inductive bottom-up approach to rule 
development and the persistence of prescriptive rules that all cases revealed, 
demonstrated that they were cautious to change the rules. The argumentation for the 
solutions also demonstrated a strong trust in predominantly intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge and rule- and identity based rationality. In spite of the persistence of 
prescriptive rules, all cases found the increased attention to outcomes of the suggested 
rule solutions to be useful for the safety work.  This was attributed to their explanatory 
power for educational and motivational purposes and their function as reference for 
control.  
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The solutions for the risk-based approach 
 
Regarding the risk-based approach; the case also favored finding solutions where 
perspectives of this approach were combined with perspectives of the existing rule 
tradition. All cases chose solutions where risk analyses were incorporated in the existing 
rule tradition. In their solutions, none of the cases followed the ideals of a risk-based 
approach where the risk analyses served as an important fundament for the rule 
development. Instead, the bottom-up strategy reveals that the work was based on railway 
knowledge and in particular knowledge associated with existing rules. The project leader 
of the Overarching Maintenance project explained that the goal had been to achieve more 
rational decision processes with increased use of risk analytic tools. However, he also 
explained that the cases did not apply what he called a logical structural approach. Instead 
existing competency and experience were applied to point out areas where control was 
considered to be important.  
 
The cases chose different solutions for the interaction between the tasks of risk analyses 
and rule development. The different interactions between risk analyses and rule 
development gave the analyses different functions in the modification work.  
 
Core participants from all cases expressed their preference to perform their task of rule 
development in interaction with the risk analytic task. Also, all interviewees of the two 
cases that were described as iterative, e.g. the Traffic-rule case and the Power-supply case, 
found the iterative decision-making processes very useful. The main reason given by the 
interviewees was that overlapping and intertwining of activities gave flexibility and 
possibilities to take advantage of lessons learned during the work. This made it possible 
to incorporate new information and knowledge that evolved from the inquiries and 
experiences of both the rule development and from the risk analyses. This developed and 
refined their methods for the accomplishment of rule modification with the new 
approaches. The Traffic-rule case made an explicit description of their developed 
method39 (See Appendix F). Furthermore, the representatives of the Signal case and the 
Power-supply case where the organization of the work had made extensive interaction 
between the actors difficult, explicitly regretted the lack of continuity in their work.  
 
In the risk analyses themselves, railway knowledge served as the main input. The risk 
analytic methods contributed with a framework for selecting, organizing and expressing 
this knowledge. The dominating perspective upon risk and safety also influenced which 
knowledge became included.  
 
The results of the previous chapters revealed that when conclusions of the new 
approaches came in conflict with railway knowledge, this initiated inquiries and 
consensus building processes. Confidence in the ability of different conclusions to 
contribute to safety played an important role for the strategy to solve the problem. The 
common reaction was to question the conclusions of the new approaches. For example, as 
a reaction to conclusions the work group of the Traffic-rule case did not trust, they had an 
                                                 
39 Logg 638-1A, Logg 689 
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internal expression saying: “It is legitimate to use the head too!”  The only exception 
where conclusions derived from railway knowledge were questioned was when there 
already existed doubts about this knowledge. Therefore the dominating pattern of the 
consensus building processes was to adapt the conclusions of the new approaches to 
railway knowledge.  
 
The preference for combined perspectives 
 
Taken together, the results above demonstrate that all cases preferred solutions for both 
the hierarchical and risk-based approaches that combined perspectives of rationality and 
knowledge from the existing rule tradition with the perspectives of the new approaches. 
In other words, they preferred to take advantage of different perspectives. The 
rationalistic rationality and knowledge perspectives inherent in the hierarchical and risk-
based approaches became adapted to the conditions of the context of the Norwegian 
railway system and the areas of regulation. In this way the solutions of the new 
approaches became more context specific. Contradictions that occurred can be seen as 
examples of confrontations between perspectives of rationalities and knowledge.  
 
There were no preset decision rules to solve confrontations between the existing and the 
new perspectives of rationality and knowledge. However, the responses revealed that the 
railway knowledge functioned as reference for what was considered to be good solutions.  
Accordingly, the predominantly intuitively-contextual knowledge of the railway experts 
had more trust than the rationalistic knowledge of the conclusions from the hierarchical 
and risk-based approaches. Furthermore, the railway knowledge played the major role in 
the modification work. This happened in spite of the many resources that were invested in 
the new approaches. The leader of the Maintenance-rule project explained this cautious 
pattern like this:  
 
“One brings with oneself a lot of tradition that is difficult to delete and that may 
be become very influential upon the new. I think it is difficult for many to 
disregard what one possesses and what one has done and to think new, - even if 
this might be the right thing to do.”  
 
Three interviewees were worried that so many of the participants represented the tradition 
of the former NSB. One of these was the eldest and most experienced interviewee from 
the Traffic-rule case. Another expressed a concern that it was the railway professionals 
recognized as the best who become included in the work and hence served as the 
reference for good solutions. Accordingly the rules might be adapted to their needs, not to 
the needs of the average or weak rule-followers. One interviewee had also experienced 
that he had more influence in the organization when he was posited in the capital city 
compared to when he was posited in a regional office with the same type of job. 
 
Both when the conclusions of the new approaches gave support to, and when they 
contradicted, the railway knowledge, the processes resulted in strengthened trust in this 
knowledge. In the first instance the trust was strengthened because the railway knowledge 
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became validated, in the second the trust was strengthened because the knowledge 
survived an attack. This was particularly evident regarding the rule specific knowledge of 
the prescriptive rules.  
 
The inquiries, experiments and discussions associated with the solutions of the new 
approaches also made included railway knowledge more articulated and shared. Again 
knowledge from different sources became combined.  
 
8.2.2 The strong position of railway knowledge  
 
In the following, these findings will be discussed. The initial discussions will focus upon 
the strong position of predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge when the 
new and predominantly rationalistic approaches was explored and applied. In the 
following, it will also be discussed that the rather ambitious intentions of introducing 
hierarchical and risk-based approaches did not have the expected impact upon the 
modification processes and their results. As will be elaborated, this can either be 
understood as attempts to counteract the intentions or as attempts to find good solutions 
for the new requirements.  
 
8.2.2.1 Exploring the new approaches with railway knowledge as fundament 
 
The incitements to the hierarchical approach were not followed by educational steps. 
However, the history of the Norwegian railway system presented in Chapter 2 revealed 
that earlier attempts to implement the internal control principle had not been without 
problems. In spite of this, all cases experimented with the hierarchical rule solutions. The 
way this was done resembled the descriptions of Reflection-in-Action provided by Schön 
(1991). With reference to this theory, the introduction of the new approaches represented 
a new problem setting that was inquired into. The evolving hypotheses of how this could 
be done were tested with experimental actions where railway knowledge served as 
reference.  
 
The core elements in the strategies to supplement the railway knowledge with risk 
analytic competency were in accordance with the dominating educational traditions of the 
main participants in the work. The strategy of the Traffic-rule case that tried different 
solutions in practice was in accordance with rule- and identity based rationality and the 
intuitively-contextual knowledge perspective. This strategy also gives associations to the 
descriptions of Reflection-in-Action of Schön (1991). The introduction course of the 
Maintenance-rule case was more in the tradition of the rationalistic rationality and 
knowledge perspectives where academic experts teach those holding practical knowledge 
that, according to Schön (1991), holds lower status. However, in the experimentation 
with the chosen risk analytic method on the actual subsystems, the railway knowledge 
became included. Accordingly, the processes also had parallels to Reflection-in-Action 
here. This reveals that the introduction of the risk based approach mobilized both 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge and rationalistic risk analytic knowledge. 
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However, the general strategy of all cases adding risk analytic competency to the railway 
knowledge and not the opposite, is the common approach discussed by Perrow (1999). 
Building upon his discussion, this strategy reveals an attitude that it is the predominantly 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge that is weak and needs to be developed, not the 
risk analytic competency. The incitements with the ideals of the hierarchical approach in 
the tradition dominated by prescriptive rules for the low level rule-followers reflected 
much of the same attitude; it is the railway knowledge that needs to be developed in an 
abstract and theoretical direction. On the other hand, the results also indicate that the 
educational steps functioned as an arena where perspectives upon rationality and 
knowledge both met and were developed.  
 
8.2.2.2 The role and function of the new rationalistic approaches in the modifications 
 
The role and the function of the new rationalistic approaches were influenced by the way 
they were implemented in the existing modification tradition. 
 
Implementation of the hierarchical approach 
 
The attempts to apply the hierarchical approach in the modification processes 
demonstrated both intentions to enrich the existing rule tradition with solutions of this 
new approach and the strong position of the old railway tradition. This was particularly 
evident in the choice of the inductive bottom-up strategy to rule development. As 
discussed with reference to Lindblom (1959), a strict adherence to the deductive top-
down strategy would have forced the cases to abandon the inherent railway knowledge of 
the existing rules. Accordingly, the work would have had to be based upon knowledge 
from other sources. In accordance with the tradition of technical rationality as discussed 
by Schön (1991) the natural source would have been academic and rather context free 
rationalistic knowledge. Following up both the principles of internal control and the 
incitement of a risk-based approach, the risk analyses might have been an important 
contributor.  
 
On the contrary, the inductive bottom-up approach that the cases applied made the cases 
able to build upon existing knowledge of the prescriptive rules’ context and function and 
rule specific knowledge, i.e. predominantly intuitively-contextual knowledge. It also 
made it possible to integrate this knowledge into higher order rules. In other words, the 
existing knowledge became transformed into the outcome-oriented form, i.e. the 
experimentation with higher order rule solutions transferred the rule specific knowledge 
of former prescriptive rules into the more abstract academic forms of outcomes.  
 
The inductive bottom-up strategy of the cases showed that in the transition period when 
higher order rules were developed from lower level rules, the process activated both 
rationalistic and intuitively-contextual railway knowledge. Accordingly, this strategy 
made it possible to take advantage of different perspectives in the work.  
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Regarding the choice of rule solutions, the Maintenance-rule cases that could apply 
different solutions representing different perspectives built consensus for a combination 
of these. Also the Traffic-rule case was in favor of a combination of solutions that would 
have made it possible to include different perspectives upon rationality and knowledge. 
However, when divergences between the conclusions of suggested rule solution and 
railway knowledge became apparent, the case used railway knowledge to build consensus 
for a cautious pattern that favored the rule- and identity based rationality and 
predominantly intuitively-contextual knowledge. Furthermore, as this case had to leave 
their plan for a textbook, the inclusion of rationalistic perspectives in written texts 
associated with the rules was left. This did not happen without regrets from the main 
participants in the work. 
 
In these decision-processes the cases’ railway knowledge served as reference for good 
solutions. Accordingly, all cases applied a logic of appropriateness as described by March 
(1994). Here the reference for appropriateness was the predominantly intuitively-
contextual railway knowledge. Hence, the decision processes of rule solutions were 
dominated by rule- and identity based rationality. The trust in professional judgments of 
railway experts fit in with the descriptions Weber (2000) made of the bureaucratic 
tradition. What is different from this tradition is that the knowledge base of the experts is 
more intuitively-contextual than one could expect in such a tradition. 
 
Implementation of the risk based approach 
 
The dominance of rule- and identity based rationality and intuitively-contextual 
knowledge was also evident in the application of risk assessments. The different 
processes that the cases demonstrated for combining risk analyses and rule development 
showed that the processes did not apply the rationalistic form of rationality where all 
knowledge is collected before decisions are made. Even if not always possible, the central 
participants in the work preferred to solve their tasks in a form resembling Reflection-in-
Action as described by Schön (1991). Also here, the handling of the problem of 
divergences between conclusions of risk analyses and railway knowledge followed the 
logic of appropriateness. Again the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge was trusted to function as reference for appropriateness.  
 
When performing the risk analyses, the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge served as input. Like Kørte et al. (2002) discuss, the operational environments 
provided updated process knowledge and experience data that served as input to the 
analytic process. Which knowledge was included was influenced by the chosen risk 
analytic method and the participants’ perception of risk. As revealed in Chapter 7, the 
cases and in particular the Traffic-rule case applied a wide and more informal definition 
of risk than that of the risk analytic tradition. Accordingly, more of the railway 
knowledge became included in the work with the analyses. Again this knowledge was 
transferred into more rationalistic forms, this time in accordance with the structure and 
schema of the chosen risk analytic methods.  
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The combination of the perspectives 
 
The discussions above demonstrate that the rationalistic new approaches became adapted 
to the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge and not the opposite. In 
contrary to theory, this implies that it was the rationalistic approaches that were 
developed and the rule- and identity based rationality and the predominantly intuitively-
contextual knowledge that had the highest status (Perby, 1995; Schön, 1991).  
 
The decision strategy of the cases resembled that of “Mixed scanning” presented by 
Etzioni (1967).  Building upon his metaphor, predominantly intuitively-contextual 
railway knowledge represented a broad angled camera. This was used to scan the 
situation or in other words to get an overview of railway activities, related risks and 
experiences with existing means to prevent accidents, including safety rules. Then rule- 
and identity based rationality, applying the same knowledge, was used to zero in on those 
areas that required more in-depth examination. When available, the rationalistic risk 
analyses contributed to this work. Then risk analyses were applied for more detailed in-
depth examinations of revealed risks and means to control these before, during or after 
the rule development. 
 
8.2.2.3 Attempts of counteracting the new approaches?  
 
The fact that the hierarchical and risk based approaches did not have the expected impact 
upon the modification processes and their results raises the question whether there were 
mechanisms in the cases where the approaches were counteracted.  
 
Outsmarting of the new requirements? 
 
The theories of Baumard (1999) can provide one possible explanation for limited 
influence of the new approaches. The early experience with elements of the hierarchical 
approach and the development of risk analytic competency can be seen to parallel his 
description of lateral transfer of both tacit and explicit knowledge from the collective to 
the individuals participating in the work. In this process the actors might have 
appropriated and assimilated the knowledge of the two approaches. According to 
Baumard, this provides the participants of the cases with the ability to use this knowledge 
to outsmart rules for the work, argue against the new approaches and to adapt them to 
what they find appropriate or suited them the most. In the terminology of March (1994), 
one could say that the cases could bend the new approaches from the original intention.  
 
There were also differences between the cases in the influence of the new approaches. 
The internal control principle that can be associated with both the hierarchical and risk-
based approaches has been discussed in the Norwegian railway system for a long time 
(Gulowsen & Ryggvik, 2004; Justis- og politidepartementet, 2000b; Justis- og 
politidepartementet, 2001; Ryggvik, 2004). Baumard (1999) explains that when a rule is 
laid down without systematically provoking revolution, it is because there has already 
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been a tacit absorption of them before their institution is made explicit. The reason why 
the cases accepted being influenced by the hierarchical and risk-based approaches might 
therefore be that the system had already accepted them as useful. Another reason might 
be that parts of the organizational learning necessary to apply them, had happened before 
the cases started their work. Differences in the implementation might also be related to 
different forms of acceptance, different social practices and different ways to get around 
the practices. 
 
The results reveal no proof of mechanisms of outsmarting such as discussed by Baumard 
(1999). Furthermore, my impression is that the participants of the work were devoted to 
the issue of safety. This is based on the explanations that the cases gave for their solutions 
to the new approaches. As discussed, their argumentation for their limited trust in the 
conclusions of the hierarchical and risk-based approaches resembles that of LaPorte, & 
Consolini (1991) against experimenting when the consequences of the experiments might 
be dangerous situations. Their argumentation was anchored in their rich knowledge of the 
existing technical solutions and the functions of the Norwegian railway system.  
 
Also, if mechanisms of outsmarting were operating, the strong commitment to safety 
discussed above, does not make me suspect that the participants did this out of evil or 
private motives, but rather out of concerns for safety. 
 
Hypocrisy? 
 
The limited influence from the new approaches can also be explained by organizational 
hypocrisy such as described by Brunsson (1989). With reference to bureaucratic public 
organizations he associates this phenomenon with weak or nonexistent links between talk, 
decisions and actions. He argues that organizational hypocrisy might develop in 
organizations that have to deal with conflicting demands. A division between words and 
action in organizational hypocrisy might be very damaging for organizational learning 
(Argyris & Schön 1996).  
 
Put to the edge, the solutions that the cases found for the introduction of the new 
approaches and that gave them limited influence in the practical modification work, can 
be understood as organizational hypocrisy. They can be seen to represent a way to solve 
the conflicting demands to control risk and to apply the new approaches that were not 
considered capable of sufficient risk control. The solutions gave the illusion that the new 
rationalistic approaches were introduced while the work was dominated by intuitively- 
contextual knowledge of how risk had to be controlled. However, the chosen solutions for 
the approaches were thoroughly discussed before decisions were made, i.e. there were 
links between talk, decisions and actions. Therefore I find it difficult to accuse the cases 
for hypocrisy.  
 
What could be questioned is the fact that the ambitions of the new approaches were not 
followed with preparation of conditions that could have made their implementation 
compatible with safe performance. In the Traffic-rule case this problem was particularly 
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evident regarding suggested rule solutions compared to technology and the conditions of 
the implementation phase. In the Maintenance-rule cases this was evident regarding the 
decision to apply risk analyses compared to the limited resources to perform the risk 
analyses and the timing of decisions.  
 
This discussion also directs the attention towards the close relationship between rule 
modification and access to resources. Access to resources is closely related to power 
(Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). However, power is a huge 
theoretical field that is not within the scope of this study. 
  
8.2.2.4 Attempts to find good solutions? 
 
The conclusions above that there was no evidence of attempts to outsmart the new 
approaches and the refusal organizational hypocrisy implies that there must be alternative 
explanations for their limited influence.  
 
Confidence in railway knowledge revisited 
 
The most obvious explanation is already thoroughly discussed. This is that the 
participants of the work of the cases trusted the existing railway knowledge so much that 
they found it very unwise to abandon this knowledge base.  
 
This cautious approach of the cases made them look for solutions where it was possible to 
include the new approaches in the existing tradition. By doing so they demonstrated a 
willingness to enrich the existing tradition dominated by rule- and identity based 
rationality and intuitively-contextual knowledge with elements belonging to the 
rationalistic rationality and knowledge tradition.  
 
The solutions for the new approaches also provided examples of how this could be done. 
This is particularly evident in three findings. One is the inductive bottom-up approach to 
rule development that can be seen as a supplement to the rationalistic deductive top-down 
approach. Another is the iterative processes between risk analyses and rule development 
shown in the Traffic rule case and the Power supply case. As revealed the other two cases 
also preferred an iterative development. The third is the solution of the Maintenance rule 
cases that combined different types of rules; the triggering requirements that can be 
associated with rationalistic decision making and the prescriptive rules that can be 
associated with rule- and identity based decision making. Also, the Traffic rule case 
wanted a solution that included an increased emphasis upon the intended outcomes of the 
rules. The argumentation here was educational purposes. 
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A move towards discursive strategies? 
 
The current conditions of the Norwegian railway system contain elements of complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity. The theory discussed in Section 3.5, favored combined 
perspectives of rationality and knowledge when uncertainty and ambiguity exist (Jaeger 
et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Perrow, 1999; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). This gives 
support to the preference that the cases revealed for strategies that combine perspectives.  
 
Furthermore, under such conditions these theorists argue for discursive strategies (Jaeger 
et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Perrow, 1999; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Also, the 
introduction of hierarchical and risk-based approaches to the rule modification and 
solutions of the cases can be seen as a move towards more discursive strategies in the 
modification work. There are three major reasons for this.  
 
First, the introduction of new approaches created a new situation for rule modifications 
that functioned as an incitement for inquiries and discussions involving different actors. 
The cases also demonstrated that inclusion of different perspectives created a challenge 
of diverging conclusions that had to be solved.  
 
The cases did not have any preset procedures for the discussions and handling conflicts 
and diverging conclusions such as Hale & Swuste (1998) suggested. By drawing upon 
their network and available resource groups, the decision-makeres tried to involve actors 
that were considered to be capable of positive contributions to the purpose of safe 
solutions. Furthermore, they tried to build consensus around their decisions. Accordingly 
a good decision was the one found to be good for safety under the current conditions 
among those involved. Etzioni (1967) suggests that the measure of a good decision might 
be the decision-makers’ agreement about it.  
 
However, Etzioni (1997) also discuss that the measure of poor decisions is those that 
exclude actors capable of affecting the projected course of action. Some interviewees 
made reflections about how people were involved in the work. Because many of the 
involved actors had much of the same background, belonged to much of the same 
network and applied a consensus building strategy, there might be a danger of bias in the 
decisions. Hoffman & Maier (1961) have demonstrated that group discussions made the 
participants more satisfied with consensus decisions even though the discussions did not 
increase the probability for better conclusions. There might also be a risk that the 
motivation of participants to reach consensus extended the motivation for evaluating risk 
and benefit of alternative solutions (Janis, 1982a; Janis, 1982b). Therefore, there might be 
weaknesses in the decisions that the participants are not aware of. The cases also made 
steps to counteract this danger. The Traffic rule case involved new actors in their change 
analyses of the rules. The Maintenance rule cases had a hearing process for the rules in 
the regions. 
 
The second reason that can be associated with a move towards more discursive strategies, 
is that a hierarchical approach, with more use of outcome-oriented rules and the internal 
control principle, requires more engagement from the rule-followers’ side. The 
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Maintenance-rule cases that implemented an outcome-oriented rule solution were also 
prepared for more dialogue about the rules.  
 
However, the mentioned experiences from the oil industry indicate that the dominance of 
academic thinking in this development might be a problem for this democratic element 
(Hovden, 2002). This might make it difficult for the rule followers to influence the 
decision processes with their more rule- and identity based rationality and intuitively-
contextual knowledge in a democratic sense. Another problem is the distributed nature of 
the system, both geographically and organizationally. With reference to the Dutch 
railway system Hale et al. (2003) argue that the distributed nature of that system and the 
constant traveling of the majority of staff cause that there is no such thing as a cohesive 
work group. They find that the limitations imposed on communications between the main 
protagonists, make it difficult for any cohesive relationship to develop between them. The 
recent development where they are now working for different companies rather than the 
old monopoly strengthens the difficulties. This description has parallels to the regulated 
area of the Maintenance rule cases.  
 
As discussed, for the Traffic-rule case there were no concrete plans for direct dialogue 
between the main rule-followers and the Inspectorate.  
 
The third reason is that even tough risk analyses are originating in a tradition where 
rationalistic perspectives dominate, the work processes can be made more or less 
discursive. The results of the risk-based approach showed that the cases varied with 
respect to the involvement and interaction of actors. One important reason for this was 
the different organization of the cases.  
 
In the descriptions of discursive strategies the inclusion of potential victims is also an 
element (Jaeger et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Perrow, 1999; Schrader-Frechette, 
1991). This was not an issue at stake in the cases.  
 
Perspectives from other branches? 
 
The discussion about the conditions of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in the 
Norwegian railway system directs the attention towards the ability of the cases to reveal 
potential risk. Furthermore, some interviewees raised the question of the ability of 
railway personnel with a strong experience base in the former NSB to foresee the 
consequences of the ongoing changes in the system. Accordingly there might be a danger 
of disaster incubation in the system, i.e. a discrepancy between the state of affaires and 
the culturally taken for granted (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Etzioni (1967) argues that 
under conditions like the Norwegian railway system, it might be required to increase 
investments in encompassing high coverage scanning of the situation. In this case the 
purpose of such scanning can be to check for dangers that can not be easily discovered by 
the help of the knowledge of the tradition of the former NSB and risk analyses derived 
from this knowledge. In this work it might be useful to search for the inclusion of 
alternative approaches to the traditional railway knowledge. In the framework for safety 
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rule development that is applied for the SAMRAIL research (European Commission. 
2004b), this might imply to increase investments in the first step covering the activities 
“Define processes, scenarios & controls for the activity”.  
 
In this connection it is worth mentioning that many interviewees unasked expressed that 
the railway system had much to learn from aviation but not so much from the oil industry. 
Their arguments were that aviation had many of the common features as the railway 
system for example the geographical distribution and a long history. In addition, this field 
had already faced the challenges associated with many actors and cross national traffic 
operation. Many also mentioned that the strong impact from the oil industry in Norway 
had made them rather familiar with the perspective and knowledge of this field. 
 
8.2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The introduction of rationalistic hierarchical and risk-based approaches influenced the 
direction of attention in the modification processes. Furthermore, the new approaches 
increased the diversity of represented perspectives upon rationality and knowledge. This 
development is supported by theory (Jaeger et al. 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Perrow, 
1999; Shrader-Frechette 1991). However, the preexisting rule- and identity based 
rationality and predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge dominated the 
work.  
 
The main elements in the development towards the combination of perspectives upon 
rationality and knowledge were as follows:  
 
• The new approaches created a situation where the modification work mobilized 
both rationalistic rationality and knowledge and rule- and identity based 
rationality building upon intuitively-contextual knowledge.  
 
• In the modification processes and the rule solutions, the cases favored to combine 
perspectives of rationality and knowledge. This can be seen to represent a 
development towards more discursive strategies.  
 
• The modification processes selected knowledge and transformed included 
knowledge, that fitted into or could be changed into the forms of the chosen rule 
solutions and the rationalistic form of the risk analytic methods.  
 
• When conflicts occurred between perspectives, consensus-building processes 
developed. Here predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge had a 
function as reference for appropriateness, i.e. as reference for good solutions.  
 
• The use of predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge as reference 
for good solutions gave this knowledge perspective the dominating role in the 
modification work.   
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• Furthermore, the modification processes contained mechanisms where the 
introduction of the approaches increased the trust in this railway knowledge. This 
happened both when the new approaches gave support to this knowledge and 
when it came in conflict with it. 
 
The way people with railway knowledge were included in the work might be a source of 
bias in favor of perspectives and knowledge of skilled and centrally positioned railway 
professionals from the former NSB. 
 
8.3 Railway knowledge was revived and changed  
 
The second problem of this Chapter concerns the influence from the rationalistic 
hierarchical and risk-based approaches upon the predominantly intuitively-contextual 
railway knowledge.  
 
Below, it will be further elaborated that the new approaches raised questions and 
provoked inquiries into the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge. The 
modification processes also contained different feedback loops that initiated even more 
inquiries. These processes revived railway knowledge. It remains a question whether the 
new approaches contributed with really new railway knowledge. 
 
8.3.1 Changes in railway knowledge   
 
The findings of changes in railway knowledge are presented according to the two major 
themes of knowledge and organizational learning discussed in Chapter 3, i.e. changes in 
knowledge forms and learning cycles. Finally, the evidences of changes in railway 
knowledge are presented.  
 
8.3.1.1 Changes in knowledge forms  
 
The introduction of the hierarchical and risk-based approaches created a new situation for 
the modification work. The cases met these approaches with processes of reverse 
invention. The explorations and evaluations of the new approaches provoked inquiries 
into the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge. For example, one 
member of the Board of the branch of the Traffic-rule case explained how one of the 
railway professionals of the work group always expressed his worries for safety. He did 
this even when he was not able to express why he was worried. These expressed worries 
led to inquiries and discussions that revealed the foundations for these worries. This 
contributed to better solutions.  
 
The work of the risk analyses also initiated inquiries. As one of the interviewees of the 
Maintenance-rule cases related:  
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“But I do believe that we have had much to learn from the RCM. There (in the 
RCM analyses, my comment) were systematically asked questions about 
consequences of failures etc. And it is clear that we have this in the back of our 
mind for anything we do but we have not always followed the thinking to the end. 
And sometimes one experiences some surprises.”  
 
The inquiries of the cases revealed that railway knowledge was spread around the 
organization. It was sometimes difficult to retrieve because some of it had a more or less 
individual and tacit form, just as the quotation above demonstrates. 
 
The knowledge retrieved from the inquiries were combined and sorted out, discussed, 
systematized and to some extent documented. These processes were governed by a 
combination of the incitements to the rule solutions, the frameworks that the risk analytic 
methods provided and the risk perception of the participants. For instance, the final report 
of the Traffic-rule case comments that the risk analyses did not contribute with any 
particular unknown conditions. However, it had a systematizing function, contributed 
with an overview and drew attention to conditions known from before40. An interviewee 
of the Maintenance-rule cases made some of the same reflections: “At least the 
systematizing of it (the risk analyses, my comment) forces one to evaluate and document 
what one does.” And he continues: “ …before it was very based on individuals -  the 
experience one had within the areas.”  
 
Therefore the inquiries and the following work with the achieved knowledge implied an 
articulation of this knowledge and that more people had access to it. Furthermore, this 
implied a direction of attention where some knowledge became more in focus than others 
and therefore included in the work.   
 
However, there were differences between the cases. The interviewees were asked who the 
core contributors to the work were. This revealed that those performing the rule 
development and the risk analyses were the main contributors. Their networks 
contributed as important supplements. The organizing of the cases and the tasks differed 
and influenced how much the knowledge of these actors became articulated, made 
collective and combined. There were also differences between the cases regarding time 
for reflection.  
 
As revealed, the Traffic-rule case had the best conditions of the cases for interaction and 
access to knowledge resources. The work group was located together and had specific 
time for the work. It worked as an interactive team where also the different task 
interacted in iterative processes. Furthermore, this case had a formalized organization that 
included many actors, required communication and written reports and agenda papers. 
This implies that knowledge from different sources became articulated and combined and 
to a great extent transferred into a written form.  
 
Among the Maintenance-rule cases, only the work group of the Superstructure case was 
located together and had continuity in their work. This case also had a formalized Board 
                                                 
40 Logg 1208, p 20 
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of the branch that it included. The Signal case that had the role as a pilot had more 
available economical resources and specific time to organize meetings about the risk 
analyses. The Maintenance-rule cases were also less formalized than the Traffic-rule case. 
Therefore they did not communicate with others and did not produce written 
documentation to the same extent.  
 
However, when it came to the rule solutions, the Traffic-rule case only expressed 
knowledge in prescriptive rules while the Maintenance-rule cases expressed it in three 
ways: In triggering requirements, their explanatory texts and in prescriptive rules.  
 
There were also other factors influencing the articulation of knowledge during the work. 
The rule-responsible of the Signal cases found that the homogeneity of participants in the 
work also influenced the expression of tacit knowledge: ”… as the participants of the 
work were so competent and posited so much tacit knowledge, it is very likely that this 
knowledge was used in the analyses but not documented or made visible.” And he adds: 
“So there is much tacit knowledge in the existing (set of rules, my comment) that is still 
tacit in the new set of rules.” 
 
Another interviewee from the Board of the branch of the Traffic-rule case revealed that 
because he considered the railway knowledge of the work group to be very good, he 
found it unnecessary engage himself in the work.  
 
8.3.1.2 Feedback loops of the work 
 
The work of the cases included different and more or less formalized feedback loops. 
First, the cases had feedback about the efficiency of the existing rules. Second, the cases 
took steps to achieve feedback upon the evolving rule solutions, methods to include risk 
analyses in the modification work and risk analysis results. In the Traffic-rule case the 
members of the work group took advantage of their good organizational conditions for 
using each other and their network for feedback. This was mostly done through informal 
inquiries and discussions when the work raised questions. The work group also involved 
their resource groups. Statistical material and reports of unwanted events and accidents 
were also used. 
 
The Maintenance-rule cases also took steps to get feedback upon their work. Again, the 
network of the core participants became involved to achieve feedback. However, 
differences in the organization of the Maintenance-rule cases and their tasks created 
different conditions for using those people directly involved in the different tasks for 
feedback. The cases participated in a joint hearing process of the modified rules and the 
risk analyses. Also these cases looked into statistics and accident reports. At the end, the 
Maintenance-rule project organized a joint two-step hearing process. 
 
No evidence was found of consciously withheld information in the studied modification 
processes. However, examples of this were provided from other processes within the 
Railway system. These were associated with the competitive advantage of knowledge. 
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For example, one interviewee had experienced that staff performing outsourced 
maintenance activities had told him that they knew what maintenance activities the Rail 
Administration should ask for, but now that the activity was outsourced, he would not tell 
representatives of that organization what they were.  
 
8.3.1.3 Evidence of changes in railway knowledge? 
 
Many of the participants in the modification processes described how they had learned 
from the work.  
 
Changes in railway knowledge due to the risk-based approach? 
 
Most of the examples were associated with the competence building of risk analytic 
methods and their application in the modification work. For instance the interviewees 
described how they felt more confident with the methods and the analytic results when 
they had practiced them on their areas of regulation. Furthermore, even though the risk 
analyses were applied differently in the work of the cases, the fact that all cases 
performed analyses implies that learning about risk analytic methods had taken place 
among the participants. This also demonstrates that the participants of the work have 
learned something about combining rule development and risk analyses. However, as 
they found different solutions and functions for the analyses, they have learned different 
lessons.  
 
The question at stake is whether the risk analyses caused any changes in the railway 
knowledge. Above it is argued that the inquiries of the processes made railway 
knowledge more explicit and collective and that knowledge from different sources was 
combined. Also, the risk analyses functioned as a validation of selected railway 
knowledge. Accordingly, the risk-based approach has caused changes in railway 
knowledge; the processes of articulation, sharing, combining and validating railway 
knowledge have revived it.  
 
The study revealed different attitudes towards the contribution of the risk analyses to the 
development of railway knowledge. For instance the Safety director of the Rail 
Administration found that the risk analyses of the Traffic-rule case had increased the 
consciousness about which unwanted events the rules were supposed to prevent. He also 
found that the analyses had demonstrated both missing barriers and unnecessary barriers 
against accidents. On the other hand, the final report of this project commented that: “the 
risk analyses did not contribute with any particular unknown conditions”41. The report 
went on and commented that because “…existing rules build upon long time experiences 
where one in practice has tried to build in barriers when found necessarily this is not 
strange. Where one has not managed to build in barriers there have been good, real 
reasons for not managing this.” At first glance these quotations appear to contradict each 
                                                 
41 Logg 1208, p 20 
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other. However, as the report explains, missing barriers does not necessarily mean that 
this fact was not known. It might mean that no practicable solution had been found to 
solve the problem.  
 
Regarding the Maintenance-rule cases, the project leader of the Overarching Maintenance 
project found that the risk analyses had contributed to clarify where prescriptive rules 
were necessary. One of the participants in the work of these cases described: “… I think 
that by working with the RCM-process I have a strengthened picture of what are safety 
related requirements and what are not because I have recognized what top events they 
prevent.” 
 
However, one of the rule-responsible of the Maintenance-rule cases found that:  
 
“I do not feel that the (the RCM-analyses, my comment) has contributed so much 
to the field until now, but it is obvious to me that it will contribute a lot. The 
challenge will be to combine, one has to find a way to get a practical approach to 
the inspections of the tracks.” 
 
Changes in railway knowledge due to the hierarchical approach? 
 
Regarding the hierarchical approach, it is also argued above that this initiated inquiries 
that made railway knowledge more explicit and collective and that knowledge from 
different sources was combined. Also, the previous section revealed an increased trust in 
railway knowledge associated with the prescriptive rules that survived the modification 
process. Accordingly, also the hierarchical approach has caused changes that revived the 
railway knowledge.  
 
Even though the Traffic-rule case and the Maintenance-rule cases ended up with different 
rule solutions, all cases made attempts to develop higher order rules in the outcome-
oriented form. This implies that learning about outcome-oriented rules has taken place. 
However, as mentioned in the previous subsection, the cases were not unfamiliar with 
outcome-oriented rules from before. It is therefore difficult to judge if the introduction of 
the hierarchical approach was a direct source for learning that contributed with new 
knowledge. There are some indications of this: For instance one interviewee of the 
Maintenance-rule cases explained: “One faces some questions that one has not been 
thinking about before. When following rules it was like this, but when developing rules 
one has to argue for the solution one prefers.”  
 
How collective and explicit did knowledge become? 
 
Even though the results demonstrated that the risk-based and hierarchical approaches 
revived railway knowledge, a common feature from the findings is that it is difficult to 
judge exactly how collective the knowledge became. The descriptions of the work 
processes, the conditions for interaction and access to knowledge resources indicate that 
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the more involved actors and the more cooperation between them, the more collective the 
knowledge became.  
 
The study does not include studies of the distribution of revived knowledge outside this 
group of people. One participant of the Board of the branch from the Traffic-rule case 
expressed that he was hesitant to distribute information from the processes before it 
became clearer what the results of the process would be. Furthermore, the study has had 
its focus upon the modification processes and not upon the consequences of the processes 
and resulting rules for the areas of regulation. Therefore it did not inquire into changes in 
practice of the rule-followers.  
 
8.3.2 The revival and change of railway knowledge  
 
The results revealed that the new approaches initiated processes where the predominantly 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge became inquired into. Furthermore, the cases 
made arrangements to achieve feedback upon the efficiency of existing rules in their 
current context and their evolving work. Through these processes the railway knowledge 
became articulated, shared, combined and validated, i.e. it became revived. These issues 
will be discussed below. Finally, it will be discussed if the railway knowledge really 
developed. 
 
8.3.2.1 Revival of knowledge and knowledge transitions  
 
The railway knowledge was revived and transformed by different mechanisms. 
 
Recalling knowledge 
 
In accordance with the discussions of organizational memory of Stein (1995), the 
inquiries into railway knowledge that the new approaches stimulated can be understood 
as if organizational memory of the Norwegian railway system was recalled. This also 
demonstrates that the participants found this knowledge important enough to mobilize 
motivation for retrieving it. Accordingly, even though the system was undergoing 
significant change they valued what was done in previous contexts.  
 
As revealed, the cases also faced problems to retrieve some of the wanted knowledge. To 
be aware of information and knowledge that exists such as Stein (1995) discusses, 
requires an overview of what information there is. The participants of the work used each 
other, their network and if available, their resource group(s) to locate and decode 
knowledge that was seen as important for safety. Accordingly, the task to gather relevant 
knowledge for the work was very dependent upon those who became included in the 
modification activities.  
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The cases showed that the participants’ own knowledge and network were important for 
the retrieval of knowledge. Many of the networks built upon relations developed in the 
former NSB. The networks were included because they were considered as positive 
contributors to the modification processes. As they were “about something” they held an 
important feature of “communities of practice” such as discussed by Wenger (1998). 
Furthermore, they seemed to be active because they provided something that the 
participants valued.   
 
When modification processes are so much dependent upon knowledge from such 
communities of practice as those studied here, the future modification work is very 
vulnerable; it is a vital question whether these communities will be kept alive. According 
to Wenger (1998) this will depend on the experience of them as valuable for the new 
context of the Norwegian railway system.  
 
The new context of the Norwegian railway system with a more divided and competitive 
environment might be a challenge for the dependency that the cases revealed upon 
individual knowledge, their network and communities of practice. For future 
modification processes it might therefore be necessary to look for alternative solutions for 
collection of important knowledge. For instance, the new context might represent a 
potential for development of new communities of practice.  
 
The strong position in the work of skilled and centrally positioned railway professionals 
from the former NSB might have been a source of bias in the cases. As Stein (1995) 
warns, this might represent a potential for retrieval of dysfunctional methods, values or 
prejudices. Accordingly, there is a danger that the work has been based on lessons 
learned from conditions in the former NSB instead of the features of the current 
Norwegian railway system. The results also revealed a concern that they were biased in 
favor of the needs of centrally positioned, skilled railway professionals. 
 
The use of experience-based statistics and accident reports in the work might strengthen 
this danger. These sources for information also represent a potential source of biased in 
favor of former features of the system. As discussed in the SAMRAIL report upon 
organizational learning from accidents and incidents, such information also contain very 
little information about the context of these happenings (European Commission, 2004a). 
Accordingly, it is difficult to judge their relevance for the current situation.  
 
However, all cases established direct communication with the practical fields of the rule-
followers and made active steps to counteract such dangers of bias. Anyway, the fact that 
one representative asked for risk analyses of the dangers associated with no changes in 
the rules can be seen as a warning.  
 
Furthermore, both Stein (1995) and Baumard (1999) point to the fact that not all forms of 
knowledge maintained by the organizations are voluntarily retrievable. They discuss the 
fact that knowledge might be consciously withheld. However, I did not find any evidence 
of this. As discussed, my impression is that the participants in the work were seriously 
devoted to safety.  
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There are also some suggestions for solutions to solve the challenges of knowledge 
retrieval in the future. First of all, Wenger (1998) discusses that there are possibilities to 
stimulate both the survival and establishment of communities of practice. Furthermore, 
the new context might create new communities of practice such as revealed in the Dutch 
railways where motivated railway people from different companies set up informal 
networks in order to foster learning from each other (European Commission, 2004a). The 
planned system for future rule management of the Maintenance-rules might be another 
possible strategy for developing alternative solutions for knowledge collection.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, SAMRAIL suggests establishing learning 
agencies at different levels in the railway system (European Commission, 2004a). They 
explain that such agencies consist of people with the assigned task to look into matters of 
concern and generate lessons-to-learn and a learning products. Updated knowledge of 
rules context and efficiency and modified rules can be seen to be such learning products. 
 
Feedback upon current rule context and efficiency of existing and evolving rules  
 
The results also revealed that the cases held different conditions for feedback such as 
discussed by Argyris & Schön (1996). The issues that got most attention in the cases 
were feedback upon the development of the current context of the rules, the experiences 
of the rules’ efficiency and feedback upon the evolving rules  
 
The Traffic-rule case with the different resource groups, funds to pay for investigations 
and a rich network had better conditions for feedback upon existing rules and the 
evolving work than the Maintenance-rule cases. Furthermore, the Traffic-rule case had 
generally more time for reflection and better conditions for dialogues between 
participants than the Maintenance-rule cases. These are conditions that are seen as 
important conditions for organizational learning, i.e. the conditions for learning of the 
Traffic-rule case seemed better than those of the Maintenance-rule cases (Ellström, 2002). 
 
Regarding feedback upon the efficiency of existing rules and the development in their 
context, there were differences between the cases. The Traffic rule case initiated a small 
study among the rule followers while this plan was dropped by the Maintenance rule 
cases42. Furthermore, the Traffic rule case involved more actors in the work. On the other 
hand, the Maintenance rule cases could draw upon the system for communication with 
rule-followers that were established for the annual rule revisions.  
 
However, these feedback mechanisms were rather unsystematic and limited. The study of 
the Traffic rule case involved very few people (11 persons and one group discussion43) 
and was also not an element in a more continuous system for feedback upon the 
efficiency of existing rules and the development of their context. Furthermore, the 
communication system of the Maintenance-rule cases was mainly based on the 
                                                 
42 SINTEF report for the Traffic rule project, no STF38 F03408 
43 SINTEF report for the Traffic rule project, no STF38 F03408 
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motivation of the rule followers to inform the rule responsible people at the Head office 
about problems with the rules. As discussed by SAMRAIL, such a system is very 
dependent upon the ability of rule followers to recognize the importance of their 
discoveries and their motivation to report them (European Commission, 2004a). 
Unsystematic and limited feedback upon the efficiency of existing rules and dependency 
upon the participants’ own knowledge, initiative and network in the modification work is 
not only a problem for the Norwegian railway system. It is in line with studies of rule 
modifications in the Dutch railways provided by Hale et al. (2003).  
 
Regarding feedback upon the evolving rules during the work of the cases, the cases built 
in feedback processes. Again, these were rather dependent upon participants’ own 
knowledge, initiative and network. As discussed, the Traffic-rule case appeared to 
possess the strongest railway knowledge and networks. Furthermore, through the use of 
resource groups, the Traffic-rule case had a more organized structure for feedback than 
the Maintenance-rule cases. However, the discussions above about the possible danger of 
bias from the strong position in the work of centrally positioned railway professionals 
from the former NSB are also relevant here.  
 
All together, these discussions reveal that the modification processes had a function that 
resembles learning agencies even though this was not an assigned task for those 
modifying the rules. Those involved in the modification work gathered knowledge about 
rules’ context and efficiency from rule followers and translated these messages into 
lessons-to-learn in the form of modified rules.  
 
However, the system for transfer of observations of changes in the rules’ context and 
weaknesses in their efficiency were not systematized in a way that makes it possible to 
claim that learning loops were well developed in the cases. The implementation phase of 
the modified rules that is important for the closing of the loops is also not included in this 
study.  
 
The SAMRAIL report upon accident and incident reporting argues that the increased 
organizational complexity of railways in Europe has created barriers for organizational 
learning (European Commission, 2004a). The report underlines the importance of finding 
solutions that counteract the negative impact of the reorganizing of the railway systems 
upon former learning arrangements. 
 
The plans for future management of the Maintenance rule cases might improve the 
learning conditions associated with these rules. However, theory upon knowledge implies 
that to fill this function, this system must not become reduced to communication of mere 
written information through a data system (Baumard, 1999; European Commission, 
2004a). The challenge to manage the important step of communication between the rule- 
followers and the rule-imposer of the Traffic rules, i.e. the Inspectorate, about changes in 
the rules’ context and discovered weaknesses in the rules is very complicated. This 
communication has to bridge the long distance between the rule-follower and the rule-
imposer in the organizational hierarchy of the Norwegian railway system. Furthermore, 
as Kirwan & al. (2002) discuss, the nature of the regulatory relationship is difficult with 
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respect trust. According to Argyris & Schön (1996) this is an important condition for 
organizational learning.  
 
An additional challenge associated with feedback is its retroactive character (Baumard, 
1999; Ellström, 2001b). As revealed, Ellström discuss the paradoxical function of 
feedback in learning; it impedes the more development forms of learning necessary under 
changing conditions. In addition, changing conditions create different opportunities to 
relate the work to the actual context for their application, to apply mental maps in the 
work and to correctly formulate problems for inquiry.  
 
In particular, three theorists underline the importance of finding solutions to these 
challenges. First, Bourrier (1998) has revealed that rule-followers might develop different 
strategies to manage situations where rules do not match the actual context. Second, 
Vaughan (1998) has illustrated that safety might be negotiated. Third, Rasmussen (1997) 
has demonstrated how the combined pressure towards efficiency and least effort can 
cause migrations towards boundaries of safe performance.  
 
Knowledge transitions 
 
These recalling- and feedback processes revived railway knowledge. However, the 
conditions for articulation, sharing, combining and validating of knowledge varied 
between the cases. Accordingly, the cases varied regarding conditions for knowledge 
transitions that might create organizational learning such as discussed by Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1995) and Baumard (1999). The results showed that the Traffic-rule case had 
better conditions for knowledge transitions and articulation than the Maintenance-rule 
cases.  
 
These processes, that led to a revival of railway knowledge, can be associated with two 
out of four transitions between different knowledge forms discussed by Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1995). First, the descriptions of the inquiries and feedback processes in the 
work and the treatment of their results demonstrated that tacit knowledge became 
converted into explicit by articulation. Furthermore, the inquiries and discussions imply 
that railway knowledge was shared between people. Accordingly, railway knowledge has 
been transformed into a more explicit and collective form.  
 
Second, the inquiries and the discussions of the cases caused conversion of explicit 
knowledge into another form of explicit knowledge by the combination of knowledge 
from different sources. The combination of knowledge was based on the understanding 
that the participants of the modification work had of safe performance. In the terminology 
of Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) a logic of compatibility or “fitting together” dominates. 
Further, the logic of compatibility was applied when the suggested rule solutions and the 
risk analysis results were compared with and adapted to railway knowledge.  
 
Selections of this knowledge became transferred into the written texts. In the terminology 
of Stein (1995) the knowledge became encoded into the written form of the chosen rule 
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solution and the framework of the applied risk analytic methods. Some knowledge was 
also encoded into agenda papers, minutes from meeting and written explanations for the 
changes in the rules 
 
The knowledge that the inquiries retrieved was treated differently depending on how it 
fitted in with the discussions of the new approaches and the frameworks of the rule 
solutions and the risk analyses. Accordingly, some knowledge had more attention while 
others got little or no attention. Knowledge that was seen as irrelevant became excluded 
from the rule texts, from the risk analyses and the other written texts. This opens the 
possibility that the processes also contain elements of the third conversion of knowledge 
that Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) discuss. Here explicit knowledge is converted into tacit 
by internalization. Knowledge that received little attention or that became excluded might 
have been internalized by the participants of the work. One example of knowledge that 
might be subject to such a process is knowledge associated with the attempt to develop 
goal-oriented rules in the Traffic rule case. However, the cases did not provide any clear 
examples of internalization and the study has not included follow up studies to see 
whether this happened or not, for instance to by checking later use of knowledge about 
the rules’ intentions. The differences in the organization of the cases and the interaction 
between the actors and the tasks might influence the potential for internalization.   
 
The comment of one interviewee that a homogenous group articulated less of their 
knowledge might mean that this group shared the same knowledge from the beginning. 
However, it might also be that their homogeneity gave the participants a platform that 
made it possible for them to share and circulate tacit knowledge within the group through 
socialization. If that was the case, it fits in with the description of Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) of the fourth conversion of knowledge; from tacit knowledge into another form of 
tacit knowledge.  
 
The new constellation with the hierarchical and risk-based approaches in the modification 
work created a situation of ambiguity that revived railway knowledge. This gives 
associations to Baumard (1999). He argues that under conditions of ambiguity 
articulation might make knowledge visible to some and invisible to others more visible. 
This increase in visibility of knowledge might solve ambiguities. This theory might also 
provide one explanation why there were different experiences of learning among the 
interviewees. Those for whom the knowledge was visible, might not have experienced 
any learning while those who had it demonstrated by its revival, experienced learning.  
 
8.3.2.2 Did railway knowledge develop? 
 
Above is concluded that the modification processes contained elements of inquiries, 
feedback loops and knowledge transitions that represent potential for organizational 
learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Baumard, 1999; Ellström, 2001a; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). However, the results revealed that learning loops associated with the modification 
work were not fully developed.  
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Also, the study is limited to the modification processes themselves and their products. 
Therefore the study only includes evidence of organizational learning within processes. 
The results associated with the hierarchical and risk-based approaches revealed that the 
introduction of the new approaches to the modification processes did not create any 
fundamental change that demonstrates dramatic changes in knowledge. The new 
approaches became adapted to the existing railway knowledge. This is particularly 
evident in the consensus building processes when conflicts between railway knowledge 
and conclusions of the new approaches occurred. To apply the terminology of Ellström 
(2001b), the learning that took place had the characteristics of adaptive learning. 
Accordingly the new approaches did not cause higher order developmental learning as 
described by Ellström or “turnaround learning” that require unlearning as described by 
Hedberg (1981).  
 
However, the introduction of hierarchical and risk-based approaches revived existing 
knowledge.  Through this process knowledge was transformed into more collective and 
explicit forms and combined into other explicit forms as discussed by Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1995) and Baumard (1999). Furthermore, railway knowledge that became 
validated through the processes achieved increased trust. The cases did not provide clear 
evidence of knowledge transformation from explicit to tacit and from tacit to tacit.  
 
There is a question how collective or distributed this revived knowledge became. There is 
also a question whether the transformation and combination of knowledge developed new 
railway knowledge. The discussions of Baumard (1999) about knowledge that can be 
visible for some and invisible for others demonstrates that the experience of learning 
among some interviewees does not necessarily mean that entirely new knowledge is 
added or developed in the processes. However, it might mean that individual knowledge 
has become more collective or organizational. 
 
The transformation of predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge into a 
more explicit and collective knowledge implies that it was transformed into a more 
rationalistic form. Furthermore, selections of retrieved knowledge that fit into the 
framework of the chosen rule solutions and the risk analyses became encoded into written 
texts. The same happened with some of the knowledge that was emphasized in 
discussions, particularly in the Traffic-rule case. Through these processes the revived 
knowledge became reduced into thin written descriptions (Perrow, 1999; Stein, 1995)  
 
8.3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The hierarchical and risk-based approaches created processes where predominantly 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge became revived, i.e. it was inquired into and 
made more explicit and collective, combined and validated. Accordingly, the 
modification work had elements where those involved functioned as a learning agency 
such as discussed by SAMRAIL (European Commission, 2004a). However, this function 
was not formalized. Furthermore, the retrieval of knowledge was much dependent on the 
competency of those directly involved in the modification work and their network. Also, 
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the modification processes did not include fully developed learning loops that are seen as 
important for organizational learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996; European Commission, 
2004a).  
 
It remains a question how collective the revived knowledge became. It also remains a 
question whether the new approaches led to actually new railway knowledge.  
 
The transfer of railway knowledge into the more explicit and collective form implies that 
it was changed into a more rationalistic form, i.e. a form dominated by thinner 
descriptions where the contextual elements of knowledge becomes less visible. Parts of 
the revived knowledge became encoded into written texts.  
 
8.4 Revived, but saved?  
 
The third problem of this Chapter concerns how railway knowledge became stored in 
organizational memory.  
 
Below, it will be elaborated that even though the hierarchical and risk-based approaches 
contributed to a revival of the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge, 
only the most rationalistic elements of railway knowledge is systematically stored in 
organizational memory.   
 
8.4.1 Written texts systematically stored, weak or no systems for the rest 
 
In the following, results revealing that the hierarchical and risk-based approaches 
influenced the direction of action will be presented. Furthermore it will be revealed that 
some knowledge became encoded into written texts and that there are indications that the 
organizing of the work influenced storing of knowledge in organizational memory. 
 
8.4.1.1 The hierarchical and risk-based approaches and direction of attention  
 
The previous results and discussions have demonstrated that the rationalistic hierarchical 
and risk-based approaches led to a revival of the predominantly intuitively-contextual 
railway knowledge. Knowledge that fits in with the rationalistic perspectives of these 
approaches got attention in the modification processes. The railway knowledge served as 
a reference for good solutions and as a corrective to the conclusions and solutions of the 
new approaches. Therefore, also knowledge that conflicted with the new approaches got 
attention. Through the rule development and the risk analyses, the included railway 
knowledge became articulated, combined, systematized and encoded into the thin written 
descriptions of the chosen rule solutions and the risk analytic frameworks. Some 
knowledge also became encoded into agenda papers and minutes from meetings.  
 
 230
The direction of attention and selection of knowledge that the hierarchical and risk-based 
approaches caused, implies that knowledge that did not get attention or became excluded 
was less discussed and articulated. As one interviewee of the Maintenance-rule project 
expressed it:  
 
” The issue of tacit knowledge was very much emphasized. And there was rather a 
lot of “aha” experiences for the most. However, I feel that much of this tacit 
knowledge fell out of the process. That there is not so much space for this 
competency that is not on the paper but that exists within the heads, the 
experiences and such things, in such a theorized system as we have here.”    
 
8.4.1.2 Encoded knowledge into written texts 
 
Regarding encoding of railway knowledge into written rules, the rule solution of the 
Traffic-rule case became limited to expressing knowledge about what to do to perform 
safely. The rule solutions of the Maintenance-rule case expressed both expected 
outcomes and required activities. When found necessary, it was also prescribed how the 
required activities should be done.  
 
Also, both the Traffic-rule case and the Maintenance-rule cases removed some of their 
former prescriptive rules. In particular, the Traffic-rule case removed rules that were 
seldom used due to a development in the technical solutions for traffic control and rules 
for educational purposes. The Maintenance-rule case removed rules that were seen to 
represent unnecessary restrictions upon rule-followers. This implies that rule specific 
knowledge of removed rules became less visible.  
 
Many interviewees, and in particular those who were or had been involved in educational 
activities, were concerned about the function of rules as knowledge communicators. Their 
concerns were about both rule specific knowledge and knowledge about rules’ context 
and intended function. This knowledge was also experienced as being important for 
judging the quality and relevance of rules under the changing conditions of the regulated 
areas.  
 
However, none of these interviewees considered the rules themselves to be sufficient as 
knowledge communicators. One interviewee of the Maintenance-rule cases expressed it 
this way: “The regulations can be incomprehensible if one does not know their platform. 
So then the challenge is to bring forward the tacit knowledge” 
 
Many interviewees discussed the importance of textbooks and explanatory texts for the 
rules. This was particularly evident among the interviewees of the Traffic-rule case that 
did not have any textbook previously. One teacher expressed the need for such a book 
like this: “What is most difficult is what we do not have, the textbook about why things 
are as they are.” And she continues: “Because the regulation is very short, or the rule set 
are short. We miss a description about why it is as it is (the rule set, my comment), in 
other words, an explanation.”  
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As revealed, it seems that the textbook will not be developed in the near future. Two of 
the interviewees of the Inspectorate were also concerned about the need for a textbook, 
but were uncertain whether it was the task of the Inspectorate to develop it. Regardless of 
this, the Director of the Inspectorate found it to be the responsibility of the Inspectorate 
and also an important task for the organization to store knowledge about the background 
of the rules and their changes. He also found that it was the risk analyses that had become 
most visible in this documentation.  
 
The situation of the Maintenance-rules was different. The rules were supplemented with 
explanatory texts placed in direct connection to the rules. In addition, this area already 
had textbooks from before.  
 
Rule specific knowledge expressed in rules that survived the modification processes of 
the cases and that got support from risk analysis results, achieved increased legitimacy 
and hence increased status. Also, when rules received the status as ‘safety relevant’ their 
status increased with respect to requirement to comply. This was particularly evident in 
the Maintenance-rule cases where safety relevant rules were tagged. The Traffic-rules 
have traditionally been considered as safety relevant and had a high status.  
 
When it came to encoding of railway knowledge into the frameworks of the risk analyses, 
it was the Traffic-rule case that transformed most knowledge into written texts. The 
reason was that this case had wide scope for the analyses and this caused the analyses to 
become very extensive, i.e. they encoded a lot of knowledge into the schemas of the 
analyses. The scopes of the Maintenance-rule cases were more narrowly defined. 
Therefore they included less knowledge than was included in their schemas.  
 
Through the cases’ striving for consensus, the knowledge of the chosen rule solutions and 
of the risk analyses became validated by the railway knowledge and thus achieved higher 
status. Many interviewees argued that the risk analyses had an important function as 
underlying documentation for the rules. One lawyer involved in the work of the Traffic-
rule case said that the risk analyses were an important source of background information 
for the rules. Another interviewee found it important for the judgments of later rule 
revisions: 
 
“Before one was also thinking in terms of risk assessment, but this has not been 
documented in a good way. And this is the most extensive change when we make 
changes in the rules this time. Today it is – everything that is done in the Traffic-
rule project is very well documented. …this makes a very good foundation for 
later revisions and for judgments about where changes are needed.” 
 
He underlines the importance of this documentation in the current situation of the 
Norwegian railway system like this:  
 
“Then (in earlier times, my comment) this has been documented in the head of 
each individual. This has not been a problem because they have had a lifelong 
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course within the system. Before people left, newcomers started learning. In this 
way there has been a continuous follow-up. But now as people are changing their 
jobs more often and one turn around quite a bit (change the organization, my 
comment), it has become important that this is very well documented.”  
 
The function of the risk analyses in the planned system for future rule management of the 
Maintenance-rules, also gives the risk analyses of these cases the function as the formal 
foundation of the rules.  
 
Accordingly, in all cases the rationalistic risk analyses had the function as the formal 
legitimating of the rules. The revived intuitively-contextual elements of railway 
knowledge remained undocumented and with an informal status. This happened in spite 
of the fact that this knowledge had such an important role in the judgments of the 
suitability of suggested rule solutions and for the judgments of the quality of evolving 
rules and risk analyses 
 
Both projects developed databases. The database of the Traffic-rule project contained the 
old and the new rules, the links between these and comments. Furthermore, the risk 
analyses and the links to the rules and arguments for changes in the rules are stored here. 
As revealed, one of the interviewees pointed out that this does not provide information of 
the rationale for not changing pre-existing rules. Another pointed out that the context and 
function of the rules that former rule-developers had was still missing. At the end of the 
project the database was transferred to the Inspectorate together with the rules. The future 
management of this database was not settled when the data collection of this study came 
to its end. One interviewee commented that the transfer of the rules and the database to 
the Inspectorate made it difficult to use the database for the purpose of communicating 
feedback to the risk analyses.  
 
The Maintenance-rule project developed two databases for future management of the 
Maintenance-rules. The plan was to use these in future rule modification and as a means 
to communicate feedback to the rule management processes. The included elements were 
the old and the new rules, the reasons for change, the risk analyses and their link to both 
the triggering requirements and the work instruction. The databases were not operative by 
the time of implementation of the rules.  
 
Both the Traffic-rule project and the Maintenance-rule project developed agenda papers 
and minutes from formal meetings. These enlighten questions of principle interest related 
to the hierarchical and risk-based approaches. The Traffic-rule case had a more 
complicated and formalized organizational structure for the work than the Maintenance-
rule cases. Therefore the Traffic-rule case produced a huge amount of agenda papers and 
minutes. The production of such written statements was rather limited for the 
Maintenance-rule cases. This documentation became stored in electronic archives. 
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8.4.1.3 Organizing of the work and organizational memory 
 
The previous section discussed the differences between the cases in their organizing 
regarding participation, communication and interaction. This revealed that they differed 
regarding degree of social interaction and relation to the rules’ context. Furthermore, this 
created differences regarding articulation of knowledge and how this knowledge was 
distributed among the involved actors.  
  
The Traffic-rule case involved most people in the work and in the discussions. Also, the 
work group itself included people who had recently worked in the operative field and 
cooperated closely. Accordingly, in this case knowledge was a part of a social interaction, 
it became context related and distributed among many people. When the work was 
transferred to the Inspectorate and the project closed down, the explicit and tacit 
knowledge that was not encoded into written texts or transferred through the cooperation 
between the project and the Inspectorate became scattered around in the Norwegian 
railway system. Some of it left the system with the hired participants. Therefore, the 
structure for social interaction changed and was continued by the personnel of the 
Inspectorate. At the end of the data collection of the study there were no concrete plans 
for systematic communication between the Inspectorate and the core rule-followers.  
 
The situation of the Maintenance-rule cases was different. The cases included far less 
people and only the Superstructure case had close interaction between those directly 
performing the modification work. Also personnel operating in the rules’ contexts were 
less systematically involved in the work. Accordingly, in these cases the knowledge was 
not a part of a social interaction, coupled with the rules’ contexts and distributed among 
people to the same extent as the Traffic-rule case. On the other hand, the participation of 
the permanent rule-responsible people, made the work more linked to continuity than the 
project organizing of the Traffic-rule case did. The plans for communication between the 
rule-imposers and the rule-followers of the Maintenance-rule cases might contribute to 
make knowledge contextual and relational in the future. The project leader of the 
Overarching Maintenance project explained that one intention with the transition to risk-
based management was to create a more dynamic view of knowledge. The idea was that 
this would develop knowledge and make the enterprise able to take more advantage of 
tacit knowledge. The tacit knowledge should be attended to by making the work with the 
data-program for management of maintenance activities and the prescriptive work 
instructions more alive. However, this will depend upon the implementation of the plans. 
 
8.4.2 Written texts systematically stored – what about the rest?  
 
The introduction of the new approaches has caused a development where railway 
knowledge is now stored better in organizational memory than before. However, the 
rationalistic elements of this knowledge, and in particular the written texts are better 
stored than the intuitively-contextual railway knowledge that is seen as important for 
decoding rationalistic knowledge and in particular written texts. In the following these 
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issues will be elaborated. Finally, the process of reverse invention will be linked to the 
process of revival and reduction of railway knowledge. 
 
8.4.2.1 Knowledge stored in organizational memory 
 
The two main reasons for the better storing of knowledge in organizational memory are 
the revival of railway knowledge and the transfer of railway knowledge into written texts.  
 
Revival of railway knowledge 
 
The modification processes with the interplay between the rationalistic hierarchical and 
risk-based approaches and the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge 
revived and activated the latter. Social interactions between the participants of the work 
and their network were also an important contributor to this revival. This implied that 
existing railway knowledge became more articulated and distributed within the 
Norwegian railway system and hence less vulnerable, for instance by departure of 
employees.  
 
It also appeared that this railway knowledge had a high status and played an important 
role in the modification processes, in particular as reference for what were considered to 
be good conclusions and solutions. Also, the experiences that this knowledge became 
validated through the modification processes improved its status.  
 
According to theory, the safety work of the Norwegian railway system can benefit from 
the revival of the intuitively-contextual elements of the railway knowledge. Chapter 2 
revealed that there is a development towards increased complexity, ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the Norwegian railway system. The organizations that Baumard (1999) has 
studied escaped ambiguity when they directed their efforts towards understanding the 
ambiguity instead of concentrating on the reduction of complexity into rationalistic 
knowledge. Furthermore, theory upon risk and accident prevention does not find 
rationalistic knowledge sufficient for accident preventive work under such conditions 
(Perrow, 1984/1999; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Jaeger et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001). 
Furthermore, such knowledge is important for decoding the written rule texts (Stein, 
1995). 
 
Encoding of railway knowledge into written texts 
 
Selections of revived railway knowledge became encoded into written texts such as the 
rule texts, the risk analyses, agenda papers and minutes from meetings, i.e. it became 
transformed into a more rationalistic form. 
 
Regarding encoding knowledge into rule texts, the choice of rule solutions naturally 
influenced what elements of the revived knowledge that became encoded, i.e. the 
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solutions favors some knowledge and not other. As revealed, the cases both wanted and 
had the possibility to take advantage of both prescriptive and outcome-oriented rule 
formulations. As discussed in Chapter 6, this might have been positive for the safety 
work. However, in the resulting rule solutions only the Maintenance rule cases increased 
the emphasis upon outcome-oriented formulations. 
 
The prescriptive rule solution of the Traffic rule case and the work instructions of the 
Maintenance rule cases contains rather thick practice related descriptions or rules about 
what were considered to be the appropriate actions when certain conditions occurred, i.e. 
the IF-THEN knowledge as Hale describes it (Hale, 1990). Accordingly, the content of 
these solutions favor rule- and identity based railway knowledge. They do not contain the 
rationalistic elements of outcome oriented rules or the BECAUSE element for 
motivational purposes such as Hale discuss.  
 
Also, the triggering requirements of the Maintenance rule cases contain elements of IF-
THEN knowledge. However, here the IF-THEN conditions became reduced into shorter 
descriptions of the conditions that the maintenance activities are supposed to maintain, i.e. 
the intended outcomes of the maintenance activities, and the required action to achieve 
this outcome. Accordingly, the rule-followers are supposed to elaborate the best way to 
perform the required activity for maintaining the required condition. Furthermore, with 
the emphasis upon outcomes in the IF-condition, the BECAUSE element as described by 
Hale (1990) becomes more evident.  
 
If the Traffic rule case had followed up their intention of goal oriented formulations 
either as higher order rules or in a textbook for educational and motivational purposes, 
the BECAUSE element would have become more evident also in this case. 
 
On the other hand, if the cases had based their rule solutions entirely solely upon outcome 
oriented rules, this would also have implied a reduction or removal of the encoded 
knowledge of the prescriptive rules. This might result in a weakened position of rule- and 
identity based rationality and the associated intuitively-contextual knowledge. The lower 
status of this rationality and knowledge might have strengthened this tendency (Perby, 
1995; Schön, 1991). As revealed, the cases found this strategy to be to dangerous.  
 
Regarding transformation of revived railway knowledge into the framework of the risk 
analyses, these processes consisted of two stages. First, the knowledge became selected 
and transformed in accordance with the chosen risk analytic method. Second, the selected 
and transformed knowledge became encoded into written texts in the schemas of the 
analyses.  In other words, the written texts of the risk analyses contain the encoded 
elements of the knowledge that was considered relevant for the frameworks of the chosen 
risk analytic method.  
 
As the risk analytic methods are derived from a rationalistic knowledge tradition, these 
frameworks and schemas are influenced by its knowledge perspective. Accordingly, the 
content of these texts emphasize the rationalistic elements of the revived railway 
knowledge. However, also the chosen scope for the analyses influenced to what extent 
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the revived knowledge became included in the written texts; wide scopes resulted in 
inclusion of more knowledge than narrow scopes.  
 
As already discussed, the written texts of the risk analyses together with some written 
explanations for the changes in the rules achieved an important role in the formal 
legitimacy of the modified rules, i.e. the rationalistic risk analyses became the major 
formal written statements of the rationale behind the rules. Accordingly, they will most 
probably play an important role in future rule modification processes.  
 
Regarding the other types of written texts, the study revealed that the cases produced 
agenda papers and minutes from meetings. In particular, these covered matters of 
principle interest. As revealed, the new approaches raised questions that led to inquiries 
into railway knowledge. This implies that these written texts are influenced by the 
questions that the introduction of the new rationalistic perspectives stimulated.  
  
In the current situation of the Norwegian railway system with ongoing changes both 
generally and in the regulated areas, theory gives support to this transfer of railway 
knowledge into the more rationalistic written form. Baumard (1999) argues that when 
organizations begin to move, it appears essential that they learn to move their knowledge. 
He argues when renewing knowledge it is usually necessary to use codified knowledge, 
i.e. knowledge encoded into written texts. According to him, this implies to reduce the 
complexity of the rich mental maps in the practice related knowledge. When discussing 
organizational learning from accidents and incidents, SAMRAIL also directs the attention 
towards the necessity to filter data to enhance fast dissemination of important knowledge 
(European Commission, 2004a). However, here it is also underlined that to add value to 
the data it is important to code knowledge about the actual context of the knowledge. 
Furthermore, as Perby (1995), Zuboff (1988) and Ellström (2001b) discuss theoretical 
knowledge and concepts might help the understanding of information from production 
processes and their interactions. Therefore, this transfer of knowledge into more 
rationalistic explicit collective forms seems to be a positive contribution to the safety 
work.  
 
Is written texts in databases the same as stored knowledge? 
 
The fact that some of the revived railway knowledge is transferred into the written form 
and stored in databases does not mean that the knowledge is stored in organizational 
memory. As knowledge is relational and context specific, data and information that is 
transferred into written form is not the same as knowledge for the reader of the written 
documentation (Baumard, 1999; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Stein, 1995). Written 
documentation cannot communicate the rich mental maps that might be necessary to 
decode written texts and to understand the complex dynamics of reality. Written texts 
stored in databases require that its storing can be located and that access is given to it 
when it is necessary or useful to retrieve it (Stein, 1995). In addition, mental maps are 
also often important to foresee consequences of different actions and choices that are 
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necessary for accident prevention (Perrow, 1984 /1999; Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 2000).   
 
Accordingly, to keep the revived railway knowledge alive for the future, the written text 
has to be possible to retrieve.  Furthermore, it has to be supplemented with elements of 
social interaction and context. The results of the study also revealed that such knowledge 
was experienced as being important for the understanding of the rules and their intended 
function, for judging their relevance and for rule-followers’ motivation for compliance. 
Therefore, it is essential that intuitively-contextual railway knowledge is stored in 
organizational memory. 
 
8.4.2.2 Intuitively-contextual elements of railway knowledge at risk? 
 
In spite of the discussions above about the important functions of the intuitively-
contextual elements of railway knowledge, there are indications that this very knowledge 
might be endangered in the future. The most important reason is that the transfer of this 
knowledge into the more explicit and rationalistic form might have weakened its position 
compared to rationalistic knowledge. The major explanations are as follows: 
 
First, even though this knowledge served as fundament for the work, it is not 
systematically stored in the encoded written form to the same extent as the rationalistic 
knowledge.  
 
Second, the written risk analyses have the function as documentation of the rules’ 
legitimacy and serves as the main official argumentation for rule changes. The original 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge of the context and function of the surviving 
rules remained undocumented and has lost its status as their formal fundament, a status it 
had before. 
 
Third, the strong emphasis that the Inspectorate has put upon the internal control 
principle, risk analyses and increased use of outcome-oriented rules, see Chapter 2, is a 
rather rationalistic strategy for the safety work. This implies that rationalistic knowledge 
will, most probably, have a higher status in Norwegian railway system in the future. In 
addition, rationalistic knowledge already generally holds a higher status than intuitively-
contextual knowledge (Perby, 1995; Schön, 1991). The status of knowledge might 
influence the motivation to retrieve information (Stein, 1995). 
 
Fourth, Baumard (1999) warns against the danger that the need to renew knowledge 
might lead the firm to remove the representatives of the old knowledge. By doing this, 
they remove the tacit knowledge of the firm. As revealed, the Norwegian railway system 
is already deep into this problem, particularly because of workforce reductions and 
organizational changes.  
 
Fifth, the ongoing division of the Norwegian railway system seems to weaken the 
conditions for developing railway knowledge that holds an extensive overview of the 
 238
complex interactions of the system. They also weaken the system’s traditional conditions 
for socialization and existing communities of practice that were considered particularly 
important for transfer of tacit knowledge (Baumard, 1999; Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Wenger, 1998). 
  
In addition, the study revealed that the organizing of the cases influenced the distribution 
of revived railway knowledge within the Norwegian railway system. Stein (1995) argues 
that this might again influence how difficult it will be to retrieve this knowledge for later 
use.   
 
If the strengthening of rationalistic knowledge in organizational memory is followed by a 
weakening of intuitively-contextual knowledge, it is not only the theory that indicates that 
this might be negative for the safety. Also results presented in earlier chapters imply that 
it might be negative for the safety of the Norwegian railway system.  
 
One reason for this is that the results revealed that this knowledge is an important element 
in the knowledge of rules’ context and function. Without it, it appeared difficult to judge 
their relevance and efficiency for current conditions and expected development. This 
knowledge was also seen as important for educational and motivational purposes.  
 
Another reason is that without its contribution to the understanding of the system’s 
functioning it might be difficult to anticipate the consequences of ongoing changes.  
 
A third reason is that the results revealed how this knowledge was crucial in the 
judgments of new incitements to rule modifications such as the hierarchical and risk-
based approaches.  
 
8.4.2.3 Possible solutions for storing intuitively-contextual knowledge in organizational 
memory 
 
The discussions above mean that to enhance the storing of intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge and in particular knowledge of rules’ context and functions appears to be very 
important in the future. In the following I will outline a few possible solutions that can be 
derived from the study and theory. 
 
First of all, the results revealed that the organizing of the cases influenced the possibility 
to retrieve available knowledge and the contribution of the work to the distribution of 
both retrieved and evolving knowledge. With respect to participation, the inclusion of 
people directly involved in the work and the organizing for communication between these 
and others influenced both what knowledge became included in the work and how it 
became distributed. Strong links to the rules’ context made it easier to include intuitively-
contextual railway knowledge in the work. Furthermore, the interaction and continuity of 
the work both within a particular modification process and between different rule 
modification processes influenced the possibility to transfer such knowledge from one 
task to another and between different modification processes. 
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Second, the discussions of SAMRAIL revealed that there are already ongoing discussions 
in European railways about establishing learning agencies to further the development of 
organizational knowledge and it’s storing in organizational memory (European 
Commission, 2004a). The organization of rule modifications can either be given the 
status as a learning agency or be linked to such agencies.  
 
Third, the results revealed that there are existing communities of practice within the 
Norwegian railway system that can be stimulated such as Wenger (1998) has discussed. 
Furthermore, there might also be a potential for establishing useful communities of 
practice within the system, such as revealed in the Dutch railways ((European 
Commission, 2004a). 
   
8.4.3 Reverse invention revisited 
 
The discussions of this section and the previous one gives associations to the processes of 
reverse invention discussed in the previous two Chapters.  First, the two stages of 
exploration and evaluation of the rationalistic ideals of the hierarchical and risk based 
approaches initiated inquiries into railway knowledge. Retrieved knowledge was 
discussed. Through these activities the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge became more explicit and collective, and knowledge from different sources 
became combined, i.e. the knowledge was revived.  
 
Second, the stage where the rationalistic ideals were left and conclusions were adapted to 
railway knowledge, functioned as a validation of the railway knowledge. Through the 
validation this knowledge achieved increased trust.  
 
Third, in the stage where the work built upon validated railway knowledge; this 
knowledge became reduced to knowledge that fitted into the frameworks of the chosen 
rule solutions and risk analyses. Selections of knowledge became decoded into the 
written texts of the rules and the risk analyses. Accordingly, railway knowledge became 
reduced into more rationalistic forms. This process might endanger the revived 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge in the future.  
 
The development is illustrated in Figure 8.1 below.  
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Figure 8.1 The influence from the process of reverse invention upon railway 
knowledge. 
 
In Figure 8.1 the circles demonstrate the stages of the process. Their overlap illustrates 
that there were overlap between the stages. The arrows from the stages of reverse 
invention towards the process of revival and reduction of knowledge indicate the 
direction of influence. The arrow from left to right demonstrates the direction of 
development for the two processes.   
 
8.4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The revival of the predominantly intuitively contextual railway knowledge that the cases 
demonstrated made this knowledge more explicit and distributed. Accordingly it became 
better stored in the organizational memory of the Norwegian railway system.  
 
Knowledge that fit into the frameworks of chosen rule solutions and the risk analytic 
methods and selections of knowledge of principle interest became encoded into written 
texts. The written texts became systematically stored in databases and electronic archives. 
This development strengthens the position of rationalistic knowledge. Theory gives 
support to a strengthening of rationalistic knowledge elements when an organizational 
system undergoes changes (Baumard, 1999; Ellström, 2001b; Perby, 1995; Zuboff, 1988).  
 
However, the organizational structures for storing unwritten revived knowledge and in 
particular the intuitively-contextual dimensions of this knowledge are unsystematic and 
vulnerable. Due to the organization of the cases, much of the revived knowledge became 
spread around in the Norwegian railway system when the work was finished in a way that 
might make it difficult to keep track of it for later retrieval. This was particularly evident 
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in the cases where engaged people did the majority of the work. Accordingly, revived 
intuitively knowledge is endangered. Ongoing changes of the Norway railway system and 
increased emphasis upon rationalistic knowledge strengthen the vulnerability of this 
knowledge.  
 
According to theory, intuitively-contextual knowledge is necessary for decoding written 
texts (Stein, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Baumard, 1999). This knowledge is also 
considered to be important for safety work (Perrow, 1984/1999; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; 
Jaeger et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 
2000). This implies that if this knowledge is not stored in organizational memory by 
means other than written texts, it might be negative for the ability to decode rules and to 
retrieve revived knowledge for later use.  The chapter provides some examples of how 
such a negative development can be counteracted. These are first to carefully organize 
future rule modification processes with emphasis upon knowledge retrieval, transfer and 
distribution, second, to give the organizations for rule modifications a status as learning 
agencies or to link them to such one(s) and third, to stimulate existing and potential 
communities of practice.  
 
8.5 Conclusions to influence upon railway knowledge 
 
8.5.1 Main conclusions 
 
The introduction of the hierarchical and risk-based approaches created a new situation for 
rule modifications in the Norwegian railway system. This activated different perspectives 
of rationality and knowledge and revived railway knowledge.  
 
This happened because the new approaches functioned as an incitement to inquiries into 
the predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge. This knowledge was 
distributed in the system in a more or less explicit and collective form. Through the 
inquiries and following discussions the railway knowledge that received attention was 
articulated and made more collective. Furthermore, knowledge from different sources 
was combined. When railway knowledge got support from the new approaches or 
survived a conflict with them, it was seen as a validation. Hence the trust in this 
knowledge increased. The cases provided contradictory information about whether these 
processes produced knowledge that was really new for the system. 
 
However, the richness of this revived knowledge became reduced through the processes. 
Its relevance for safety and for the new approaches was discussed and knowledge sorted 
out. Knowledge that became included was systematized according to disagreements 
between conclusions of the new approaches and railway knowledge, the frameworks of 
chosen rule solutions and the chosen risk analytic methods. Some knowledge was 
encoded into the written texts of rules, risk analyses and agenda papers and minutes from 
meetings. This means that the knowledge became removed from human action, i.e. 
contextual and relational elements of the knowledge were removed. Accordingly, the 
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predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge was reduced into a more 
rationalistic theoretical form.  
 
The organizational structures for storing unwritten revived knowledge and in particular 
the intuitively-contextual dimensions of this knowledge are unsystematic and vulnerable. 
Accordingly, revived knowledge is endangered. According to theory, intuitively-
contextual knowledge is necessary for decoding written texts (Baumard, 1999; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Stein, 1995). This knowledge is also considered to be important for 
safety work (Jaeger et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Perrow, 1999; Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). This implies that if this 
knowledge is not stored in the organizational memory by other means than written texts, 
it might be negative for the ability to decode rules and to retrieve revived knowledge for 
later use.   
 
Referring to the framework for the study demonstrated in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3, these 
consequences of the new approaches upon railway knowledge are visualized in Figure 8.2.  
Rule and knowledge tradition of the Norwegian railway system 
Hierarchical approach Risk-based approach 
Reverse invention Reverse invention 
Processes influencing railway 
knowledge: 
 
Direction of attention 
 
Revival of railway knowledge 
 
Reduction of revived railway 
knowledge into rationalistic forms 
New railway 
knowledge? 
Revived railway 
knowledge 
Endangered railway 
knowledge? 
Main direction of influence
 
Figure 8.2    The influence of new requirements upon railway knowledge  
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The boxes in Figure 8.2 demonstrate the main concepts discussed in the study. The 
arrows of the figure illustrate the directions of influences and interactions between the 
concepts in the studied modification processes. The arrows from the rule- and knowledge 
tradition towards the hierarchical and risk based approaches demonstrate that the 
hypothesis that this fundament would influence the implementation of the two approaches 
was supported. The two-ways directed arrow between the hierarchical and risk based 
approaches illustrated that the hypothesis that these approaches interacted was supported. 
The arrows from the two approaches towards the box of processes influencing railway 
knowledge illustrates that also the hypothesis that these approaches influenced railway 
knowledge was supported. The arrows from the box of the processes to the boxes of the 
impacts upon railway knowledge illustrate that the processes gave different results for the 
railway knowledge. However, the figure is a simplification of the real processes. As the 
results and discussions demonstrated, the influence upon railway knowledge had a more 
iterative character.  
 
Finally, the chapter provides some examples of how the problem of endangered 
knowledge can be counteracted. One example is to carefully organize future rule 
modification processes, another to give the organizations for rule modifications a status 
as learning agencies or to link them to one or some and a third is to stimulate existing and 
potential communities of practice. However, these examples are outlines that need to be 
elaborated.  
 
8.5.2 The theoretical problems  
 
The conclusions of the revealed problems are:  
 
 
1. What knowledge base to apply as decision support?  
 
The introduction of rationalistic hierarchical and risk-based approaches influenced the 
direction of attention in the modification processes. Furthermore, they increased the 
diversity of represented perspectives upon rationality and knowledge. The pre-existing 
rule- and identity based rationality and predominantly intuitively-contextual railway 
knowledge dominated the work. This gave continuity to the rule development and made it 
possible to build upon existing railway knowledge. To combine perspectives of 
rationality and knowledge is supported by theory upon risk and safety (See for instance 
Jaeger et al. 2001; Perrow, 1999; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). 
 
2. Did increased emphasis upon the rationalistic knowledge perspective change the 
predominantly intuitively-contextual railway knowledge? 
 
The hierarchical and risk-based approaches created processes where predominantly 
intuitively-contextual railway knowledge became revived, combined and transformed 
into more collective and explicit forms. Retrieval of knowledge was greatly dependent 
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upon the competency of those directly involved in the modification work and their 
network(s). It remains a question how collective the revived knowledge became. It also 
remains a question whether the new approaches led to actually new railway knowledge.  
 
The transfer of railway knowledge into the more explicit and collective form implies that 
it was changed into a more rationalistic form. Parts of the revived knowledge became 
encoded into written texts.  
 
3. How did railway knowledge become stored in organizational memory?  
 
Encoded written information derived from railway knowledge and that fits into the 
frameworks of chosen rule solutions and risk analyses or were of principle interest is 
most systematically stored in organizational memory. The existing structures for storing 
intuitively-contextual knowledge are unsystematic. Unwritten knowledge and in 
particular the intuitively-contextual railway knowledge is therefore very vulnerable. 
However all cases saw the need for improving this. Theory underlines the importance of 
intuitively-contextual knowledge for decoding written information (Baumard, 1999; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Stein, 1995). This knowledge is also seen as important for 
safety (Jaeger et al., 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Perrow, 1999; Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). 
 
8.5.3 Needs for further research 
 
The overview reveals that the study leaves some questions for further research:  
 
First, the processes both included and excluded knowledge. The importance of excluded 
knowledge for the safety work remains a question. If important, it is vital to study what 
happens with excluded knowledge.  
 
Second, the study demonstrates that the intuitively-contextual railway knowledge that 
played an important role in the modification processes, and that theory finds important 
for decoding of stored written information, is endangered. It is therefore interesting to 
study if this knowledge becomes stored in the organizational memory and if it is possible 
to retrieve it in future modification processes.  
 
Third, a few solutions for storing intuitively-contextual railway knowledge in 
organizational memory are outlined. These should be elaborated. 
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PART III: MAIN CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE AND RESEARCH  
 
The three previous Chapters have answered the sub-questions of this study. In this Part of 
the study the main conclusion is drawn and implications of the results for safety rule 
modifications are discussed. Finally, the results are linked to theory and suggestions for 
further research are provided.  
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9 Main conclusion and implications  
 
9.1 Main conclusion: Reverse invention and revival of knowledge 
 
The four studied modification processes abandoned the intentions of hierarchical and 
risk-based approaches; they did not develop outcome-oriented rules on the background of 
risk analyses and did not derive prescriptive rules from such rules. Furthermore, the 
hierarchy of rule solutions were not linked to the positions of rule-imposers in the 
organizational hierarchy such as expected.  
 
The main reason was that the new approaches did not take existing railway knowledge, 
that had been found to be important for safe performance, sufficiently into account. 
Instead, the modification work of all cases turned into processes that are given the name 
“reverse invention” in the study. Here existing railway knowledge and prescriptive rules 
were used as a fundament for the work. Accordingly, existing knowledge was brought 
forth.  
 
The risk analyses supplemented railway knowledge. The four cases integrated the risk 
analyses in the modification processes in four different ways (See Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 
7.4 in Chapter 7). This gave the analyses different functions in the rule development. The 
evolving work was evaluated with railway knowledge as a reference and brought in 
accordance with this knowledge.  
 
The cases favored solutions that took advantage of different perspectives upon rationality 
and knowledge. However, existing railway knowledge, including existing prescriptive 
rules, appeared remarkably persistent compared to the expectations for the work. 
Furthermore, the modification processes contained mechanisms that validated this 
knowledge.  
 
The new approaches and the processes of reverse invention raised questions that initiated 
inquiries into railway knowledge. These inquiries revived this knowledge. It remained 
uncertain whether the potential of inquires for organizational learning resulted in actual 
new knowledge.  
 
However, the rationalistic ideals of new approaches stimulated a reduction of the revived 
railway knowledge into more rationalistic theoretical forms, i.e. relational and contextual 
elements were removed. Theory argues that the latter knowledge is important for the 
ability to decode theoretical knowledge for future use and to judge its relevance (Stein, 
1995; Baumard, 1999; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The benefit of revived knowledge 
might therefore be lost in the future. The study outlines some solutions for counteracting 
such a negative development.  
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9.2 Implications for rule modifications 
 
The purpose of the thesis has been to contribute to better safety rules through the 
development of new insights into rule modification processes. It is therefore natural to 
follow up the conclusions of the different parts of the study with reflections upon their 
practical implications. However, due to limitations of the study, the relevance of the 
lessons learned must be carefully judged before applying them to other contexts. 
 
9.2.1 A bottom-up strategy for rule development  
 
The projects revealed that requirements of higher order, outcome-oriented rules in a 
system with a prescriptive rule tradition can be met with an inductive bottom-up approach 
to rule development. In this strategy the existing railway knowledge and prescriptive 
rules are used as fundament for the rule development, both when the chosen rule solution 
is outcome-oriented and when it is prescriptive. This strategy contradicts the deductive 
top-down strategy that was the major incitement to the work.  
 
The bottom-up strategy in a prescriptive rule tradition gives an opportunity to transfer the 
existing tradition and rules with associated knowledge into new rule modifications and 
higher order, outcome-oriented rules. This prevents that the old tradition and knowledge 
is abandoned, as it would have been if the rationalistic principles of the top-down 
approach had been followed, i.e. the work does not have to start from scratch.  
 
However, when the knowledge is transferred into higher order, outcome-oriented rules, 
this changes the attention from what to do towards what to achieve. The study revealed 
that knowledge of both might be important for safe performance. Hence, when outcome-
oriented rules are introduced, steps should be taken to ensure that knowledge of what to 
do is also safeguarded. An example of possible means might be context related training 
with social interaction supported by written guidelines for the rule-followers.  
 
Furthermore, the study revealed that to be able to judge the relevance of railway 
knowledge including the safety rules, it is important to have access to knowledge of the 
rules’ context. In other words, it is important that such knowledge is stored in 
organizational memory and that the development of the context is followed closely. The 
framework of outcome-oriented rules reduces the attention to such knowledge in the rule 
texts compared to prescriptive rules.  
 
9.2.2 Risk analyses as supplement: Risk informed rule modifications 
 
The projects revealed that the risk analyses could be applied very differently in 
modification processes. In the four different applications that the cases demonstrated, the 
risk analyses had a function as supplement to existing railway knowledge instead of a 
function that replaced this knowledge. In other words, the requirement to apply risk 
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analyses in safety rule modifications were given the content of “risk informed” and that is 
applied elsewhere (Apostolakis & Vesely, 1999; Chapman & Dimitrijevic, 1999)  
 
The different applications of the risk analyses revealed that risk analyses could serve 
different functions: First, they can contribute as decision support. That is to say to 
provide information for use in decision processes. In the studied processes the analyses 
had this function when they were carried out before or during the rule development. One 
case developed a method for the interaction between risk analyses and rule development 
as an iterative process. Here the risk analyses gave information to the rule development 
and vice versa. Second, they can be used to raise questions and explore issues of concern, 
in other words as a means to ensure the quality of evolving rules and in particular to 
reveal whether the rule changes generate new risks. Third, they can be used to validate 
existing or new rules and railway knowledge.  
 
The risk analyses selected, systematized and reduced railway knowledge into the written 
texts in the schema of the chosen analytic method. This demonstrates how risk analyses 
can contribute to a documentation of selected railway knowledge. However, this process 
also implied that contextual and relational elements of the selected knowledge were 
reduced. Theory underlines the importance of such knowledge to be able to decode 
written texts for application in later situations (Stein, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Baumard, 1999). 
 
The use of top events as the starting point for the analyses makes the risk analyses rather 
experience-based. When such methods are applied under changing conditions the 
relevance of the top events for the actual situation should be questioned. Again, updated 
contextual knowledge is required. It is also important to anticipate if the changes have 
created conditions for new top events.  
 
9.2.3 The importance of confidence for the impact of the new approaches 
 
The projects demonstrated that the impact of the new approaches was dependent upon the 
participants’ confidence in their ability to cover risks that they considered important on 
the basis of railway knowledge.   
 
With respect to the outcome-oriented rule solutions, the confidence was dependent upon 
the expected ability of the rules to control risk under the actual conditions, i.e. their 
ability to serve their major function. Major concerns appeared to be conditions for 
feedback and requirements for coordination associated with a tightly coupled system, 
severity of potential accidents, characteristics of rule-followers and context for 
implementation of modified rules. When the outcome-oriented rules were not considered 
capable enough to control known risk, they were either replaced or supplemented with 
the traditional prescriptive rule solution. This is supported in theory; experimentation 
with different solutions should be performed under conditions where erroneous decisions 
will not cause accidents (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
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The projects provided examples where detailed prescriptive rules were preferred to 
compensate for reduced trust in rule-followers’ railway competency and weakened 
conditions for peer review. However, even though rules can have a function in 
organizational memory, theory discusses that this knowledge form has its limitations 
because the rules represent codified knowledge (Stein, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Baumard, 1999). To be useful, the same theory argue that such knowledge must be 
decoded, i.e. a process that requires knowledge of the rules’ context and social interaction. 
 
With respect to the risk analysis results, the projects demonstrated that the confidence in 
these were dependent upon a judgment of their ability to cover known risks, including 
complex underlying mechanisms for potential accidents. Weaknesses in the risk analytic 
methods are widely recognized in the scientific literature (see for instance Schrader-
Frechette, 1991; Klinke & Renn, 2001; Aven, 2003; Rausand & Øien, 2004). It is 
therefore reasonable and recommended to critically judge the risk analysis results. 
 
Three factors appeared to be particularly important for the confidence in the risk analysis 
results: First the competency of the risk analyzers, second the experienced suitability of 
scope and preconditions for the analyses and third, the experience of the appropriateness 
of the chosen risk analytic method for the actual risk problems and conditions. These 
factors underline the importance of the initial phase when risk analyses are introduced to 
modification processes.  
 
9.2.4 The cautious strategy in a dynamic context 
 
One can say that the importance of trust discussed above created a cautious pattern in the 
cases and with good reason.  
 
However, there is a danger that the strong influence from the participants’ railway 
knowledge might bias the work. The projects were aware of this and took steps to 
counteract this danger. These steps provide examples of how bias can be prevented. Most 
of the steps were based upon feedback processes that either included people considered to 
be up-to-date railway experts or experienced rule-followers who had not been involved in 
the processes. However, one problem might be that because these trusted people held 
much of the same background, this might result in “group think” as they did not represent 
completely “fresh eyes” (Janis, 1982a; Janis, 1982b). 
 
As already touched upon, the relevance of old knowledge and rules based on this 
knowledge must be judged when a system undergoes rapid change. In particular the study 
demonstrated two important issues. First, the cases provided examples where the 
knowledge of the context and the intended function of existing rules are no longer 
available or even lost. This makes it difficult to judge their relevance. This underlines the 
importance of taking good care of such knowledge in organizational memory.  
 
Second, to make sure that the rules are on pace with the development of the rules’ context 
when conditions are changing, the question of their relevance requires concerns and 
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organizing. Theory suggests that special attention should be given to the possibilities for 
the closing of the learning loops and the conditions for both single and double loop 
learning (European Commission, 2004a and 2004b; Argyris & Schön, 1996; Kjellén, 
2000). This implies that there must be communication between the rule-imposer and the 
rule-follower and the rule-imposer must have access to knowledge about the development 
of the rules’ context. The need for regularity and systematizing of judgments of relevance 
should be considered, especially when the situation is very dynamic.  
 
9.2.5 Ambitions of change and dependency of other processes 
 
The projects demonstrated how the potential for wanted changes in safety rules or 
alternative preventive means might be dependent upon other developmental processes in 
the system. Special attention was given to the development of technology and rule-
followers’ knowledge base. In addition, inherent requirements of the new solutions to 
changes in rule-followers’ competency, combined with constraints upon the 
implementation processes were taken into consideration.  
 
Therefore the ambitions of changes in safety rules should take other ongoing processes 
into consideration. In particular, the study underlines the importance of processes 
associated with the opportunities and constraints related to the actual conditions, the rule-
followers’ characteristics and the implementation phase.  
 
If changes in rule principles are really requested and the actual rule solutions do not suit 
the actual conditions, steps should first be taken to change these conditions. Hence, to 
achieve a requested rule development, modification work should be coordinated with 
other ongoing processes that influence the potential for safe changes. If not, the chosen 
rule solution might be incompatible with safe performance.  
 
9.2.6 The potential for reviving, developing and endangering knowledge 
 
The projects revealed that the introduction of hierarchical and risk-based approaches 
represent a potential for interactions between knowledge traditions dominated by 
different knowledge forms.  Interaction between different knowledge forms can create 
organizational knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Baumard, 1999). Furthermore, the 
meeting between traditions triggered off inquiries into railway knowledge that led to a 
revival of railway knowledge and combinations of knowledge from different sources. 
This demonstrates that the introduction of new approaches can create arenas for 
organizational learning and serve a function in organizational memory.  
 
However, the projects also showed that the new approaches influenced the attention of 
the modification work, the status of the former safety rules and associated knowledge. 
The contextual and relational elements of the knowledge and that are important for the 
ability to decode the content of the abstract formulations in the written texts of the rules 
were weakened. This might endanger the ability of rule-followers to use the rules as 
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intended. Therefore, implementation of new approaches requires attention to the potential 
for such negative consequences. In particular, the theories of Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) 
and Baumard (1999) underline the importance of attention to tacit knowledge. 
 
In addition, the projects demonstrated the importance of organizing and participation in 
modification processes for knowledge. The reason was that the organizing of the work 
created the conditions for involvement of participants, their interactions and the 
interaction between different tasks. Accordingly, the organizing influences the inclusion 
of knowledge in the modification processes, the opportunities for feedback during the 
processes and how much the knowledge becomes articulated and exchanged and hence 
shared.  
 
Due to the limited generic knowledge about how to perform safety rule modifications and 
to prepare for future rule modification process, the experience and knowledge acquired 
from rule modifications should be taken care of in a systematic way. This is also 
important to ensure continuity in the management of safety rules.  
 
9.3 Links to theory and needs for further research 
 
The study has just followed the rule modification processes of two projects within the 
Norwegian railway system. Hence, the study has only managed to look into some aspects 
of safety rule modifications and only in one particular context. Accordingly, there is still 
a need for more research upon safety rule modification.  
 
9.3.1 Reverse invention 
 
First of all, the cases revealed the strategy of reverse invention as solution to the 
hierarchical and risk-based approaches. It would be interesting to follow up this finding. 
One reason is that this strategy contradicts the rationalistic ideals of the new approaches. 
Another reason is that the new approaches are increasingly required. A third reason is that 
almost no organizations start their rule development from scratch. Therefore, it is 
interesting to make comparative studies to find out how widely this strategy is used. 
Furthermore, it is also interesting to perform evaluative studies to find advantages and 
disadvantages of the strategy. In addition, it is interesting to make comparative studies to 
see if there exist alternative strategies to the reverse invention.  
 
In spite of a common strategy of reverse invention, the cases revealed that the inclusion 
of risk analyses in the modification processes could be done in different ways that give 
different roles and functions to the analyses. One case even wrote their method, see 
Appendix F. To improve knowledge about risk informed safety rule modifications, the 
contributions and efficiency of the different applications and functions of the risk 
analyses for the quality of the rules should be explored and evaluated. Furthermore, a 
follow-up study to see how the experiences with the methods are incorporated in later 
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modification practices might give useful information about their usability for other 
contexts.  
 
9.3.2 Appropriateness of rule solutions 
 
The cases demonstrated concerns for the appropriateness for the rule solutions for the 
actual situation and the rule-followers. This finding calls for more research. One issue of 
interest is the importance that these concerns were given compared to concerns for 
appropriateness for the rule-imposer. There should be  comparative studies performed to 
elaborate whether the dominance of the concerns for the actual situation and the rule-
followers represents a more general pattern. Furthermore, the importance of the 
appropriateness for the rule-imposer for safety should be elaborated upon. This will 
require explorative and evaluative studies.  
 
Another and associated issue is that the concerns for the suitability of rule solutions for 
the actual situation imply that to decide upon rule solutions, the rule-imposer must 
possess a rather extensive knowledge of the actual activities and the rule-followers. 
Furthermore, some interviewees explained that they had to go into details to understand 
what the outcome-oriented rule had to be. This contradicts the argument that higher order 
rule solutions reduce the requirement to rule-imposers’ knowledge of the rules’ context 
(Hale, 1990). Hence, further research is required to nuance the requirements to rule-
imposers’ competency. This also raises the question of possible means for the rule-
imposer to achieve knowledge of rules’ context as discussed by Reason (1997).  
 
A third issue is whether the arguments that the participants gave for appropriateness of 
different solutions functions in practice. The theory regarding which rule solutions fit in 
with which conditions is not completely clear. Therefore, when implemented for some 
time, it would be useful to follow-up the efficiency of the rule solutions to fulfill their 
intentions with evaluative studies.  
 
A fourth issue that has links to the one above is the interaction between rule development 
and other developmental processes in the actual situation. As one case pointed out, a 
common strategy for technical development and rule development, instead of performing 
rule development as isolated phenomena, could have opened for alternative rule solutions 
or reduced the need for rules. Furthermore, as both theory and the cases demonstrated, the 
need for rules and if needed, the suitability of different types of rules, are also associated 
with the rule-followers’ competency (Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997). Concerns for the 
amount of rules found both in theory (see for instance Hale, 1990; Reason, 1997; 
Rasmussen, 1997) and in the railway system (see Chapter 2) make it interesting to 
explore possible solutions for more coordinated developmental strategies, i.e. strategies 
that change the situation or the competency of the rule-followers so that rules, and in 
particular detailed prescriptive rules become less necessary. 
 
Fifth, both theory and the study demonstrated the importance of evaluating the relevance 
of rules in dynamic context (Rasmussen, 1997; Hale et al, 2003; European Commission, 
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2004b). This makes it important to explore methods for such evaluations. The study 
revealed that to be able to evaluate the relevance of rules in such contexts it is necessary 
to know the context that the rules were associated with when they were developed and 
their intended function. This also demonstrates that it is important to explore means to 
store knowledge of the rules’ context and intended function.  
 
9.3.3 Railway knowledge and knowledge of safety rule modifications 
 
The new approaches initiated inquiries and directed attention that revived railway 
knowledge. However, the study has revealed two issues that need to be elaborated. First, 
there were dangers of bias in the modification processes. Together this points to the 
danger that possible risks might be overlooked. With reference to Reason’s theory of 
latent conditions or pathogens and Turner’s discussions of incubation of disasters it is 
therefore of interest to follow the implementation of the rules and evaluate their 
efficiency (Reason, 1997; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The efficiency should be evaluated 
with the purpose to reveal if potential risks are overlooked.   
 
Second, the study has concluded that the modification work should take advantage of 
both rationalistic and intuitively-contextual knowledge, but that the latter might be 
endangered. One important reason was that this knowledge was not systematically 
incorporated in organizational memory. This reveals different topics that should be 
explored. First, it is important to explore methods for safety rule modifications that 
include both intuitively-contextual and rationalistic knowledge in the work. Second, an 
associated topic is to evaluate what really happens with this knowledge in the long run 
and how available does it become for future modification processes. Third, it is important 
to explore methods for storing knowledge in organizational memory.  
 
In particular, theory directs attention towards challenges associated with storing of 
intuitively-contextual knowledge and in particular the tacit elements (Baumard, 1999; 
Stein, 1995). Therefore, there is an urgent need to elaborate practical means to safeguard 
such knowledge in modification processes. The development of learning agencies and 
communities of practice, as discussed by SAMRAIL (European Commission, 2004a), 
might be of interest to explore. The ongoing changes within the Norwegian railway 
system discussed in Chapter 2 imply that methods to be explored should not be as 
dependent upon personal networks as the methods of the projects were. They must also 
be able to cope with the development of the system towards a more dynamic context.   
 
9.3.4 Rule-imposer’s position 
 
In the cases the question raised by Hale & Swuste (1998) and followed up by Hale & al. 
(2003) in their discussions about railways about who it best suited to have the role as 
rule-imposer was not an issue for the cases except for in two situations. One was when it 
was discussed if the rule solution fitted with the position of the rule-imposer in the 
organizational hierarchy of the Norwegian railway system. The other was when it was 
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discussed if the actual risk required that decisions about how to proceed safely, i.e. to 
translate goals about safe performance into action/state rules, could not be left to the rule-
followers themselves. These decisions were also linked up with the positions of the rule-
imposer in the system’s organizational hierarchy. 
 
Hale & Swuste (1998) discuss the position of the rule-imposer. However, in their 
discussion the position is linked to their position and function in an organization’s safety 
management system. They underlines that this position often, but not necessarily parallel 
the positions in the organizational hierarchies.  
 
As the study does not go deeply into the discussion about who the most suitable rule-
imposer is, the question of Hale & Swuste (1998) and Hale & al. (2003) calls for further 
research.  
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Appendix A: List of acronyms 
 
ATC   Automatic Train Control 
DG   Directorate-General 
EEA   European Economic Agreement 
EU   European Union 
FMECA   Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
HAZOP   Hazard an Operability Study  
HRO   High Reliability Organizations 
HUL analyses  Analyses judging if rule-changes had caused higher, unchanged or 
lower risk (HUL refers to the first letters of high, unchanged  and 
lower.) 
Inspectorate   Norwegian Railway Inspectorate 
ISO    International Organization for Standardization 
NCR   The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NSB    Norges Statsbaner (The former state owned Norwegian State 
Railways) 
NSB BA/   The new commercialized traffic operator originating from the  
NSB AS  former Norwegian State Railways called NSB BA and later NSB 
AS 
PDCA    Plan-Do-Check-Act 
PHA   Preliminary Hazard Analyses  
Rail Administration  Norwegian National Railway Administration 
RAMS   Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety  
RCM    Reliability Centered Maintenance 
RISIT   Risk and Safety in the Transport Sector 
SAMRAIL  A project directed at Safety Management in Railways under the 
Fifth Framework Programme. Financed by the European 
Commission 
TRJ 2003   Trafikk Regler for Jernbanen 2003 (In English: Traffic-rules for 
   Railways 2003).  
TSI   Technical Specifications for Interoperability  
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Appendix B: Presentation of author’s background  
 
My professional background and practice have links to safety rule management, 
educational systems and the Norwegian railway system.  
 
I am educated as a physiotherapist with a Master degree in preventive health care. 
Furthermore I have attended several courses in different aspects of safety management. 
These were mainly courses for chartered engineers and for the Ph.D. degree in 
engineering.  
 
My most important professional experiences are from occupational health services in 
companies with a variety of characteristics, the Norwegian Directorate of Labor 
Inspection and from the Physiotherapy education, teaching in the field of occupational 
health care.  
 
From 1998 until 2001 I worked in the Occupational health service of NSB BA. The 
department where I worked served all railway activities of both NSB BA and the Rail 
Administration in one geographical region. Furthermore, we cooperated with departments 
serving other geographical regions.  
 
This work gave me an extensive knowledge of the different activities of the Norwegian 
railway system and in particular those that were associated with ergonomic problems. 
Furthermore, it gave me a network of railway professionals at different levels in the 
system’s organizational hierarchy. It also functioned as an introduction to the different 
methods of communicating and cooperation within the system.  
 
In the Ph.D work I took advantage of my prior knowledge of the Norwegian railway 
system. First, it made me aware of the ongoing rule modification projects, how to 
approach them and achieve the necessary permissions for the study. Second, the 
knowledge of the different activities helped the communication with the railway 
professionals. I was familiar with the terminology and the subjects they were talking 
about. Third, as a former employee of the system I found that I was considered an insider 
by the interviewees.  I also got the impression that the role I had had as a health worker 
meant that I was considered to be a person with a certain degree of integrity.  
 
However, there might also be some dangers associated with the prior knowledge. First, 
there might easily occur a misunderstanding that I had understood more than I had 
because the interviewee and I built upon unconscious assumptions that we did not check 
out. This is why I found it particularly important to verify my preliminary analyses with 
the two project leaders.   
 
Second, an associated problem might be that both the interviewees and I were socialized 
into the railway culture. Therefore, I might have adopted many of the same attitudes as 
the interviewees. This might have made it difficult to be sufficiently critical of the 
information I received.  
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Third, because the interviewees knew I had a background as a health worker in the 
system, I sometimes realized that the interviewees had certain expectations about what I 
wanted them to tell me. When this happened, I repeated the purposes of the study and 
discussed my new role as a researcher of safety management more thoroughly.  
 
Fourth, as I had worked in one region of the Norwegian railway system, the use of my 
network and knowledge of the system to approach the field and potential sources for 
information might have influenced the data collection. However, many of the 
interviewees held central positions in the system and I only previously knew 5 of the 41 
people interviewed from before. 
 
Fifth, there are some geographical differences in the Norwegian railway system. As I had 
worked in one region I was most familiar with the characteristics and culture of this 
region. The region I knew was the most geographically distributed one. Furthermore, it 
did not include the lines with the highest traffic density.  
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Appendix C: Interview guide, a translated example 
 
1. Introduction: 
a. Thank you for participating in the study. I hope it will give something 
back, ref. the information about the purpose of the study.  
b. Any questions to the information about my work?  
What is the available time? I suggest starting with the questions I have 
prepared. They do not have to be followed strictly, I will be happy about 
comments, points of views, associations.  
c. I might ask questions that might appear obvious or that you expect me to 
know or where you expect me to have opinions. The reason is that I am 
interested in your points of view.  
d. The information that you give during the interview will be used in the 
study. However, direct quotations that can easily be linked to  individuals 
will be clarified with the actual people. I will also be careful about 
referring to what you say in my communication with others in the system.  
e. You still agree with the use of tape recorder?  
f. Do you want the transcription of the interview?  
 
2.  Background information 
a. Name? 
b. Age? 
c. Profession? 
d. For how long have you been working in NSB/the Rail Administration/the 
Inspectorate/the Educational system?  
e. Which functions have you had in NSB/the Rail Administration/the 
Inspectorate/the Educational system?  
f. Do you have other background/work experience that you think might have 
affected your work with rules?  
g. What was your organizational position when you were involved in the 
modification work? 
 
3.  Own role and perspectives 
a. What is your role in the work groups where you have participated?  
i. What have you considered to be your main task? 
b. How has it been to possess that role? 
i. Have you experienced conflicts between roles? 
ii. Have you had sufficient resources at your disposal to fill the 
role?  
c. What have been your major concerns during the work? 
d. How have you found working with safety issues in the organization?  
e. How do you define risk? 
f. How do you define safety?  
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4. The process of developing rules 
a. What do you think is the major reason for the decision to make rule 
modifications?  
b. Where did the most important inputs to the work come from?  
c. What role have the risk analyses had in the rule development?  
i. Who and how many people participated in the risk analytic 
work? 
ii. What have been the roles of the different participants? 
d. How would you describe the development of the work to change the rules? 
e. What do you think has served as important fundament for the work?  
f. What do you think has been important for the development of the work?  
i. For the process? 
ii. Other important aspects? 
g. What is you opinion about the results of the development?  
h. How have you found the work?  
i. What challenges have you met? 
j. How do you consider your own impact?  
k. How is the project developing compared to your expectations?  
 
5.  The choice of rules as solution 
a. Why did you decide upon rules as a solution?  
i. Do you think that it is necessary to have written rules for 
safety in the regulated area?  
ii. Have you discussed if there should have been other means 
than rules to achieve the purposes of safe traffic performance? 
If yes, which means?  
iii. Have you found that rules have had to compensate for lack of 
other means that would have been better for safety?  
b. How do you think rules can contribute to accident prevention?  
i. How do you think that the rules will work?  
c. What challenges do you associate with them?  
d. Do you think that the rule-followers will find the rules necessary and 
efficient for the purpose of safety?  
e. Do you think that the line management will consider the rules as necessary 
and efficient for the purpose of safety?  
f. How do you think the rules will function for the future development of the 
regulated area?  
i. Are there conditions in the development you think will 
influence the rules and their application?  
ii. Which ones? 
g. How would you describe a good rule? 
 
6. Chosen rule solution 
a. Why did you decide upon the rule solution?  
b. What is your opinion about the chosen rule solution? 
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c. What have been the main arguments for removing some of the existing 
rules?  
d. Have there been discussions of level of detail in the rules?  
i. If yes, what has been their content? 
e. Have there been discussions about user-friendliness?  
i. If yes, what has been their content?  
f. Have there been discussions about the form and the content of the rules 
compared to competency and understanding of risk and safety in the 
organization?  
i. If yes, what has been their content?  
g. Do you think the form of the rules can influence the ability of the 
organization to learn?  
h. Have there been discussions about geographical differences of 
geographical environment, climate and the railway system?  
 
7. The relationship to old rules 
a. What do you consider to be the most important changes in the rules?  
b. Why were these changes made? 
c. Who/What has provided the most important input for these changes? 
d. Has there been input to changes that has not been emphasized? 
e. Have there been discussions about how extensive the changes can be?  
 
8.  The relationship to other participants  
a. Who do you think have been the main contributors to the rule 
development? 
i. What has been their contribution? 
b. Are there actors you think should have been/have been more included in 
the developmental work?  
i. If yes, what do you think their contribution would have been?  
c. In general, who do you think are the most important contributors of 
knowledge to the accident preventive work?  
i. What were their contributions?  
ii. Are there other groups that should participate in this work?  
 
9.  Rule-followers 
a. Who do you consider to be the most important rule-followers and users of 
the rules?  
b. What knowledge do you find important that the rule-followers possess?  
c. What do you find are the rules’ contribution to them?  
d. Do you think that the rules are directed at the right group of rule-followers? 
e. What opportunities do you think the rule-followers have to influence the 
rule development?  
i. Do you think it is important that the rule-followers  have 
influence?   
f. What possibilities do you think the rule-followers will have to influence 
the work in later phases?  
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10. Hearings  
a. Do you think that the hearings have involving the right people?  
(If there have been any hearings or approval processes) 
b. What do you think of the plans for later hearings? 
c. Are there other processes that have influenced the rule development? 
 
11.  Education 
a. How would you describe the education of the rule-followers?  
b. How is the interaction between theory and practice organized?  
c. How do you think future education should be?  
d. Do you think that the chosen rule solution should influence future 
educational programs?  
e. Do you think the rule changes should be followed by educational means? 
i. If yes, do you see any problems associated with these means?   
 
12. Control of compliance 
a. Are there any plans for future control of compliance with the rules?   
b. How do you think compliance with the rules should be followed up?  
c. Do you think that the chosen rule solution will influence how control of 
compliance with the rules should be done? 
d. Do you think the choice of means for control will influence organizational 
learning?  
e. How do you think deviation from rules should be handled?  
f. Do you think there will be situations where the rules are not appropriate?  
g. If weaknesses of rules are revealed, where to give this information?  
h. How will you describe good rules?  
 
13.  Preparation for future modifications  
a. Has future needs for rule modifications been discussed?  
 
14. Closure 
a. Thank you 
b. May I come back later and ask more questions?  
c. To you have any feedbak to give me? 
i. About the interview? 
ii. About the project?  
 276
Appendix D: Reflections behind each group of questions  
 
The front page 
The front page did not contain questions; it was developed as a memo. It contained 
elements to be covered in the introduction to the interview. It was an aid to myself to 
ensure that the interviewees were taken well care of and all formalities were clarified. 
 
Background information of the interviewee  
The interviewees were asked about their age, educational background and work 
experience, current position in the organization and other information that they thought 
might influence their work and points of view. These questions were prepared from the 
expectation that this might influence their answers to the following questions.  
 
Role and perspectives related to the rule modification and/or the safety work 
The research questions had a very open form. This was done in the belief that different 
roles and perspectives might increase the understanding of the modification process and 
its outcome. To get a better understanding of the interviewee’s answers and the rationales 
behind them, it was necessary to ask about their perspectives on risk, safety and safety 
rules and their role in rule modification. It appeared that the questions of perspectives had 
to be asked in an indirect way, because many of the interviewees found it difficult to 
answer the questions directly and some felt as if it was an examination.  
 
Knowledge about the actual or former rule modification processes 
In this section the interviewees were asked about their knowledge about the background 
for the actual rule modification process, its development and influencing factors and their 
own experience as participants. This section was very important for the development of a 
picture of the whole modification process. The questions were therefore asked to all the 
interviewees that had been directly involved in the process. Because some had been 
involved in former rule modification processes, they were also asked about these. This 
was done because I thought that their experiences might have influenced their attitudes to 
the ongoing rule modification.  
 
Attitudes towards the choice of rules as solution for the actual safety issues 
Here the interviewees were asked about their knowledge of the rationales behind the 
choice of rules as means for control of the actual risk and their expected role in the 
preventive work. They were also asked about their own and others’ attitudes towards 
rules in the preventive work. These questions were developed to get an impression of the 
role of the rules and the attitudes towards other possible solutions for risk control. I 
thought that different actors might have different points of view according to their 
different roles and that these points of view might influence the process and the choice of 
rule approach. The interviewees were also asked about potential challenges to the rules. 
This was partly done to reveal issues at stake for the future implementation, control and 
possible need for modification of the rules. At the end they were asked to describe 
“good” rules to see if there were many diverging attitudes. The questions of this section 
were used a lot in the interviews. 
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Chosen rule solution 
The section invited the interviewees to talk about the rationale behind the chosen rule 
solutions and eventually the removal of former rules, their attitudes towards the new rules, 
the usability of the rules regarding the needs of the rule-followers, their detail level, 
different geographical conditions and their relation to the knowledge tradition and the 
organization’s ability to learn. These issues were of interest to get information for the 
research questions related to the rationales behind the rules and how the new rules would 
be met and function.  
 
The relationship between the new and the former rule solutions 
This section was meant as a follow-up question for the former section. The purpose was 
to clarify what the interviewee considered as the most important changes of the rules. I 
hoped that this would show both what the system considered as the most important 
breaks with the former rule tradition and also indicate where the projects might face 
challenges and needs for education in the implementation phase. These questions were 
considered to indicate follow-up questions related to the rationale behind the changes.  
 
Evaluation of the contribution of others in the rule modification processes  
Here the interviewees were asked about who they considered to be the main contributors 
of the projects and what their contribution was.  They were also asked about who they 
considered to be the most important contributors with knowledge to the general safety 
work. This was done to get input to the research questions both related to the 
development of the processes and the chosen rule solutions. These questions were used a 
lot.  
 
The relationship between the target group and the rules 
This section directed attention towards the potential rule-followers. What interested me 
was who they were considered to be and how their needs for rules were considered. 
Whether the interviewee considered the potential rule-followers to be the right target 
group for the control of potential risk related to the activities at stake was of interest. The 
opportunities for the rule-followers to influence the process were also covered. I thought 
that the definition of the rule-followers and their needs was an important issue for the 
content and form of the rules and who were invited to influence the process. Further I 
thought it might be an important issue for the understanding of the role of the rules in the 
safety work. The questions of this section were frequently asked.  
 
Hearing of the rules  
Since the projects were ongoing, the interviewees were asked both about what 
involvement and hearing processes had been in the project and what plans there were. I 
though that the involvement in the development and approval of the rules might influence 
the process, the chosen rule approach and the future implementation and use of the rules. 
This section was frequently used as most of the interviewees had been in touch with the 
rule modification. However, the formal approval of the Traffic-rules was not carried out 
by the end of the data collection of this study.  
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Education and training related to the activities of the rules and expected challenges to 
the implementation phase 
This section focused on the educational background that the rule-followers had and the 
way this was organized. Furthermore, the interviewees were asked about the expected 
needs for education or training when the rules were about to be implemented and the 
practical possibilities for this. None of the projects had developed plans for this when the 
data collection finished. The intention was both to see if there was any relationship 
between the background of the rule-followers and the chosen rule solution and considered 
needs for education or training in the implementation phase. I also wanted to see how 
such education could be carried out. These questions were mainly used for the Traffic-
rule project since the professions involved in the regulated activities were educated 
within the railway system.   
 
Control of compliance with the existing rules, their quality and eventual plans for the 
future 
Even though the rule modifications were not finished, I wanted to know if there were any 
plans for future control of compliance with the rules or if the interviewees had any 
experience with former controls which could be useful to take into consideration. Further 
information about where knowledge about the efficiency of rules could be channeled was 
wanted. I thought that there might be a relationship between ideas of control, the 
development of the process and the chosen rule solution. I also thought that there might 
be some interesting ideas on the relationship between the control of rules, learning and 
rule modification. This question was frequently used, but with most response related to 
experience with the former rules.  
 
Expectations for and preparations of future rule modifications 
The interviewees were asked about their ideas about the needs for future modifications of 
the actual rules, eventually whether this was taken into consideration in the work and if 
so, how. This was done because it would be interesting to see if there were any planned-
for dynamics in the rule management and how this could be done.  
 
At the end I had another memo to be covered when rounding off the interview. 
In addition to thanking the interviewees, they were asked for the opportunity for further 
questions if needed and feedback on the interview. The purpose of the latter was to give a 
debriefing opportunity, to see if they had any more information related to the issues that 
was not covered in the interview and to learn about the guide and my performance as an 
interviewer. How deeply we went into these issues varied with their response.
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Appendix E: Analytic schema   
 
     Intentions  
for the cases
What 
happened in 
the cases? 
Why and 
with what 
conse-
quences? 
Comments 
Conse-
quences for 
knowledge 
1.Introduction 
Presentation of the rule 
projects 
    
1.1.The Norwegian Railway 
system and its rule tradition 
    
1.2.Area of regulation     
1.3.Purpose and background 
for the projects 
    
1.4.Organizing and 
organizational position  of the 
rule projects 
    
2. How are the processes of 
developing the rules run and 
why?  
    
2.1.The activities and sequences     
2.1.1.Information that are 
grounding the work:  
    
2.1.1.1.The existing learning 
and training programs/ 
Knowledge 
    
2.1.1.2.Input from evaluation 
and information about the 
existing situation and rules of 
the area 
    
2.1.1.3.Input from risk analyses     
2.1.1.4.Input from international 
development 
    
2.1.1.5.Input from other sources 
or groups 
    
2.1.2.Defining the process, 
scenarios  
    
2.1.3.Defining control principle     
2.1.4.Simplifying the rules     
2.1.5.Writing the rules where 
rules are considered necessary 
    
2.1.6.Combining the risk 
analyses and the rule writing  
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 Intentions  
for the cases
What 
happened in 
the cases? 
Why and 
with what 
conse-
quences? 
Comments 
Conse-
quences for 
knowledge 
2.1.7.Developing the database 
of the rules 
    
2.1.8.Testing the rule 
suggestions  
    
2.1.9.Transfer from the projects 
to the “owners” of the rules 
    
2.1.10.Approving the rules - 
The hearing processes  
    
2.1.11.Plans for promotion and 
training of the rules 
    
2.1.12.Plans for monitoring the 
use of the rules  
    
2.2. Progression and status of 
the work 
    
3. What are the underlying 
perspectives dominating the 
ongoing modification of safety 
rules?  
    
3.1.The main contributors to 
the development of the rules 
    
3.2.Underlying perspectives      
3.2.1.Risk and safety     
3.2.2.Rules and their role      
3.2.3.The rule-followers     
3.2.4.Other influencing 
perspectives 
    
3.2.5. Summary      
4. What are the chosen rule 
solutions?  
    
4.1.Rules or no rules?     
4.2.Type of rules     
4.2.1.Operative versus technical     
4.2.2.Goal-oriented versus 
prescriptive  
    
4.2.3.Structure of the rules     
4.3.Formalizaton of the rules 
(Organizational position of the 
rules) 
    
4.4.Developed systems to build 
on for future learning and 
adaptation of the rules 
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 Intentions  
for the cases
What 
happened in 
the cases? 
Why and 
with what 
conse-
quences? 
Comments 
Conse-
quences for 
knowledge 
4.4.1.Inherent in the projects     
4.4.2.Inherent in the chosen 
solution 
    
4.5.Knowledge modes of the 
safety rules 
    
4.6.Built- in features of the 
system that represents 
opportunities for org. learning 
of the quality of the rules 
    
5. Unclassified issues     
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Appendix F: The method of the Traffic rule case 
 
 
When the Traffic rule case, i.e. the TRJ 2003 project of the Norwegian National Railway 
Administration, were run for a couple of years, the work group described what became 
seen as the method of the case44. This was a summary of the experiences that had evolved 
until then and the plans for the further progression of the work. In this method the risk 
analyses and the rule development were organized as two parallel processes; risk analyses 
and rule development. These processes were divided into stages where the rule 
development interacted with the risk analyses.  
 
The main steps in the two parallel processes are as follows: 
 
The process for the development of the risk analyses: 
• Develop a risk analysis of the activities with top events as an outset, version 1 
• Hearing of the version 1 analysis and discussions with the involved professional 
groups 
• Correct the analysis, i.e. develop version 2 
• Based on version 2, develop risk analyses and analyses of the safety condition for 
sub-top events. These serve as foundation for changes from Draft A to Draft B of 
the rules (see below) 
• Perform change analyses for each sub-top events of the new rules 
• Upgrade the risk analyses version 2 to version 3 on the background of changes 
found during the analyses of the safety condition 
  
The process for rule development in combination with the risk analyses:  
• With the 1997 rules as an outset develop draft A based on the input of the general 
knowledge of the project group and the impressions from the work of the version 
1 risk analyzes. This version A keeps the same format and structure as the 1997 
rules. 
• Develop draft B based on draft A and the analyzes of the safety conditions of each 
sub top event, also in the same format as the 1997 rules 
• Hearing of draft B and a subsequent update of this draft  
• Based on the wishes from those involved and the requirement as to form for 
regulations, develop version C in the final format and organizing from the revised 
version B.  
• Develop plans for education of the new rules and related education material. 
 
The case also provided thorough descriptions of each step 
 
As the work proceeded it became more iterative than expected. The main explanation for 
this was the time pressure of the work. However, the work contained the elements of the 
described method.   
                                                 
44 Project log 689 
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